

Eugen Enyvvari's Road to Göttingen and Back: A Case Study in the Transleithanian Participation in Early Phenomenology

Abstract: Despite attending Husserl's classes, his participation in the discussions of the Göttingen phenomenological circle, and his prolific writings on phenomenology, Eugen Enyvvari (1884-1959) seems to have been virtually ignored by phenomenological scholarship. I use an array of unpublished sources and a survey of his juvenilia to reconstruct Enyvvari's biography and intellectual formation, including his confrontation with Melchior Palagyi's critique of Husserl and Bolzano. Based on both his reports and records from the Göttingen University Archives, I attempt to establish the influences to which he could have been exposed in Göttingen. I rely on a careful micro-analysis of the development of Husserl's notion of noematic meaning around Enyvvari's stay in Göttingen in order to assess Enyvvari's specific contribution to phenomenology and his significance from the point of view of the general historiography of phenomenology.

1 Introduction

A student of Husserl and early phenomenologist Eugen Enyvvari (original name Enyvvári Jenő¹) certainly deserves more attention than the almost complete ignorance that contemporary phenomenological scholarship shows of him.² Born in Budapest in 1884, Enyvvari studied at the University in Göttingen in the winter semester of 1909/1910, where he attended not only a lecture course and advanced seminar given by Husserl, but also the lecture course of Adolf Reinach, who had received his habilitation in the previous semester. In a certificate issued to him personally by Husserl at the end of the semester, Enyvvari is attested as a student with

1 The family name is a Hungaricisation (literal translation) from *Leimstädter* in the 1880s.

2 Enyvvari is not mentioned in any of the standard reference works on the history of phenomenology (K. Schuhmann 1977; Spiegelberg and Schuhmann 1982; Moran 2000). The present author is also not aware of any phenomenological secondary literature on Enyvvari either. In March 4, 1985, Karl Schuhmann was told in a letter by [removed for the purposes of blind review] about the existence of Enyvvari. Schuhmann intended to include Enyvvari in the planned revised edition of his chronology of Husserl (K. Schuhmann 1977). This revised edition was never completed, but he did mention Enyvvari in a short footnote appended to the version of the Reinach biography published in the critical edition of Reinach's works (see Reinach 1989, 2:620, n. 3), Schuhmann's claim that Enyvvari "*nur sehr wenig publiziert hat,*" however, is far from being true.

"extraordinary enthusiasm and diligence, thoroughness and competence" in addition to "enthusiastic dedication to the most difficult problems of epistemology," which, Husserl says, "led to capture my special sympathies" (see *Appendix*). As if that were not enough to awaken academic interest in him, Enyvvari has himself reported that discussions with Reinach and Theodor Conrad in the nascent Göttingen Philosophical Society led him to reject Husserl's theory on the "phenomenological origins of the unity of meaning."³ In the course of the late pre-war years, Enyvvari also published extensively on phenomenology, including a phenomenologically coloured dictionary (Enyvvári 1918), and, furthermore, a fifty-five page long booklet providing an exposition of Husserl's phenomenology (Enyvvári 1913; first published as a journal article), which might count as one of the first, if not the very first, general book on Husserl (i.e. that is neither a comparative work nor an investigation of a specific phenomenological problem). A German article written by Enyvvari in 1914 was considered for inclusion in the bibliography section of Husserl's *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article on phenomenology in 1927.⁴

The virtual silence surrounding Enyvvari, of course, is not without reasons. Enyvvari published almost exclusively in his mother tongue, Hungarian, and his aforementioned single German publication (Enyvvári 1914) had appeared in April 1914, i.e., shortly before the Muses were silenced (though he managed to send a dedicated copy to Husserl, which is preserved in Husserl's library⁵). Enyvvari would not have been completely forgotten, if his life had not taken a turn in a different direction. Despite some promising initial signs (and Husserl's words of recommendation), Enyvvari had failed to develop a profession career in philosophy and gradually shifted towards the profession of a librarian. Furthermore, because of the highly technical character of his writings, which are hard to assess for a critic not versed in the specific terminology of Bolzano and the early Phenomenological Movement, Enyvvari was also ignored by the philosophical historiography of his native country. Even though it is impossible to overlook the existence of his writings, none of the references to him goes beyond the confines

3 Enyvvári 1910, 194, n. 1 – Unless otherwise noted, all translation are from the present author. For obvious reasons, it is decided not to include the Hungarian originals. German quotations are left untranslated, unless standard translations are available.

4 Ms. M III 10 III 7 / 1a (the list also bears annotations by Husserl's hand).

5 Ms. SP 74. Its title page carries the dedication: "*Herrn Prof. Edmund Husserl überreicht von seinem dankbaren Schüler E[ugen] Enyv[v]ári*".

of a brief enciclopedia entry. Even the most simple details of his intellectual biography – e.g. whether he obtained a doctoral degree in philosophy or in which semester exactly he studied in Göttingen – are omitted or reported contradictorily.⁶

In what follows I attempt to present and assess Enyvvari's contribution based on the careful reconstruction of primary sources, including not only his writings in Hungarian but also unpublished archival material.⁷ My aim, however, is not merely to help Enyvvari secure his share of philosophical attention that, I think, every early phenomenologist and Husserl-student would justly deserve, but I also believe that his work carries a philosophical significance of its own, or, at least, could occasion relevant discussions on both specific phenomenological problems and the general historiographical framework of Early Phenomenology.

2 The road to Göttingen

2.1 The Philosophical Formation

His father being a civil servant, the early years of Eugen Enyvvari's intellectual formation remained within the unspectacular confines of middle class education. He attended a renowned municipal secondary school in Budapest, though the results of his maturity examination in June 1902 already manifested a philosophical inclination.⁸ In the following winter semester he matriculated at the University of Budapest, where he studied until the summer semester of 1906.⁹ Unfortunately, the archival records do not make it possible to reconstruct the exact

6 The entry on Enyvvari in the *New Hungarian Biographical Dictionary* (Budapest: 2001, II:366-367), e.g., claims that Enyvvari "earned a doctoral degree in humanities at the University of Budapest in 1905" (p. 366). In the records of the University Archives of Budapest there is no entry for his alleged doctoral examination.

7 Besides the notes explicitly mentioned below, I was also relying on Enyvvari's own manually bound collection of his offprints, which bears annotations presumably from his own hand, and Enyvvari's biographical letter to Pál Gulyás (1881-1936) a lexicographer whose project of a comprehensive national biographical dictionary was forcefully terminated after the Second World War (Ms. National Széchényi Library (OSZK) Fond 36/175). Data on Enyvvari's later career as a librarian is based on the history of the Municipal Library of Budapest (Katsányi 2004), which, unfortunately, leaves Enyvvari as a philosopher completely in darkness.

