TOWARDS A DEEPER L'NDERSTANDII\G F COINSCIOL]SNESS Selected works of Max Velmans IVIAX VEL]\AANS 7rl\ rtlr llI, \!72 WORLD LIBRARY OF PSYCHOLOGISTS SERIES u ct c A Psychology Press Book 1 m E' 6l m "Over the years,Velmans has presented a number of most interesting ideas on consciousness. Indeed, he is one of the few psychologists to take the topic so systematically and seriously. The volume will be of interest to psychologists, philosophers, neuroscientists, and anyone interested in the toughest problem currently facing science." - Chris Frith, Professor Emeritus, UCL, UK In the World Library of Psychologisfs series, international experts themselves present career-long collections of what they judge to be their finest pieces errlracts from books, key articles, salient research findings, and their major practical theoretical contributions. In this volume Max Velmans reflects on his long-spanning and varied career, considers the highs and lows in a brand new introduction, and offers reactions to those who have responded to his published work over the years. This book offers a unique and compelling collection of the best publications in consciousness studies from one of the few psychologists to treat the topic systematically and seriously. Velmans'approach is multi faceted and represents a convergence of numerous fields of study - culminating in fascinating insights that are of interest to philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists alike. With continuing contemporary relevance, and significant historical impact, this collection of works is an essential resource for all those engaged or interested in the field of consciousness studies and the philosophy of the mind. MaxVcknans is Emeritus Professor of Psychology at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK. CONSCIOUSNESS an informa business E) $\ Routledoe lsBN 978-1 -1 38-69944-1 raytorarran.iit,oup www. routledge.com/psychology Roiltledge titles are available as eEook editions in a range of digital formats ,lluJlllluullilllffillll .)I) ,(lrsre,trun 'sqlnusplog 1e 6uopuol ,{8o1oqc,(sd Jo JossaloJd snluorug sr suurula1 -;,- xul\ 'purut or{l go ,(qdosolqd aql pue serpnls ssousnorcsuoc Jo plou eql ur pelsaJ:tu. pe8e8ue osoql [e JoJ ooJllosoJ l€rluesso uB sr s>lJoa Jo uor]collo3 srr'1:edrur lEcrJolsq luecgru8rs pue 'ecue,teler ,{.re-rodrueluoc Surnurluoo qtlr\\ 'e{rle slsr}uarosoJnou pue s1sr3o1oqc,(sd 'sreqdosopqd o1 lsorolur Jo oJE 1r-_-slqSrsur SurleurcseJ ur Surleurulnc *,(pn1s 3o spleu snoJer.unu 3o acue8ra,\uor r sluesa;der pue peleouJrllntu sr qceo;dde.sueu1er1 dlsnoues pue ,(lucr1eu::s... ctdol aql lueJl ol s1sr3o1oqc.,(sd ,!\eJ oql Jo euo ruo:j serpnls ssousnorosLro-l 'j suotlecqqnd lsoq eql Jo uorloelloJ Surlleduroc pue onbrun B srefJo Iooq sr-_r 'sree.( eql lo^o {Jo,r\ paqsrlqnd srq o} pepuodser e,ruq oq,u esoql o} suou,i.:sraJJo pue'uorlcnporlur,{\eu pue"rq e ur s,^aol pue sq8rq oql sJeprsuoJ.la;j:: porJ€^ puu Suruueds-8uo1 srq uo slcego,r su€urle1 xEIAI otunlo^ srql ul ;o ;oleur ;reql pue 's8urpug 'suorlnqrJluos I€crloJooql qc-reosoJ luorlus 'selcrye .(e1 ,s1ooq lr?Jr13r. _ uro{ strf.i:i: secerd Jroql eq ol e8pnl .{eqt suorloolloc 3uo1-;eeler lseuu 1uq.u.}o tu:s:-: se^lasuaql s],redxe l€uorleuJellrr 'seues s6t3o1ot1t{s7 to l.to.tq7 plrefi au.i'::_ ssousnolJSuoJ ;o SurpuulsJepull redaoq B spJB.uoI World Library of Psychologists The World Library of Psychologists series celebrates the important contributions to psychology made by leading experts in their individual fields of study. Each scholar has compiled a career-long collection of what they consider to be their finest pieces: extracts from books, journals, articles, major theoretiial and practical contributions, and salient research findings. For the first time ever the work of each contributor is presented in a single volume so readers can follow the themes and progress of their work and identify the contributions made to, and the development of, the fields themselves. Each book in the series features a specially written introduction by the contributor giving an overview of their caroer, contextualising their selection within the development of the field, and showing how their thinking developed over time. Reasoning, Rationality and Dual Processes Selected works of Jonathan St B T Evans By Jonathan St B T Evans The Assessment, Evaluation and Rehabilitation of Everyday Memory Problems Selected papers of Barbara A. Wilson By Barbara A. Wilson Facial Expression Recognition Selected works of Andy Young By Andy Young From Obscurity to Clarity in Psychometric Testing Selected works of Professor Peter Saville By Professor Peter Saville With Tom Hopton Philosophy and History of Psychology Discovering the Social Mind Selected works of Christopher D. Frith By Christopher D. Frith Selected works of Elizabeth Valentine By Elizabeth R. Vqlentine Thinking Developmentally from Constructivism to Developmental Transitions across the Lifespan Selected works of Leo B. Hendry By Leo B. Hendry Studies of Thinking Selected works of Kenneth Gilhooly By Kenneth J. Gilhooly Attention, Perception and Action Selected works of Glyn Humphreys By Glyn W Humphreys Neuroconstructivism of Annette Karmiloff-Smith Selected works By Anne t te Karmiloff- Smit h Acquired Language Disorders in Adulthood and Childhood Selected works of Elaine Funnell Edited by Nicola Pitchford, Andrew W Ellis Towards a Deeper Understanding Consciousness Selected works of Max Velmans By Max Velmans of )uolA tN oNV NooNot dnorg souerl jto1,{e1 \[| abpallnou (E suBrule^ XBHI suelulo^ xsl^i Jo s{ro^\ pe}celes sseusnorJsuoJ Jo Eupuulsropun redoeq B sprulrol First published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square. Milton Park. Abingdon. Oxon OXl4 4RN and by Routledge 7l I Third Avenue. New York. NY 10017 Routledge is on intprint of the Tat,lor & Franci.s Group, cut infinrtabu,sine.s,s O 2017 Max Velmans The right of Max Velmans to be identified as author ol this work has been asserted by him in accordance with scctions 77 and78 ol the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A11 rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic. mechanioal. or other means, now known or hereafter invented, includin-e photocopying and recording. or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in rvriting from the publishers. Tratlenrark notice: Product or corporate names may bc trademarks or rcgistered tradcmarks. and are used only for identification ar.rd explanation without intent to infringe. British l.ibrarr Cutalo,guing in Publicotion Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Librnry o/'Congress Cotctloguing itt Publication Data A catalog record lor this title has been requested ISBN: 978-l -l 38-69944-l (hbk) ISBN: 978-l --3 I 5-5 I 677-6 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Out ol House Publishing ./} FSC Mtx FSC. C013604 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CRO 4YY xapuJ 9ZZ 861 (EIO) tusmol I olrxegeg pue Iepo IN luoplr1 sseusnorcsuo3*pur141-,(po g ',gl'ursqenpuoNeileApv'usrlenqez(q4ue5 Suorue secue8re,rrp pue secueS.reluoJ :uorlceJrp oATJJB o} 1y\oH I I uJolsely[ e ruoJJ eceld u;elseiJue le (ZtOd sseusnorcsuoc Jo uorlnlo^e bLI 6sI LTI 8ZI (ttoz) (ZOO) esur€Jq lceJJe secuerredxe snorcsuoc LE t(, I L. gtes ( t OO t plnoc,r\oH g ) ,,ea,rlcedsred uos;ed-1srg e ruo4 sseusnorcsuo3,, ruo{ slc€J}xg L (tOOt) .6asnorcsuoc slc?Jlxg g (ZIOO sseusnorcsuoc pue reilBru'pupu Suoue suorluleJ 1ecrs,(qdoqc,(s4 :rusruour elrxegoU g Sursseco:d uoJleruJoJur ugrunq sL, ruo4 Z9 0I snorcsuocun/snorcsuocerdsqlpue,(cue8e snorcsuoC 6 66 6L eql (tOOd ssousnorcsuoc go ,(pn1s eqt roJ ,(8o1orue1srde (OOOt) plro^A 1ecrs,(qd uy eql pue ure.rq 'sseusnorcsuo3 n t (OOOZ) sseusnorcsuoc ouuep ol lou ^\oq pue - sseusnorcsuoc euuep 01 ,&\oH z uo[cnporlul I sluawaBpalnou4)y slueluoJ Acknowledgements The deep conversations I have had about consciousness with others over the years are far too numerous to mention. But I would like to give special mention to interactions with David Fontana, John Crook, Jeffrey Gray and Stevan Harnad that were influential in my early years, along with Peter Fenwick, David Lorimer and members of the Scientific and Medical Network who were also interested in rekindling the study of consciousness from the early 1990s onwards. In more recent times I have also particularly enjoyed interactions with Don Price, Ed Kelley, Etzel Cardefra, Milan Scheidegger, Alan Wallace and Michel Bitbol, all of whom are extending the boundaries of what remains to be explored, and how to explore it, along with senior Indian academics such as K. Ramakrisna Rao, and Anand Paranjpe, who helped me to develop an Eastern dimension to my thought, and speciflcally checked Chapter 11 to make sure that I have represented Eastern views accurately, and provided supportive comments. Any remaining errors of interpretation are of course my own. Over the years I have also been privileged to cross intellectual swords with many gifted opponents, including John Searle, Dan Dennett, Nicholas Humphrey, Thomas Metzinger and David Chalmers. My thanks to my many students whose enthusiasm and fascination about the problems of consciousness energised my teaching at Goldsmiths over decades, and closer to home, my thanks to the many folk who I engage with in interesting ways on this topic, in Totnes, where I now live. Closest to home, my thanks as