Études maritainiennes / Maritain Studies, Vol. XXXII, 2016, pp. 137-154 Scott Ventureyra
God’s Simplicity, Evolution and the Origin of
Embodied Human Consciousness
Scott Ventureyra
1. Introduction
In this paper, I will argue that the best explanation for the origin of embodied
human consciousness is grounded in God as understood through the doctrine of
divine simplicity. First, I will present a modern expression of Aquinas’
understanding of divine simplicity. I will focus on one of Aquinas’ main
contentions, namely, the impossibility that God possesses any spatial or temporal
parts. Second, I will offer a modern version of a cosmological argument that will
fortify the doctrine of divine simplicity with respect to the implied transcendent
cause. Third, for embodied consciousness to arise, given modern science, it must
arise through an evolutionary process of some sort. I will take a theistic
evolutionary approach. Such an understanding will be explored while providing a
connection to Jacques Maritain’s view of human evolution as expressed in his sixth
chapter of Untrammeled Approaches titled “Toward a Thomist Idea of
Evolution.”1 From there I will tie the main three threads of this paper together.
2. The Doctrine of Divine Simplicity According to Aquinas
Although both Augustine and Anselm provided their own formulations,2 Thomas
Aquinas was the first to expound a rigorous defense of the doctrine of divine
See Jacques Maritain, “Toward a Thomist Idea of Evolution,” in Untrammeled Approaches,
tr. by Bernard Doering (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), pp.
85-131.
2
See Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 92.
1
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simplicity.3 In the Summa Theologiae he gives the doctrine precedence over all
other divine attributes and perfections.4 This is because the doctrine of divine
simplicity delineates the true nature of God from which all other theological and
philosophical notions of God proceed from. Thomistic philosopher Eleonore
Stump indicates that it is “fundamental to the Thomistic worldview [and that, it] is
foundational for everything in Aquinas’s thought from his metaphysics to his
ethics.”5 From a Christian understanding, reality consists of both spiritual and
material substances and also what are known as abstract objects. Spiritual beings
include God, angels and things like the soul, spirit, psyche and consciousness;
while material beings comprise anything consisting of physical reality which
includes subatomic particles to celestial bodies; and abstract objects include things
like numbers, propositions and logic. Aquinas’ understanding of physical beings
follows an Aristotelian framework for matter and form. God’s simplicity excludes
God from such delineations.
According to Eleonore Stump, the doctrine as is understood by Aquinas can be
distinguished by three main contentions6: i) the impossibility that God possesses
any spatial or temporal parts, ii) the impossibility that God possesses any intrinsic
accidental properties and lastly,7 iii) the only thing attributable to God is His
essence or nature.8
3
See Jay Richards, The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection,
Simplicity and Immutability (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), p. 213.
4
See Richards refers to divine simplicity as the first of all divine attributes treated by St.
Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae..
5
Stump, Aquinas, p. 92.
6
See Ibid., p. 96. Stump suggests that Aquinas’ understanding of the doctrine of simplicity
can be explained through three specific theses.
7
The second contention is exemplified when Aquinas states:
“There can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is related to an accident as
potentiality not actuality, for with regard to an accident a subject is in actuality in a certain
respect. But being in potentiality is entirely removed from God” (ST Ia.3.6.). A helpful
distinction in understanding Aquinas here would be between intrinsic and extrinsic
properties. The important discrepancy to note here is that an extrinsic change to a particular
entity’s properties will not change the entity but an intrinsic change will. Yet as Stump notes
“[b]ut no entity, not even a mathematical or divine entity, can be exempted from having
extrinsic accidental properties” even though they lack intrinsic accidental properties.
8
Eleonore Stump, Divine Simplicity in Aquinas, ed. by Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 135. “The third contention regarding divine
simplicity in Aquinas’ thought is that God is His own nature or essence. There cannot be
any distinction between properties in God. All created things possess a difference between
their essence and existence but not so for God. According to the doctrine of divine simplicity
God is equivalent to His existence. Thus, essentially, the three main contentions of the
doctrine of divine simplicity include God’s lacking of spatiality, temporal parts and
metaphysical parts.”
Ventureyra: Embodied Human Consciousness
The first contention which will be the focus of this paper, which affirms a
distinction between God and material reality. As Aquinas states: “It is impossible
that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we
have shown (I: 2:3) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is
impossible that God should be composed of matter and form” (ST III, article 2).
Thus, God cannot be a physical being. Moreover, God is simple in the strongest
sense since God lacks any parts at all, whether physical, temporal, spatial, or
metaphysical. Moreover, no distinctions between property, essence and existence,
actuality and potentiality, exist in God. Complementary to this, Aquinas develops
God’s eternality which includes His being outside of time; hence lacking temporal
parts.9 This is derived from Aquinas’ development of divine immutability but
ultimately from divine simplicity.10
Turning briefly to the third contention of Aquinas’ understanding of simplicity,
namely that God is His own nature or essence. There cannot be any distinction
between properties in God. All created things possess a difference between their
essence and existence but not so for God. A crucial distinction must be made before
we proceed, as Aquinas anticipated an objection being raised to this when he
expounded his argument for a first cause which is central to establishing God’s
transcendence from physical reality. The objection lies in bringing attention to an
apparent confusion between essence with existence. This illustrates the distinction
between God’s nature and the fact that God exists. 11 One may want to know want
9
Stump, Aquinas, p. 96.