8 Enyvvari received the grade "excellent" (the best of the five possible grades) in philosophical propedeutics and religious studies, while in other subjects, except for freehand drawing, he was awarded "good" (the second best) or "sufficient" (just above the failing level). Ms. Budapest City Archives (BFL), VI.502.d (II. ker., 1902.1.6/8).

9 Data are based on the historical almanacs of the university, consulted in the University Archives of Budapest.

course of his studies, but it is possible to conjecture some of the classes he attended, since Enyvvari as teacher trainee was explicitly required to attend certain lectures on the history of philosophy. This part of the university curriculum was dominated by Bernát Alexander (1850–1927). Alexander, a local academic heavyweight who co-translated and commented on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* before the turn of the century, was lecturing precisely on the history of modern philosophy in the academic year 1902/1903 when Enyvvari entered the university. If we look into a student transcript of these lectures, which might have laid the groundwork of Enyvvari's historical knowledge and preferences in philosophy,¹⁰ we find that in the section on contemporary philosophy Alexander, not surprisingly, portrayed the revival of Kantianism as the most promising development, though he put a surprisingly strong emphasis on the significance of empirically inclined thinkers like Lotze, Wundt and Fechner (Alexander 1904, 2:96–97). This type of education apparently did not fail to exercise its influence. Starting from the third semester of his studies, Enyvvari published a series of reviews in the progressive monthly *Huszadik Század* (The Twentieth Century), and some of his juvenilia already showed him well versed in Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy (beyond manifesting his interest in a broadly conceived socialism, which helped him secure the support of Ervin Szabo, the director of the progressively inspired Municipal Library of Budapest, who recommended Enyvvari for an internship in June 1904).

In a review of book preaching monism, the dominant scientific world view of late 19th century, Enyvvari argued clearly against conflating logic and psychology: "Logic cannot be psychologised" (Enyvvari 1905, 557). The reason for their difference is namely that "logic is concerned with the *validity* of the functions of knowledge, which is *totally independent* from its psychogenesis" (ibid.). Logic and psychology, however, are not unrelated either, since it is certain that every thinking is a psychological process" (ibid.). Even though Enyvvari's argument was still cushioned in the Neo-Kantian terms of his professors, his claim clearly indicates a susceptibility for a non-trivial reception of Husserl's phenomenology.

2.2 Enyvvari's Reply to Palagy's Critique of Husserl

For every Hungarian philosopher in the first decade of the century, however, there was a serious roadblock on the intellectual path towards embracing Husserlian phenomenology. This roadblock was created by another Hungarian scientist and philosopher, Melchior Palagy (or

¹⁰ The curriculum of philosophy in the secondary schools was not historically oriented.

Palágyi Menyhért, 1859-1924), who is certainly the most known Hungarian interlocutor of Husserl. Palagyi had already been an established natural scientist, when, during an academic peregrination in Germany in the years 1900–1903, he published a series of books in German, in which he tried to join cutting-edge academic debates of contemporaneous German philosophy. In one of these books (1902a), Palagyi capitalized on the surge of interest in Bolzano,¹¹ while in another he explicitly turned against Husserl, whom he perceived as a “symptomatic example” of the “metamorphosis of a psychologist into the contrary position of formalism,” a position he believed was “initiated” by Bernard Bolzano himself (Palágyi 1902b, 9). The fact that Palagyi’s latter booklet not only contained a strongly worded polemic against Husserl (Palágyi 1902b, 11 ff.) but some of his suggestions were on the verge of accusing Husserl of plagiarising Bolzano’s ideas¹² led Husserl in 1903 to publish an equally strongly worded and annihilating counter-critique (Husserl 1979, 152–161). This book by Palágyi was also believed to have been instrumental in Johannes Daubert’s famous lecture in Munich in July 1902 on the “dispute between logicians and psychologists”,¹³ a lecture that is credited with spurring the Munich Phenomenology (see Smid 1985, 269).

In an article published in two instalments during 1909 (Enyvvári 1909a, 1909b), Enyvvári undertook the task of confronting Palagyi’s critique of Husserl. Because of the proposed reduction of the “formalist” position to Bolzano, the main thrust of Palagyi’s argumentation was directed against Bolzano’s theory of logic, especially against Bolzano’s *Fundamentallehre*, which is expounded in *Part One* of the first volume of the magnificent *Wissenschaftslehre*

11 It is an interesting question of how Palagyi (and other Hungarians) became aware of Bolzano in the years immediately after the turn of the century and whether osmotic transmission mechanisms from the original Bolzano-Circle, which never totally disappeared in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, played any role in this process. Both Palagyi and Enyvvári were members of the scarcely documented Bolzanoist philosophical circle in Budapest, called “BEMBE,” which is reported as active between 1909 and 1914 (Somos 1999, 597 ff.), Somos, however, believes that the interest in Bolzano was initiated by Husserl’s work (ibid.).

12 Palagyi claimed that Husserl, despite his explicit praise of Bolzano in the *Logical Investigations*, concealed the “origin” (*Provenienz*) of his own position (Palágyi 1902b, 16). Such remarks were apparently taken by Husserl as a hint at intellectual plagiarism: “In a series of hints which would be insignificant taken separately, but which are efficacious when taken in sequence, he gives the reader no less a notion than that I have exploited *Bolzano* in a dishonest manner and have kept silent about my dependence upon him [*in unredlicher Weise ausgenützt, aber meine Abhängigkeit von ihm verschwiegen habe*].” (Husserl 1979, 155, ET: 1994a, 200).

13 Daubert 2002, 344, ET: 345. Daubert did not explicitly refer to Palagyi’s book.

(Bolzano 1837). For Palágyi, Bolzano's *proposition in itself* (*Satz an sich*), the basic building-block of Bolzano's logical theory, is the result of a twofold abstraction:

„Zunächst müssen wir von dem sprachlichen *Ausdruck* eines Satzes absehen, so dass uns bloss der *Sinn* desselben zurückbleibt; dann aber müssen wir vermittelst einer zweiten Abstraktion bei jenem Sinn davon absehen, dass er von jemandem gedacht wurde [...].“¹⁴

Palágyi finds even the first tier of abstraction objectionable, since he believes that the meaning of a proposition could never subsist as an “independent psychological phenomenon,” “detached from any accompanying signs, vocal presentations etc.” (Palágyi 1902a, 32). This stance of his has earned him credits from interpreters belongs to a broadly conceived linguistic turn (see e.g. Nyíri 1999); and it might also be compelling to perceive a certain resemblance between Palágyi's views and such claims of Reinach like that the “act of meaning” is “always linguistically clothed [*sprachlich eingekleidet*]” (Reinach 1911, 206, English translation (hereafter: ET): 1982, 323; cf. Smith 1987, 194). Palágyi has, a more technical objection against the second tier: even the “naked sense,” which has taken off its “garb of language” (Palágyi 1902a, 33), is still thought *by* somebody (metaphorically speaking, it still has a “skin of a thought” [*Gedankenhaut*]). In order to distil a *proposition in itself*, we have to abstract from this relation as well; but then the *proposition in itself* becomes *per definitionem* unintelligible. In other words, there is something at the roots of our cognition that is not part of it – yet something that is supposed to define our cognition. As Palágyi summarized this apparent contradiction:

„Wenn ich nämlich eine Wahrheit an sich erkenne, so hat die Wahrheit, die ich erkannt habe, im Sinne der Definition Bolzano's zugleich Existenz und auch keine Existenz. Als ‚Wahrheit an sich‘ hat sie nämlich kein Dasein, als gedachte Wahrheit jedoch ist sie eine reale Erscheinung in meinem Gemüte.“¹⁵

This is where Enyvvári's defence sets in, consisting in a careful reconstruction of Bolzano's theory of meaning on Husserlian grounds. The meaning of a word, says Enyvvári in a section entitled “Remarks on the phenomenology of the theory of meaning,” is not to be sought in the presentations accompanying it, but rather in the intentional act which underpins meaningful word-consciousness. More precisely, it is necessary to distinguish between sense-bestowing or

14 Palágyi 1902a, 32.

15 Palágyi 1902a, 34.

fulfilling act and "a meaning *in specie*, which is a concept in logical sense" (Enyvvári 1909a, 320). The latter is the "identical sense," or, more technically, "the identity of the meaning-species;" and this is where Enyvvári refers to Husserl's *Logical Investigations* for the first time. According to Enyvvári, "Bolzano's doctrine of the *propositions in itself* was essentially misunderstood by Palagyi" (Enyvvári 1909a, 321), because what Bolzano's *proposition in itself* amounts to is precisely "the meaning *in specie*, the meaning as an ideal identical unity" (ibid.). Palagyi overlooked that, according to Bolzano, the *proposition in itself* and a *proposition in thought* stand "not in a real connection, but rather only in an ideal relation" to each other (ibid.). Enyvvári's defence of Bolzano (and thereby of Husserl), I think, is entirely legitimate, as Bolzano clearly distinguished between a *proposition in itself* (*Satz an sich*) and a *proposition in thought* (*gedachter Satz*) precisely by pointing out that the latter is the "content" (*Inhalt*) of the former (Bolzano 1837, I:78). This distinction runs through the whole *Fundamentallehre* of Bolzano's work, and it clearly comes to the fore in Bolzano's treatment of *presentations* (*Vorstellungen*), which are derived by Bolzano from *propositions*. Here Bolzano contrasts the *presentation in itself* (*Vorstellung an sich*), or *objective presentation*, with the *possessed* (*gehabte*), *thought* (*gedachte*), or *subjective presentation*:

"The subjective presentation is thus something real, [...] it has a real existence in the subject for whom it is present [...]. This is not true of the *objective* presentation or *presentation in itself*, which belongs to every subjective presentation. I mean by it something not to be sought in the realm of actuality, something that makes up the direct and immediate *material* [*Stoff*] of the subjective presentation."¹⁶

The only way Palagyi could have constructed the above (quoted) contradiction was thus by conflating a distinction clearly drawn by Bolzano. But Enyvvári was also aware of the contexts and limits of Bolzano's logical theory. At the end of the first instalment (Enyvvári 1909a, 326), he clearly warned against the Herbartian transformation of Bolzano's ideas by Robert Zimmermann (1824-1898), Bolzano's erstwhile protégé, who is usually credited as the main transmitter of Bolzano's philosophy. Given that it was only recently that a more nuanced view of Zimmermann's role won recognition in academic scholarship (cf. Morscher 1997), Enyvvári's warning really counts as an expert-level knowledge of the intricate relationships of 19th century Austrian philosophy (which also manifested itself in a bibliography of primary and

16 Bolzano 1837, I:217, ET (mod.): 1973, 78.

secondary literature on Bolzano, published by Enyvvari three years later: Enyvvári 1912a). Enyvvari was, by the way, also aware of Frege’s, as well as terminological differences between Frege’s “*Bedeutung*,” which, in the phenomenological parlance, amounts to the intended object, while Frege’s “*Sinn*” to “the meaning (or sense) bestowing, respectively fulfilling act” (Enyvvári 1909a, 319, n. 1).

Husserl’s counter-critique was warmly greeted by his academic contacts, who generally viewed Palagyi’s accusations as hasty and unfair (cf. Husserl 1994b, V:198, VI:447). Regrettably, it is not known whether Husserl had been aware of the glaring defence of his by the another Hungarian philosopher. But, for Enyvvari, the stage was set for Göttingen.

3 Historical Traces of a Semester in Göttingen

At the end of the second instalment of his article, Enyvvari has already included “Göttingen” in his signature (Enyvvári 1909b, 411), presumably to inform Hungarian philosophical audience that he is now studying directly at the sources of his new-found philosophical conviction. According to archival records,¹⁷ Enyvvari attended the following classes in the winter semester of 1909/1910 (starting from October, 18, 1909 and March 3, 1910):

- Edmund Husserl: *Kant und die nachkantische Philosophie*
- Edmund Husserl: *Philosophische Übungen über Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*
- Georg Elias Müller: *Psychologie*
- Georg Elias Müller: *Experimentelle physiologische Übungen*
- Adolf Reinach: *Einleitung in die Erkenntnistheorie*

Enyvvari thus assembled an enviable curriculum, including not only Husserl’s two philosophy classes, but also Reinach’s very first university lecture course (cf. K. Schuhmann and Smith 1987, 17). Furthermore, the letter of recommendation issued to Enyvvari by Husserl himself on the day before Enyvvari’s exmatriculation (see *Appendix*) is also worth of our attention: not only because of the praising words by the otherwise parsimonious Husserl, but also because of Husserl’s last particular praising phrase – “enthusiastic interest in the most difficult problems of epistemology” – could hint at the possible focus of Enyvvari’s stay in Göttingen.

The period Enyvvari spent in Göttingen fell into a gap between the first wave of initial

17 Cf. Ms. Göttingen University Archive, draft *Abgangszeugnis* 1910, Nr. 859, as well as the *Abgangszeugnis* itself (in private possession).

enthusiasm (the so-called Munich invasion of Göttingen in 1905 and its repercussions) and the steady growth of the new Movement in the immediate pre-war years. Even newcomers like Dietrich von Hildebrand, who had first arrived in Göttingen in SS 1909, moved back to Munich and came back only in the following summer semester. The majority of the early phenomenologists arrived only in subsequent semesters, e.g. Hedwig Martius in WS 1910/11, most of them even later. Nonetheless Enyvvári managed to meet some of the early phenomenologists and participate at the discussions of the nascent Göttingen Philosophical Society (that might have been formally set up during Enyvvári's stay, cf. Conrad 1992, 78, 84); and the discussions proved fateful for him. The details of his encounters, as I mentioned earlier, are reported directly by Enyvvári in a footnote of his next published work. I quote this footnote in its entirety:

"The present author has, at an earlier occasion [...] [Enyvvári 1909a, 1909b], interpreted the notion of the unity of meaning in Husserl's terms. He supposed that the unity of meaning is a 'meaning-species' (a general notion), corresponding to an 'individual meaning moment' of a meaning-experience, and that it is obtained by a generalising abstraction, which, with regard to the 'individual meaning moment' of a meaning-experience, intends the corresponding 'meaning-species.' His discussions with *Privatdozent* A. Reinach and Mr. Th. Conrad (Munich) in the 'Philosophical Society of Göttingen' led him to the conclusion that Husserl's explanation of the phenomenological origins of the unity of meaning is false."¹⁸

Enyvvári, as it were, went to Rome as a believer but came back as a heretic. What is more important philosophically is the underlying philosophical consideration – and whether it has anything to do with Enyvvári's reliance on Bolzano. In order to answer these questions, I will look into the historical-philosophical situation that Enyvvári encountered at Husserl in 1909-1910.