ever to those of my family and friends who have been fellow travellers on this never-ending jourrrey and who have, in one way or another, supported me over the years. You know who you are. Finally, my thanks to the following individuals and publishers for permission to reproduce material in this book: Graham Horswell and Imprint Academic for: Chapter 1. How to define consciousness - and how not to define consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16(5), 139-156, 2009. Chapter 4. Reflexive Monism: psychophysical relations among mind, matter and VIOZ'SZ-11'dd teSurrd5 :{JoA .treN 'sauqcadsn4 {nq1dtcstp"tayu1 :{1ag puo ssausnoDsuo) '('spe) uelueloeJs 1'g '€quls 'V 'uouel I 'S uI JIes snorosuocun /snorcsuocoJd eq1 pue tcua?e snorcsuo3 'g reldeq3 :rog re8uudg 't66r'6\L-Z0L :(y)p1 'sacuaps ulo.tg puo lD.tol^oqag 'ea.rlcedsred uosred-lsrg € tuo{ ssousnorcsuo3 ruor; stc€r}xg '9 reldeq3 'rcil'699-ls9 t(ilyl ' 'sacuaDg ult2.tg puo lDtotl.Dqag isnorcsuoc Eurssecord uorleruJoJur uerunq sI ruo{ slcer}xg 'g reldeq3 :roJ sserd ,(llsre,trun e8prrqure3 .LOOZ 'SZL-IIL'dd '[e,4a;lcelg :>lJo 1(ofl 'ssausnoosuoJ o7 uoruodtuo3 ilaAopDlg aql'(spe) repreuqcs 'S pue su€rule1 'htr uI 'sseusnorcsuoc go ,(pn1s orll JoJ ,(8o1oure1srdo uV '€ reldeq3 :JoJ Ile,/l\{celg-,(e[,&\ .ZIOZ,BEI-LII,(dL 'suottouoldxg iluaoso.ffiaN puo uDlutw"tnq Sur?ualloq) :siluaos lDtoos aqt SurstSolotg uo anssl lolcadg 'iluaDs plJos t.uttodtua1uoS '('spe) gnquJnl '61 pue Jelu€J 'C uI 'sseusnorcsuoo Jo uorlnlolo oql '6 ;e1deq3 '0661 '66 17'g '[3o1oqc[s4 ptctqdosofqd 'ppo.u, pcts,(qd eql puB ulerq 'sseusnorcsuo3 '7 rc1deq3:JoJ srcu"Jd ry ro1,(ea ' Z0OZ' 6Z-E' (1 1) 6' s alpnt S s s ausnoD suo 2 to loumof seouerredxe snorcsuoJ plnoc ,!\oH n1deq3 '7197 asuleJq 1co.U€ ggl-E7 g s s ausnoo suo) ' l'(O t-O)O t'satpru {o loutno1'ssousnorcsuoc 'l 1t,t sluaruaBpalaowpy 'ecue8qlolul eurqoeu Jo sruJoJ.(pea pue sc4eureq.{c ur eldurexe lo3 oseurqceur uI spu[u Eurleerc o1 peqdde eq ppoc sruels,{s IoJluoc JruoJloole ur sluerudo -lelep .lrt.eu .&oq uo Sursnco; 'slselelur ,(ru eurquroc o1 .(um e punoJ I '€96I ul 'srseql ree,{ leug ,(ru JoJ 6puv 'erur1 e;eds ,(ru ur ,(qdosolqd pue ,(8o1oqc,(sd peoJ ol pep€ls I oS 'suorlsenb p4uelsue ,(ru pesserppe 1l Jo euoN 'eJrl snorcs -uoc ruo{ polorueJ ',r\oqouros 'peruees osle 1r 'ere,tr r(pee1c scrs.(qd puz srlleru eq1 q8noql InJosn 'uorleuerTe go lurod eql 01 llncgJrp sorurleuos pue Iecru -qce1 '1ce;1sqe prre,,.', eql Jo r{'nur punoJ I spr?1(uo "^r I"clrlcolg rrr .Hllrr;llrl" ,(pn1s o1 peldo peq 1 ',(8o1ouqcel luertlrrq ,(q pelue.,rur Euieq pFoz*r uecrrourv eq} r(q peldsur'pue secuercs.,pJEq,, eql ,lneu egl pue urerSord eceds ens.rnd o1 pe8ernocue eJo./y\ scrsr{qd pu€ sq}"ur 1e pooB s,(oq 'rvrou se ueqJ pF#tiil:*lll srql sr,, repuo.r pu" qpq rq'll Bu*uuq"eruq eq11e dn erels go ,firsrs,run) e8e11o3 s,^ erpuv '1S le ruoor ,(ul go slp,^d. peleprdelp eq1 ,(q pepunoJJns paq ,ftu ur auol€ 3ur.(1 (1arco5 1ecr1e8ue,rg eql roJ llncuJlp oJII Eur4eru ur uorlceJsrles {oo1 ,(lleuorsecco 1 e8e11o3 18 pue osselc ernldrrcs eq1 go eS.rnocs oql eru ep€ru IooqJS q3r11 s,r(og r(eup,(g 1e,,cr1sou8e,, .(1urrg Sureg 'osJo,r uorl€nlrs Ierluelstxe ,ftu apeur lsnl scuepme ,{rosues ro cr3o1 uo poseq fprrg 1ou Surqfue Jo l"crlrrc pue pcrldecs Sureq puy 'd1aq l,uprp uorErleg 'sEursq uetunq reqlo eJnpu;edeep eqt tlqured Jo erour'pue .fi4ee.r Jo eJnleu redeep eql qlh,r lceluoc .{ue urorg lno po{col ileJ I teup,(g Jo EeoJls pere^oc-lueruec eq1 Eurrye16 's8urql 3o sscuereedde ece;rns eq] ecueuedxe 01 alq€ ,(po Sureq snorosuoc pel"lo$ ue lleJ I 's€,ta I or{^\ Jo esues elllll ,fte,t 3ut,,req JeqruerueJ i(Fee1c 1 1nq .atl,ou o8e eur4 3uo1 e s,l1 ilueuuedxe InJssoccnsun lsrg ,(ur - ocualsrxe olur 8uue1cru 1I qcl€, plnoo I tplcrnb .fte,r peurnl 1 gr 'eq,fuur 'oS '1r oes ol punorc pournl I gtun ]stxe l.uprp lceq (u pulr{oq plrolr\ oi{l}eqf (lq8noqi 1 os) ecuenbesuoc eql g11,tr - lsrxe o] pe,necred sl ll JI slsxe ,(po plJo.4d er{l lerl1 - ruslrcepr ,(q 'eldurexe rog 'pen8rJlur s€1vr 1 suorlsenb lecrqdosolqd 1se1 ppoc euo t€ql &rTrqrssod eql ,(q peleurcse; .(pee"r1e se.4A I S I go e8e eql lV .&lluer;o.$gcudo oql uollrnporlul I 2 Introduction As a newly qualifled Electrical Engineer I initially worked in the electron_ ics laboratory of EMAIL Ltd., (at that time a major Australasian engineer_ ing company) tasked with the design of electrical iircuits for household and light engineering applications, and after six months, was moved on to their newly formed Information Technology Department as a systems analyst, focusing on how to run business and industrial systems on the (then state of the art) pride of the Department, a l6Kb memory IBM computer driven by punched cards. At the same time I longed to continue with my university studies and, hop_ ing to turn my interests in the nature of mind, consciousness, and existence into something practical, I enrolled in a full-time, evening_run, psychology attiattime was firmly behaviourist, existential questions were left to piilosophers, and con_ sciousness, according to the only tutor who mentioned it, didn,t exist! After two years of this I had the sense that I was inwardly dying. I had a good job, well on the road to a management position _ Uuitt e Company devotion to improving profitability by 10 per cent per annum didn,t seem to me the basis for a worthwhile working life. Much as I enjoyed the outdoors life of Sydney, it was at the time deepty conformist, ou..ity anti_intellectual and geographically remote from the centres of culture. It was time to leave. Like much of my generation I took the boat to Europe. Having been born in Amsterdam, that was also for me a return although to what ididn,t know. I left the boat in Naples and hitchhiked for three months looking for some_ where to live and something to do. I was open to whatever the iates might present. Perhaps, so I thought, I could study existentialism at the Sorbonne under Sartre or Beauvoir. But my French wasn,t up to it. It would have to be England, and it was August, 1966. perhaps I couid pick up my psychology studies in September in time for the new term! I rushed over to London, without any knowledge of UK university entry requirements. But, based on my Engineering degiee, two complet.d y"u., of psychology studies and, perhaps, my enthusiasm about the ptssibiliiy of doing fundamental psychology research, Joan Reeves, then the Reader in Psychology at Bedford College, accepted me to take a London University (postgraduate) MPhil Qualifying year, with the possibility of going on to do research for a London Mphil. or phD. 1967 I was ready. What to do? I was still very interested in the mysteries _In of mind and consciousness and wondered whether I could somehow combine my psychological research with electrical engineering. I visited Colin Cherry then head of Electrical Engineering at Imperial Coliege, who had pioneered groundbreaking work on selective attention. He offerid to take *" o, u, u research assistant working on human/machine interfaces in electronic com_ munication systems. Interesting - but somehow, I felt, tangential to research_ degree. But I found that alienating too. psychology in Sydney ing consciousness. I had another idea. It was already known that human sense organs are not tuned to the same energy ranges, and are quite restricted, compaied to those uorl€rJ€A IsuJolu pue eJqxol oJoru J€J pol"s^eJ osle spJrq Jo SurdJrqc oql 'Eurddolc so.{ooq-esJor{ a{rl eJoru pepunos dnc e lsure8e pedd4 uoodseal e q8noqlle 'r(cuenber; ur peJe,&ol uoq.^a erues eq1 qcnu pepunos saoJl er{} ur pur^r eql pue surqsnr JolB.r e{rT spunos **".}H:,3'$:j;:[i5lHr#H" q qel Ieuru€ eq} tlleuorsecco 'pu? 'uopuol Jo sleeJls eq} 3ur11e,Lr, erurl Jo 11q e elrnb lueds 1 'ecr,tep elqegod '>pe6 ,(ru qlptr peddrnbs 'og sseusnorcsuoc (rolrpne go e8uer pellull eJoru Jno Jo ,(3o1oqc,{s4 eql s1ue8e11 punoJa 'Surpuelsrepun eruos eplr.ord lseel le lo 'puelxe lq3rur e8uer Suueeq eq1 Eurlq -nop ur sel\ lseJelur ureur fur 1ng '(ngssn oq 01 1no peuJnl qcrq.tr) slueu ^\oq -osuoe pu? sla,uo^ JoJ lueJeJJrp ,(rarr puu 'xelduroc ereaa. qceeds uo slsaJJe eq1 i(crsnru .,,(psoq8,, Jo puH e Surcnpord) Surlserelur ,(11ecr1eq1see 1nq e8uerls eJel( crsnru go .(cuenber; eq1 Suue,tol Jo slcoJJo sql ipeuaddeq ]erl1y\ 'CIqd e roJ olqelrns qcreeser Jo pleg e 3ut1e1 -osr 01 .4AerA 3 qlu,r i(lurutoJur suorleuJoJsu?Jl qcns Jo EceJJe eq1 psroldxe 1 'sqluoru ul\eJ lxeu erll JoAo 'pue 'uo os pue sleu8rs orpne Jo runrlceds punos eql 8u4re.tur Surpnlcur osfe,tt reqlo ,(ueur ur punos elepdrueur osp ppor 1I 'Euueeq u€runq go e8uer eql olqnop pFoc leq1 rssodsuerl .fuuenberg esod;nd -1e;eue8 'e1qe1rod € 1[nq I'rNOV o1 dn spunos lcolop o] elqe euoqdorcnu rely T IeRJg e pue 's8s11o3 aq1 luor; ecrlpe ol}lll e puedrul le Suuaeu6ug IecrJlcelg ;o luerugedeq uro4 00ZT go luerE e q1r.4a 'oS 'a8e11o3 proJpeg '1ce1ur (uor1 -?ruroJur 1eu6uo slr Jo lsoru pue) u,re11ed lerlceds sll qll^\ e8uer elqrpne eq1 olul pelJrqs eq o1 puErs errlue oq1 Euluolp 'leuErs eql Jo luouoduroc qces o1 pelldde aq plno^\ ryrqs ,(cuenbe4 aru€s eql 'z)0€ punore sleu8rs xeldruoc rog 'ryIgl Jo,{cuenberg elqrpn€ u€ oq plno,^a slcnpord erll Jo euo 'rNOZ Jo.