AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTIGATING PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS Max Velmans In M. Velmans (ed.) (2000) Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. Advances in Consciousness Research Volume 13, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 1-15. Abstract: (for online upload) The readings in Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness (2000) were developed from an International Symposium on Methodologies for the Study of Consciousness: A new Synthesis,” that I organised in April, 1996, funded and hosted by the Fetzer Institute, Wisconsin, USA, with the aim of fostering the development of first-person methods that could be used in conjunction with already well-developed third-person methods for investigating phenomenal consciousness. In this Introduction, we briefly survey the state of the art at that time, the reasons for a resurgence of interest in consciousness, the available methodologies, the reasons for increasing dissatisfaction with the adequacy of reductive third-person methods, various difficulties facing the development of rigorous first-person methods, and various creative approaches to solving these difficulties. Suggestions are also made about how to heal the fragmentation in consciousness studies, by placing different approaches to the study of consciousness into a broader context, establishing their domain of applicability and providing some bases for synthesis. The study of consciousness predates the founding of modern experimental psychology, and was its original focus of interest. Psychology's original method, "experimental introspection" (developed by Wundt) was intended to be a form of 'chemistry of the mind' in which compound experiences were to be analysed into their constituent elements; early psychologists also attempted to chart the manner in which variations in the elements of consciousness depend on variations in stimulus conditions (psychophysics). However, experimental introspectionism, in its early forms, did not provide a firm foundation for the growth of a science of consciousness, let alone a science of psychology. Different laboratories produced widely differing estimates of the number of component elements of consciousness, and used different categorical systems. There were differences of opinion over what was an elemental as opposed to a compound experience. Crucially, there was no agreed method for settling disagreements. Psychologists also became increasingly uncomfortable with the need to couch all their investigations in terms of how things are experienced. Watson (1913) for example, argued that it was fruitless to speculate on how non-human animals experience the world, and that this blocked the development of a study of behaviour which could be 1 applied both to humans and to non-human animals. Refocusing psychology on the study of behaviour would also provide it with a public, "objective" database, commensurate with other areas of science. Although introspective methods continued to be used in clinical fields, for example in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, with the ascendance of Behaviourism the study of consciousness came to be regarded as bad scientific practice. Even in psychophysics, where it persisted, the language used to describe the methodology avoided all reference to consciousness. Verbal reports (of perceived stimulus dimensions) were regarded as "verbal behaviour," or verbal reports were avoided altogether by requiring subjects to respond to stimuli with some non-verbal motor response (such as pressing a button). These developments in psychology were reflected in the attitudes of the wider scientific community, and for much of the 20th Century consciousness has been thought to be beyond scientific investigation. At the present time, we are in a period of transition. While some of the scientific community remains cautious, the resurgence of interest in consciousness in recent years is becoming intense. The reasons for this are diverse: 1. Culturally, there is increasing dissatisfaction with a worldview in which consciousness in its many forms has no natural place. For the science of psychology this 'loss of consciousness' is acute - a psychology that investigates brain states and behaviour but not how humans experience the world, cannot be complete. 2. In recent theorising about the relation of mind to body it is becoming recognised that consciousness poses not just one problem, but many. Some of the problems lend themselves to investigation by existing scientific means, some require the development of new methodologies, and some require theoretical advance. But these problems are increasingly being thought of as problems for science (rather than for philosophy). The newly emerging science of consciousness is correspondingly diverse. Much of the research is taking place within psychology and the related biological sciences (see readings in Velmans, 1996, Cohen & Schooler, 1997 and reviews by Crick and Koch, 1998, Frith, Perry and Lumer, 1999). Cognitive psychologists, for example, focus largely on the contrasts between conscious and nonconscious processes and seek to fit consciousness into some functional model of the mind/brain. Social psychologists increasingly view consciousness as embedded in social context and culture, and have turned to qualitative methodologies to illuminate such relationships. Neuropsychologists have uncovered many dissociations within consciousness and between conscious and nonconscious states. They are also beginning to isolate some of the neural conditions for consciousness. In the clinical domain there is a reawakening interest in psychosomatic interactions, for example, in the influence of imagery, meditation, biofeedback, hypnosis, and placebo treatments on bodily states. 