4 The Göttingen constellation around Husserl in 1909/10 and Enyvvári's role in it: Bolzano and the Noematic Sense of Meaning

4.1 The Outlines of Husserl's Trajectory and His Relation to Bolzano as Its Marker

"Bolzano apparently lacked clarity in the relation of proposition [*Satz*] to judgement [*Urteil*] as

18 Enyvvári 1910, 194, n. 1. The printed version reads "W. Conrad," but Enyvvári corrected it in his own offprint copy to "Th. Conrad" (cf. note above).

an act. At least, I have tried in vain to find decisive passages, which decide on the two alternative readings [...].” This remarkable comment was made by Husserl in a research note written during the preparation of the *Logical Investigations* in April 1899 (Husserl 2009, 138–139). It testifies that, notwithstanding the powerful language of Husserl’s influential invocation of Bolzano in the *Logical Investigations* (cf. Küne 1997, 40 ff.), Husserl was uncertain as to what was actually implied by Bolzano’s doctrine. What was at stake, furthermore, was of fundamental philosophical importance, as demonstrated by Husserl’s retrospective remarks: In the *Ideas I*, written 14 years later, Husserl remarked that, in hindsight, he found his *Logical Investigations* to be “one-sidedly” noetic (cf. Husserl 1975, 13–14, 1976, 217). Given that the principle of noetic-noematic correlation is the fundamental tenet of transcendental phenomenology,¹⁹ Husserl’s characterisation of his earlier *opus magnum* was clearly intended to mark his transition to a new philosophical standpoint which rendered the earlier book obsolete (he indeed tried to rewrite it). What is even more intriguing is that this general shortcoming of his *Logical Investigations* was linked by Husserl to a specific failure of Bolzano, namely Bolzano’s inability to make “clear to himself the proper sense of” judgement in itself and proposition in itself, in other words “that we have here *two* essentially possible interpretations” of judgement in itself: “the specific essence of the judging process (the noetic idea) and the *noematic* idea correlative to the noetic idea” (Husserl 1976, 218, n. 1, ET: 1982, 230, n. 38). It is precisely this distinction that was anticipated by the aforementioned alternatives considered by Husserl in 1899: “the proposition is either the judgement *in specie* or the content that is common to presentations, judgements, wishes and questions etc. relating to the same state of affairs [*Sachverhalt*]” (Husserl 2009, 139).

Both the anticipated distinction of 1899 and the distinction underlying his self-critique in 1913 differs significantly from what we find in the first edition of the second volume of the *Logical Investigations*, published in 1901: Here Husserl distinguished between states of affairs as intentional correlates of judgement acts and the specific essence of these acts themselves, derived via abstraction based on the signification essence (*bedeutungsmäßiges Wesen*) of meaning-bestowing intentional experiences, which yields meaning (*Bedeutung*) in the proper

19 Among the many formulations of this principle by Husserl, it is worth to highlight his retrospective claim from 1935–1936, according to which “[t]he first breakthrough of this universal a priori of correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness [...] occurred during work on my *Logical Investigations* around 1898” (Husserl 1962, 169, n. 1, ET: 1970, 166, n.; cf., e.g., Moran 2003, esp. 56 ff.).

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phenomenological sense. Let us look into the details of this conception: Apart from specific cases of introspection, the act itself, which is defined by Husserl as an experience exhibiting the descriptive property of intentionality (Husserl 1984a, 392), does not coincide with its intentional object (414), as demonstrated by the fact that very different mental experiences are capable of presenting the same intentional object in virtue of differences in the apprehension (*Auffassung*, 396). In case of judgements, e.g., "when we say that the knife is on the table," the knife is the intentional object of the subject of the judgement (*Urteilsobjekt*), i.e., "the knife is the object about which we judge," but the "full and entire object corresponding to the whole judgement is the state of affairs [*Sachverhalt*] judged" (416, ET: Husserl 2001a, II, 114). The same state of affairs could furthermore be the intentional object of the corresponding presentation of the knife being on the table, the wish "that the knife should be on the table," the corresponding question etc. (ibid.). The state of affairs obviously differs from the presentation of a judgement, the intentional object of which is judgement, i.e., a mental act.

Johannes Dauber rightly pointed out in his aforementioned lecture on the occasion of Palagyi's psychologistic anti-critique in 1902 that the proper response to the psychologistic challenge hinges on further refining this initial distinction, namely "on the answer to the question as to how in a judicative act [...] we are to think the relationship between the psychological act and what is intentionally posited therein, the intentional object, and especially the intentional content, the meaning [*Bedeutung*]" (Dauber 2002, 364, ET (mod.): 365). Concerning the latter, third element, Husserl's proposal was to conceive meaning as a result of a special type of abstraction (hence the term "*in specie*"), performed upon the non-independent parts of the acts, termed signification essence, which consist of the matter and quality of the acts (cf. Husserl 1984a, 431). Propositions (*Sätze*) are a particular categorial type of meanings. In a strict sense, Husserl says, truth concerns propositions, while being (*Sein*) concerns states of affairs as their correlates (cf. Husserl 1984b, 655). It is the state of affairs that serves as the truthmaker of a proposition, respectively the evidential fulfilment of a judgement itself constitutes a (different) state of affairs (cf. 654).

Already Reinach conjectured that this clear-cut distinction, as applied at judgements, only gradually emerged during the composition of the *Logical Investigations* (Reinach 1911, 224, n.). The fact that in 1899 Husserl was considering a different distinction that posited a further element – that differed from the mental act, the specific meaning and the state of affairs –, namely "the uniformity that can be characterised as a relation to the same state of affairs but in different relational modes" (Husserl 2009, 139), seems to indicate that the printed text merely

represents a particular crystallisation of Husserl’s otherwise fluid network of concepts (which are, in fact, surprisingly close to Husserl’s more mature ones).²⁰ The other side of the same coin is, then, that a personal visitor to Göttingen was able to participate in the underlying fluid process of conceptual development.