(cuonb -er3 Sursodsu"Jl e qlt.r z)0€ Jo ,(cuenber3 orpn? ue soxlu euo gr eldurexe rog 'seuoqdree Jo les pue tegrldure ue te11g e tolelpcso ,(cuenberg e ,(q perld " -dns,(cuenberg Sursodsuerl e texrur e legqdue-erd e '(lcelep ueo sJee u€unq .fuuenber3 lseq8rq eqt e.toqe) zXgZ o^oqe sleu8rs lcelep 01 elqe euoqdorcrur E sr speau euo ilV 'erurl IBoJ ur Suuueq ueunq go e8uer eql puelxo ol pesn eq plnoc eldrcuud srql l€91 eru 01 perrnoco 1l pu" - esoql Jo euo lrelas 01 pesn eq uegt uer rollg -r/) ecueregrp eq1 teqlo oql pu" '(:rl + tg sercusnberg o/$ eql Jo IUns oql euo 's1eu8rs.4aeu o,&\] seleeJJ qcrqzr,r (rsxrur E pelluc.{1pnsn) JolsrsueJl Jo oqnl runno€A e s? r{Jns ecrlop EulssecordleuErs reeurluou ? ur pourquoc em zt pue sercuenbsr3 o,tr1 'ssscord sq1 '.,Euru(porelerl, se u,4AoDI sleu8rs IecrJlrelo 3o ,buenberg egl Jo1l" o1 ,(e,u. Jo .^AoDI 1 oEur.resu -6ue .(ru ruoJC 'ur?uop ,fuo1rpne eql ur Jersee eq lq8pl" 1r te,re,u.o11 .ecr,^.op lectEoloqcr(sd esodrnd 1e;eue8 e olul elerodJocur ol ,(see .(lpcruqoel lou pue 'e,rrsuodxe eq lq8rur 1eq1 q8noqlle (se1E3o8 uolsu,-1q8lu ur se) uor3er 1e1ou, -eJlln Jo peJ-BUur oq1 olur uorsrl puelxe o1 oeldruexe ro3 'slqrssod eq lqEnu 1I 'sl 1l leql f"^\ eql ur peuErsop sr eouerJodxe snorcsuoc uerung purou,(q.r,r, lnoqe Surqleuos 8ur1eea.e.l ,(qereql 'luerudrnbe elg"J€e,tr qlp\ }I Sulpuelxe ro 1r Surrelp ,(q ecueuedxe snorcsuoc ,(ep.fte,re Jo suorlcrJlser eq1 puo,(eq 1eE o1 elqrssod eq pFo.r 11 eq,&4 6eq leql rq8nu [q,r,1 spturue reqlo .(ueur;o y'(t f E q uou)npo.ttul '.aa*& r)"ll---' .:6Eo Z 0aAei1-l 4 Introduction when transposed from the higher frequency region where birds have maximal discrimination to the lower hearing range where human hearing has maximal discrimination. There were also animal signals above the range of human hearing. For example, in the animal lab I heard a high frequency shriek. One of my fellow PhD students (who had heard nothing) pointed out that a Gerbil was signalling fear by thumping its back feet. I now knew that it was also screaming at around 30K2. But, in my random wanderings, such natural signals above the normal hearing range were only occasional - and although I could have increased the sensitivity of the system by using a sound collector to compensate for the limited sensitivity of the microphone, or focused on animals known to use high frequency sound for species-specific purposes, one basic principle was already clear: human hearing is tuned to thefrequency range that it normally is, because that's where the auditory information most useful to human life normally is. That insight wasn't going to get me a PhD! However, it occurred to me that frequency transposition might be of use in sensory-neural deafness, where either inner ear and/or auditory nerve damage typically produces a high-frequency hearing loss, which affects the vowels and consonants of speech in different ways. Vowels, produced by the way vocal chord frequencies are affected by resonances in the articulatory system, have their major harmonic energy components in the lower frequencies and are more resistant to such losses. Consonants, produced by sudden releases of air, or air forced through narrow constrictions in the articulatory system, have noisy, higher-frequency components, and are vulnerable to such losses, particularly sibilant and stop consonants such as s, sh and /, as in the words sip, ship and rip - making them difficult to identify and discriminate. The amplification supplied by normal hearing aids doesn't address this problem because the neural circuits that detect and transmit the relevant higher frequency information no longer function and cannot, therefore, detect the amplified signals. So after a further period of experimentation using filtered speech to simulate deafness, I designed a two-channel frequency transposing hearing aid and/or speech training aid, that would lower the frequency of badly affected consonant sounds to the residual hearing range while leaving vowel sounds intact. The first channel amplified any vowel information that remained in the low-frequency residual hearing range in the normal way; the second (transposing) channel selected consonant spectra above 4 KHz, lowered these by 4Kz, and then combined them with the normal amplification channel. I found that this conflguration of the system had very little effect on vowels, while producing low frequency versions of the transposed consonants in a way that closely resembled the originals, or were, at least, readily identiflable after a short period of learning (to a normal hearing person). The development of the system and its subsequent testing (a) with normal hearing adults under conditions of simulated deafness, and (b) with sensory-neural deaf schoolchildren became the subject of my PhD. Following some promising results the '..snoIcsuo3,, s3 Jo lq8noql SurssocoJd e^rluellB-lecoJ pue (.snorJsuoceJd,, oq 01 lq8noql se.& EurssocoJd elrluelle-eJd ',.lsed I€orSoloqc[sd,, s.euo go ged Burruoceq pue Surureel o1 Surlnquluoc ,(qersql ,,ftorueur urel-Buo1 01 poJJeJsueJl eq ueql pFoc pue - ,.lueserd 1ecr3o1oqc,(sd,, oql go ped Bururoceq FqoJer{l '(.,ero1s Eur1ron,, Jo ruJoJ e) ,ftoureur ruJol-Uoqs peJolue r1ruurls peloeles .(1u6 'secrnoser Surssecold pelnqrrlsrp s(ur€Jq eq1 uo plnoc leql s,{e,tr ^\"Jp m elqxog pue polrelep oJoru s€^r leql Surssecord e,tr1ue11e1ecoJ Jo ruJoJ lerluenbss tre1un1o,,r. ,,r,ro1s ,(1ea.r1e1er 1eqUry roJ polseles uoql ere,u rprurls " eg o1 lueure8pnle,lroge o1 luegodtur lsou egl 'ecuelrodurr rreql lnoqe operu pollslep r(lluelcggns s€.4A lBql srs.(pue ea.r1ua11e-erd .1e11ered .crleurolne .1seg e pelrocoJ,(11er1rul sue8ro osuas oql ,(q pelcalep rprurls lndur ge leqi palse88ns s?,4a oury 1€ql lB ocueplla oql '(6961) uouualtv puo ["towa1,y uo {ooq s(ueruroN pleuoq ul aldruexe JoJ pesrJerrfiuns , 6(elrluelle-Ie)oJ,, pue .6elrlue11e-etd_ se go lq8noql ueql 'ureJq eq1 ur srs,(1eue lndur go seEels orrrl Eu4roddns eJnl€Jalrl eql qlr,tt. J"llrrueJ se.4A I uorluelle olrlceles uo Eurqceel ,(ru ruorg sseusnorJsuoJ lnoqu slq8noql ls"qg 'slq8noql Ierlrur u.ro ,(ur,(grrelc o1 erull g1es,(ur ea.r8 pue 6pepueq .(1dure 1no Uels ol peprcep 1 'ue11rr,u, ueeq ,(peerle peq l"q.tr eleSrlsezrur ol eJnleJolrl eq1 qcrees ueql reql€J 'gL6I ul.(pee 'og 'll lnoq? .(es o1 en1e,r go ro pur8rro Eurql -.(ue e,teq l{Erur l Jegleq^\ lnoqe €opr ,(ue e,teq I plp roN ilslxe }.uprp saryruS ssausnoosuo) Jo pleg e'(296i a!7 yaua7,q {o nuaos aq1 :[Boloqcdsg >1ooq s.Jollltr tr eBroeg ur sreldeqc o.4A1 ur 'sldurexe ro3 ,f8o1oqc,(s4 eru1ruBo3 go pleg lue8reue ,(1,treu eq1 urqlr^\ pereedde peq ll lnoqe s8u4r"lr Iecrleroeql perellecs ,neg e q8noqlp pue 'sree,( 69 re^o roJ .(Bo1oqc,(s4 ruo4 peuueq ,(1e8re1 ueeq peg ssousnorcsuoc go ,(pn1s oq] tloleungoJun .sseusnorcsuoc ,(q pen8ulur illls se^a I ]ng 'scrlu"ures uo {ro,r op o1 Bu4serelur eq lq8lur 1r 1{3noq1 1 'ursrrnor.teqefl Jo ugJoc oq} ur IrEu deep e pereruu€q pue scqsm8 -uqoqc,{sd pesruonnloleJ peq,Qsuroq3 rueoN Jo >Iro.&\ er{} rvroq,(q perrdsul 'suorlsenb leorleJooql l"luoru"punJ uo sncoJ o1 peEuol 11ps 1 tsa,e.,vro11 'Icuno] qcmeseu Iscrpel l eql te1e1 'pue ',(lunces plcos pue qlleeH go lueurpede6l oqJ ,uor1e;odro3 lueurdole,teq pu" qcreeseg puorleN eql ,(q pepunJ ,(geurelxe ,s1ppe geep .pre Euueaq Sursod lerneu-r(.rosues qlr^\ I€rJ1 pleu eJlueo-qlnru u Surpnlcul -suer1 .(cuenberg sqt Surlenpa,e pue Surdole,Lsp urerSord qoJeesoJ .reer(-g1 e 0q 01 lno uJnl p1no.&t ]"q,u uo pe>lJequro osl€ p€q 1 .scqsm8uqoqc,(s4 go pleg lue8reura .(yrteu oq] pu€ {roruetr41 'uor1us11y ,uorldacre4 uo sosJnoc Surqceel ueoq p"q puu e?e11o3 sr{trusplog 1e lueugedeq ,ffio1oqc,(s4 peruJoJ ,(larreu eql ur drqsernlcel luoueruJed e pepre.nre ueeq uegl f,q per{ I 'pr"oq Suluerp eql o1 {ceg }ue,^a I 'rL6I ul CIrId ,(ur Bultrecer reuv '(9161 'sueur1e1) uedel pue Sn eq1 Tn egl ut pelueled puu (dnorg ,(3o1ouqcel qslllrtr eql peueusr re1e1) uorlerodro3 lusrudole,r,eq pue qoJ€ose{ I€uorl€N oql ,(q peldope se./y\ ocr^.ep 9 uolpnpo"tlul 6 Intro&tction But what was consciousness and what did it actually do? Having been a systems analyst, it was obvious to me that the operations specifled by models of focal-attentive processing could, in principle, be carried out by a suitably designed, electronic, information processing system, whether or not it was conscious - for the simple reason that cognitive models of information processing specify nothing other than information processing, and don't require anything else to make an implementation of them work. Perhaps, I thought, consciousness was something additional, but nevertheless physical that makes such workings more efficient, giving humans a selective advantage, for example an emergent brain property such as its magnetic fleld. If so, I knew from my engineering, there might be ways to detect and measure it. Given the way such fields naturally form in a way that responds to the combined electrical activities with which they are associated, perhaps the function of consciousness was to integrate the brain's electrochemical information processing, in a moment to moment fashion, thereby enabling it to organise integrated realtime adaptive responses, in a natural way. But I only entertained these ideas for a few days. There was clearly something wrong with them. Although human consciousness might or might not turn out tobe associatedwith the brain's magnetic fleld, that seemed very different to the claim thatit justis that magnetic field. Given the variety and felt qualities of conscious experiences and given what was known about magnetic fields, it was far from obvious that these could be one and the same. There was also an obvious