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Signalling Games Select Horn Strategies

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Abstract

In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressionstypically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn'sdivision of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is aconventional fact that we use language this way.This convention will be explained in terms ofthe equilibria of signalling games introduced byLewis (1969), but now in an evolutionary setting. Iwill also relate this signalling game analysis withParikh's (1991, 2000, 2001) game-theoretical analysis ofsuccessful communication, which in turn is compared withBlutner's: 2000) bi-directional optimality theory.

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van Rooy, R. Signalling Games Select Horn Strategies. Linguistics and Philosophy 27, 493–527 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:LING.0000024403.88733.3f

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