4.2 Micro-analysis of Husserl’s Development around Enyvvári’s Stay

There are many signs indicating that the incubation of Husserl’s explicit distinction between the noematic idea of the judgement and the noetic idea of the specific essence of the judging process reached a critical stage precisely around academic year 1909–1910 and that this ascertainment process was linked to his ongoing occupation with Bolzano’s *Wissenschaftslehre*. Let us take a closer look at this historical development and the underlying philosophical considerations!²¹ Already in his lecture course *Bedeutungslehre (Theory of Meanings)* in SS 1908, Husserl proposed a “parallel expression” of meaning which “is a pure correlation to the notion of meaning in the sense of species” (Husserl 1987, 38). The distinction is made between “meaning [...] as a specific unity” (31), which is a result of the abstraction performed upon the meaning moments of the singular unities of judgements as mental acts (cf. 32), and “something that is correlatively opposed to the act on the objective side” (35), which Husserl termed “the categorial objectivity of the corresponding expression” and distinguished from the “objectivity that is simply meant [*bedeutete Gegenständlichkeit schlechthin*]” (37).

Husserl’s reasons for establishing this distinction did *not* lie in the problem considered in 1899 (cf. Husserl 2009, 126–127), i.e., that it is possible for us to intentionally relate to the same state of affairs in specifically different acts (e.g. judgements, presentations, questions etc.). Husserl, as seen above, explicitly acknowledged this possibility in the printed text of the *Logical Investigations*, and the reason why it did not pose any problem for him was that in the printed

20 This tripartite distinction between judgement *in specie*, uniformity of a relation to the same state of affairs, and state of affair itself is richer and more specific than the equivocacy that Husserl, as Robin D. Rollinger pointed out, diagnosed between “sentences in themselves [...] regarded as the objects” of thought and sentences in themselves “regarded as the species of these thoughts, more precisely of judgements” (Rollinger 1999, 80).

21 Even the most detailed developmental analysis available so far (Mohanty 2008, 224–241) has a very narrow textual basis, respectively is not fine-grained enough for our purposes, not to mention the commentaries on Husserl’s *Ideas I* (cf. Ricoeur 1996, 138; Moran 2015, 221). Anchors are provided by the respective editorial introductions, see esp. Husserl 1984c, xxiii ff., 1987, xvii ff., 1996, xxxiii ff., 2009, xxxiv ff..

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text Husserl proposed a sophisticated analysis of compound acts, in which he confined the object-giving function to certain intellectual acts (cf. Melle 1990). In compound acts, non-object giving acts merely contribute to the resulting compound quality, whereas the matter is contributed by the so-called objectifying acts, i.e., positing or non-positing nominal or predicative acts (Husserl 1984a, 515 ff.). Hence the matter of objectifying acts – which is a non-independent part of their signification essence – is, to a certain extent, capable of performing the function that Husserl in 1899 tried to make independent under the headword “the uniformity that can be characterised as a relation to the same state of affairs but in different relational modes” (Husserl 2009, 138). Correspondingly, in the lecture course in 1908 Husserl claims that it is possible to grasp “this shared ideal moment” by an “overarching consciousness” (Husserl 1987, 34).

What is then Husserl’s reason in 1908 for drawing a distinction between meaning *in species* and the corresponding categorial objectivity? It lies in the infamous example of “the victor at Jena” – “the vanquished at Waterloo.” Presentations having different contents (*Inhalt*) but the same extension (*Umfang*) were commonplace in nineteenth-century academic logic (cf., e.g., Bolzano 1837, I, 445 ff.), and in the printed text of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl himself got over this example by claiming that “names can differ in meaning but can name the same object” (Husserl 1984a, 53, ET: 2001a, I, 197). In 1908, he acknowledged that, even though the “object simply [*Gegenstand schlechthin*]” is the same, we do not mean it in the same way, the “subject [*Theme*] that is before our eyes” is different (Husserl 1987, 36). This line of argument resembles a sophisticated distinction in the printed text of the *Logical Investigations*, namely that of between “the object as it is intended [*Gegenstand sowie er intendiert ist*]” and the “object (period) which is intended [*schlechthin der Gegenstand, welcher intendiert ist*];” or, in a different terminology, between “intentional and extra-intentional content of the object” (Husserl 1984a, 414–415, ET: 2001a, 113–114). The surplus Husserl intended to capture via this distinction consists in precisely the possibility of various ways of meaning an object – e.g., “the German Emperor” and “the grandson of Queen Victoria” –, where the identity of the intended object – e.g., Kaiser Wilhelm II – is revealed only “in virtue of an objective unity of knowledge” (ibid.). The crux is that the “object as it is intended” is an objective determination that cannot yet be identified with the object itself (the object simply), thus anticipating Husserl’s corresponding idea in 1908 and his later full-fledged notion of noema.

It apparently took time for the full-fledged recognition of this distinction to prove effectual for Husserl. Both Husserl’s cumbersome terminology in 1908 and his rudimentary argumentation

is indicative of a distinction that was still *in statu nascendi*.²² In the introductory lecture course *Alte und neue Logik (Modern and ancient logic)*, which was delivered in WS 1908/09, Husserl restrained himself from discussing his newly developed ideas on the two-fold sense of meaning.²³ That the lack of these ideas was perceived by Husserl as one of the shortcomings of his lecture course is demonstrated by a retrospective note to his manuscripts, in which Husserl asked the question “What is the relation between the theory of meaning and the theory of the essences of judgements as such?” and concluded that his elaboration still lacked the “completely clear inner unity of all the problems” (Husserl 2003, 96, n. 1).

There is, however, a clear instance of *terminus ante quem* for Husserl’s recognition of the full-fledged distinction, namely WS 1910/1911, when Husserl lectured on *Logik als Theorie der Erkenntnis (Logic as a Theory of Knowledge)*. In this lecture course Husserl not only clearly distinguished between “ideal singularities” of judgements (Husserl 1996, 37) and the “proposition [*Satz*]” (42), but also provided a more systematic phenomenological argument in favour of it: Normally, we are dedicated to our intentional objects, we are immersed in them. It is possible, however, for us to interrupt this state and to direct our attention to, e.g., the judging itself: “the gaze must be turned away from the object and and turned back to the ego and its acts” (42). What manifests itself in this perspective in virtue of the corresponding abstraction is the “idea of judging as an essential generality [*Wesensallgemeines*] of the reflexion” (ibid.). It is possible, furthermore, to invert this perspective that originates from the judging and direct

22 The published text of Husserl’s lecture course of 1908 contains a more pronounced terminology, namely the distinction between “phansical [*phansisch*]” and “ontical [*ontisch*]” (Husserl 1987, 38); though these terms are later additions by Husserl. The adjective “phansical” was employed by Husserl for a short time around 1909-1910 to denote the investigation of mental acts according to their “immanent-real content [*reellen Bestand*]” (Husserl 2005a, 157, cf. 58 n., 65). Husserl intended to coin the *terminus technicus* φάνσις, in opposition to the more widespread term φαίνόμενον (which he translated as “[*das*] *Erscheinenden*” or “[*die*] *Erscheinung*”), in order to denote “the appearing itself as an experience [*das Erscheinen selbst als Erlebnis*]” (Husserl 1988, 307–308). Husserl actively used this terminology during Enyvvári’s stay in Göttingen (e.g., Husserl 2004, 235, 241, 258, 2005b, 238, 258–259), thus Enyvvári unsurprisingly picked it up as early as in 1910 (cf. Enyvvári 1910, 184). Husserl continued to sporadically employ it in 1911-1912 (Husserl 1980, 313, 2009, 291, 300), but he later denounced it (e.g., Husserl 2012a, 465, n. 1) and explicitly replaced it by the adjective “noetical” (e.g., Husserl 2005b, 238, n. 3, 2009, 300, n. 1; unpublished manuscript Ms. M III 12 / 7-8).