problem with the idea that consciousness integrates the brain's information processing. I wasn't conscious of my brain's information processing. I wasn't even conscious of having a brain! So how could my consciousness be integrating such processing? If it did, it would have to be doing so unconsciously -whichdidn't make sense! A first step in a new direction After about a week of this, I was struck by a thought that was even more disturbing. Up to then I had adopted some very basic, entirely conventional assumptions about how conscious experience relates to the brain and physical world. For example, in visual perception I took it for granted that light reflectances from external physical objects stimulate the eye and visual system and that once the conditions that support conscious experience in the brain are satisfied, these cause visual experiences o/those objects either o'in the brain" (according to reductive materialists) or perhaps "nowhere,, (according to dualists). Although, following the work of Descartes, debate about the precise nature and location of conscious experiences had been ongoing for over 300 years, I agreed with reductionists and dualists that "physical objects" are quite separate from ooperceptions of physical objects,,. In particular, physical objects are out-there in the world, while ',percepts of physical objects" are in here (in my head or brain). lsnf sr,.plJo.r lecrs,(qd,, eq1 se Jo {urq1 {ll€urJou e.& }erl.&\ JI ,lng .,.seouerJedxe elrlJolqns,, Eur,rcq ,(lereru sr oq.ta ,1ce[qns ogl 01 ls€Jluoc ur..suorl€AJesqo elrl -celqo,, Sur4eur se 3o lq8noql sr uorlenlrs stql ut lsrlueros eqi tlpuoqrieluoJ 'e,t4ce[qns pue 'e1e,rr"rd '(lcelqns eq] ol) oscueuedxe snorcs IeuJelur sl rlclr{ r -uoc qlcefqns eq1 ol 1s€J1uoc ur ,e.Lrlcelqo pue cllqnd .(lsrluercs Bur,tresqo oql 01) Ieurelxo se go lqEnoql ere uorldecred goddns 1er{1 ur"rg s,lcafgns sq1 ur sluole luenbesqns IIe pu€ ,sue8lo esues s,lcelqns eql .Inurrls pcrs,{qd ,e1d -ru?xo JoJ 'uorldecred Jo serpnls 1ecr3o1oqc.(sd ulqllztt .41qnd snsJol awtt.td pue 'au1cafqo snsJel a,qtca[qns ,ptuta4xa snsJol lou,tarut sl ]eq/a uoe,l\loq uorl -eredes J€elc e sr oJeql uoqdecred Jo sleporu Ieuorluoluoc uI 'peurruexo-eJ eq o1 poau 1eq1 sdrqsuorleloJ pelcouuocJelur Jo s{Jo,rleu osle oJ€ eJoqJ alou Jo 1r errrecred oa Jeqloq \,(e.nr,,(ueu s1r uo sonurluoc Jleslr plJo^\ er{l l€ql eouopme lerluelsrrrnoJrc 'enrsseur eql qlr.4d luelsrsuoo aq lerli plnoc ,esec eq1 s.ler{l JI iuoq puy lpe,uecred Suleq qr uo ged ur lsBel 1e puedep plJo,4a Ieue -uroueqd leql Jo ecuelstxa eql l,useop ,scrs,(qd uJepou r(q psqrrcsep plJo.^a eql o] lueJoJIrp dre.l, 'ecuereedde ue 1sn[ sr ,.p1ro.tr pcrs,(qd,, oql se Jo 1urq1 ,(geur -Jou e,r 1€rl.4A JI aol"qep usrrcepr snsJeA rusrlBoJ ]uercus eq1 1noq" 13q.4a puv lpeurc1dxs eq leq] uec znoq 'eq .1ng .oq o1 naddo secuer.redxe lsoru oJeq \ 1ou s,lerll lsruu sellosrueql seoua JI -uedxe eq1 oJeq^la s,1eq1 'uopsr1y1, I€uorlue.{uoc o1 Burprooce ,ueql ,urerq eq1 ur oleurruJol secuenbes IBSnec IeJneu eq1 JI lnq ,ol? soJueuedxe snorcsuoc eJeq./r\ pu€ lsq.& lnoq" eleqop e eq lq8rur ereqJ 'spue,fto1s lerneu eql ereq \ s,1eq1 puv snorosuoc eruocoq pue Eurssecord pelecrlsrqdos erour o1 pelcafqns sre eseql 'pe1ce1es JI 'ocuepodun rreql ssesse ol ge,l r(lluercggns rueql ,{gquepr o1 JepJo ur (Surssecord u,trop-do1 pue dn-uro11oq Jo uorleurquoc e Eur(o1due) lndur eql es,(1eue 1eq1 sruels,(s pnldecredT,(Josues porlmlle pue sue8ro esues oq] els^rlJe 13q1 lFrurls leuJelxo ,(q pelurlrur ,ecuenbos reeuq ,(1q3noJ e ,^aol -loJ o1 sessoJo.ld lenldec.rsd orunsse olsruorlcnper Jo lsrT"np Jeqlaq,{\ .uorldeco -Jelxe Jo slepotu puorlueluo3 luorldecred ur uo Eulo8 s".&\ leg,& puelsJopun euo pFoc .laoq puv lscrs,(qd ,(q peqrrcsep plro.4.\ ogl otr e]eloJ (p1ro,r,r pue -uroueqd oql) po^recJod-se p1-ro,u eql plp ,eldruexe rog .,rno11 .e8ueqc ol peq osle plJo.4A 1ecrs,(qd pu€ ureJq er{1 01 dlqsuo4eler slr pue ssousnorcsuoc Jo eJnl€u eq1 lnoq€ op"ur perl 1 suorldurnss" Jer{lo i(ueru ,enl1 sB.&\ leg1 }ng JI '..u1€Jq ,(ur uI,, Jo .(oJeq.tAou,, ernsserd 3o acueuedxe peppe ou se1( eJoql pue sdrlre8ug ,ftu 1e uorlesues elrl -cel e IaeJ plno. a 1 reqlsSol srs8ug .(ur pssssrd 1 gr elduexe JoC .suorrcsues fl1poq se qcns secuerredxe Jeq]o Jo onJ] eq ol poruees osle 1"q] puv ierues eql pue euo eJeA\ .,1eeJls eql Jo ocueuadxe,, .{ru pue ,,,loeJ1s 1ecrs,(qd,, eql 'tSolouawouaqd pnvd, ,7ary to swat uJ'(,ureJq ,(ru ur,, Jo ..oJeqt\ou,, Jeqlrg looJls oq1/o ocuerradxe I"uorlpp" ,(ue l,uselr e$ql ip4o44 aql m a,taqt-ruo ata paus aql sDni pa4s eq1 lo Bur,rcq se,4l I socuerredxe lensr,r ,(1uo eql 'suorldrunsse .(ue lnoqllu tpseuoq rueql peurruexe I JI lsecueuedxe lenslt ,(ur o1 puodsatto) tou ptp secueuedxe pnsil .&u lnoqe suo4drrrnsse esaql leql eru ol paJJnroo ]l 'loeJls q8r11 ,{elurorg u.,!\op Burlp.Lr ,1ng o7 pa.ruaddo L l! sD uou)npouul 8 Introduction ooobser- an appearance, how can that be? Doesn't that apply to the scientist's vations" (of the entire experimental arrangement) just as much as it applies to the subjectt experiences - that is, in terms of their phenomenology, aren't the scientist's observations of the entire experimental arrangement and his/her experiences of that arrangement one and the same? And, if that's so, in what senses could science still be "objective"? The list went on. Given this different view of what and where conscious experiences are, how might these relate to the details of human information o'conscious processing" relates processing, for example to the precise way that to "unconscious processing"? And what might the implications be for neuroscience, for example, in the way conscious experiences relate to their neural correlates and to their antecedent neural causes. Given the apparent causal closure of the physical world, how could the apparent, bidirectional causal interactions between consciousness and brain be understood? I had no idea. So, over the next nine months, I began to explore the consequences of this unconventional first step with an open mind, but without any commitment, as I fully expected that something about the path I was following might be wrong. Although I had described my experience just as it seemed to be, there had to be good reasons why that point of departure was uncommon. Perhaps, once I started to explore where this path led, I would come to a dead end, a conceptual cliff that led to nothing, or a reductio ad absurdum. But that's not what happened. The conceptual route through one problem seemed to lead, step by step, to the route through the next in a way that made sense (although in an unconventional way). The problems also seemed to interconnect, and although the entire route through the problems turned out to be complex, my path of travel seemed natural, unforced, and without internal contradiction - until at the end, I found myself back at my point of departure, suggesting that the entire system of thought was internally consistent. It felt as if I had uncovered the rough outlines of a labyrinth of interconnected relationships that might actually be there. My next thought was that if the route was tenable, someone must have thought of it already and outlined it, defended it, or rejected it. So in the next nine months I read everything I could lay my hands on already in print. That proved to be an interesting exercise. Having independently grappled with many of the relevant problems myself it was fascinating to read about how many of these had been dealt with by others - and particularly interesting to see when and why they had taken a different route. Whenever that happened I could clarify my thoughts about whether to follow them or keep going my own way. Collectively, these readings also provided a necessary context for any decision about whether to develop my own tentative analyses into a formal work. As it turned out, I found many connections with, and interesting differences from, the way the problems of consciousness had been dealt with by others, but no one, as far as I could tell, had followed the same interconnected route through them all. It seemed to be work worth pursuing. I spent a further 6\r.".k i)"1&-.*= L,\," lpAopDlg (pe1pe-oc) aq1 '(1002) roprouqcs pue su€rulo1 pue i,(1der ,(ur pue 'seuelueruuroc 1q3re ,(q pe,r,ro11o; 'uorlsenb srql uo ell4rc 1e8re1 ,(ur uo peseq satpryS ssausnoesuo) to loutno1 arll Jo onssl lerced5 e - ..esureJq lceJJe seoue -rradxe snorosuoo plnoc .^aoH,, (SOOZ) suetule1 ispoqleur uosrsd-prrq1 01 uorl -BIoJ JIoI{l pu€ spor{leur uos.red-1srg uo pesncoJ - sdo7,ry puo sa8oloporyary A4aN :ssausnolosuo) puawouaqd ?u1loBusa,w1 (OOOZ) suerule1 isluepnls rog pau8rsep ,(llecgrceds s,^.\or,\oJ IerJolnl Jo uorpelloc pelrpe ue s4\a1^a[ lDllull) puo locr8oloqc{sdoma71'locrSoloqttsd :ssausnoosuo3 lo iluaDS aqJ O66D suerule1 se qcns s{ooq Sulpnlcul 'sseusnorcsuoc uo suor}ecrl -qnd 1euor11pp" 00I punor? pecnpord I glOZ o1 066 I ruor; sree.( eql re^O $O,u,ftU JoJ eoJnos II€JeAo lseq e13urs eq1 sureuroJ pue 'sre.Lrem.er,(q pea.recer lervr,{rs,t s",r >looq oql tlSuunsseeg '6002 ur uorlrpo puoces e ur pepuedxe pue peugaJ JoqunJ pue '0002 ur peqsqqnd w,4a srql 'ldrrcsnueru put8rro ,(ur 3o sged Jellel oql Jo uorsJol psqsqod oJoru € 'ssausnotcsuo3 SutpuoLs.tapu2 erueceq '1.rozvr go sree.