Ibid. It is worth mentioning in relatively recent years, there has been several erudite
defenses of divine simplicity. These include the Fr. Lawrence Dewan, “Saint Thomas, Alvin
Plantinga and the Divine Simplicity” Modern Schoolman 66, 2 (1989): 141-151 which is a
response to Plantinga’s Aquinas lecture of 1980 Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee,
Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1980). Other defenses include Eleonore Stump’s
chapter “God’s Simplicity” in her book titled Aquinas where she attempts to resolve a number
of other difficult issues, Peter Weigel’s book long treatment, Aquinas on Simplicity: An
Investigation into the Foundations of his Philosophical Theology, and most recently James
Dolezal’s God without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God's Absoluteness
(Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications, 2011), another full length treatment of the subject.
This is all to say that despite the many criticisms and detractions, the doctrine is alive and
well in contemporary philosophical and theological discussions.
11
See Peter Weigel, Aquinas on Simplicity: An Investigation into the Foundations of his
Philosophical Theology (Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang AG), p. 74 – hereafter referred to as
Aquinas on Simplicity. Peter Weigel asks: “‘Does God exist?’ is a separate issue from the
question ‘What (essentially) is God?’ Thus to identify essence and existence is to focus these
two separate matters since we do not know God’s essence but we know that God exists. (One
could go in the reverse direction. To know that God’s essence is somehow ‘just to exist’ does
not guarantee there is in fact a God.) This manner of objection confuses the character of the
divine essence with an inquiry into its existential status.” See Aquinas, De potential q.7 ad.2
ad 1. The following quote “In reply to [this objection] it must be said that ‘being’ (ens) and
10
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kind of God exists but the question of God’s existence is a separate one. Having
said that, one can make certain deductions about a cause after one establishes the
legitimacy of the cause’s existence.
It is important to note at this juncture that Aquinas is not convinced by
arguments made a priori such as the case with Anselm’s ontological argument
since it would be quite conceivable to perceive an association between essence and
existence in God as formulating some sort of ontological argument by just
affirming God’s essence we would know His existence. 12
Having sorted through this issue, we can now move on to our next component.
I will present a modern formulation of an ancient argument that I believe fortifies
the doctrine of God’s simplicity.
3. The Kalam Cosmological Argument
As part of a theistic evolutionary model, we will need an explication for situating
our existence in an overall cosmic setting whereby its origins and evolution are
grounded in a transcendent cause, namely, God, and for our purposes as understood
by the doctrine of divine simplicity. One way in accomplishing this end is to turn
to what has become known in recent memory as the Kalam Cosmological
Argument (henceforward KCA). It is worth noting that the cosmological argument
is more accurately represented by a family of arguments, as opposed to a singular
argument. I will take a different approach than Thomas Aquinas and subsequent
Thomistic thinkers including Maritain13 through utilizing a cosmological argument
predicated on the principle of determination over that of the principle of causality.
Unfortunately, Maritain died several years prior to the revival of this type of
cosmological argument which seeks to corroborate evidence from the
cosmological sciences with philosophical argumentation against a succession of
‘is’ (esse) is said in two ways, as in Metaphysics V. Sometimes [they] signify the essence of
a thing or the act of existing; at other times they signify the truth of a proposition, even in
things which have no being: just as we say “blindness is” because it is true that a man is
blind. Accordingly, when John Damascene says that the being of God is evident to us, the
being of God is understood as in the second way but not in the first. For in the first way God’s
existence is the same as his substance, and so just as his essence is not known neither in his
esse [act of his existence]. In the second way we know that God is because we conceive this
proposition in our mind [reasoning] from his effects.” Jacques Maritain, Untrammeled
Approaches: The Collected Works of Jacques Maritain, trans. Bernard Doering (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press), p. 87: “It is to God that the ultimate perfection of
life belongs, for in Him intellection is not something other than existence, (God has the idea
of Himself, and this idea is His being).”
12
See Weigel, Aquinas on Simplicity, p. 74.
13
Jacques Maritain died in 1973. William Lane Craig completed his dissertation on The
Kalam Cosmological Argument in 1977 and published his book of the same title in 1979.
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an infinite number of past events, for the sake of demonstrating a transcendent
cause to a temporally finite universe.
William Lane Craig in his extensive historical examination, laid out in his 1980
book titled: The Cosmological Argument: From Plato to Leibniz develops a
tremendously useful distinction between the three main types of cosmological
arguments: “[first], the arguments based on the principle of determination,
[second], arguments based on the principle of causality and [third] arguments
based on the principle of sufficient reason.”14
Although I believe that the Thomistic arguments based on the principle of
causality are still cogent in and of themselves I do not think they are as forceful as
the KCA. In this area I favour Bonaventure’s approach who disagreed with
Aquinas on arguing for the finitude of the past. Aquinas as I understand him,
believed by Scriptural faith (which must be emphasized is not a form of fideism)
that the world was created by God via ex nihilo. Yet, he thought that reason alone
could not permit us to make a conclusion either way since the arguments for the
infinite past and the converse arguments for the finite past were antonymic.
