Abstract
This paper focuses on a running dispute between Werner Callebaut’s naturalistic view and Filip Kolen and Gertrudis Van de Vijver’s transcendentalist view on the nature of philosophy of biology and the relation of this discipline to biological sciences. It is argued that, despite differences in opinion, both positions agree that philosophy of biology’s ultimate goal is to ‘move’ biology or at least be ‘meaningful’ to it. In order to make this goal clear and effective, more is needed than a polarizing debate which hardly touches upon biology. Therefore, a redirection in discussion is suggested towards a reflection on the possibilities of incorporating philosophy in interdisciplinary research, and on finding concrete research questions which are of interest both to the philosopher and to the biologist.
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Notes
Callebaut’s criticism claiming that Van de Vijver et al.’s review article on complexity (2003)—dubbed the ‘VVV paper’ by Callebaut, with the second V standing for Van Speybroeck—omits certain research trajects is well-taken, even though our paper explicitly stated not to have the pretence to be exhaustive. If the referees and editor had pointed out major gaps or faults in the review, we would have been more than willing to take the advise seriously. Also, the VVV paper ‘exemplifies’ only part of the workings of the research group of Gertrudis Van de Vijver at Ghent University. For a more ‘naturalistic’ approach, I refer to my work on the conceptual history of epigenetics and its contemporary molecular form (cf. Van Speybroeck 2000; Van Speybroeck et al. 2002). During this research, there has been a close contact with molecular biologists and with the biological practice. This was translated in a lab experiment on epigenetic inheritance, which was conducted by a molecular biologist and myself. The experimental setup and its preliminary results were presented by the co-promotor of my doctoral thesis, Anna Depicker (Molecular Genetics at Ghent University), at the 2001 interdisciplinary conference on epigenetics (Het Pand, Ghent). I initiated and organized this conference in cooperation with Gertrudis Van de Vijver, Dani De Waele and Denis Thieffry (UMarseille). It gave the floor to top experts in epigenetics and to philosophers of biology. Both parties were explicitly asked to take distance from too strict jargons and to find common themes of discussion in order to explore the possibility of a dialogue between philosophers and biologists (cf. Jablonka et al. 2002; Van Speybroeck 2002). This particular setup was attributed a pioneer’s role in the workshop on ‘Epigenetics: Historical and Conceptual Perspectives’ (9–11 February 2006, Berlin), organized by the Zentrum für Literaturforschung (i.c.w. Eva Jablonka and Ohad Parnes).
Also academic philosophers now and then ‘literally’ breed, which explains my physical absence at our Department for a couple of months, after which time pressure hindered our initial planning to co-write a Letter to the Editor. This very time pressure also explains that this letter contains ‘embryonic’ thoughts, as suggested in the title.
Dani De Waele presented this manuscript as a Letter to the Editor in the context of the current discussion on the role of philosophy of biology. In this manuscript, De Waele adopted a personal and autobiographical writing style, illustrating how she experiences philosophy of biology and its goals and ambitions. The paper was not accepted for publication, based on the editorial argument that the chosen style draws not enough within the lines of a ‘standard’ publication, being too personal in content and format. This very decision opens two interesting side debates: (i) while Kolen and Van de Vijver (this volume) acknowledge that any philosophy also takes place within a perspective, perhaps this perspective need not only be theoretically characterized, but also sociologically. It may be interesting to investigate in how far the specific and personal (academic) experience one has with, for example, philosophy and biology can be isolated from the role(s) one attributes to philosophy of biology. And (ii), the editorial decision also opens a discussion about publication formats in philosophy. For example, does dictating philosophical writings into the very same publication formats handled by the scientific community, possibly hinder philosophy of science from having a sufficient autonomy or allowing a domain specific creativity? With regard to the theme of ‘complexity’ which seems to be a hot item in both biology and philosophy, one can ask why philosophy—being less attached to experimental standards—so little allows to play with alternative formats and ways to translate or talk about this complexity. In other words, could our discipline not gain from a revaluation of diversity in image and word?
Which is a point similar to the one defended in my doctoral thesis, only then, the focus was on the views of Conrad H. Waddington instead of on Darwin’s.
In that respect, it is advisable to interpret Callebaut’s talk about biological facts and data in terms of a vocabulary on models. The biologists I met in the field of molecular biology and epigenetics are very much aware that their experimental data are “just” that: observations within a partially controlled setting, which do not automatically lead to strict and/or objective interpretations of what is ‘really’ going on (which would lead to a fact). As such, they prefer to call their interpretations of these data models (or speculations, depending on how much data and theoretical background can be placed within the interpretative scheme). This is contrary to the "plea for facts" that Kolen and Van de Vijver read into Callebaut's paper.