( reqlrn; otr1 JeUe '1eq1 pue sseusnonsuoc uo {ooq e elrJ,4A 01 sser6 ,(3o1oqc,(s47e8pe1lno5 ,(q peuorssrrruoc s€^r I 'L66I rrl'(leurnol cgrl -usrcs .rofeur e) sacuaog uto.tg puo lD.tomoqag aqJ q po.ldolloJ ,.enrlcedsled uosred-1srg e ruo4 sseusnorcsuo3,, ,{1der r(ru pue seusluoururoc reed-uedo 99 ,(q psruedruocte..isnorcsuoc Sursseco.rd uorlerrrJoJur u"unq sL, uo elcrpe 1eB -Jelte 166l ur pu€ '[3o1oqck7 lnnqdosopq4 ur peqsllqnd se,&..pFod\ 1ecrs,(q4 egl pue ur?Jfl ssousnorcsuo3,, 'sseusnorcsuoc uo reded lsrg ,(ur '066I uI 'sdrqsrepeer pue sleurnol cglceds .rog pe8elceder,(1tqBF eJolu lnq - ouop ,(pee4e peq I {ro.4A eq} uo peseq 'sreded ;o seues e qsqqnd 01 asuos alsrpeullm oJoru op€ur 1I '1r"AA plnoc >Iooq eq1 Jo uorsJe^ poler^eJqq€ u3 uo {Jo/( oJoru leql servr 3uqeeJ.ftu 'eSpelznou)l puB sssusnorcsuoc use^qeq suorlceuuo, repr,4A eq1 8urs,(1eue 01 pelo^op ,(peerp peq 1 sree,( oq1 ue^rg 'ssousnorssuoc qlu,r.(lpsrlP rleep 13ql ]drJcsnustu 3q1 Jo eergl ped uo ,(lureru pesncoJ l"ql uorsJol Jegorls e pecnpord I leq1 paprlo.rd 'pelserelur se,Lr 'sser4 JelseAJBH Jo rolrpa Suruorssruruoc eql ueql 'uepog 1ere8re141 ;eqdosopqd eqt tsztsnoll 'slsrl rreql rog lq8p elrnb 1,use.u 1l poprcop oqzrr 'sreqsqqnd e,rg o1 1r lues 1 'drqsrspeer rclncrlrede ol pelceJrp.(11q8p 1ou pue'EurEue.r-eprar'3uo1 Jegl"J 1nq 'elelduroc se.Ll ldrrcsnuerx eq1 '>lJo,r Jo sree.{ uel JoUe (986I uI '(1ue,ra a1qe,(olue pue elqeroureu,(re.L e eru ro3) elJ€es uqof reqdosoyqd eq1 r{lr^a el"qep clqnd lnoq-1ry lusnbesqns E ur s"epr IBJluec ,(ru go eruos lsel o1 ,(lrunpoddo lsrg e peq osl€ I 'serpn1s e,rr1lu8o3 JoJ elnlrlsq q,(e1eryeg o1 o,,ruolqord ,(pogpu1141 aql pue ssousnobsuo3,, uo eJnpol cqqnd lsrg ,fte.t fiu a,m8 'grdy u1 opue -,(e1e>peg '€ruJoJrIeJ go ,firsrenrun t8o1oqc.(s4 3o luerugedeq og1 ur Jeloqog lq8rrqlng Surlrsrn e se ree.( pcrleqqes e pueds o1 ,(lrunlroddo eql p€q 1 'ldrrcsnueur eql eleldruoc o1 't86I Euunq 'urerg pue purtr41 'sseusnorcsuoJ (c pue'uzrrou) oql pu€ Je.,tAou) oql (q'lueEyEuru,ou;1 uerunH eqJ (" :s1red eerql ur pe8uerre ldrrcsnueru eEed-699 'leldelqc-g7 e 'aBpaluouy puD ssausnoosuo) uownH olur ernlcrd EurErerue eql polJeJc ,(1mo1s 1 sree,( lqEre lxeu eql JeAo pu? - suorloouuocJolut Jroq] pue so{uoqlqns oseruaql roleru olur ureql Surlros pu€ salou olrsuelxe ,(ur Euxepur sq]uou xrs 6 uou)npo"tluJ 10 Introduction Companion to Consciousness - a 55-chapter state-of-the-art review of sci­ ence and philosophy in the Consciousness Studies field, now in press for its second edition. Reintroducing consciousness studies Nineteenth century founders of modern Psychology such as Gustaf Theodore Fechner, Wilhelm Wundt, and William James assumed the study of consciousness and its relation to brain and behaviour to be its central focus, but, in 1975, when I began my own theoretical work in the area, Western psychology had long since redefined itself as "the study of behaviour". An interest in consciousness was regarded as "fringe", unscientific, and was well known to be unhelpful to one's academic career! Although the topic might receive an occasional historical mention in psychology textbooks and mainstream undergraduate programs (usually accompanied by a dismissive critique of introspection), it was, as far as I knew, no longer taught in UK psychology departments. Nevertheless, as my own understanding of the area developed, I felt it important to reintroduce elements of it into my undergraduate teaching for the Goldsmiths BSc (Hons.) Psychology Degree, initially (from around 1980) in the form of topics surrounding the mind/body problem in my "Theoretical Issues in Psychology" course, and, from around 1987 to 2004 in a final year option on "The Psychology of Consciousness", which covered philosophical, cognitive, neuropsychological and clinical aspects in ways that reflected the emerging field. It also seemed important to re-institutionalise the study of consciousness within the broader psychological community, so in 1987, with a colleague (John Pickering), I founded a Mind/Body Special Interest Group within the History and Philosophy of Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society, which (from 1987 to 1992) ran yearly symposia on Consciousness in annual meetings of the Section and/or annual meetings of the Society itself. In 1993, a group of seven of us (Jane Henry, David Fontana, John Pickering, Ingrid Slack, Richard Stevens, Elizabeth Valentine and myself) expanded this to found two new full sections of the Society, the Consciousness and Experiential Psychology section and the Transpersonal Psychology section, each running its own annual conferences, workshops and symposia, which continue to this day. To help things along, in 1992 I organised an international symposium, funded and hosted by the Ciba Foundation (now the Novartis Foundation) that gathered together 25 of the leading international scientists and philoso­ phers then working on consciousness for a three-day conference in London. The papers and subsequent discussions were recorded, edited by Ciba, and published as Experimental and Theoretic.al Studies of Consciousness: Ciba Foundation Symposium 174 (Bock and Marsh, 1993). In subsequent years other organisations also began to host conferences, for example the first of the Tucson conferences on "Towards a Science of 'o^rrc oq 01 $ ,(1per ervr oq.r lnoqe leql uro4 u€c 11 1€q.4a Jo ueerl eql 13 sorl oJ? e,tr leqat uJeel 01 pue ecueuadxe o1 ,(1111qe Jno Jo slrurT pu€ sqldep eq1 eroldxe o1 Sur8uol e ,sn 3o ,(ueru rog .leuosred .(1esue1ur osl? eJe 1nq lecrqdosopqd pue ,grluarcs eq lsnl louu€c sseusnorrs -uo, Jo suo4eroldxe 'lcelqns aql ur pe8e8ue .(1ng euofue ro; te,lerrroll sepr punor8 eql epnord l€ql 'lusurdole,rep .ft oeql rog ecueJeJur pu€ luerun8re lecr8ol Jo suorlculseJ 1ensn eq1 pue ecuercsoJnou pu? ,(8o1oqc,(sd e,rpru8oc urorg But8reure s8urpug curluercs peldecce-11e,r, qlra Suole ,ryo,lr crurep"ce IeruJoJ .(w ur ocusuadxe snorcsuoc ,(reurpro 3o selzznd oq] uo 1sn[ sncog 01 eru ol olqrsues peruees ]r 'secueuedxo.fueurpro-er1xe Jo eou"cgru8rs ro .(1rcere.r. eq1 ol epnirlle pcrldecs .(UB1q eql pu€ 'eurrl eq1 1e ,(8o1oqc,&d ur peleuuroperd 1eq1 tusrTeuorlounJ oLrlonpal IesJelrun-Jeou eq1 'psgels eruq er{1 1€ serpn}s ssousnorcsuoc oluelsrxs ,(1e"req oq1 ue^rg .oleldurocur ,elzlncce sr ,{razr. 1nq Jo elels sp8erg >lJo^\ Jo eete ue euuep 01 ,(r1 o1 pe.uo11oJ 1 qled snolrncJrc l?g,{\erllos eq1 ,e,roqe eq; pu? ssousnorrsuoc ut lseJelur fru pe1cer11e 1€qla Jo qclo{s ;euq I ,{rols p1o1un eq1 .C8IIHAU^fl eJ-gzqzdrrqlpqselbrf bTurS.Id_1s[a]sl 1,{eldproc'aqn1no,(',rrrr*tr l? ourluo peceld pue porulu ere.u s8urpescord errlue eq1 'sre>1eeds eql Jo ,(ueui r(q ue.r.r8 s114 crls?lcouocr eql pue pe1c"Jlle srql lsoJelur opr.4A eql us.trg '(;n) tsnra olqelrJeqJ rrlseqs pes€rd rreg sql ,(q pepunC '9e11 uolSurUBCI le sJeqcJ?esoJ Eurpeel JoJ..JIoS pue sseusnorrsuoJ 'pulru Jo eJnl€N eql o1 saqceo-rddy lse11\-lsei[,, uo doqspo,r I?uorleurelur ue pesrueS.ro osle I tIgZ ul 'eseql 3urure11e o1 seqceordde e^llelrperu uJelseg pue 'pecnpur-8nrp ur pu€ 'sseusnorcsuoo Jo sel"ls .(reurpro-er1xo ur lseJolur Iercos apr.&\ or{1 ueArg 'saryruS ssausnoosuo) to lou.tnoy eql Jo enssl prcedg e'(ZyOZ) e.ueseEe5l pue suerule1 srs"q eql erueoeq qclq,!\ ,(Sn) uortepunod uoleldurel eq1 .(q pepunJ 'uoleq ,1e11 uol8urge6l le ,.,ursr1ecrs.(q4 o1 se,,rrleuJellv lsruotr l,, uo 'doqs1"ro.&t IeuorleuJelur ue pesrueEro-oc I 0I0Z ur '..u.&\o1 ur sue8 ,(1uo oql s,lr,, leql slsrluorcs pue sreqdosoyqd ,(ueur go uorlcrluoc eql pue oecuele,Le;d s1r ue,rrE 1nq ,(rus4ecrs,(qd se urvroul osp) tusrl€rJoleru e.^.rlonpeJ qlr.^a surolqord snoues .(ueur punog peq 1 >1rolr ,ftu uI'ssausnoDsuo) puawouaq4 3u17o317satu1 ,4ooq pol1pe .(ur rog srseq eql peuJoJ qcrg,tr'gn'e1n1r1sul Je4og oq1 .(q pelsoq pu" pepunJ...sseusnorcsuo3 go ,(pnig eql roJ setEolopoqlel4l uo urnrsodru.(s leuorleurolur uE pesr ^&eN,, -ue8ro I '.spoqleu uosred-prrql ol uorleleJ Jreql pue spogletu uosrsd-1srg ur lsoJelur uB uo{e,ere-oi ol'966I ur ,eldurexa rog .Burst8reua pepeeu lerll serueq] eru 01 perueos leg.^a uo Eursnco; ,ersodu.r,{s leuor}BuJo}ur Jeq}o Jo Jaq -runu e peslueEro-oc ro pesrue8ro I plJo,4a oq] punoft seJnloel polrlur pu" socueJeJuoc 'elsodru,(s osdoqs4rozrt reqlo ,(ueur ur uorledrcrlred.{ur pu€ esaql 01 uorlrppe uI 'ueruoJod Uoqog pue .elsren ocsrcueJd ,epeeg uqot qllrr uorsses e ur releeds .fteue1d pel1,l.q u€ s€,ta I qclqr!\ 1e e8e.reloc sserd epua pol,receJ legl ecueJeJuoo 966I luenbesqns eql pue ,V66I uI.(sseusnorcsuo3 II aou)npouul " r).tl-* .