Notes
A belief p is epistemologically unsafe if p is easily believed in possible worlds where p is false. A belief p is epistemologically insensitive if p would also be believed if p were false.
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Van Eyghen, H. Review of Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology, edited by Matthew Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz. SOPHIA 58, 539–541 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-00739-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-00739-7