Callebaut here refers to the meetings of the International Society for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB) at which biologists are welcomed. All good intentions not withstanding, it does remain unclear in how far this forum attracts not just those biologists already interested in and tolerant to philosophy in the way it currently presents itself.
In his abstract, Callebaut (2005) claims that “it makes sense to define philosophy of biology more narrowly than the totality of intersecting concerns biologists and philosophers (let alone some scholars) might have” I return to this statement in section 3.5.
Although Callebaut mentions that “the reasons for the success of the ‘new’ philosophy of biology remain poorly understood” (Callebaut 2005, 93, italics added), it is not clear in how far this success reaches out to Biology. Fact is that, as witnessed by the ISHPSSB, the “internal community” of Philosophers of Biology is steadily growing, even though the situation in the Dutch regions gives a somewhat different signal.
It is interesting to note that philosophers as well as biologists published articles on biology in Philosophy of Science journals. “Professional” philosophers displaced these biologists as soon as Philosophy of Science began to establish itself within disciplinary boundaries (cf. Byron, forthcoming). In combination with Callebaut’s review of “great biologists [who] have doubled as philosophers reflecting on the epistemological or, more often, on the ethical aspects of their discipline” (Callebaut 2005, 98), it surely makes wonder if philosophers tout court have been too busy with establishing their disciplinary boundaries, in the meantime missing the interdisciplinary boat and now being forced to make up for this lost time.
Kolen and Van de Vijver claim that it is “worthwhile to pursue the search for conditionality, and this without a priori strings attached. It is philosophically speaking a missed opportunity, to say the least, to cut off research in an arbitrary and a priori way, as seems to happen in the naturalistic approach” This sounds like a metaphysical ideal, lying much closer to the God-like and objective stance they claim no longer to be engaged in.
From its inception onwards, scientists have considered philosophy of science as an arrogant, if not irrelevant, discipline. Hull (2000) stressed this by claiming that philosophers put themselves on a meta-level, i.e. the so-called critical level from which the object of study is dissected, screened and evaluated. This ‘allowed’ philosophers to abstract away the details of any scientific endeavour and to define what science is. In search for the so-called demarcation criterion, they hoped not only to distinguish the scientific from the non-scientific by studying its methods and theories, but also to redirect inconsistencies and to steer the scientific course without much dictate or interference from the scientist himself.
This expression is adaptated from John Dupré’s paper entitled “The lure of the simplistic” in which the quest for a simple and unified worldview is attacked because it distorts an understanding of complex phenomena. It refers to evolutionary theory as a fundamental perspective present in the scientific world view, and argues how evolution needs to be complemented with other perspectives for an understanding of biology in general, and human behaviour in particular. Dupré pays attention to a shift in views of science from universal laws to models locally suited to specific phenomena (Dupré 2002).
Definitions often result from a reflective activity singling out regularities in a dynamic situation (cf. Van Speybroeck et al. 2007).
Regarding changes in definitions, see Jablonka and Lamb (2002) on the concept of epigenetics.
Dogmas focus one’s thinking. They allow economizing our time and efforts in not constantly reinventing the wheel. They also act to eliminate or suppress alternative habits of thought (cf. Steele et al. 1998). For example, the past decades, Francis Crick’s original stress on “the central biochemical importance of proteins” (Crick 1958: 152) was kept down in favour of “the dominating biological role of genes (‘ and the genetic linearity within the functional gene’ (Crick 1958: 152). The focus on the causal direction from DNA to protein long prevented speculations on passages from RNA to DNA, from protein to DNA, etc. According to Morange (1998), this had not much to do with the biochemical data that were available to Crick and his contemporaries, but with the traditions inherited from genetics and neo-Darwinism. Here, the Central Dogma found its place as a principle of evolutionary theory and was placed in the context of natural selection, random genetic mutations and the impossibility to cross the Weismannian Barrier between soma and germ. This created a climate almost in advance disinterested in ideas on environments changing proteins, and proteins influencing DNA. Such ideas also have been called neo-Lamarckian (Steele et al. 1998), but they can also be seen as originally embryological (cf. Gilbert 1996), a theme which today—in the context of molecular epigenetics—has regained attention from within biology itself (cf. Van Speybroeck 2000).