2 The broad field of "consciousness studies" also includes input from many other disciplines ranging from the natural sciences to the social sciences. Efforts to establish a more complete model of mind have also received input from disciplines such as parapsychology and the study of spiritual practices, currently thought (by many) to be at the edge of or outside of the prevailing scientific paradigm. Methodologies. Within experimental psychology and the related biological sciences, the focus has largely been on relating given states of consciousness to given states of the brain, defined either in structural or functional terms. While subjective reports of conscious experience enter into such studies, they remain minimal, for example requiring subjects to report on whether they can detect, identify or notice changes in relatively simple stimuli. The purpose of such reports is mainly to provide information about the processes antecedent to consciousness rather than about consciousness as such. Although the use of subjective reports is widespread in experimental psychology, they are still regarded by some researchers with suspicion, even as reliable indicators of whether a stimulus is conscious or not.1 This suspicion is fostered by the prevailing tendency towards reductionism in philosophy and science, along with a reliance only on what can be observed from a "third-person perspective." Although this re-awakened interest in consciousness and its relation to psychological processes is a welcome development there is increasing doubt about whether a science of consciousness can be properly carried out only from a third-person perspective. For example, many of the presuppositions which ground the third- versus first-person distinction are currently under challenge (see chapter 15, and Velmans, 1993, 1999b, 2000). Equally, the traditional separation of the observer from the observed is difficult to sustain when consciousness is the focus of interest (particularly in subjective reports or other forms of self-examination), suggesting the need, at least in some contexts for a participative science. States of consciousness are also embedded in, and partly determined by social and ecological contexts, requiring a more holistic approach to analysis (see Harman, 1994, and readings in Harman & Clark, 1994). More generally, traditional studies of psychological processes do not in themselves address the complexities of human life as experienced, nor in any broad sense, the difficulties these present (see Claxton 1991). The understanding and transformation of human experience requires different methodologies. In response to this, the broad field of consciousness studies employs and is continuing to develop a wide range of methodologies (both ancient and modern) appropriate to the different questions one can ask about consciousness, and the different approaches appropriate to its fuller understanding. Unfortunately, this diversity is also leading to considerable compartmentalisation and fragmentation. For example, there is little understanding of how traditional studies of psychological processing relate to more introspective first-person investigations, and uncertainty about how to translate the findings derived from first-person methods into a systematic, intersubjective science. Nor is there a clear understanding of what the practical applications of such a science might be. The issues are ontological and epistemological as well as methodological. 3 The purpose of this book is to introduce some of the creative ways in which first-person methods can be used and to re-assess their limitations. Suggestions are also made about how to heal the fragmentation in consciousness studies, by placing different approaches to the study of consciousness into a broader context, establishing their domain of applicability and providing some bases for synthesis. THE BOOK PART 1: METHODOLOGIES is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of the many techniques for studying consciousness. Rather it samples from a range of methods that give first-person phenomenology a central place, although many approaches also stress the value of triangulating first-person findings with traditional third-person measures, or stress the dependence of first-person investigations on establishing intersubjectivity (second-person relationships) within a social context. Part 1:A Chapters 2, 3 and 4 exemplify different ways of relating conscious and unconscious mental states to processing in the brain: Peter Fenwick (chapter 2) provides an introduction to the range of neuroimaging techniques that are currently available for investigating brain activities that accompany conscious experience, giving a brief overview of their advantages and limitations. These include magnetic resonance imaging and functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI, fMRI), MRI spectroscopy, positron emission tomography (PET), single photon emission tomography (SPET), magnetoencephalography (MEG), and electroencephalography (EEG). Experiences whose correlates have been investigated with such techniques range from externally generated ones such as visual input, to those where the subjective response to stimuli is more important than the representation of external stimuli as such, for example, orgasm, and the response to psychotropic drugs. Experiences that rely largely on endogenous processing have also been studied, including imagined (rather than real) movements, emotions such as fear anger and disgust, and the cognitive activity accompanying a “theory of mind.” With these techniques, the brain can be partitioned into numerous functional areas whose relationship to consciousness can be studied in detail. However, Fenwick warns that such imaging techniques do not reveal consciousness itself and do not allow one to study it as it is in itself. The metaphysical assumptions implicit in this largely third-person approach also exclude any understanding of how neuronal activity becomes “subjective experience.” Howard Shevrin (chapter 3) illustrates how findings based on first- and third-person investigations can complement each other by providing mutual support for inferences about mental processing. This can apply to both conscious and unconscious mental states. In the research that he reviews, first-person information (patients’ accounts and understanding of their symptoms) is combined with thirdperson cognitive and neurophysiological measures to provide evidence for “unconscious conflict” – an inference about unconscious processing initially derived from psychodynamic theory. He also provides evidence that unconscious affective 4 processing is active and controlled rather than merely dispositional or automatic. Unconscious processes also appear to be highly individual and subject to the influences of personality and the vicissitudes of individual history, unlike the nomothetic models of such processes typically derived from a purely third-person investigative techniques. Mark Solms (chapter 4) examines clinical situations in which the interpretations suggested by first- and third-person evidence conflict. It is often taken for granted that third-person accounts are to be preferred in such instances. Solms, however, advocates a more neutral stance. As he notes, traditional “subjective” and “objective” research traditions in psychology provide different perspectives on a common underlying reality (the mind itself). Consequently, differences between these can be utilised to correct viewpoint-dependent observational errors and theoretical interpretations, whether they are first- or third-person. To illustrate, he provides detailed case histories of the “right hemisphere syndrome” (a combination of anosognosia, neglect, and defective spatial cognition) for which there are three standard interpretations in behavioural neuroscience. Surprisingly, first-person data obtained via psychoanalytic investigations suggest a fourth account of this syndrome that provides a fuller understanding that is consistent with all the data. Part 1:B Chapters 5 and 6 re-examine the scope and limits of first-person methods as such: Richard Stevens (chapter 5) suggests that phenomenology should be the central discipline in consciousness studies but argues that this requires procedures for mapping phenomenal consciousness just as there are for neurophysiological mapping. He re-examines the history of phenomenological methods in Western psychological science, from the early work of Wundt and James to the more recent work of Jaynes, Romanyshyn, Donaldson and Csikszentmihalyi, and notes that in none of these is there a clear statement of methods for phenomenological mapping. The eidetic analysis of phenomenological psychologists working in the tradition of Husserl does appear to be systematic. However these methods arguably elicit abstractions rather than providing an account of what is actually being experienced. Stevens asks “what is it about consciousness that makes it so resistant to investigation?” His answer is that conscious experience is in itself essentially sensory though it is underpinned by implicit meaning systems. To make progress one needs to distinguish between these. Only the former allows for sufficient intersubjective agreement to provide a consistent mapping onto neurophysiology. The latter requires hermeneutic reconstruction that varies according to the assumptions and methods of the researcher. A further feature of consciousness is its capacity to construct as it represents, which may pose the need for a third epistemology that the Stevens terms “transformational”. Natalie Depraz, Francisco Varela and Pierre Vermersch (chapter 6), by contrast, describe a recently developed phenomenological method of investigation that is not restricted to abstractions. As with other methods in the tradition of Husserl, this has 5 at its heart the so-called phenomenological reduction or épochè, which can also be described as "a reflective act", "becoming aware", or "mindfulness". In essence, this requires a suspension of habitual thought and judgement, a conversion of attention from "the exterior" to "the interior" and