Abstract
A standard conception of metaphysical modality accepts that (i) Some de re modal claims are true, (ii) These should be understood in terms of a possible worlds semantics, and (iii) There is trans-world identity. For instance, it seems true that Humphrey could have won the election. In possible worlds speak, we say that there exists a possible world where Humphrey wins the election. Furthermore (given trans-world identity), had that possibility been actualized instead of this one, Humphrey—our Humphrey, the very same man—would still have existed. Here, I argue that this way of understanding de re modal claims, in conjunction with certain other plausible assumptions, entails that The World (i.e., the enormous object which has both you and I as proper parts) is a necessary being.
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Notes
Though of course, Humphrey—our concrete, actual Humphrey—doesn’t literally exist at any of the possible worlds; for these are merely abstract representational entities according to which various possibilities are represented. (For further clarification, see note 2, below.)
Alvin Plantinga writes (1974, 47), “To say that Socrates exists in W is not, of course, to say that Socrates exists, but only that he would have, had W been actual.” Michael Loux (2006, 179) writes: “We can say that an object, x, exists in a possible world, W, just in case it is impossible for W to be actual without x’s existing. To say that a thing exists in a possible world, then, is not to say that it is physically contained in or literally present at that world; it is merely to make the counterfactual claim that had the world been actual, the thing would have existed.”
Adams 1979, 199, emphasis mine. David Lewis describes the intuition as follows: Seemingly, “it is Humphrey himself who might have existed under other conditions, who might have been different, who might have won the presidency, who exists according to many worlds, and wins according to some of them.” (1986, 198, emphasis mine)
Note that I will not be arguing for these assumptions. My conclusion here is a conditional one. That is, I intend to demonstrate that, if one endorses the assumptions, then they are committed to this conclusion.
Or, it is at least partly concrete; for there may also exist abstract objects such as numbers, universals, propositions, ersatz worlds and so on. Note that even David Lewis, who regularly refers to his worlds as ‘concrete’, expressed a reluctance about applying this label to them, since he endorsed the existence of, e.g., pure sets. (1986, §1.7)
On his view, “Whenever two possible individuals are spatiotemporally related, they are worldmates.” In turn, “Things are worldmates iff they are spatiotemporally related.” (1986, 70–71) Lewis then adds (1986, 78): “There is a second way in which the worlds are isolated: there is no causation from one to another. If need be, I would put this causal isolation alongside spatiotemporal isolation as a principle of demarcation for worlds.”
Note that I have restricted my claims to concrete beings. For a justification of this restriction, see note 8, below.
Note that abstract necessary beings (e.g., numbers, universals, etc.) will not suffice. For instance, David Lewis explicitly accepts that universals enjoy trans-world identity, even though the worlds themselves are numerically distinct (1986, 205). For, there is nothing problematic with the claim that two tomatoes—each existing in one of two numerically distinct Worlds—are both red. More formally, for redness (R), the following claim is false: For any pair of Worlds, W1 and W2, and for any two universals (one in each world), R1-in-W1 and R2-in-W2, if R1 and R2 are numerically identical, then W1 and W2 are numerically identical. Thus, I restrict my thesis only to the claim that, when two possible worlds share some concrete individual in common, then they must be representations of numerically one and the same World.
Perhaps The World even has things like numbers, universals, and propositions as parts—if such abstract objects both exist and stand in part-whole relations. For an endorsement of such a view, see Wallace (2014).
Peter van Inwagen writes (2008, 4), “Let us call “everything” collectively ‘the World’. Since ‘the World’ is a name for everything, the World includes even God (if there is a God).” Note that this is in disagreement with Leibniz, who equated ‘possible world’ with ‘possible physical universe’, rather than ‘possible whole of reality’. He writes, “Beyond the world, that is, beyond the collection of finite things, there is some One Being who rules … he is above the world …” (1989b, 149). Though oddly enough, for Leibniz, God is still a necessary being—indeed, the only necessary being—such that, “Except for the existence of God alone, all existences are contingent.” (1989a, 19)
Ross Cameron (2009) argues that classical theism and modal realism are compatible, such that numerically one and the same God could be wholly located at each of Lewis’s numerically distinct, concrete Worlds. If correct, Cameron’s proposal would conflict with what I have said here. I have argued elsewhere, however, that Cameron’s proposal is mistaken. (Vance, 2016) I am in agreement when Stephanie Lewis, who concludes that the existence of such a being is “profoundly, fundamentally, completely, and utterly inconsistent with David’s modal realist metaphysics of possible worlds.” (2015, 218)
Roughly, the explanation is as follows: Since all of the unactualized possibilities are just the possible manifestations of the properties of some actual (concrete) individual(s), it follows that each metaphysical possibility must share at least one causally potent, concrete individual in common with the actual world—namely, whichever actual individual(s) possess the relevant dispositional properties. The implication for the metaphysics of modality is that things could not have been completely different. For more, see Cameron, (2008b, 273), Vetter (2011, §3.2), and Vance (1113).