Nonetheless, in spite of this, he was more persuaded by the science of his time
which affirmed the eternality of the past. Given contemporary discoveries in
modern physics and cosmology, I disagree with such a position.
In a very recent critical essay, written by Alex Vilenkin, a leading cosmologist
published at the end of last October in the new journal, Inference: International
Review of Science, argues that the universe had a beginning and that a “singularity
appears to be unavoidable”. This inference was posited by a theorem he cotheorized; the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem. This theorem according to Vilenkin
intimates that “if the universe is, on average, expanding, then its history cannot be
indefinitely continued into the past.”15
The initial singularity represents the bringing into existence of space-time. To
speak of events occurring prior in time, does not make sense when you are
speaking of time itself possessing a beginning since there is no prior event when it
comes to the commencement of time. This is something that Augustine recognized
in the fourth century.
Historically the KCA can be traced back to John Philoponus a sixth century
Christian philosopher, theologian and scientist. Philoponus’ belief that God
created the universe out of nothing played a significant role in questioning the
14
William Lane Craig, The Cosmological Argument: From Plato to Leibniz (Eugene,
Oregon: Wipf and Stock), p. 283.
15
Alexander Vilenkin “The Beginning of the Universe,” Volume 1, Issue 4 Inference:
International Review of Science. Vilenkin does not believe one can infer God’s existence
because of the finitude of the past but he has not really looked at the KCA in depth according
to his writings. Although he does deny the first premise for seemingly scientific reasons.
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reigning philosophy of his time.16 It is worth pointing out that many Christians and
Jews were embarrassed by the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and were divided over
whether God created from pre-existing matter through reorganizing it as opposed
to creating matter itself from nothing.17 The reason for this embarrassment was
precisely because of the natural philosophical consensus that pointed towards an
eternal past. As philosopher, Richard Sorabji notes: “Up to AD 529, Christians
were on the defensive. They argued that a beginning of the universe was not
impossible. In 529, Philoponus swung round into the attack. He argued that a
beginning of the universe was actually mandatory, and mandatory of the pagans’
own principles.”18
Fast forward almost 1500 years, the KCA’s modern formulation can be best
described with the following deductive argument:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.19
In defense of the second premise two lines of scientific evidence have been
offered. The first, the expansion of the universe which is intimately connected to
big bang cosmology. The second, the second law of thermodynamics. This second
argument suggests that given a sufficient amount of time the universe and all its
processes will run-down and reach a state of equilibrium or maximum entropy. For
instance, the sun cannot burn and produce light ad infinitum, in lieu of this fact,
the question arises as to why it hasn’t burned out already if it has existed from
eternity past. In addition to these scientific evidences, two philosophical arguments
with intriguing examples have been provided. First, on the impossibility of an
actual infinite existing, so, that the finitude of the past is predicated on the
impossibility of an infinite temporal regress of events. “Hilbert’s Hotel”20 is used
16
The prevailing philosophic (pre-scientific) view from the time of the pre-Socratic
materialists up until as recent as the early 20th Century modern science was that the universe
was beginningless (eternal in the past).
17
See Richard Sorabji, “Infinity and Creation,” in Philoponus and the Rejection of
Aristotelian Science, Second Edition ed. Richard Sorabji (London: Institute of Classical
Studies, 2010), 208.
18
Sorabji, “Infinity and Creation,” p. 210.
19
William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and
Stock), p. 63. The warrant I provide for the first two premises of this argument are quite brief
in comparison to the treatments provided by Craig and many of the supporters of the KCA.
My intention is to very briefly outline strong reasons to support this argument in lieu of
Philoponus’ reasoning in the sixth century. I will not engage in all the criticisms and
objections to these premises since that would extend far beyond the objective of this paper.
20
See Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, p. 84-86. The incoherence of an infinite
number of things existing in reality is David Hilbert’s Hotel. This peculiar hotel begins with
Ventureyra: Embodied Human Consciousness
as a “thought experiment” to illustrate the various absurdities that arise in
envisioning the existence of an actual infinite.21 The second philosophical
argument in support of the second premise entails, that it is impossible to form an
actual infinite by “successive addition”. The thought experiment of Tristram
Shandy22 who takes a year to write a day of his life, is offered as an example to
illustrate the various absurdities that arise with the formation of an actual infinite
via successive addition. Bertrand Russell suggested that if Tristram Shandy were
immortal the book could be completed since one year and one day would both be
infinite. However, such a notion is impossible since the future represents a
a finite number of rooms without any vacancies, so that a new guest is turned away. But then
the hotel is transformed into one with an infinite number of rooms which are all filled up.
Now when a new guest arrives she can go to the first room while the manager shifts every
other guest from room 2 to 3, 3 to 4 and so on unto infinity. Things get stranger when an
infinite number of guests show up, each customer is shifted into a room number twice the
previous’ room number, leaving all the odd numbered rooms vacant. Thus accommodating
all the infinite number of guests into the odd numbered vacant rooms and again having an
infinite number of rooms filled, even though an infinite number of rooms were previously
occupied with zero vacancies. Things can get even more bizarre than this if all the people in
the odd numbered rooms check out. Even though an infinite number of guests would have
been checked out; an infinite number would still remain. It is important to note that even
though infinity may have fruitful applications when applied to Georg Cantor’s set theory
where it plays a well-defined role devoid of absurdities, it is does not when applied to
physical reality.
