Études maritainiennes / Maritain Studies, Vol. XXXII, 2016, pp. 51-70
Scott Ventureyra
The Cosmological Argument & the place of
Contestation in Philosophical Discourse:
From Plato & Aristotle to Contemporary Debates
Scott Ventureyra
Introduction
Two of the great progenitors of western philosophical thought, Plato and Aristotle,
ignited various vigorous debates. Although partially in agreement, one of these
great legacies can be found in the cosmological argument. What their thought
spawned has impacted even contemporary debates revolving around the
cosmological argument. The approach I adopt is distinct from the debate that
ensued between the Dominican University College’s two great professors and
former presidents of the Canadian Jacques Maritain Association, Fr. Lawrence
Dewan and Leslie Armour. Rather I seek not to pin one philosopher against the
other but to look to the tremendous joint legacy both have left behind. Indeed,
both of these Greek philosophers have precipitated countless intellectual fruits to
which western philosophical tradition is indebted.
The cosmological argument has possessed an enduring history. Historically it
has been defended by Greek pagans, Jews, Muslims, Christians including,
Catholics, Orthodox and Protestant and even pantheist thinkers. It has captured
the minds of some of the greatest thinkers in the history of Western philosophical
thought, aside from Plato and Aristotle, this impressive list includes: Philoponus,
Maimonides, Avicenna (ibn Sina), al-Ghazali, Averroës (ibn Rushd), Anselm,
Bonaventure, Aquinas, Scotus, Suarez, Descartes, Spinoza and Berkeley. Despite
this impressive long line of philosophers, the argument has been heavily criticized
over its vast history, particularly in the 18th century by David Hume and Immanuel
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Études maritainiennes / Maritain Studies
Kant. Nonetheless, the argument(s) have withstood the test of time, especially
considering the renewed interest it has attracted in recent years with modern
reformulations by prominent philosophers of religion.1
In this paper, I seek to examine three significant periods of the cosmological
argument which exemplify the importance of contestation: first, Plato’s and
Aristotle’s formulation of it, second, Philoponus’ own reactions and influence,
third, the contemporary state of such discourses. Contestation has an inestimable
role in philosophical development and reflection, as will be demonstrated through
the examination of such periods.
1. Preliminary Remarks
It will be useful to make some preliminary remarks. My intention is not to defend
nor refute any of the cosmological arguments but to document the development of
the arguments through first, commencing with Plato’s and Aristotle’s versions then
examining Philoponus’ later input and finally looking to contemporary debates.
What is of value, is to witness how contestation has helped develop the rigour of
such argumentation. The cosmological arguments are fascinating to examine
regardless if one agrees or disagrees with their intended purpose. They are indeed
a testament to the grandeur of human reflection.
In contrast with the ontological argument, the cosmological argument without
fail has an existential premise which affirms that something exists.2 It is an
argument grounded in our experience of the world. The cosmological argument is
an a posteriori argument irrespective of it containing some a priori principles such
as the principle of contradiction or the principle of causality.3
The cosmological argument pursues a cause or reason.4 Some entail a first
cause in a temporal sense while others in rank. It is important to note that the
predominant versions of the cosmological argument particularly modern ones
affirm the existence of the world whereas the prime mover ones seek to account
for movement of the cosmos emphasizing the order and design. These prime mover
arguments tend to intersect with the teleological argument as we shall see with
Plato’s argument.
1
Since the 1960s, there has been a resurgence, in the Anglo-American realm, of rigorous
philosophical argumentation for the existence of God. Plato and Aristotle’s legacy has
played an undeniable influence in this renaissance. See, Eds. W.L. Craig and J.P. Moreland,
The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
2
See William Lane Craig, The Cosmological Argument: From Plato to Leibniz (Eugene,
Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1980), p. X – hereafter referred to as The Cosmological Argument.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
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Ventureyra: Contestation in Philosophical Discourse
2. A Useful Typology of Cosmological Arguments5
Before we proceed to Plato’s and Aristotle’s version of the cosmological argument,
it would be worth exploring the different kinds of cosmological arguments that
exist. The cosmological argument is more accurately represented by a family of
arguments, as opposed to a singular argument. William Lane Craig in his groundbreaking and extensive historical examination, laid out in his 1980 book titled: The
Cosmological Argument: From Plato to Leibniz develops a tremendously useful
distinction between the three main types of cosmological arguments: “[first], the
arguments based on the principle of determination, [second], arguments based on
the principle of causality and [third] arguments based on the principle of sufficient
reason.”6 This threefold typology is helpful in advancing our understanding of the
debates surrounding the cosmological arguments. As Craig notes,
[f]ailure to appreciate their demarcation not only leads to an incorrect understanding
of the historical versions, but also conceals the crucial fact that one type may be
impervious to a criticism that is fatal to another. All too many modern discussions
on the cosmological argument proceed on the basis of some blurry amalgamation of
the different types of the argument.7
An example of the value of contestation arises precisely here. The nature of
the critical attacks by figures such as Hume8, Kant9 and others and the conflation
of one type of argument with another have10 prompted this typology developed by
5
See Ibid., pp. 282-295. Craig provides an in depth discussion and examples of these
conflations and “blurrings/amalgamations” between the three different cosmological
arguments.
6
Craig, The Cosmological Argument, p. 283.
7
Ibid.
8
For a thorough rebuttal of Hume’s attacks on the cosmological argument, see Douglas
Groothuis “Metaphysical Implications of the Cosmological Arguments: Exorcising the Ghost
of Hume” and Garrett J. DeWeese and Joshua Ramussen “Hume and The Kalam
Cosmological Argument,” ed. by James F. Sennett and Douglas Groothuis, in In Defense of
Natural Theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005).
