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Organizational Isomorphism and Corruption in Financial Institutions: Empirical Research in Emerging Countries

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Abstract

The globalizations of capital markets in the last 20 years has led to a historic degree of financial integration in the world. It is clear, however, that globalization is not conducive to a complete homogeneity of financial markets and institutions. Among others, one element of diversity is the importance of the impact of corruption in emerging countries. Corruption decreases the credibility of financial institutions and markets. Scandals and unethical behavior in financial institutions erode confidence in such firms. Relying on neoinstitutional literature, this article focuses on the link between corruption and organizational isomorphism in financial institutions in emerging countries. Therefore, our aim is to examine the institutional reasons for corruption in financial institutions in emerging countries. Our structural equation model is based on empirical research in financial institutions in emerging countries. A questionnaire was administrated to 70 top executives of financial institutions in 18 different emerging countries.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Audencia. Nantes School of Management, Financial Institutions Center, Wharton Business School, 8, Route de la Jonelière, BP 31222, F-44312, Nantes Cedex 3, France

    Bertrand Venard

  2. ENITIAA. Graduate Institute of food industry, Rue de la Géraudière, BP 82225, F-44322, Nantes Cedex 3, France

    Mohamed Hanafi

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  1. Bertrand Venard
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Correspondence to Bertrand Venard.

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Venard, B., Hanafi, M. Organizational Isomorphism and Corruption in Financial Institutions: Empirical Research in Emerging Countries. J Bus Ethics 81, 481–498 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-007-9519-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-007-9519-9

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