23 According the assessments by Elisabeth Schuhmann (Husserl 2003, viii) and Ursula Panzer (Husserl 1996, xxxiv, n. 2).

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our gaze at “what is judged in the judging,” e.g. when one says “What is judged by you now is a universal proposition” (ibid). Such judgements are about the proposition itself, rather than the original object of the proposition (cf. 44). The latter, the objectivity or state of affairs intended by the judgement may exist or may not exist in the reality, without affecting the former, “that which is posited by the judgement as such” (45), or, as Husserl later said, “the noema of the judgement” (411). Indicating his full awareness of the extent of his discovery, Husserl then reproached traditional logic for failing to distinguish not only between the logical and psychological sense of judgement – i.e., the anti-psychologistic critique that was presented in the hugely influential first volume of the *Logical Investigations*, published in 1900 – but also between “judging and proposition” (43).

The estimated date of the full recognition of the distinction by Husserl could be pushed back closer to Enyvvari’s stay in Göttingen, based on a series of observations. One testimony is the unpublished manuscript Ms. A I 42, written around June 1910 (cf. K. Schuhmann 1977, 142), in which Husserl tried to reconcile this distinction with his advances in his theory of essences.²⁴ Furthermore, the dissertations of Erich Heinrich (born in 1881), who passed his doctoral examination at Husserl on February 3, 1909, distinguished explicitly between meaning (*Bedeutung*) that is derived by a reflexion and ideation (abstraction) from the mental acts and an “objective-logical” meaning, even though he used the term proposition (*Satz*) for the former (Heinrich 1910, 29–31). Husserl was supervising the dissertation of Heinrich in as late as in July 1909 (cf. K. Schuhmann 1977, 127). Finally, in a text written in October – December 1909 (i.e., exactly during Enyvvari’s stay), which is dedicated to the perceptual noema, there is a clear distinction between the judgement *in specie* and the “logical judgement (Husserl 2004, 251, cf. 245, 1987, 145).

The most intriguing aspect of this micro-development was the sudden flip in Husserl’s attitude towards Bolzano, which run exactly parallel with the ascertainment process analysed above. All passages before ca. Enyvvari’s stay in Göttingen are marked by Husserl’s manifest uncertainty about whether he was right in depending on Bolzano as a precursor of the noematical sense of meaning, complaining of contradicting passages in Bolzano just like Husserl did in 1899.²⁵ In a research note written in 1910, dedicated to securing the “distinction

24 Compare Ms. A I 42 / 31a and Husserl 2012b, 29 ff.

25 Husserl 1987, 156 and n. 1 (a research manuscript from 1907), 2012b, 38 (a research manuscript from September 1907), 1987, 33 (the SS 1908 lecture course itself). This incertitude in interpreting Bolzano is

between the judgement *in specie* and the intended states of affairs" (Husserl 2009, 155), however, Husserl suddenly claimed:

"Bolzano was right [*richtig gesehen*] about [the tripartite distinction], as I came to understand it in hindsight, after I had become clear in my mind about the phenomenological clarifications. [...] For what prevented me [from recognising it] was this: the phansical [noetical] interpretation of presentation in itself and proposition in itself, which was suggested by him."²⁶

Husserl was thus suddenly made certain of the two central tenets of his interpretation of Bolzano in the *Ideas I*: (1) Bolzano's misleading noetical self-interpretation that also deceived Husserl at the time of writing the *Logical Investigations*, and (2) that, notwithstanding, the genius of Bolzano "had the noematic concept in mind" (Husserl 1976, 219, n., ET: 1982, 230, n. 38). In the 1910/11 lecture course, Husserl similarly claimed that the second distinction, neglected by traditional logic, was "first emphasised by Bolzano," who, however, did "not rightly grasp" it.²⁷ Based on the short-lived terminology employed by Husserl, it must have been in the same period around Enyvvári's stay in Göttingen that Husserl noted on the inner title page of his copy of the *Logical Investigations*: "For the [planned new] Foreword: That phenomenological analysis is taken as phansical (only in this book) [...]."²⁸ Given this distinctive development, the question arises as to whether the flip in Husserl's attitude towards Bolzano could have an extrinsic trigger as well?

markedly opposed to Husserl's continued confident references to Bolzano's fundamental discovery of "the distinction between subjective presentations as psychical experiences and logical presentations as ideal unities" (Husserl 2001b, 56 (WS 1902/03), cf. 2002a, 14, 70 (SS 1905), 1984c, 143 (WS 1905/06), 2003, 42 (WS 1908/1909)). The discovery of the latter, simple distinction – essentially, the refutation of the psychologism (in contrast to Husserl's more moderate assessment of Bolzano's merits in this regard in the *Logical Investigations* itself, Husserl 1975, 226 ff.) – was, after the emergence of the noematic sense of meaning, reassigned by Husserl to the Ancient Stoics and Bolzano's achievement was degraded to a mere rediscovery (Husserl 2012a, 87).

26 Husserl 2009, 160. Concerning the adjective "phansical," see note above.

27 According to the student transcript (Ms. N I 3 / 11b), cf. Husserl 1987, 408.

28 Husserl 1984b, 790. Bolzano as an unconscious forerunner of the noematic sense of meaning also figures in Husserl's influential self-interpretation written in 1913 and first published posthumously in 1939 (Husserl 2002b, 298–299), even though the bulk of it is dedicated to explicating the dilemma between Platonism and psychologism (i.e., the more trivial first distinction).