-6-"+ .: EE"o Z 0o^eru-Iurt-0{0o0o i t 12 Introductton That's true for me too, and in my many travels around the world, I have explored both ordinary consciousness and extra-ordinary forms of consciousness in interactions with meditators, yogis, mystics and the occasional shaman. I have also exchanged innumerable stories with fellow travellers and researchers willing to probe their own experience beyond the limits of the known. With the passing of over 50 years from the time I 1ay on my bed, staring at the ceiling in St. Andrews College, wondering, "Is this all there is?" I eventually discovered the universe of the individual psyche to be far more interesting and unfathomable than I could possibly have imagined. Countless others, following similar paths, have come to the same conclusion. William James, much admired for his foundational book The Principles of Psychology (James, 1890) took a similarly multifaceted approach to his explorations of consciousness in his additional works, for example, in The Varieties of Religious Experience, through personal experimentation with nitrous oxide ... about which he writes: One conclusion was forced upon my mind at that time, and my impression of its truth has ever since remained unshaken. It is that our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, deflnite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their fleld of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be flnal which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How to regard them is the question, for they are so discontinuous with ordinary consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a region though they fail to give a map. At any rate, they forbid a premature closing of our accounts with reality. Looking back on my own experiences, they all converge towards a kind of insight to which I cannot help ascribing some metaphysical significance. The keynote of it is invariably a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictoriness and conflict make all our difflculties and troubles, were melted into unity. (James, 1902, p. 388) I took eventually led me, step by simple step, to reflexive monism, a similarly integrative view. Within reflelive monism classical antinomies such as psychological versus physical, first-person versus third-person, inner versus outer, subjective versus objective, private versus public, and even self versus other can be seen as complementary ways of viewing a deeper underlying unity. Rather than consciousness being a freak accident of nature, reflexive monism treats it as one of many natural manifestations of what the universe The path i e\err-tffi 5)" t-= .:6Ep z 0€A?r\,1-IUrr pue 'uoutpfl puuas 'ssausnoosuo) ?u1puo1s.tapu2 (OOOZ) suerulo1 sr srql roJ ecJnos eleldruoc lsour'1seq oql 'serpnls sseusnorcsuoc pel€urruop sree,(.{ueu roJ e^€q 1"q1 solr]euJell€ lsruor]rnpeJ pu€ lsq€np eq1 qloq o1 lueregrp ,fte,L sseusnorcsuoc 3o srsr(1eue lecqdosopqd psseq ,(lpeorq e sr ursruorr e.^.ryegeu ansruota aqxagfay '..0url1,, pue '.,l(3leue,, s€ qcns scrs.(qd uI sIUJal clseq qlL4A srncco (e8pel.Lroq ;o qluor8 q1r.4a) Euru€orrr Jo uorlelruusuerl 'uedeep osl€ ilr,^a sr sseusnorrsuoc l"qrvt. go EurpuelsJopun Jno J€lrrurs 'suedsep sdrqsuo4eler eseql Jo Surpuelsrspun cgrlueros Jno sV 'ruJel eql Jo (esues ro) Surueeur eql s1ruusu"J1 oru4 ur .(eur sql pue 'ur8eq uec snobsuot 1ou eJe l"ql sesseooJd pue slue,re 'ser1r1ue o1 sdrqsuo4eleJ slr pue .(3o1o1uo s1r go suo4e8rlse.,rur tSoloueuroueqd slr ur popunorE ,(plrg sr 6.ssousnorcsuoc,, Jo uoqruuep € ecuo 'pFo,r IeuJelxe pue ,(poq 'ur?Jq eql ur sesn€c luopecelue pu? solsloJJos I€Jneu s1r 01 solsleJ ,(1en1ce .(Solousruoueqd snorcsuoc 1eq1 ,(e,u eq1 Suuncsqo ,(gerluelod 6peuuep sr ,,ssocoJd snorrsuoc,, e (e,u eql ur osrJe uuo surelqord J"lrurs 'suorlrugop olut pepnrlur s,teq (ppotr pue puru 'sseusnorosuoo Jo eJnleu eqt lnoqe) sluerulrurruoc IecrleJoeql Surlsrye-ord qcrr{A\ ur s.(ezvr ureru aql Jo eruos sossnrsrp osle 1I 'aoJJeu oo} Jo p?oJq oo1 Jeqlro oq u?c sseusnorssuoc Jo suo4rugep qclq.4d ul s,(e,tt 3o saldurexa se,Lr8 reded srql 'pleg eql ut uorsl^.rp pruolur pue uorsruuoc luenbesuoc qlrrrr'serpnls ssousnorcsuoo uJepou ur uouluoc are seldrcuud sldrurs oseql uro{ suor}erlep ',{leleungogun 'snorcsuoo }ou eJB leql sossecoJd pue sluer.e 'sar1r1ue epnlcxe ol 1(oJJeu.(1lusrcg;ns pu" selels snorosuoc 3o seldurexe IIB epnlcm 01 peoJq .(lluercg;ns eq 01 peeu ssousnorosuoc Jo suoqrugeq 'suorlruuop lnoqe J"eI3 ,ftal. eq 01 speou euo 'serpnls ssousnorcsuoc u sser8ord e>1eru oJ :lJuJlsqy y ssausnoosuoc au{ap ol lou A,toq puD - GOOO7 'suorya71) ssausnoosuoc augfap ol ttoq ssausnoosuoc Zu1u{aq s8upl.ul palrolos de.u ,(ru uo eur {oo} }eq} sdels le4uesse erll Jo etuos aleJ}snlll leq} s8urlrr,tr er{J 'uor}eurcseJ lenlcollolut sselpue Jo ocJnos e se IIea se ^toIIoJ e,Lrler8elur ,(leuos.red uoeq o.\eg serpnls sseusnorcsuoc q8no;qi s,(eurnof,(ur '1roqs u1 'qcreesog lecqdosopqd uerpq eql Jo Ircuno3 ,(q pslurodde JosseJord Surlrsrn leuorleN ? s€ 'I llOrcZ ur eldruexs ro; 'erpu1 q8noqt sla.{"Jl ,ftu ur scrurep"c€ Joq1o,(uuu qlltr suorssncsrp,(ul pue (1197 'oeg ess) oBU Busrr>leru€U') sB qcns sJeloqcs uerpul Jorues qlr,la suorlc€Je rrr .(ru ur eroldxe o1 peSep,tlrd ueeq e^"q I osree,( re1e1 ,(ur m 'qcrq,lrr, 1cefqns e 'sseusnorrsuoc go SurpuelsJepun go s,(e.Lr uJelwg pue uJolsa & eql uee.{qoq lueursqcorddel e eq lq8rru e;eql qclq.4A ul s,(ezrr s1se33ns osl€ lI 'e>pT ,(geer sr €I uo4)npollul ' 4" <2rrle lI*':LE"oz 0aAE,r1-IU 14 Introduction a useful sunmary that includes a detailed defence of many of its basic claims is Velmans (2008) Reflexive Monism. As these sources are too long to include in these selected readings, I have focused on shorter papers and extracts that were in various ways self-contained, innovative and iconoclastic. The papers also often provide details beyond those included in the main summaries, and those published after 2009 demonstrate the ways in which my work has continued to develop over recent years. The beginnings of reflexive monism Consciousness, brain and the physical world ( Velmans, 1990 ) Abstract: This is the first paper I published on consciousness, which gives the rationale for and immediate consequences of the very first, unconventional step I took on my own intellectual journey (in Bromley High Street, 1975). In it I introduce a reflexive model of perception. I note that dualist and reductionist theories of mind disagree about whether or not consciousness can be reduced to a state, or function, of the brain, but agree that the contents of consciousness are separate from the external physical world as-perceived. I argue that this assumption has no foundation either in everyday experience or in science, and, drawing on extensive evidence for perceptual projection in both interoceptive and exteroceptive sense modalities, make the case that the physical world as-perceived is a construct of perceptual processing and, therefore, part o/the contents of consciousness (not apart from it) a finding that requires a reflexive rather than a dualist or reductionist model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. The physical world as-perceived may, in turn be thought of as a biologically useful model of the world as described by physics. Redrawing the boundaries of consciousness to include the physical world as-perceived undermines the oomental" from the "physical", and with it conventional separation of the the very foundation of the dualist versus reductionist debate. The alternative reflexive model departed radically from conventions that were current at that time, with consequences for many aspects of consciousness theory and research. Some of the consequences which bear on the internal consistency and intuitive plausibility of the model are explored, for example, the causal sequence in perception, representationalism, a suggested resolution of the realism versus idealism debate, and the way manifest differences between physical events as-perceived and other conscious events (images, dreams, etc.) are to be construed. In later years, the consequences of some of the main themes addressed in this paper, such as the apparently external, extended nature of the phenomenal world became central issues for other theorists such as Karl Pribram, Antti Revonsuo, Jeffrey Gray, Steven Lehat and Michael Tye, in ways discussed in Velmans (2008, 2009a, 2016). ."t"-"rk slcr L== t- .s 6\ra r"T t1 uo 'eueurouorld I€uJolxo Jo s,4Aorl, uosJed-pJrr{} snsJe^ -}sJu Surpue}sJopun Jo ,(ea\ InJesn e sopraoJd rusruoru IBJlneu ep[,^a 'elrlcedsred uosred-prgr € ruo.t3 pe,4lorl uoql\ plJo,r leuJolxo oql pue urerq 'purur 'sseusnorcsuoc go Eurpuelsrepun InJesn e epu,ord usq"uorlcunJ pu? rusrlecrs.(qd 'eldurexe.rog 'sellesJno se qcns seJnleeJc luerlues ,(q sdrqsuo4"leJ Jo qo.^A srql uq1r,4a {uog .(e,l uosred-pJrr{} e Jo -lsJU e Jeq}re ur pe.&erl eJB eseql ueq,tt. plJo,{4. IeuJelxg eql pue urerq opurur 'sseusnorcsuoc ls8uorue sdrqsuorleler eql Jo spedse luareJJrp Eurpuelsrepun ;o s.(e.u InJosn ept,tord ol uaes eq IIB uec rusruoru oursrleuorlcung'ursqecrs.{qd lcedse-1enp pue tusruotu leJlnou'ursrlenp 'sdrqsuorlelsJ Jo qe.& sql 01 ecqsnl op uec 'ursqecrs.(qd s? qcns '.,ursr,, Ieuorsuarurp-euo'leuorluoluoc ou alrrl\\'sorpnls sseusnorcsuoc elepdod f,puerrnc 1eql ,.srusr,, reqlo .(ueur eql Jo suo4rsoddo eql Jo eruos eAIoseJ pu" [11p1n aql el€nl"Ae 01 pesn eq u€c deur lsruoru o^rxogeJ srg] seleJlsuoruop ueql 1I 'ecuens go s8urpug eql pue ecuerredxe .{eprfuele^aor{ Jo sJnoluoc oql s,rolloJ qloq 13q1 ,(e,tr e ur plJo,{rl l?uJalxa eql pue urerq 'purur 'ssousnorcsuot ls8uorue sdrqsuorleler xelduroc er{1 Jo deur leuorsuourpr}Fru '1er1lur ue sepr,rord rusruoru e^rxeueJ lnoqe s8urlrJ.r Jolel ,{ui go eldures sql :}J?Jlsqy (oZf OZ 'suow1a1 ) ssausnoDsau? puo DllDta 'pwru Suouto suotrulat pcrstqdoqctsd :rusruou.t auxag[ay .ustaotu auxagfat to sacuanbasaot ndaap aruog 'eJuarJS o1ur,(1q1oorus serpnls sseusnorcsuoc slg leql .,,(Soloueurouaqd 1ecqrrc,, Jo ruJoJ e spoddns sdrqsuorlelar eseql Jo Surpuelsrepun olrxogoJ e 1eq1 an3.re 1 'scrs,(qd ur pasn esoql luoJJ regtp ,Go1oqc.