letting-go – a state of receptivity towards the experience. Based on their work in Paris, the temporal dynamics of these phases are described in careful detail. The authors point out that for the purposes of communication and the establishment of intersubjectively shared, systematic knowledge, such investigations need to be accompanied by two further phases involving engagement with others: expression and validation (a transition from a first- to a communally shared second-person perspective). They also indicate how aspects of this methodology relate to classical Buddhist investigative techniques. Part 1C: Chapters 7, 8 and 9 focus on methods for changing experience rather than describing it and analysing it: Jane Henry (chapter 7) surveys the methodologies used to transform experience in clinical practice and the growing field of personal and professional development. She begins by contrasting the diverse theoretical positions of the key schools, but goes on to suggests that there is more commonality in practice, and outlines some of the critical, common factors identified by outcome research. She then goes on to question the wisdom of some of the principles that are widely assumed to be necessary to transform consciousness in clinical and applied psychology. The standard clinical orientation focuses on pathology rather than positive potential. Privileged strategies tend to stress rational routes to insight and to assume a need for emotional discharge. This has led to the neglect of other strategies that research on well-being suggests may be more critical, such as the importance of social interaction and active involvement in challenging but achievable tasks. Janet Richardson (chapter 8) presents a case for applying an “intersubjective science” to the study and development of the “therapeutic relationship” in clinical settings. Combining theoretical analyses of intersubjectivity drawn from psychology and nursing, she illustrates the effects of establishing genuine intersubjectivity or ‘shared consciousness’ both on what is revealed in diagnostic procedures and on therapeutic outcomes. ‘Objective’ measures are needed to diagnose and treat disease. But intersubjectivity is required to understand the experience of illness, for example through attention to patient’s stories, and by the development of empathy in clinical practice. Openness and ‘presence’ within a therapeutic encounter can also have non-specific healing effects that are often regarded as “placebo effects” in the evaluation of conventional and complementary medicine. However these effects can be harnessed rather than dismissed. In research, qualitative methods such as ethnography, grounded theory and phenomenology are particularly well suited to an open-ended exploration of the individual, social and cultural factors that might facilitate such effects, although quantitative methods are needed to test their efficacy. Once the ‘healing’ factors are understood it may, to some extent, be possible to train practitioners to develop the appropriate skills. 6 David Fontana (chapter 9) gives a detailed account of how methods for examining consciousness have been used as a means to change it in diverse cultures for nearly 3000 years. Irrespective of cultural differences, similar features emerge. These include the view that normal consciousness is only one of many potential conscious states, that some states can be categorised as being at higher “levels”, and that it is possible to realise human potential by entering into progressively higher states. He then summarises one of the clearest models of these states, the Advaita model of Vedantic Hinduism, and shows how many of the “oppositions” in Western thought (materialism versus idealism, self versus no-self) are not necessarily opposed in Eastern thought or in Western mystical traditions. Rather, seeming opposites translate into how things appear at different ‘levels of realisation’. Of the many techniques suggested to change conscious experience, Fontana picks out disidentification (with ordinary conscious contents) and mindfulness (clear and focused attention) as central. How do we assess these practices and these claims? Fontana suggests that investigators need to examine their effects both on others and themselves. One can also note the cultural impact of such practices on social cohesion, education, philosophy, literature and the arts. PART 2: MAPS provides six different overviews of the consciousness studies terrain. Alwyn Scott (chapter 10) presents an applied mathematician's view of consciousness research and presents a case for consciousness being a property of nonlinear biological systems that emerged at the point that organisms developed the ability to make choices. However, he stresses that present day physical science is far from achieving even a qualitative understanding of an object as intricate as the human brain embodied in a biological substrate and embedded in culture. Given this, such simplifying notions as reductive materialism, genetic determinism, and computer functionalism appear to be more the beliefs of certain scientists than necessary conclusions of physical science. According to Scott, formulations at least as general as those of philosophers Karl Popper and Ken Wilber will be required to encompass the nature of mind. He also offers