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Greatness of Spirit: A New Virtue for Our Taxonomies?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 June 2017

SOPHIA VASALOU*
Affiliation:
University of Birmingham

Abstract

In this paper, my aim is to present an unexplored aspect of the Arabic ethical tradition—greatness of spirit—and to assess its philosophical merit. As philosophers in this tradition approach it, greatness of spirit is essentially a virtue of moral aspiration. I consider two construals of the virtue, one as a second-order virtue, another as a virtue whose closest cousin is neo-Aristotelian emulousness. It is the latter that enables us to pick out the substantive commitments the virtue incorporates. These include its emphasis on open-ended aspiration and its self-referential elements. Having isolated these controversial features, I outline some possible defences.

Cet article vise à présenter un aspect peu exploré de la tradition éthique arabe — la grandeur d’esprit — et à évaluer ses mérites philosophiques. Selon les philosophes de cette tradition, la grandeur d’esprit est fondamentalement une vertu d’aspiration morale. J’examine deux interprétations de la vertu, l’une comme vertu de deuxième ordre et l’autre comme vertu apparentée à la vertu néo-aristotélicienne de l’émulation. C’est la seconde interprétation qui nous permet de distinguer les engagements essentiels incorporés dans cette vertu, y compris l’accent mis sur l’aspiration ouverte et les éléments auto-référentiels. Ayant identifié ces caractéristiques discutables, j’esquisse quelques pistes de réponse.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2017 

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