(sd ut posn spoq}eru ,4Aoq pue poqleu lecurdrue ogl eulluexe-er 01 uo seo8 reldeqc eql firpqeleede; e,n1cefqnsrelq pue e.r.rlcelqns-er1ul JoJ suorlrpuoc oq] pu" 'e,l.r1ce[qo 1r Jo suorlelJesqo pus c11qnd eq ssoloqpolou u€c uousurousqd e qslq,l\ ut sesuos luoJeJlrp aql 'a^rloofqns pue e1e.r.ud ere (1ecrs,(qd ro pcl8o1oqc,{sd reqleq.a,r) eueurousqd pecuerredxa /r IIB r{clq ur esues oql 'lcefqns e osp sr reluerurredxe eq] rlorq.ry\ ur esues eql seuruexe reldeqc eql 'peecoJd ,(11en1ce ssousnorcsuoJ Jo serpnls .4Aoq Jo suottolasqo cgftrua1cs to am7ou nlqnd Surpuelsrepun elenbepe ue ^\o[" eql snsJo^ atuartadxa {o {codr.td eq} pue [11dqta{qo snsJel [4tpcafqns lnoqe suorldurnsse lsruorlcnpeJ Jou lsrlenp Jor{lleu }€q} e}eJlsuouep ISSausnoDSuoJ o7 uoruodu.to2 lptr4)Dlg eql ruo{ reldeqc IeuU sql uI '?uououoqd 1ecrs.{qd Jo eJnleu cqqnd 'e,rrlcelqo '1eure1xe oq1 snsJel eueuroueqd 1eclEo1oqc,(sd 3o eJnleu elelrJd'ea.r1csfqns touur egl eldurexe;og',.euourouoqd pcrs,(qd,, snsJOA .,eueuroueqd 1ec6o1oqc.{sd,, pe11ec-os ueetueq suorlcurlsrp Ieuor}ueluoo ,(ueru eunuexe-eJ 01 ouo sacJoJ uorldscred Jo Iepou olrxegeJ V :lJu.t1sqy ( l00Z ssausnoDsaoc 9I to 'suDu,ttarl ) ssausnotcsuoc to {pn1s aqt acuaos o ,to{ tusraow aqxagfat to nt [8o1outatslda uV sacuanbasuoc clwatsldg uou)npo.tlul ,."rn"e +"ll-."-* .:6Ep z 0€nel\r-Iu 16 Introduction the other hand, dual-aspect monism provides a useful way of understanding flrst- versus third-person views of mind, including Eastern versus Western views of mind. Dual-aspect monism also provides a useful understanding of the "unconscious ground of being" that gives rise to, supports and embeds all these observable phenomena. For an integrated understanding one needs to understand how these phenomena and relationships combine into an integrated whole. The relation of phenomenal consciousness to human information processing Extracts from " Is human information processing conscious?" (Velmans, l99la) In cognitive psychology, investigations of how phenomenal consciousness relates to human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where and when does consciousness appear as information processing develops; and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. At the time that this Behavioral and Brain Sciences target article was written, input analysis was thought to be initially oopreconscious", "pre-attentive", fast, involuntary, and Abstracfi automatic. This was followed by ooconscious", "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary and flexible. It was thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing was also thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory and the organisation of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection or creativity. It was also commonly taken for granted that "conscious processing" was actually carried out by consciousness. But this target article reviewed evidence for the radical view that phenomenal consciousness itself performed none of the functions attributed to it. Consciousness nearly always results from focalattentive processing (as a form of output) but does not itself enter into this or any other form of human information processing. Consciousness appears to be necessary in a variety of tasks because they require focal-attentive processing; if consciousness is absent, focal-attentive processing is absent. This suggests that the term "conscious processing" needs re-examination and the paper suggested three distinct meanings of the term that are routinely confounded in the consciousness studies fleld. Given the functionalist reductionism that was taken for granted in 1991 (and still ubiquitous in 2016), the target article was extremely iconoclastic. For example, in spite of warnings by Kahneman and Tieisman (1984) that consciousness should not be confused with focal attention, consciousness and focal-attentive processing were commonly regarded as two sides of the same coin. The target article provided the first systematic case for distinguishing between these both on conceptual grounds and in terms of the available experimental evidence. In later years, evidence for their dissociation was also *t-*lk 5)" L*= l EE"o Z^ 0a^BrI1-1ulr000000 Introduction 17 reviewed by Shiffrin (1997) and recently, from the perspective of neurosci­ ence, by Koch and Tsuchiya (2006). More generally, the target article demon­ strated that phenomenal consciousness cannot be reduced to the (third-person describable) functions with which it is most closely associated. Many com­ mentators thought that the only alternative to this was epiphenomenalism. But my analysis suggested a radical non-reductive alternative: viewed from a first-person perspective, conscious states are causally effective. First-person accounts are complementary to third-person accounts. Although they can be translated into third-person accounts, they cannot be reduced to them. A complete theory of mind requires both. This more nuanced treatment of first- and third-person views of the mind later became quite standard in con­ sciousness studies, for example in neurophenomenology, and in the widen­ ing acceptance within neuroscience that third-person investigations of the brain can in principle reveal the neural correlates of consciousness, but not the nature of phenomenal consciousness itself. The target article and reply also introduced a dual-aspect theory of information - a form of ontologi­ cal monism combined with epistemological dualism reminiscent of the work of Fechner (1860). This, and many other non-reductive features of my BBS analysis were also later adopted (and popularised) by the philosopher David Chalmers (1995) in ways outlined in Velmans (1995) - my invited commen­ tary on his target article for the Journal of Consciousness Studies. Extracts from Consciousness from a first-person perspective (1991b) Given the prevalence of functionalist reductionism, my non-reductive BBS analysis was fiercely contested in the 36 commentaries that accompanied it, as well as four later continuing commentaries published in BBS. Space limitations prevent inclusion of my detailed replies (although they are all available online). It is, however, instructive to include some extracts. This selection from my 1991 reply illustrates the numerous confusions about how consciousness relates to information processing that were prevalent in the field at the time, particularly regarding the relationship of phenomenal consciousness to focal-attentive processing. I also introduce a number of added themes that relate to the ways in which first- and third-person views of the mind can be thought of as complementary that I developed more fully in later writings (including those chosen for this collection). How to understand causal interactions between consciousness and the brain "How could conscious experiences affect brains?" ( Ve/mans, 2002a) Abstract: In everyday life we take it for granted that we have conscious control of some of our actions and that the part of us that exercises control is the conscious mind. Psychosomatic medicine also assumes that the conscious mind can affect body states, and this is supported by evidence that the use l8 Introduction of imagery, hypnosis, biofeedback and other "mental interventions" can br therapeutic in a variety of medical conditions. However, ever since the timt of Descartes, there has been no accepted theory of mind/body interactior and this has had a detrimental effect on the acceptance of mental causatior in science, philosophy and in many areas of clinical practice. Biomedical accounts typically translate the effects of mind into the effects of brain functioning, for example, explaining mind/body interactions in terms of the interconnections and reciprocal control of cortical, neuroendocrine, autonomic and immune systems. While such accounts are instructive, they are implicitly reductionist, and beg the question of how conscious experiences could have bodily effects. On the other hand, non-reductionist accounts have to cope with three problems: l) The physical world appears causally closed, which would seem to leave no room for conscious intervention; 2) One is not conscious of one's own brain/body processing, so how could there be conscious control of such processing? 3) Conscious experiences appear to come too late to causally affect the processes to which they most obviously relate. This paper suggests a way of understanding mental causation that resolves these problems. It also suggests that "conscious mental control" needs to be partly understood in terms of the voluntary operations of the preconscious mind, and that this allows an account of biological determinism that is compatible with experienced free will. This target article for a Special Issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies was accompanied by eight commentaries and four later commentaries along with two replies (Velmans, 2002b, 2003). A deeper understanding of the Self Conscious agency and the pre cons cious I unconscious self ( Velmans, 20 I 4 ) Abstract This paper was based on an invited talk on "Who's in control?" given at the International Conference on "Looking Within" hosted by the Nqtional Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, January, 2012. In it I examine the consequences of reflexive monism for a deeper understanding of the Self. We habitually think of our Self as a conscious agent operating largely in terms of how we consciously experience those operations. However, psychological and neuroscientific findings suggest that mental operations that seem to be initiated by the conscious Self are largely preconscious or unconscious. In this paper I examine how these aspects of the Self and its operations