21
For an example of a common objection, see, Craig’s response to Richard Swinburne’s
objection against an actual infinite existing in time:
https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/swinburne-on-the-kalamcosmological-argument Philosopher Mark Nowacki has tried to give a more rigorous defense
of the KCA especially the first premise through a substance-based metaphysics which
involves arguing beyond logical possibilities into the realm of factual possibilities which
entails scientific and mechanistic empirical support rather than hand waving.
22
See, Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, Creation out of Nothing: A Biblical,
Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), pp.
213-216. One can argue that an infinite collection could never be made by beginning at a
certain point and just adding members. In, essence one cannot count from one to infinity nor
from infinite to one. This dilemma is known as the impossibility of traversing the infinite. A
helpful illustration of this, is the paradox of Tristram Shandy. This paradox, as developed
by Craig, shows the impossibility of forming an actually infinite collection of things by
adding one member after another. Shandy writes his autobiography at an incredibly slow
pace whereby it takes him a year to record one day of his life. The paradox can be ultimately
summed up with this statement: “If Tristram Shandy would have finished his book by today,
then he would have finished it yesterday.” (Copan and Craig, Creation out of Nothing, 216).
So, we can ultimately argue that if the universe does not have a point of beginning then we
have no reason for the present moment to have arrived but commonsensically it has, therefore
we know that the events of the physical past are not without beginning.
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potential infinite. So, although Shandy would write for eternity he would get more
behind as time passes never catching up to his chronological age. Thus, Russell’s
one-to-one correspondence between days and years is rendered absurd. The two
scientific lines of evidences coupled with the two philosophical arguments has
indeed given the KCA a very empirical robustness in favour of the contemporary
development of the KCA over previous historical periods.
Moving onto the first premise. A defense of this, typically relies on the
metaphysical intuition that things cannot come into existence from nothingness.23
Having now outlined the KCA we can turn to the implications of it, as it is relevant
to that first contention of divine simplicity.
3.1 Implications of the KCA for the first contention of Divine Simplicity24
We can now explore some basic implications of the KCA for the first contention
of divine simplicity. A number of properties logically jump up at us. As the cause
of space and time, this cause must transcend space and time, rendering such a cause
to exist timelessly and non-spatially.25 This would also entail that the cause is
immutable and immaterial, since timelessness implies immutability and
immutability, immateriality. The cause must also be without beginning and
uncaused. Re-examining a summary of Aquinas’ understanding of divine
simplicity echoes this since, as Stump has noted: “It is impossible that God have
any spatial or temporal parts that can be distinguished from one another as here
rather than there or as now rather than then, and so God cannot be a physical
entity.”26
Thus, the implicative derivations of the KCA’s transcendent cause bare an
identical resemblance to Aquinas’ first contention of God’s simplicity since
immateriality, timelessness, non-spatiality and immutability are established. This
is in line with Peter Weigel’s observation that:
[T]he claims of simplicity function as a kind of shorthand for the basic ontology of a
first cause, then it is natural to place simplicity right after the arguments for the
existence of a first cause. Aquinas, moreover, realized that the claims of simplicity
articulate an ontological situation that the other major predicates presuppose in the
state of affairs that they each describe as true of the first cause.27
23
See Nowacki, The Kalam Cosmological Argument for God (Amherst, New York:
Prometheus Books, 2007).
24
So, given that the KCA is a valid argument and sound argument given the assumption that
the two premises are more plausible than their denial we have an argument which points to a
transcendent cause.
25
See William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics Third Edition
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), p. 152.
26
Stump, Aquinas, p. 96.
27
Weigel, Aquinas on Simplicity, p. 38.
Ventureyra: Embodied Human Consciousness
This method of establishing an apophatic description of God through the KCA
is evidentially based through using the best science and philosophy at hand. For
this reason, it can be deemed superior to arguments based on the principle of
causality for deriving God’s simplicity. Although cosmological arguments based
on the principle of causality are nonetheless powerful for establishing a God who
sustains the universe moment by moment. This is a perfect segue into looking at
a particular theistic evolutionary model that is consonant with big bang cosmology,
as we have seen with the expansion of the universe supporting that second premise
of the KCA.
4. Theistic Evolution
In my estimation, one of the three following models is most conducive to a broad
picture of God’s creative action concerning the universe, its governing physical
laws, life in all its diversity and human consciousness. There are three main subcategories of theistic evolution which include non-teleological evolution (NTE),
planned evolution (PE) and directed evolution (DE).28
NTE affirms that there has been no supernatural intervention since the creation
of the universe.29 So, although God exists, natural forces without any plan or
direction are responsible for all the phenomena within the universe. On the surface
it bears similarity to a deistic view but many adherents would seriously contest
such an association.
PE holds that there is a specific intention and plan which was implanted into
the universe at the moment of creation. It is a form of teleological evolution and
is a monotheistic position. PE suggests that although God certainly can intervene
in creation but does not do so because the original creation was perfect.