several suggestions for modifications in the nature of scientific research in specific fields of activity that may be appropriate during the coming century. The chapter closes with an observation first advanced by ethnologist Ruth Benedict that a fundamental understanding of the nature of human consciousness may require the re-emergence of a complementary relationship between the sciences and the humanities. Rom Harré (chapter 11) provides an example of how the consciousness studies terrain might be charted from the perspective of linguistic philosophy. Following Wittgenstein, he suggests that by analysing the rules for the application of a word we can gain insight into its domain of application. The term “consciousness” for example has a relational component (consciousness of) and involves “perceptual centredness” (exemplified by the use of first-person expressions). He suggests that common sense psychology currently seems to include four classes of being -- souls, persons, organisms and molecules -- and that each of these is described with its own characteristic “grammar”. For example, unlike organisms and molecules, the soul 7 and the person can be said to have moral responsibility. The distinction between tasks, and the tools used to carry out the tasks may be a useful way to relate these “grammars”. Soul and person grammars, for example, are used to describe tasks while organism and molecule grammars describe the tools to carry them out. Such considerations may have consequences for the forms that consciousness takes in different societies. Linguistic and other symbolic forms provide means by which experience is made available to someone in an act of cognition. In so far as these symbolic forms are local to a given society, they may contribute to a local, socially constructed field of awareness. Charles Tart (chapter 12) approaches the problems of consciousness from the point of view of one who has devoted many years to investigating altered states of consciousness (ASC’s). He warns against reductionism, which does not take into account the wider effects of the phenomena of consciousness on personal life, values, culture, and on science itself. Rather the phenomena have to be studied in their own right, and this applies especially to the effects of ASCs. The essential methods of science (observation, theorizing, prediction, communication and consensual validation) also have to be distinguished from the particular methodologies one might apply in a given field. He proposes that the essential methods of science can be applied from within various ASCs, using the state-specific perceptions and forms of thought which characterise these states to form a variety of state-specific, complementary sciences that will expand our understanding of both consciousness and world. Prospects for the development of such state-specific sciences are also discussed. John Pickering (chapter 13) suggests that first- and third-person investigations of consciousness can proceed in a spirit of mutual co-operation and points out that some of the seeming difficulties have to do with the ethos of third-person science to which much of psychology subscribes. Third-person methods usually employ impressive machinery which carry the badge of “big science” – with funding and other implications for psychology as a discipline within the realpolitik of the academy. However psychology suffers from a degree of rigidity as a consequence. For example, the stress on experimental control and conformity to norms (implicit in the use of statistics) tends to marginalise individual differences. Exclusive reliance on mechanistic, computational models overlooks more organic, systems views of cognition. The treatment of first-person accounts as unreliable folk-psychology, opens the way to consciousness being thought of as nothing more than a state of the brain. Because subjectivity cannot be encompassed within such approaches, this over-extension of reductionist thought will leave psychology at an impasse. As an alternative, Pickering advocates a post-modern pluralism, in which multiple perspectives are an intrinsic condition of knowing anything. These would include phenomenological as well as cognitive and neurological methods. Systematic qualitative methods also need to supplement quantitative ones, allowing for new forms of triangulation and theory development (this has happened in recent investigations of the experience of “time” and investigation of Eastern practices such as meditation). Such developments will mean a broadening of the psychology 8 curriculum and recognition that methods carry values – which opens the way to a more complete, inclusive science of mental life. Ken Wilber and Richard Walsh (chapter 14) provide a very broad map of consciousness studies that incorporates nearly all current disciplines that might be directly or indirectly relevant to its understanding. They begin by comparing the major schools of thought, including cognitive science, introspectionism, neuropsychology, psychotherapy, social and developmental psychology, psychiatry, psychosomatic medicine, studies of altered states, Eastern and contemplative traditions, quantum approaches, research into “subtle energy”, and evolutionary psychology. They then fit the complementary features of the world that these disciplines study into