Abstract
Although the term ‘transcendental consciousness’ seems like a rather basic notion in Husserl’s philosophy, its precise meaning is in fact one of the principle dividing points among scholars. In this paper I first outline three different views on transcendental consciousness and identify reasons for maintaining them. The most interesting opposition this exposition yields is between the latter two positions. The rest of the paper is then devoted to developing a solution to this interpretative problem which should satisfy intuitions underlying both camps. Particularly novel about this solution is that it (a) understands Husserl’s notion of transcendental consciousness as involving a kind of metaphysical commitment, and (b) takes it not as any kind of object or regional ontology, but as encompassing the totality of being considered from a unique transcendental-phenomenological perspective.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
Melle (2010, 94) correctly points out that Husserl’s metaphysical claim, or argument as Melle calls it, comes before the phenomenological reduction. The commitment at stake is therefore not strictly phenomenological, but can be made prior to that in the natural attitude.
- 4.
Phenomenology as such does not demand this a priori thesis. Husserl’s statements about e.g. physical thing constitution could still hold a priori within a certain region without it. More exactly, the phenomenological laws of physical thing constitution could then hold a priori within the now limited (ontological) region of consciousness. In short, an a priori phenomenology could do without the metaphysical commitment. However, it would then be a ‘de-transcendentalized’ phenomenology, and hence not the phenomenology the mature Husserl envisaged.
References
Dreyfus, H.L. 1982. Husserl’s Perceptual Noema. In Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science, ed. H.L. Dreyfus and H. Hall, 97–123. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dreyfus, H.L., and H. Hall. 1982. Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Drummond, J. 1992. An Abstract Consideration: De-Ontologizing the Noema. In The Phenomenology of the Noema, ed. J. Drummond and L. Embree. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, B. V.
———. 2009. Phénoménologie et ontologie. Trans. G. Fréchette, Philosophiques 36 (2009): 593–607.
Føllesdal, D. 1969. Husserl’s Notion of Noema. Journal of Philosophy 66 (20): 680–687.
Husserl, E. 1960. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Trans. D. Cairns. The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff.
———. 1974. Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 5 (3): 9–56.
———. 1976. Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologische Philosophie, Husserliana VI, ed. W. Biemel. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
———. 1977. Phenomenological Psychology: Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925. Trans. J. Scanlon. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
———. 1980. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Third Book: Phenomenology and the Foundation of the Sciences. Trans. T. E. Klein, W. E. Pohl. The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
———. 1983. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. Trans. F. Kersten. The Hague/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
———. 1984. Logische Untersuchungen, Band I-II, Husserliana XIX/1-XIX/2, ed. U. Panzer. Den Haag: Nijhoff
———. 2002. Einleitung in die Philosophie: Vorlesungen 1922/23, Husserliana XXXV, ed. R. Bernet and U. Melle. Dordrecht: Springer Science + Business Media B.V.
———. 2003. Transzendentaler Idealismus: Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908-1921), Husserliana XXXVI, ed. R.D. Rollinger and R. Sowa. Dordrecht: Springer Business+Media B.V.
Luft, S. 2005. Husserl’s Concept of the ‘Transcendental Person’: Another Look at the Husserl-Heidegger Relationship. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2): 141–177.
McIntyre, R. 1986. Husserl and the Representational Theory of Mind. Topoi 5: 101–113.
Melle, U. 2010. Husserls Beweis für den Transzendentalen Idealismus. In Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences: Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl, ed. C. Ierna, H. Jacobs, and F. Mattens, 93–106. Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London: Springer.
Moran, Dermot. 2005. Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology. Cambridge: Polity.
Smith, D.W. 2007. Husserl. New York: Routledge.
———. 2013. Phenomenology. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/phenomenology/
Smith, D.W., and R. McIntyre. 1982. Husserl and Intentionality. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Smith, D. W., and R. McIntyre. 1989. Theory of Intentionality. In Husserl’s Phenomenology: a Textbook, ed. J.N. Mohanty and W. McKenna, 147–179. Washington: University Press of America.
Zahavi, D. 2004. Husserl’s noema and the internalism-externalism debate. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (1): 42–66.
———. 2008. Internalism, externalism, and transcendental idealism. Synthese 160: 355–374.
———. 2010. Husserl and the ‘absolute’. In Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences: Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl, ed. C. Ierna, H. Jacobs, and F. Mattens, 71–92. Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London: Springer.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
van Mazijk, C. (2020). Transcendental Consciousness: Subject, Object, or Neither?. In: Apostolescu, I. (eds) The Subject(s) of Phenomenology. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 108. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29357-4_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29357-4_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-29356-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-29357-4
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)