The final model of theistic evolution, DE, is also another form of teleological
evolution, in some ways similar to PE. Therefore, as we examined the KCA, which
finds its support in the expansion of the universe grounded in big bang cosmology
which is a fundamental component to cosmic evolution. Consequently, DE
declares that God even after bringing the universe into being still continues to act
within it. Unlike PE, in DE, God intervenes throughout the history of the universe,
28
See Gerald Rau, Mapping the Origins Debate: Six Models of the Beginning of Everything
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2012), pp. 37-38 – hereafter referred to as Mapping
the Origins Debate. It is worth pointing out that some thinkers will argue for more models
than proposed by Rau. It is also conceivable that there could be intertwinements between one
model and another but these seem to cover the basic distinctions between the broader
categories of theistic evolution. It is also worth noting that while several thinkers/scientists
may agree with one another on the broad categories, it does not mean they are in accordance
with every aspect but they share major agreements with respect to the characteristic of each
model.
29
Ibid.,Rau, p. 43.
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although, proponents are divided over whether such a thing is scientifically
detectable or not. Supporters of this view include the prolific quantum chemist,
Henry Fritz Schaefer III30, physicist Loren Haarsma31 and the famous biochemist,
Michael Behe32 who coined the term “irreducible complexity”33 as a criterion for
Intelligent Design. DE holds that Universal Common Descent (hereafter UCD),
namely that all organisms are related through one or multiple single celled
organisms, that originated 3.5 billion years ago, as the best explanation for the
diversity of life on Earth. It is empirically superior and theologically superior to
special creationist models. Theologically, theistic evolutionary models, in general,
avoid turning God into a consistent tinkerer as special creationists seem to do. It
is indeed the best explanation of several lines of evidences including: the fossil
record (e.g. transition from fish to amphibians), geographical distribution,
comparative physiology and biochemistry (e.g. DNA sequencing, endogenous
retroviruses) and comparative anatomy (e.g. homologous structures).
Based on my reading of Maritain’s essay this model seems to be most congruent
with his position. Maritain indeed has a teleological understanding of evolution.
Maritain emphatically supports a direction towards evolution when he writes:
it must be admitted that the development of the human races has been directed
hence…toward an end; and toward what end if not the actuation of the diverse
perfections to which matter is in potency in the human generative cell…direction and
finality I just mentioned, operate within the living being (that is to say, in the case we
are concerned with at present, within the human being) which by its essence as a
living being, is endowed with immanent activity; and this direction and finality
operate.34
He applies Thomistic philosophy to understand the history and development of
life since he acknowledges that St. Thomas lacked an evolutionary understanding
of life. For his support of this, he looks towards St. Thomas’ text Summa Contra
Gentiles¸ book III, chapter 22. This text supports what Maritain sees as a linear
30
See Henry Fritz Schaefer, Science and Christianity: Conflict or Coherence? (Athens:
University of Georgia Printing, 2003). Schaefer has published over 1500 scientific papers
and was a nominee for the Nobel Prize in Chemistry several times.
31
See Deborah B. Haarsma and Loren D. Haarsma, Origins: Christian Perspectives on
Creation, Evolution, and Intelligent Design (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Faith Alive Christian
Resources, 2012).
32
See Michael J. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New
York: Free Press, 1996) – hereafter referred to as Darwin’s Black Box; and Michael J. Behe,
The Edge of Evolution: The Search for the Limits of Darwinism (New York: Free Press,
2007).
33
Behe, Darwin’s Black Box, p. 39. Behe defines it as: “A single system which is composed
of several interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, and where the removal of
any one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning.”
34
Maritain, Untrammeled Approaches, pp. 102-103.
Ventureyra: Embodied Human Consciousness
telic development which is compatible with a directed evolution, as he states: “the
order of the ascending perfection of forms in those beings subject to the movement
of substantial transformation.”35 He sees matter tending in the direction of a human
soul as the final form.36 Maritain describes evolution as a “hierarchy of
(transcategorical) degreees and a general tendency toward higher degrees, and
toward the ultimate degree which is that of the intellective soul or of the human
being.”37 He also makes a sharp distinction between this Thomistic understanding
of evolution and Teilhard’s:
It would be utterly foolish to seek in St. Thomas a Teilhardian philosophy of
Evolution…for St. thomas there were substantial transmutations causing a true
passage from one nature to another, where in the case of Teilhard (the thought of the
great poet of Evolution lacked the evolutionary concept par excellence, the concept
of change of being), for him everything was in everything…38
This denotes a deep disapproval of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s panpsychism.