an elegant map defined by two dimensions: the individual versus the collective, and the interior versus the exterior. Different forms of existence are also arranged on the map in terms of their evolutionary development, ranging from primitive forms in the origin or centre of the map to more complex forms as one moves from the centre to the periphery. This defines “four quadrants” in which evolution can take place: evolution can be individual and interior (forms of consciousness), collective and interior (forms of cultural life), individual/exterior (physical forms), and collective/exterior (individuals forming into progressively larger groups). Each quadrant has an appropriate descriptive language – an “I”, “we” or “it” language (corresponding to having a first, second or third-person perspective). It also has domain-appropriate validity claims: for example the truthfulness of a claim about subjective experience versus the accuracy of a claim about an “objective” state of affairs. However all forms of valid knowing have something in common: an injunction, an apprehension, and a confirmation. In short, follow a given procedure, apprehend the evidence, and confirm the claim. Given that each quadrant is a part of the whole, Wilber & Walsh suggest that consciousness actually exists distributed across all four quadrants with all of their various levels and dimensions. The subjective is embedded in the intersubjective, the objective and the interobjective. In their view reductionism is doomed to fail, nor can the explanatory gap between the “subjective” and the “objective” be bridged by formal thought. Rather all quadrants are mutually supporting and need to be simultaneously explored – an “all level, all quadrant” approach to consciousness studies. My own final map (Velmans, chapter 15) approaches consciousness studies with the traditional concerns of an experimental psychologist. It stresses the need for a phenomenology of consciousness and begins with an outline of the various ways in which conventional third-person studies of body and brain can be complementary to first-person studies of experience. It then comes to grips with some of the enduring problems: How can one study “subjective” experiences “objectively”? What methodological problems peculiar to the study of experience need to be resolved? What are the appropriate ways to deal with “observer effects” which become acute with introspective methods where the observer is the observed. I suggest that the “subjective” versus “objective” distinction is largely artefactual and rooted in a misleading description of the contents of consciousness that dualists and reductionists share. The everyday 3-dimensional physical world that we experience is part-of the contents of consciousness not apart-from it – and the evidence of 9 physics relies on the observations/experiences of scientists much as the evidence of consciousness studies relies on the observations/experiences of scientists and subjects. This requires a more careful analysis of scientific “objectivity”. Scientists can be objective in the sense of being “dispassionate,” scientific method can also be “objective” in the sense that it follows well-specified, repeatable procedures, observations can be “objective” in the sense of intersubjective, but no observations are objective in the sense of being observer-free. The consequences for “repeatability” and the “empirical method” in science are then worked out. In essence, the empirical method is: if you follow these procedures you will observe or experience these results. The chapter then gives a brief survey of methodological problems that are peculiar to consciousness studies. Unlike the phenomena studied in physics, there are asymmetries of access to individual experiences. Phenomena in consciousness studies also differ in terms of their relative permanence, stability, measurability, controllability, describability, complexity, variability, and their dependence on the observational arrangements. While domain-specific methodologies have been developed to cope with some of these problems, much remains to be done. For example, “observer effects” can be particularly strong in consciousness studies either when the observed is another human being or oneself. If one’s aim is to study a given conscious state one can attempt to minimise such effects. Alternatively, if one’s aim is to change a given conscious state, one can harness such effects. Close observer - observed engagements for example foster the creation of intersubjectivity (a joint “second-person perspective”). Some techniques for observing one’s own conscious states can also, potentially, transform them. How different forms of engagement with others or oneself might facilitate such change is an important topic for research. Overview of the Maps Close study of the maps reveals broad areas of commonality. However, there are major differences of emphasis and, occasionally, areas of disagreement. All the maps agree for example that there are different aspects of consciousness studies that may need to be described by different “languages” – for example a first-person “I” language versus a third-person “it” language, and that the relationships between entities, events or processes so described need to be understood. However, Harré suggests that an analysis of the