combine in the exercise of free will - and suggest that the conscious wishes, choices and decisions that we normally associate with "conscious free will" result from preconscious processes that provide a form of oopreconscious free will". The conscious experiences associated with other so-called "conscious processing" in complex tasks such as speech perception and production, reading and thinking, also resalt from preconscious processing - which requires a more nuanced analysis of Introduction 19 how conscious experiences relate to the processes with which they are most closely associated. We need to distinguish processes that are conscious a) in the sense that we are conscious of them, b) in the sense that they result in a conscious experience, and c) in the sense that consciousness plays a causal role in those processes. We also examine how consciousness enables real-isation: it is only when one experiences something for oneself that it becomes subjectively real. Together, these findings suggest that Self has a deeper architecture. Although the real-ised aspects of the Self are the consciously experienced aspects, these are just the visible "tip" of a far more complex, embedding preconscious/unconscious ground. A dual-aspect monist understanding of the evolution of consciousness "The evolution of consciousness" ( Ve/mans, 2012b) Abstract: There have been various attempts to apply Darwinian evolutionary theory to an understanding of the human condition within psychology and the social sciences. This paper evaluates whether Darwinian theory can explain human consciousness. Starting with a brief definition of phenomenal consciousness and the central features of evolutionary theory, the paper examines whether random variations in the genome that confer a selective, reproductive advantage can explain both the emergence of consciousness and its varied forms. To inform the discussion, the paper reviews what is known about the conditions for consciousness within the human mind/brain, understood in both structural (neural) terms and functional terms (in terms of human information processing), and concludes that "random variations in the genome" provide no explanatory mechanism for why some neural activities (but not others) are accompanied by consciousness. The paper then evaluates the many functional advantages that have been proposed for various forms of phenomenal consciousness once they emerge, and concludes that, on close examination, phenomenal experiences themselves do not carry out the information processing functions attributed to them, which challenges the Darwinian requirement that they could only have persisted (once emergent) it they enhanced reproductive fitness. The paper turns finally to what can be said about wider distribution of consciousness in non-humans, contrasting discontinuity theories with continuity theories. Discontinuity theories argue for a critical functional transition that "switches on consciousness" while continuity theories argue for a gradual transition in consciousness from unrecognisable to recognisable. All theories accept that there is an intimate, natural relationship of conscious experiences with their associated material forms. Consequently, as the material forms evolve, their associated experiences co-evolve - suggesting an indirect mechanism by which the emergence of species-specific forms of consciousness can be influenced by Darwinian evolution. It also allows a non-reductive understanding of human consciousness within the social sciences. 20 Introduction Integrating Eastern and Western approaches to an undeystanding of consciousness How to arriye at an Eastern place from a Western Direction: Convergences and Divergences among Samkhya Yoga, Advaita Vedqnta, the Body-MindConsciousness (Trident) Model and Reflexive Monism ( Velmans, 2013 ) Abstract: This paper results from my increasing focus on the integration of Eastern and Western analyses of consciousness following my interactions with senior Indian scholars in recent years. Over the millennia, there have been irresolvable tensions between monist and dualist thought in both Eastern and Western analyses of the relations amongst body, mind and consciousness. This paper compares two approaches to resolving such tensions, Reflexive Monism (RM), a model of the self-observing universe that resolves many of the oppositions in Western thought, and K. Ramakrisna Rao's Eastern, Body-Mind-Consciousness (BMC) "Trident" model, which focuses on the convergences between dualist Samkhya Yoga and monist Advaita Vedanta. According to Reflexive Monism, many opposing analyses of body-mind--consciousness relationships in Western thought can be treated as different (often complementary) views of the one global system by parts of itself, from within itself. According to the BMC Trident model, many of the tensions between dualist Samkhya and monist Advaita can be resolved by noting the similarity in their analyses of the human condition and the developmental processes required to provide a release from the limitations of that condition. In spite of the very different (Western and Eastern) traditions that inform them, there are many convergences between RM and BMC although there are also some major differences, for example in their grounding ontology and their respective analyses of body mindconsciousness causal relationships. In this paper I examine both the convergences and divergences in detail. References Bock, G.R. and Marsh, J. (eds.) (1993) Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness: Ciba Foundation Symposium 174. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. Chalmers, D. (1995) "Facing up to the problem of consciousness", Journal of Cons c iousne s s S tudie s, 2(3), 200-219. Fechner, G.T. (1860) Elemente der psychophysik.Leipzig: Breitkopf und Hdrtel. James, W. (1890) The Principles of Psychology. New York: Henry Holt & Co. James, W. (1902) The Varieties of Religious Expertence.London&Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co. Kahneman, D. and Treisman, A. (1984) "Changing views attention and automaticity", in R. Parasuraman and D.R. Davies (eds.) Varieties of Attention. of New York: Academic Press. Koch, C. and Tsuchiya, N. (2006) 'Attention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes", Tr ends in C o gni t iv e S c ien ce s, 11 (1), 1 6-22. Millea G.A. (1962) Psychology: The Science of Mental Life.Grctna, LA: Pelican Books. 'Sa I I 'dd re8uuds :IroA,\\oN 'r'ant)a(ls'.tad I.routldttsrptalul :.fjag ptm ssaltstlot)slto) ( spe) ueluulears pue equls .V ,uouora,i 'S ur '..JTos snorrsuocun/snorcsuocord erll pue fcue8e snotcsuoJ,, (ttOZ) .1ru .suulule_\ ^.g '6€l L0l'dd'ppo,u1ur.rd )'C :tqloq,{\oN .ony DuqsLDlnwnd.N ,l,tss,ipg tsall-tsn4 'Ioutldr;'tsrptatul :o3o1 pLtD tqpuDg ssattstlot),-uo) (.pe) S g ul '..rusruohl a^rxago6 put? 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(1OOZ) .n ,suerup_1 :Vr{ 'uaptel I t^.tausttoDSLto) 't9-at '(71)91 ',raam1S ssausnot)sLto) ./b loutno|'!!llr^\ eeu snorrsuoce.rd,, ([OOZ) 'IN 'su?rul!.\ '96 69'(l il6'sarytus ssaltstlol)suo) .{o 1ou.moy,,,ure:q put? ssousnorrsuoo .Jo suorlrl?lolur Iesnur aql Jo esues 3ur>1e141," (qZOOZ) .tr 1 lsuutulo.\ ' 67.-t' i I)6's atpru S s s du sn o ) slto ) .p11 ,suer_u10.1 ./b lnutnoy ..asur?-rq lceJ.IB soJuerrodxe sr.rorcsuoc plnor ,,rroH., (uZO9Z) t 'a8peltnoy uopuol' : r' r^ ) SurpuD s.t apu,1 (OOOZ) ru,suElula^\ 'surueluog uqof :ruuptelsuty sdn7y pun . au sno t ) su o 1 sadolopoqlatrI ,ti;N :ssaltsnot),\'uo) lDLtaluout'u14 StulnBtlsauJ (911111(.po).W ,sueu1a.1 'eipeltnog :uopuo'I 'silau;v fnunt) put) .ru .suerup.\ 1nt8o1ot1,tlsdo.tna11 '1ttr3o1ot1lis4 :ssauvtor;tstut2.[o ))uat)q aqJ g66f; (.pe) 99e-9 9Z' (t)Z's aryn$ s s au snot ) suo ) ssousnorcsrror Jo uorlelel eq]_., (9661) .14l 'suprula.\ ' .[o lnu.rnoy ' ,ppo,\\ Il?rreletu oql oj '6I puD lD.tou,nqag ',,a,rr1reds.rad uos:ed-1s.rg 1? L ZOL :(p)p1 's'acuans ulDrg ruor.J sseusnorrstroJ,, (qtOOt) .IAI ,su?rula.\ puD lD.tou,Dqag ',,isnorrsuor Sursseco,rd uorlerurolur '699-l S9 l.P].tI'sacuarts ueunq rl'-. utD.tg jr.rgg]],I :r:"irl..t '66 LL 't "tBolotl)'1.\d .ru ,suuru1o.1 'ssousnotrsuoJ., oqt pue ur?rq (OOOt) lotnldosoyq1 ',,plro,^A 1ecrs,(qd '96a'19'oN orUJO .oN ecgJo 1ue1e4 asauedef :9/g6lgt ]uated tuolud rlsrlr-rg',,suos:ad Jeep roJ sply, (tL6l) .IAI .suurule,,\ 'tg 6r'selprrossv Iuneqlrg eJuor,re-I :fN 'qp^\qpl\l 'ssaustlot)slto) ot satl,tno.rddy ,tg/iruang ('spo) ralooqcs .,\[.,15T pup uaqoJ CT ur '..sseusnorrsuoJ puu 'rusrturuolnu ,uorluolty, (fOOt) .lt.U .ulUJlqS 'sreqsrlqnd xrrlel^l pue suorlezllr^rJ ur sJrpnls roJ erlueJ :rqloc,r\aN 'n8oa pun ssausnot)suo) 'satlDtLtoul/ ail4u?o3 (1i02) .U.) .oEU 'V'S'n :90lgtg 'oN ecUJO ,{a1t16 :1,to1,Lra51 3r;rssa;o.r7 uottntu.ro.{tt7 uDumH 01 uott)tlpo.ttLtl lz uoll)npo.tlul uy :LtotluatlV puo itorua1y (OSOt) .O 'uuLu.ro\ 22 Introduction Velmans, M. (2016) "What and where are conscious experiences? Dualism, reductionism and reflexive monism", in K. Almqvist and A. Haag (eds.) The Return of Consciousness. Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation (in press). Velmans, M. and Nagasawa, Y (eds.) (2012) Montst Alternatives to Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies Special Issue. Exeter: Imprint Academic. Yelmans, M. and Schneider, S. (eds.) (2007) The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Malden, MA: Blackwell.