Typically, those who support DE are critical of a Darwinian understanding of
evolution. Maritain exposes his disdain for Teilhard’s understanding of evolution
but also for Darwinism when he states in reference to Soviet biologists’ acceptance
of natural selection: “and they accept the pitiful extrinsic Darwinian mechanism
alone (natural selection of the fittest, that is to say, the one that by chance is in the
best condition for survival).”39 This quote seems to betray an understanding of
evolutionary theory, natural selection is regarded as the non-random component
(not a chance based mechanism) which preserves the innovations or novelties as
brought forth by the accumulation of random mutations. I wonder if Maritain was
acquainted with great critics of Darwinian evolution in France such as the zoologist
Pierre Paul Grasse, the mathematician and medical doctor Marcel Schutzenberger
or the American philosopher David Berlinski who spent much time discussing the
improbabilities of Neo-Darwinism with Schutzenberger in France. Nonetheless,
in this text, Maritain does not explain where the logic of his disdain lies. For the
majority of those who support DE it lies in the explanatory power and scope of the
joint mechanisms of natural selection and random mutation. Based on my
understanding of Neo-Darwinism I do not see an explicit incompatibility with
Christian theism. The incompatibility is strictly definitional when Darwinists
support what is known as a blind watchmaker thesis, namely that evolution is
purposeless, unguided and mechanistically and chance based. This is based on a
metaphysical interpretation of the evidence not the evidence itself. According to
the textbook, Fundamentals of Molecular Evolution, mutations are not random
35
Ibid., p. 89.
Ibid., 89.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid., p. 101.
36
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with respect to their genomic location nor do they all occur at the same frequencies.
The random aspect of mutation is said to be with “respect to their effect on the
fitness of the organism carrying them.”40 In other words, the mutations occur
without taking into consideration the benefit, detriment or neutrality of the fitness
of the particular organism where the mutation is occurring.41 This opens the door
on the compatibility of ND theory (NDT) with God’s relationship with Creation.
Thus, Maritain and other skeptics of Darwinism should do so on the basis of the
evidence not the metaphysical add-ons by materialist biologists such as Ernst
Mayr, Richard Dawkins or George Gaylord Simpson.
Maritain embraces a Neo-Lamarckian understanding of evolution while
allowing for natural selection42 but it is unclear to what degree he allows for natural
selection to play a role in explaining UCD. For instance, most special creationists
whether young earth or old earth allow for natural selection preserving random
mutations to explain micro-evolutionary change but disagree that it can be
extrapolated to explain UCD. Many mainstream biologists who consider
themselves non-religious also question whether micro-evolutionary mechanisms
can be warranted in explaining grand evolutionary change, they propose other
mechanisms as seen with their Extended Synthesis. Nonetheless, NeoLamarckism and its associated orthogenesis is rejected by the majority of
biologists today. However, Jean Baptiste Lamarck’s ideas revolving around
evolution have gained some renewed interest, in relatively recent years, with
symbiogenesis and the general study of epigenetics.43 For a vast period prior to
this, much of his work was dismissed for its “inheritance of acquired
characteristics”. However, more accurately, Lamarckism refers to the inheritance
40
Dan Graur and Wen-Hsiung Li, Fundamentals of Molecular Evolution 2nd edition
(Sunderland, Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates, 2000), p. 38.
41
For a helpful discussion between the distinctions of random (randomness) and chance, as
they are often conflated and confused on a popular level, see Brendan Sweetman, Evolution,
Chance and God: Understanding the Relationship between Evolution and Religion (New
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), pp. 109-113. Chance more properly understood refers
to something being devoid of plan or purpose, as more of an argument against teleology than
randomness as understood in scientific terms, as explained above.
42
See Maritain, Untrammeled Approaches, p. 102.
43
Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan, Acquiring Genomes: A Theory of the Origin of Species
(New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 41; ed. By Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb, Evolution
Beyond Neo-Darwinism, Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral,
and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2005); Thomas E.
Woodward and James P. Gills, The Mysterious Epigenome: What Lies Beyond DNA (Grand
Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2012), p. 146; Focus on Origins, Access Research Network
video interview with Dr. Michael Denton ( Senior Research Fellow, Biochemistry
Department, University of Otago, New Zealand). Copyright 1993 by Access Research
Network, Colorado Springs, CO 80937.
Ventureyra: Embodied Human Consciousness
of traits that are brought about in their parents through environmental conditions.44
Be that as it may, Maritain makes a very important point when he muses over
the hope that one day we will be able to explain the many difficulties facing science
including the origin of man (which for the purpose of this study encompasses the
origin of consciousness), he states that:
If we suppose that this hope will one day be realized, the explanation (or
rather explanatory description) by science of the evolutive process, since
science deals solely with the detail of the causal material involved, will not
replace, but on the contrary will call for and make absolutely necessary, the
more profound elucidations of the philosophy of nature. And these
elucidations, for their part, can be no more than problematic, except for what
touches on the fundamental principles and the answers to certain
fundamental questions, like the origin of man, which is the subject of our
present reflections. (Poor philosophy of nature. We have to admit that in the
course of the last few centuries it has, in general, cut a rather sorry figure).45
One cannot but help agree with Maritain that the dominance of materialistic
philosophy in interpreting and dominating much of evolutionary science, has been
a sad state of affairs. It has not only allowed for nihilistic existential claims but
also to dead ends because of unfruitful heuristics. For example, Francis Crick and
Leslie Orgel were misled by their use of a Neo-Darwinian framework. These
scientists assumed that there would be large amounts of non-protein coding and
non-functional regions in the DNA precisely because evolution through a NeoDarwinian fashion presupposes a process of trial and error involving vast amounts
of “junk.” That they relied on such assumptions was evident in their two articles
published in the journal Nature in 1980. This led some biologists to write to Nature
arguing that it was too early to decide that non-protein coding DNA was simply
junk. Although they then represented a minority position, these biologists have
now been vindicated.