Crick reports in Judson’s The Eight Day of Creation (1979) that, in retrospect, the term ‘dogma’ appeared not well chosen because it made forget the intention to let it serve as a heuristic tool in order to develop new hypotheses on gene expression.
It is illuminating to consult Crick’s original paper, describing both the Sequence Hypothesis and the Central Dogma as speculative and as “an instructive exercise to attempt to build a useful theory without using them” (Crick 1958: 152). Crick saw both speculations as tools in “getting to grips with these very complex problems [i.e. of protein synthesis and gene action, which was at that time under rapid development]” (ibidem). The original intention of the Dogma was to present a general explanatory framework ascribing a functional role to DNA in terms of an agent controlling (and Crick adds, “not necessarily directly” the synthesis of amino acid sequences. It was not about diminishing the role of proteins in biological systems or about extrapolating the ‘control’ of DNA to the whole of an organismic being. Crick also realized that he presupposed the possibility to separate protein synthesis (in terms of a polypeptide chain) from protein folding (which is considered as a self-organisational function of the order of the amino acids). The Dogma thus modeled a link between nucleotide sequences and amino acid sequences, without explicitly reducing protein characteristics to DNA. Neither was the Dogma about the isolation of DNA function or protein synthesis from their cellular context. Crick openly discussed that there was no known case in nature in which protein synthesis proper occurs outside cells. He even specified the question of context by asking whether protein synthesis occurs in the nucleus, the cytoplasm, or in both. He also considered experimental support for the idea that RNA synthesis is in need of a combination of nucleotides and amino acids, allowing speculations on RNA-RNA interactions, RNA-DNA interactions and translations of proteins directly from DNA (Thieffry 1998). Crick even argued that “an essential feature of [his] argument [is that] in biology proteins are uniquely important” and that “once the central and unique role of proteins is admitted there seems little point in genes doing anything else” (Crick 1958: 138–139). In sum, Crick’s Dogma appears rather flexible. Still, despite Crick’s continued urge for caution when interpreting the Dogma (Crick 1970, 561–563), a “symbol” of gene-centrism and a touchstone for biology was distilled out of it (cf. Torres 1999). Crick did visually present the Dogma in an explicit “oversimplified” (Crick 1958: 154) form. This had to do with the paper being written “for the biologist rather than the biochemist, the general reader rather than the specialist” (Crick 1958: 138). It also demonstrates Crick’s personal conviction that protein synthesis—based on a combination of “the magic twenty amino acids found universally in proteins” (Crick 1958: 140)—was a rather uniform and simple process, which led him to conclude that “in the protein molecule Nature has devised a unique instrument in which an underlying simplicity is used to express great subtlety and versatility” (Crick 1958: 139).
Although they are present, such historical detours less ‘live’ in the biological community. While in biology new technologies, data, hypotheses, models and insights push themselves into a prominent role, one may wonder if this ‘neo-neo-classicism’ or ‘keeping alive’ of historical predecessors in philosophy of biology is not already a sign on the wall. A sign not so much of identity, but a lack of identity, a lack of novel insights, a living by virtue of what others have claimed, a leaning on authorities. In this regard, the current ‘identity crisis’ may plays less regionally than the original set-up of Reydon and Leonelli’s conference suggests. It also makes one wonder if the relation between philosophy and history as academic disciplines is as much troubled as the relation between philosophy and biology.
Which has much to do with the presence of slavery in the Greek society Aristotle described and defended (cf. Aristotle 1981).
Hull was about 34 at the time, the same age I currently have. Perhaps, such papers mirror a crisis some researchers in philosophy of biology bear down upon in their early postdoctoral careers. Of course, Hull’s paper may also reflect the ‘1960s’ which in both the US and Europe stood for strong criticism on society and authorities.
See Hull (1969, 260) on how biologists themselves worked out the differences between individuals, classes, etc.
Currently, at Ghent University, an interdisciplinary oriented project is running on postgenomic complexity and how this plays in philosophy, molecular biology (Systems Biology), agricultural biology and communication sciences. The project has been initiated by Dani De Waele and myself, and stands under promotorship of Gertrudis Van de Vijver. It consists of four ‘classical’ doctoral researches in the respective domains. But it also engages itself to explore research topics ‘shared’ between several doctorandi. The exercise is difficult, but also challenging. As a result of the combination of these various disciplinary viewpoints and accents, the first interdisciplinary results begin to emerge (cf. Van Speybroeck et al. 2005; Devos et al. 2006; Devos et al. forthcoming). These may not be the most spectacular results, but at least they reflect a shared basis of interest in topics and research questions.