4.3 Enyvvari's Participation in the Göttingen Constellation in 1909-1910

We have no reliable information about the contents of the conversations between Enyvvari and Husserl that led the otherwise parsimonious Husserl to attest Enyvvari's "diligence," "competence," and "enthusiastic dedication to the most difficult problems of epistemology" (see *Appendix*). Such situation is not unusual, as, e.g., we are almost completely in the dark about the exact circumstances of the interaction between Husserl and Heidegger in Freiburg during the formative years 1916-1919, despite the high-profile of the latter among Husserl's students.²⁹ What we know in case of Enyvvari is that he was well versed in the doctrines of Bolzano and their contemporaneous interpretations (see Section 2.2 above). Furthermore, just before he left for Göttingen, Enyvvari published a review (Enyvvári 1909c) of a doctoral dissertation written by Gerhard Gotthardt (Gotthardt 1909). Gotthardt (1880-?) obtained his doctoral degree under the supervision of Carl Stumpf (1848-1936), Brentano's arch-student, in Berlin in March 1909, so he unsurprisingly aimed at a psychologistic reinterpretation of Bolzano's doctrines, including interpreting the relation between proposition in itself and state of affairs as a psychological "emphasis."³⁰ Enyvvari's harsh critique of Gotthardt, which was especially insisting on the origins of proposition in itself (cf. Enyvvári 1909c, 465), must have excellently prepared him for what was on the agenda in Göttingen when he arrived.

Seen from this angle, Enyvvari's report of his change of mind in Göttingen, quoted in Section 3 above, might turn out to be misleading about the actual extent of the philosophical interactions in Göttingen; even though it was most probably intended by him as a *bona fide* account of what he believed to have learnt during his stay. Both of his interlocutors have namely published articles shortly thereafter (Conrad 1910; Reinach 1911) aiming at refining or replacing Husserl's theory of expressions (*Ausdruck*), rather than establishing the two senses of meaning.³¹ What Enyvvari actually did in the article in which he announced his change of mind

29 Cf., e.g. Thomas Sheehan's retraction (1997, 17, n. 59) of his oft-cited claim of Heidegger's "attack" against Husserl's notion of ahistorical pure ego in 1919.

30 Gotthardt 1909, 27, n. 2; there are question marks at this passage in the copy in the Municipal Library of Budapest, where Enyvvari was working.

31 Concerning Reinach, cf. the table of contents of Husserl's lost text on Reinach (Husserl 2009, 447; cf. K. Schuhmann 1987, 246–247). As pointed out recently (Fabbianelli 2015), Conrad's distinction between *Bezeichnung* (denoting) and *Kennzeichnung* (denoting in virtue of alleged ontologically intrinsic properties) aimed at transcending Husserl's *both* concepts of meaning (222, cf. 209), motivated by "entirely different

was, on the other hand, a move *towards* Bolzano, insofar as Enyvvári opted for a direct identification between Bolzano’s proposition in itself and the phenomenological notion of meaning (see Enyvvári 1910, 13). Enyvvári’s move could have been heralded as an anticipation (or borrowing) of Husserl’s corresponding development, analysed above, if it had not been for the fact that Enyvvári never came to distinguish explicitly between the judgement *in specie* and the noematical sense of meaning. His detailed exposition of Husserl’s *Ideas* breaks off at § 92 cf. Enyvvári 1913, 53, just before the section entitled “Noesis and Noema in the Realm of Judgement” Husserl 1976, 216 ff., which contains Husserl’s references to Bolzano discussed above. The entry of meaning (“*Jelentés*”) in Enyvvári’s philosophical dictionary merely distinguished between the subjective act and the identical content of meaning, referring to the *Logical Investigations* only Enyvvári 1918, 70–71.³² Even though he listed *Noema* as a *terminus technicus* for *Sinn* (96), he was apparently unaware of Husserl’s attempts to distinguish it from the *in specie* notion of mental acts.

The assessment of Enyvvári’s merits in Göttingen thus hinges on the adopted historiographic methodology. Barring new historical discoveries, the extant sources do not warrant to speak of an unilaterally directed influence of Enyvvári’s knowledge of Bolzano on Husserl’s understanding of Bolzano and its role in the emergence of the distinction between the noetical and noematical senses of meaning. The possible unilateral influences on Enyvvári by Husserl or other members of the nascent Phenomenological Movement are, as I am going to argue below (see Section 5), also unspecific or less interesting. Yet, to say that nothing historically relevant happened in Göttingen in 1909–1910 would amount to a failure caused by an inadequate historiographical toolbox. One methodology that holds the promise of capturing the historical circumstances interwoven with Husserl’s conceptual micro-development reconstructed above is the so-called *Konstellationsforschung*, whose attention is directed at genuine *philosophical constellations* that are characterised by a “dense connection of mutually interacting persons, ideas, theories, problems, and documents” in a manner that does not allow for an isolated identification of achievements or developments (Mulsow 2005, 74). While

conceptions of phenomenology” (224), i.e., methodological opposition between Husserl’s *Aktphänomenologie* and the *Gegenstandsphänomenologie* that the Munich-based circle of Early Phenomenologists strived for.

32 As the correspondence with his publisher demonstrates, the manuscript was already finished in November 1916, or presumably even earlier, the publication being delayed due to the war (Ms. National Széchényi Library (OSZK) Fond 2/375).

Husserl admittedly assumed an asymmetrically more relevant role (at least for the scholarship of phenomenology), it is I think compelling to consider the interactions of the Early Phenomenologists with Husserl and each other as a genuine instance of philosophical constellation. From the point of view of such methodology, Enyvvari appears as a fully entitled participant of this constellation, particularly of the micro-constellation in 1909-1910 concerning the development of the noematical sense of meaning and Bolzano's role in it. The specific nature of his input could then consist in bringing in Bolzano to the debate and settling down the interpretation of Bolzano's proposition in itself,³³ which is missing, e.g., from Heinrich's dissertation.

The side lesson of investigating Enyvvari's participation in the Göttingen phase of the Phenomenological Movement is, beyond the highly technical constellation on the noematical sense of meaning and Bolzano as its forerunner, the need for a more sophisticated historiographical methodology. Before commenting on this observation, let us take a quick look at Enyvvari's work after his return from Göttingen in March 1910.

5 Epilogue: Enyvvari's Failed Creative Foray in 1911-1914

From the point of Enyvvari's own view of his literary output, we have been wasting our efforts so far on his *preparatory writings*.³⁴ What he himself perceived as his specific contribution to philosophy was twofold: The first of them was the identification and characterisation of a new class of "phenomenological givennesses".³⁵ They cannot be analysed using the "technique of direct description but only through negations and similes" (1911a, 114) and are neither intentional (related to something transcendental) nor related to an ego (1911a, 116). They are only apprehended as presenting experiences by a subsequent reflection. Enyvvari calls them

33 From this point of view, Enyvvari's insistence on passages at Bolzano linking proposition in itself and meaning (cf. Enyvvari 1910, 14–15) are particularly telling clues.

34 Cf., e.g., his self-references at Enyvvari 1913, 10, n. 2, 48, n. 1, 1918, 59.

35 First put forward: Enyvvari 1911a; further substantiated: 1912b). Enyvvari quoted the essay of Theodor Conrad (1881-1869), an elusive member of the Phenomenological Movement whom Enyvvari met in Göttingen (Conrad 1911; cf. Enyvvari 1912b, 98, n. 1). Since Conrad, however, completely rejected Husserl's framework of intentional analysis of perceptions and presentations (Conrad 1911, 64 n.), it was mistaken for Enyvvari to rely on Conrad in trying to amend Husserl's framework.