4.1 Origin of Human Consciousness
I wish to provide a brief understanding of human consciousness since there are
many ambiguities and different meanings associated with such a term. I will use
it in the sense of possessing subjective experience, which includes awareness of
self, others, objects, physical reality, death etc.
Turning our attention to the origin of humanity and by implication
consciousness we can outline some of the problematics and how DE is equipped
to deal with them. By definition the origin of consciousness cannot come from
44
See Lynn Margulis, Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution (New York, New York:
Basic Books, 1998), p. 8.
45
Maritain, Untrammeled Approaches, p. 102.
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reductive materialistic science nor be explained by conventional methodological
naturalism unless one is willing to reduce consciousness to just a physical state.
This is why we are in need of a new science. As Maritain recognizes: “that the
science of things and the sciences of intellective intentions (logic and dialectics)
are distinct from one another.”46 Likewise how are we to discover a materialistic
explanation for something that defies such an explanation as is the case with the
origin of consciousness? Maritain explains that:
it is quite evident that a spiritual soul cannot be educed from the potency of
matter, this is a metaphysical impossibility… a spiritual soul is the act of
matter, but it is also spirit; it is a spiritual being subsisting by itself (and
communicating its subsistence to the body which it informs). In other words,
even though a certain ultimate disposition of matter calls for a spiritual soul,
the existence of this soul is independent of matter and will continue without
it. This is why to say that it can be educed from the potency of matter is
pure nonsense, for in such a case it could not exist as spirit, without the
matter it actuates.”47
Consistent with this line of thought, is philosopher of mind, David Chalmers
who affirms that:
the problem of consciousness lies uneasily at the border of science and philosophy. I
would say that it is properly a scientific subject matter: it is a natural phenomenon
like motion, life and cognition and calls out for an explanation in the way that these
do. But it is not open to investigation by the usual scientific methods. Everyday
scientific methodology has trouble getting a grip on it, not least because of the
difficulties observing the phenomenon…I argue that reductive explanation of
consciousness is impossible, and I even argue for a form of dualism. But this is just
part of the scientific process.48
It is worth noting that Maritain, supports traducianism since he refutes a
creationist view of the human soul.49 The soul of a person is derived from the
individual’s parents. Maritain affirms that the reception of the soul in such a way
46
See Ibid., p. 87.
Ibid., p. 105.
48
David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. xiv. To be sure, albeit controversial, there are several
developing scientific theories of consciousness that try to account for its nature and origins.
For example, Integrated Information Theory, see Guilio Tononi and Christof Koch,
“Consciousness: here, there and everywhere?” Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B. 370:20140167. There
are others such as Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose’s Orchestrated Objective Reduction
(Orch-OR Theory), see Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose (March 2014). “Reply to
criticism of the ‘Orch OR qubit’ – ‘Orchestrated objective reduction’ is scientifically
justified”. Physics of Life Reviews (Elsevier) 11 (1): pp. 94–100.
49
See Maritain, Untrammeled Approaches, pp. 106-107.
47
Ventureyra: Embodied Human Consciousness
is “natural” in both a physical and metaphysical sense, physically because it is
called for by the developed complexity and metaphysically since it has been
included in the creation of humanity by God.50
Proponents of DE may vary on the issue of monogenism and polygenism
regarding the origins of humankind, most likely favouring monogenism but either
option is open. DE views the relationship of science and theology as interactive.51
Gerald Rau, who’s recently written an important book on differing models of
origins, explains the variants within this view of Theistic Evolution regarding
God’s action:
For those who think that God’s intervention is scientifically detectable, it makes sense
to ask whether a particular event has a natural or supernatural cause. Although natural
causation is expected for most events, the large number of low probability events that
have occurred at each level of origins is taken by this group as evidence for God’s
direction.52
It seems that the irreducibility of consciousness would not only represent a low
probability event but one of a profound disjunction between substances, namely
spiritual and material. Yet, that is not to affirm a substance dualism, one could
defend a neutral monist position. The key is that that consciousness is irreducible
to the body (i.e., the brain) and is a transcendent component which can be seen as
the form of the body. Nonetheless, a strictly materialist position is seemingly a
non-starter if you will and an unbridgeable gap for naturalism.
Having said that, this is not to deny the correspondence and correlation between
complexity and consciousness. Maritain recognizes this through his utilization of
Thomistic distinctions between vegetative, sensitive and intellective souls
corresponding with the complexity of beings. Vegetative souls are assigned to
plants, while higher animals possess sensitive souls and human’s intellective ones
alongside complex brains. Maritain also sees this distinction occurring as
exemplified through his understanding of the complicated process of human
generation according to St. Thomas.53 He sees this occurring through human
embryological development as in a way mirroring universal common descent.54 It
is important to note that Maritain emphasizes through all the developmental stages
the embryo is virtually human and becomes formally human upon reception of the
intellective soul. It is worth noting that Maritain much less Aquinas write about
50
See Ibid., p. 107.
See Rau, Mapping the Origins Debate, p. 47.
52
Ibid., 47.