use of language as such will clarify the problems of consciousness, and Tart suggests that there may be a variety of “logics” or forms of thought that are specific to given (altered) states of consciousness. These claims go beyond the general support for a multidisciplinary approach expressed, for example, in the chapters by Scott, and Pickering, and elaborated on by Wilber & Walsh. To take another example, Scott treats consciousness as a property of complex, nonlinar systems that emerged only once organisms were able to make choices, while Wilber and Walsh prefer Teilhard de Chardin’s suggestion that “Refracted rearwards along the course of evolution, consciousness displays itself qualitatively as a spectrum of shifting shades whose lower terms are lost in the night.”2 Another interesting point of difference concerns the ultimate limitations of consciousness studies: Wilber & Walsh, for example, despair of ever being able to cross the explanatory gap from the “subjective” to the “objective” by the use of formal thought. However, in my own 10 map I suggest that the “gap” exists only because the conventional point of departure is wrong. All observations in science are ultimately “subjective” although they can become “objective” in being intersubjective. It should be stressed that none of these maps is intended to be definitive and all the maps are open to development and change. However, taken together, they begin to define some of the rough contours of this complex, interdisciplinary field. Fundamental differences between the maps should not be ignored, as they are invitations to further debate and investigation. At the same time, the differences should not be allowed to obscure areas of emerging consensus. There is consensus for example, that consciousness cannot be fully understood from an external, thirdperson perspective. The third-person investigation of brain structures and functions that support conscious experiences remains important, but this needs to be supplemented by systematic first-person study of what it is like to be in given conscious states. The nature of such states is also heavily influenced by the way they are embedded in social contexts. How “I” view matters is influenced by the way “we” view matters – which requires systematic study of the complex interchange between first-, second-, and third-person perspectives. It is also interesting to note that Tart, Wilber & Walsh, and I independently arrive at an identical conclusion about what might be essential to consciousness studies. At the heart of the study of consciousness is an injunction, which in essence is, “do this and you will experience this,” or, “if you follow these procedures you will observe or experience these results.” The study of consciousness, like the rest of science, relies on the empirical method. Notes 1 See for example the attacks on introspective reports in target articles by Holender (1986), Shanks & St. John (1994) (with accompanying open peer reviews) and the subsequent critiques of these attacks by Kihlstrom (1996), Velmans (1991, 1999a). 2 I discuss the relative merits of such “continuity theories” versus emergent, “discontinuity theories” in Velmans (2000) chapter 12. References Claxton, G. 1991. “Psychosophy: are we ready for a science of self-knowledge?” Psychologist 4: 249-252. Cohen, J.D. and Schooler, J.W. eds. 1997. Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Crick, F. and Koch, C. (1998) ‘Consciousness and neuroscience’, Cerebral Cortex 8: 97107. 11 Frith, C., Perry, R. and Lumer, E. 1999. “The neural correlates of conscious experience: and experimental framework”. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3, 105-114. Harman, W. 1994. “The scientific exploration of consciousness: Towards an adequate epistemology.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 1(1): 140-148. Harman, W. and Clark, J. eds. 1993. The New Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science. Sausilito, California: Institute of Noetic Sciences. Holender, D. 1986. “Semantic activation without conscious identification in dichotic listening, parafoveal vision, and visual masking.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9:1-66. Kihlstrom, J.F. 1996. “Perception without awareness of what is perceived, learning without awareness of what is learned.” In M. Velmans ed. The Science of Consciousness: Psychological, Neuropsychological, and Clinical Reviews, London: Routledge. Shanks, D.R. & St.John, M.F. 1994. “Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17(3): 367-447. Velmans, M. 1991. “Is human information processing conscious?” Brain Sciences 14(4): 651-726. Behavioral and Velmans, M. 1993. “A reflexive science of consciousness.” In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Ciba Foundation Symposium 174, Chichester: Wiley. Velmans, M (ed). 1996. The Science of Consciousness: Neuropsychological and Clinical Reviews. London: Routledge. Psychological, Velmans, M. 1999a. “When perception becomes conscious”. British Journal of Psychology 90(4), 543-566. Velmans, M. 1999b. “Intersubjective science”. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6(2/3): 299-306. Velmans, M. 2000. Understanding Consciousness. London: Routledge. Watson, J. B. 1913. “Psychology as the behaviorist views it”. The Psychological Review XX: 158-177. 12 13