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Van Der Steen, W.J. The relation of biology to physics and chemistry — An evaluation of some recent issues in the philosophy of science. Acta Biotheor 19, 186–211 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01556091
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01556091