53
See Maritain, Untrammeled Approaches, pp. 91-106.
54
One wonders if Maritain is somehow echoing the discredited view of recapitulation theory
which indicates that a human or animal follows the same sequence of its evolutionary
ancestors in embryological development, namely that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” in
support of his Thomistic understanding of evolution.
51
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consciousness as expressed in modern terms. Consciousness and reason are well
connected to the possession of an “intellective, spiritual and immortal soul” for
Maritain since he considers the possibility of human intelligence absurd without
it.55
Maritain although favouring a monogenist position, leaves the question of
polygenism open.56 Maritain probes into the difficult question of the distinction
between apelike ancestors and humans, namely the point at which they are almost
indistinguishable. He creates a third category for this distinction among animal and
human, he considers a pre-human type of creature. At a particular juncture with
these almost indistinguishable creatures he calls pre-humans, at least from
paleontological evidences, he suggests God intervenes suggesting that: “by an
exceptional and absolutely unique motion, raising an animal nature to a level of
being which transcends animality and the entire dynamism that nature is capable
of by itself, even under the general superelevating and superforming motion with
regard to the world of life” through “the infusion of an intellective, spiritual and
immortal soul.”57 Even though we are left in the dark as to what Maritain means
by infusion, precisely because the human mind staggers when reflecting upon
processes or ways that the soul and consciousness arise – whether naturalistically
or divinely. Maritain describes this occurring “in the course of the prenatal life of
these living beings, an intellective, spiritual and immortal soul, which will have
been called for by an ultimate disposition of matter [complexity], produced in the
hominian fetus or fetuses, at a certain instant of its or their intra-uterine
development, and this soul will in a very particular way already be human.”58
In relation to Maritain’s thoughts, quite recently, an interesting position,
although admittedly highly speculative, has emerged by two Catholic thinkers
Mike Flynn59 and philosopher Kenneth Kemp to demonstrate that there is no
contradiction between a monogenist theological account of human origins and
modern genetics and evolutionary biology.60 What is important is a distinction
between what it means to be human in a metaphysical sense as opposed to solely
in a genetically and physiological sense. Briefly, they argue that God could have
infused souls or higher consciousness into one of the thousands of couples,
55
See Ibid., p. 122.
See Ibid., p. 125.
57
Ibid., 127.
58
Ibid., pp. 125-126.
59
An exposition of Mike Flynn’s position can be found at this website.
http://tofspot.blogspot.ca/2011/09/adam-and-eve-and-ted-and-alice.html Last accessed,
April 28, 2015.
60
See Kenneth W. Kemp, “Science, Theology, and Monogenesis,” American Catholic
Philosophical
Quarterly,
Vol.
85,
No.
2,
2011:
pp.
217-236.
http://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/kemp-monogenism.pdf Last accessed, April 28, 2015
56
Ventureyra: Embodied Human Consciousness
representing an “Adam and Eve”. The descendants of this couple infused with
souls mated with other couples that did not have souls and eventually the
population of humans all had higher consciousness because of this interbreeding
and the ones without these souls eventually died off. So, consequently, no
contradiction is apparent from claiming that every modern human is descended
from a population of perhaps several thousand and also from a particular couple.
This is because humans who have descended from this “original” couple do not
necessitate the reception of all their genes from them.61
5. Concluding Remarks
Much like Maritain sees the necessity of the action of the first Cause, namely God
for the process of evolution to kick start, this is what we witness through the KCA.
The KCA corroborates St. Thomas’ notion of God’s simplicity which entails God
not possessing any physical, temporal, spatial, or metaphysical parts. The KCA
also supports God’s immutability and immateriality, since timelessness implies
immutability and immutability, immateriality. God as implied through the KCA is
also without beginning and uncaused. Given these linguistic assignments and the
creation of the universe ex nihilo, consequently bringing forth the expansion of the
universe entailing physical evolution leading to the formation of planets and
galaxies, to organic compounds to life to finally embodied human consciousness,
as provided by DE seems the most plausible given the evidence. Consciousness
and the soul as we have seen by its very nature cannot be explained purely by
physical means although it is correspondent with complexity throughout
evolutionary history. God’s simplicity is the best explanation for the origin of
embodied human consciousness since God is not only the first and determinate
cause and creator of the universe ex nihilo but also of the soul. Physical reality on
its own lacks the capacity for the derivation of human consciousness from solely a
complex brain. Ultimately, the irreducible nature of consciousness is indicative of
a supreme consciousness which is the source of all material and immaterial reality
whether star dust, simple living beings, logic, numbers or embodied human
consciousness who bear the image and likeness stamp of God.
Thus we may close with Maritain’s own pointed observation at the beginning
of his Thomistic evolutionary exploration regarding the origin of humanity:
it seems clear to me that it is a philosophical basis and elucidation that are lacking the
present studies and discussions on the origin of man. I am persuaded that if we took
hold of this affair by the philosophical end of the stick, we would see a whole pile of
things cleaned up, and we would see that a just and reasonable solution is not very
61
See Ibid., p. 232.
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difficult to find.62
Doctoral Candidate, Department of Theology
Dominican University College
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
62
Maritain, Untrammeled Approaches, p. 85.