Acknowledging biological complexity is one thing, talking about it without either bringing the message too simple or too detailed (so that one loses the message) appears difficult. As I witnessed at a recent conference on ‘chromatin dynamics and epigenetics’ in Liège (Belgian Society for Developmental and Cell Biology), this difficulty plays in the biosciences: f. ex. ‘plant epigeneticist’ could not easily follow ‘animal epigeneticist’ research on chromatin dynamics is related to methylation, but is different from research on (trans)gene silencing, etc. which made the possibility of a fluent dialogue a real challenge. Perhaps here, research on the possibilities and feasibility of ‘story telling in science’ is of interest, i.e. the didactic weighing against each other of what one wants to communicate, to which audience it is addressed, in which general framework the message is introduced, to which depth the message can be explored, etc., so that the message presents itself as a story which can be followed more easily.
Cf. “A system of philosophical concepts is not (— a ready-made set of pigeonholes. (— it is something much more important, namely a way of thought. One of the best known half truths about science is that asking the questions is more difficult than answering them. Whether this is an exaggeration or not, asking questions is at least one of the essential phases of scientific activity. It is in this connection with this function that philosophy is most important. A new question implies a new context, that is to say, the attempt to fit a phenomenon into a system which has not previously been applied to it’s(Waddington 1947: 147, italics added). Do mind that Waddington stresses asking questions as part of scientific activity, a part that is often learned by trade.
This view is well spread in philosophical literature. Griffiths (2000b: 301, italics added), for example, interprets the attempt to explain basic philosophy to biologists as useful, “not because philosophy has all the answers, but because scientists must think about how to do science, that is doing philosophy of science, and scientists frequently reinvent philosophical views with known flaws” This implicitly invokes the idea of a scientist as a non-reflective being driven by unspoken biases, a failure the philosopher escapes from. Likewise Auyang states that philosophy as a critical instrument can “interpret properly the meaning of regional theoretical models and […] delineate their limits” (Auyang 2000: 75, italics added)—as if only one ‘correct’ interpretation exists which is in reach of philosophers only. Or, as De Waele (2007, unpublished) writes: “As if only (this kind of) philosophy represents the True Thinking and, moreover, is harmless, does not dirty its hands” Hull (2002) claims that biologists do stand open to philosophy, but that philosophers are unwilling to accept philosophical reasoning by biologists because they are considered to lack the necessary philosophical baggage and concepts to express what biology is really about. On the other hand, philosophers usually do lack a biological training, leading more or less to an incompetence which may not be pleasant to admit, but which cannot be set aside either.
I refer to Pauli, because Gertrudis Van de Vijver and myself have been invited to speak at Harald Atmanspacher’s conference on the role of Pauli’s ideas for contemporary science (cf. Atmanspacher 2006, for an interesting review of Pauli’s philosophical ideas, which only marginally are about epigenetics).
In this regard, De Waele’s letter and my own experience stands in contradiction with the “paradox” Callebaut points out, i.e. “whereas scientifically minded philosophers might think that they are likely to get a better hearing from scientists than their ‘woolly-minded’ colleagues (dixit Alex Rosenberg), the reverse may be true: many working scientists seem to expect philosophy to offer them some kind of (highbrow) diversion from the greyness of their lab work’(Callebaut 2005, note 10).
With thanks to Karola Stotz for introducing me to this concept. See also Sosa (forthcoming) for an introduction to this ‘new philosophy’
It will be interesting to see what the octavian session on the role of philosophy of biology in the 21st century—as proposed for the 2007 ISHPSSB meeting—will bring in. With the exception of a lone philosopher, the content and setup of this session has been welcomed enthusiastically. The correspondence with potential speakers and discussants also illustrated that this topic is not limited to the Dutch speaking regions alone. Hence, an extensive discussion is more than welcome.
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Acknowledgments
I thank FWO-Flanders and UGent (BOF-GOA Project 01GA0105) for financially supporting my research in Philosophy of Biology and for permitting routes towards interdisciplinarity. I thank the members of the GOA project and my colleagues at UGent, especially Dani De Waele, for motivating discussions on the role of Philosophy of Biology. I am indebted to Thomas Reydon for providing room for discussion, and to the many philosophical and biological researchers who until this very day continue to be inspiring to further shape my ideas on the subject.
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Van Speybroeck, L. Philosophy of Biology: About the Fossilization of Disciplines and Other Embryonic Thoughts. Acta Biotheor 55, 47–71 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10441-007-9010-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10441-007-9010-0