Ultimately, Modal Dispositionalism seems to entail something even stronger than Overlap—namely, that “All of the metaphysically possible worlds must share their initial [causal] portion in common—whether this be a necessary being (or beings), or a beginningless series.” (Vance, 1126, emphasis in original) But, the weaker claim (Overlap) is sufficient to generate the conclusion that I am interested in here, so I will set this stronger claim aside.
This follows from Vetter’s view since, whatever entities are “first” in the causal chain are—because they are first—such that “nothing has ever had a potentiality, iterated or otherwise, for them not to have existed” (ibid.).
Note also that David Lewis is careful to avoid this way of speaking, and describes the metaphysical possibilities instead as waysaworld could be. For instance, he writes, “There are ever so many ways that a world might be; and one of these many ways is the way that this world is” (1986, 2, emphasis mine; see also 72, 86). This choice to use the word ‘a’ instead of ‘the’ is consistent with Lewis’s picture of possible worlds as numerically distinct, concrete universes.
Indeed, Peter van Inwagen explicitly rejects my conclusion. He initially seems to endorse what I have argued for here, writing, “We have said that ‘the World’ is the totality of everything there is. But it is obvious that the World might be different—indeed that it might always have been different—from the way it is.” (2008, 123) However, in a footnote, he acknowledges that his use of the word ‘the’ instead of ‘a’ was misleading. He clarifies:
Or perhaps it would be better to say, “a complete specification of a way a World might have been,” for it may be that the World is a full-fledged individual thing, as opposed to a mere collection, and that if things had been sufficiently different, that individual thing would not have existed at all, and some other individual thing—either a part of the World or some individual thing that does not exist at all—would have been the referent of the description ‘the World’. (ibid., 142-143n, emphasis in original)
Still, it seems here that van Inwagen accepts that at least some of the possible worlds represent ways The World could have been (just not all of them do). However, van Inwagen ultimately rejects even this moderate claim, arguing that The World is not an individual thing at all. Roughly, his reasoning is that, if The World is a thing, then in the possible world where God does not create anything, God and The World are numerically identical—which is absurd. (ibid., 158–160) Though, for what it’s worth, van Inwagen also rejects the existence of all non-living composite objects. (See: 1990, 115) For instance, on his view there are no tables, but only “certain things arranged tablewise.” (1990, 110)
And of course, I have only argued that my conclusion follows if one endorses the four assumptions stated in §2 (the second of which was that The World is an individual thing).
The only other philosopher besides Peter van Inwagen (see the previous note, 17, above) who even recognizes or addresses the hypothesis that The World might be an individual thing for which there are de re possibilities is Ross Cameron (in his 2008a). He, like van Inwagen, rejects my conclusion, arguing instead that, though The World is an individual thing, there is no other way that it could have been. In other words, there are no de re possibilities for The World. Rather, there are only de dicto possibilities for it (i.e., there are other ways that a World could be, but the World-object that exists in each of these metaphysical possibilities is worldbound—that is, numerically distinct from any of the other possible Worlds). However, it is worth noting that Cameron only adopted this stance as a result of his particular version of truthmaker maximalism, which he has since rejected (see, e.g., Cameron forthcoming).
As Kripke put it, “to avoid confusion, [we ought] not to say, ‘In some possible world, Humphrey would have won’ but rather, simply, ‘Humphrey might have won’.” (48n) I should note that we might also have suggested that the relation of transworld identity is one between the abstract representations themselves. For instance, perhaps the representation of losing-Humphrey is numerically identical to the representation of winning-Humphrey. I think this is also a mistake, for two reasons. First, because surely no two representations are numerically identical. (To see why, consider two photographs of yourself.) Second, because this seems to put the cart before the horse. Claims about transworld identity are claims about actual objects, not abstract possibilia. As Kripke points out, “we do not begin with worlds … and then ask about criteria of transworld identification; on the contrary, we begin with the objects, which we have, and can identify, in the actual world. We can then ask whether certain things might have been true of the objects.” (53, emphasis in original)
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Vance, C. The World Is a Necessary Being. Philosophia 48, 377–390 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00090-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00090-8