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"presences" (*jelenlévők*), i.e. something standing on the border between past and future, because they "lack temporal givenness" (1911a, 118). Phenomenological examples of presences are provided by "passive states of mind, e.g. being obliviously immersed into something or star-gazing" (1911a, 120). Enyvvári's second perceived specific contribution (Enyvvári 1911b) was namely that he intended to utilize the class of phenomenological givenness delineated above to amend Husserl's eidetics. More precisely, Enyvvári believed his special class of intuitive content, which is *not yet fully apprehended*, could serve as an intuitive fulfilling element *directly* for the eidetic act, without requiring the mediation of founding acts. This is what he presented as his own creative contribution in his only German article (Enyvvári 1914, esp. 142), which is essentially a summary of the aforementioned Hungarian articles.

I do not believe that it was merely for contingent reasons that this essay of Enyvvári got omitted from the bibliography section of Husserl's *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article. First of all, by 1914 Husserl had already got over the problem Enyvvári was trying to solve. As the recently published edition of Husserl's research manuscripts on eidetics prove, Husserl's had devised the notion of eidetic variation around 1912, together with that of a typical essence that guides the former process Husserl 2012b, 56 ff.. Furthermore, Enyvvári also ignored the hints the *Sixth Investigation* could have provided (see e.g. Lohmar 2008): Enyvvári was not trying to solve the problem of the intuitive fulfilling of categorial elements, but he was trying to explain it away by presupposing a magical intuitive content that is capable of doing this job without interfering with other levels (i.e. without being apprehended as an individual red). That his proposal is a short-cut, rather than a phenomenological explanation, is also proved by the fact that it does away with the articulate (*gegliedert*) founding-founded structure, characteristic of every categorial act.

6 Conclusion and Perspectives: Enyvvári's Place in the Phenomenological Movement

Eugen Enyvvári perfectly represents those genuinely interesting figures who fell through the research net during the first major phase of the historiography of phenomenology. Thus it is part of the task of contemporary historians of the Phenomenological Movement to augment the pioneering work done by K. Schuhmann, H. Spiegelberg, and their collaborators, in other words, to identify Enyvvári and his forgotten fellow thinkers in order to establish a reconstruction of phenomenology based on the widest possible circle of phenomenologists and their actual weight, an aim to which I hope the present paper has been able to contribute. This,

however, raises the question of assessing the relevance of individual philosophical contributions, which, in the case of Enyvvari, is far from being trivial.

The most striking feature of Enyvvari's phenomenological oeuvre is the his rich complex acquaintance with both the conceptual edifice of Husserl's phenomenology as presented in the *Logical Investigations* and the historical context in which the latter was embedded. One is compelled to compare Husserl's self-imposed paucity of references to other philosophers – especially in his post-1900 works – with the the non-trivial level of Enyvvari's engagement with Bolzano and the late Prague School of Brentano and wonder how Husserl's relations to other contemporaneous strains of thought could have developed, had Enyvvari became integrated in the nascent Phenomenological Movement in Göttingen.³⁶ Enyvvari's failure to establish a professional career in philosophy, despite initial promising signs,³⁷ was not merely due to his individual luck, but his drifting away from the academia amidst the aftermath of the Great War in the 1920s was part of a larger breakdown against left-leaning intellectuals (especially against those who, like Enyvvari, engaged themselves in the service of the short-lived Council Republic in 1919). Even though Enyvvari managed to become a successful librarian and, since 1926, acclaimed director of the Municipal Library of Budapest (until he was forced to resign in October 1944 when his country was sliding into the total control of National Socialism); there certainly remains a historical possibility left unactualized. The reception of Enyvvari was, furthermore, particularly affected by the language barrier, since his only German publication presented the terminus of his road that led him to conceptual dead-end (see Section 5 above), while the interesting milestones of his journey, characterised by an intense engagement with contemporaneous and historical authors, were published exclusively in his mother tongue.

It is especially Enyvvari's reply to Palagyi (see Section 2.2) that should have been published in German instead. Palagyi's attack on Husserl reverberated in Germany and was instrumental for the birth of the Phenomenological Movement. Enyvvari's counter-critique not only belongs to the full story, but it is easily the most specific reply with regard to both Husserl's *Logical*

36 For example, in presenting Husserl's mature phenomenology, Enyvvari tried to quote Bolzano as a forerunner of phenomenology (Enyvvári 1913, 37, n. 1).

37 In January 1915,0 e.g., he was officially nominated as a corresponding member of the prestigious Hungarian Academy of Sciences by two of his former teachers, Imre Pauer and Bernát Alexander (themselves ordinary, respectively corresponding members of the Academy).

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Investigations and Bolzano. Enyvvári stay in Göttingen was, too, far from being in vain. Based on a micro-analysis of the development of Husserl’s understanding of judgement acts and their meanings around 1909-1910, including the change of his relation to Bolzano as a marker of this development, it is possible reconstruct a historical-philosophical constellation which Enyvvári was part of in virtue of his deep interest in Bolzano’s role in understanding the “unity of meaning” (see Section 4). Even though it is neither possible to formulate Enyvvári’s contributions in terms of unidirectional influences nor does Enyvvári later work mirror Husserl’s noematical-noetical distinction, an adequate historiographic methodology might allow us to grasp the historical reality that underlie Enyvvári’s “enthusiastic dedication to the most difficult problems of epistemology” in Göttingen that led him to “capture [Husserl’s] special sympathies.” Employing such sophisticated methodology could, by the way, benefit the historiography of Early Phenomenology in general.

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Appendix: Edmund Husserl’s Certificate and Postcard to Eugen Enyvvari

Certificate (Husserl’s handwriting):

Zeugnis. |

Herr Enyvvári Jenö aus Budapest, | welcher in diesem Wintersemester | zur Vertiefung seiner philosophischen | Bildung an unserer Georgia Augusta | studierte, hat sich durch außerordentlichen Eifer und Fleiß, durch seine | Gründlichkeit u<nd> Tüchtigkeit, durch seine | begeisterte Hingabe an die schwierig-|sten Probleme der Erkenntniskritik | meine besonderen Sympathien erworben. | Seine künftige wissenschaftliche Entwicklung | lässt das Beste erhoffen, wenn ihm, was | er sehr verdient, entsprechende Förderung | zu Theil wird. |

Göttingen, den 2. März 1910 |

Dr E. Husserl |

o. ö. Professor an der Uni-|versität

Postcard (Postal stamp: Göttingen; August 14, 1913; reproduction of a signed photograph of Edmund Husserl, text in Husserl’s handwriting):

Mit freundlichstem | Gruß an |

Herrn Eugen | Enyvvári |

Göttingen<,> 13.8.<19>13