9
The view of causation expounded in the argument of contingency (Thomistic arguments)
were attacked, namely the notion that: “that causation is an objective, productive, necessary
relation experienced as power that holds between two things and the Causal Principle – every
contingent being has a cause of its being – that lies at the heart of the argument.” See, Bruce,
Reichenbach, "Cosmological Argument," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2013
Edition),
Edward
N.
Zalta
(ed.),
URL
=
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/cosmological-argument/;
J.L.A.West,
“Kant’s Attack on the Cosmological Argument,” ed. by William Sweet in God And
Argument/Dieu et l’argumentation philosophique (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press,
1999), pp. 175-187.
10
See, Craig, The Cosmological Argument, pp. 282-295. Craig provides an in depth
discussion and examples of these conflations and “blurrings/amalgamations” between the
three different cosmological arguments.
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Études maritainiennes / Maritain Studies
Craig to help understand the major distinctions between each major type of
cosmological argument. Moreover, it has forced modern defenders of each type of
cosmological argument to provide more detailed premises and much lengthier
argumentation to defend it against all sorts of criticisms.11 Nevertheless, regardless
of whether one is more compelling or a better explanation for the cause or reason
for the universe, this typology helps progress the dialogue into more fruitful
avenues. Indeed, we must approach the analyses of cosmological arguments with
care since many treatments contain historical errors and focus on the wrong
elements.12
The first type encompasses the Philoponean cosmological argument or what is
more popularly known as The Kalam Cosmological Argument which argues for
the impossibility of an infinite temporal regress. The second type are known as
Thomistic arguments which involve Aquinas’ first three ways such as the proofs
from motion, causality and possible and necessary being.13 These arguments
correspondingly conclude the existence of a prime mover, first cause and an
absolutely necessary being through demonstrating the impossibility of an infinitely
ordered regress.14 The third kind provides a sufficient reason for all things15
including God, as has been defended by Leibniz and Spinoza, but I will not be
discussing this third example of the cosmological argument in this paper. All of
these arguments irrespective of their type or method of argumentation seek to
attempt to infer the existence of gods or God. We now turn to Plato’s version.
11
For an exposition of the most rigorous modern defenses of the cosmological argument, see
the following: Principle of Sufficient Reason: Alexander Pruss, The Principle of Sufficient
Reason: A Reassessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); The Kalam
Cosmological Argument: William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (Eugene,
Orgeon; Wipf and Stock, 1979); The Argument from Contingency: Robert C. Koons, “A
New Look at the Cosmological Argument,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 34, No.
2 (Apr., 1997), pp. 193-211.
12
Craig, The Cosmological Argument, p. x. For instance, some thinkers have conflated
cosmological arguments based on the principle of causality with that of the principle of
sufficient reason, as Craig states: “Howard Congdon presents Plato and Aristotle’s proofs
from motion as based on the principle of sufficient reason. John Randall characterises
Aristotle’s prime mover as a “logical explanation, not a physical cause, a natural law, not a
force… It is an arche, a principle of intelligibility, a “reason why.” Fazlur Rahman asserts
that ibn Sina’s cosmological argument is based not on the principle of causality, but on the
principle of sufficient reason. Etienne Gilson writes that Aquinas’s proofs seek a sufficient
reason to explain an observed effect, a reason without which the effect is unintelligible…
G.H.R. Parkinson confuses the Leibnizian argument with the Thomist when he contends that
“Leibniz fails to refute an infinite regress, since each question ‘why?’ is answered in a prior
being.” (p. 284)
13
See Craig, The Cosmological Argument, p. 283.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
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Ventureyra: Contestation in Philosophical Discourse
3. Plato’s Cosmological Argument
The cosmological argument finds its original formulation in book 10 of Plato’s
dialogue Laws. It takes its form as a prime mover argument attempting to prove
the existence of God or gods from motion. Plato’s primary concern is to
demonstrate the existence of the gods through persuasive argumentation as
depicted in the dialogue between the Athenian stranger and Kleinas, in order to
provide a transcendent authority for his system of political laws. 16
Plato argues that from experience we witness the world around us as being in
consistent change (movement). In his argument, Plato distinguishes between two
kinds of motion: transferred motion and self-motion.17 Plato then argues that
transferred motion implies self-motion.18 Thus, all motion is moved by something
else but that this cannot go ad infinitum, so there must be a first or prime mover
since an infinite regress is an impossibility.19 Plato’s reasoning implies that if there
was no starting point then we would not arrive to our present moment. Plato does
not provide an argument for this but takes it for granted as the alternative is
considered to be absurd.20
It is worth pointing out that Plato does not consider the starting point of his
infinite regress terminator; a temporal starting point. Rather Plato sees the primemover as an ultimate source not a temporal source. The priority Plato ascribes to
his self-mover is logically and causally prior as opposed to temporally. 21 This is
an important distinction between cosmological arguments based on the principle
of determination and those based on the principle of causality. Therefore, in
Plato’s system of motion, the source of all motion is derived from self-motion or
the soul. He indicates that there is not just one soul or god but many of them. In
Phaedrus Plato argues for the immortality of the soul since it is forever in motion.22
In essence what we have is all motion being dependent on an ultimate source of
perpetual never-ending motion. If the self-moving soul ceased to move all of the
motion of all other objects in the universe would be consequently immobile.
16
See Plato, Laws, 886.
See Ibid., 894b.
18
See Ibid., 895a-895b.
19
See Ibid., 894a-895b.
20
Craig, The Cosmological Argument, p. 5.
21
For a thorough discussion on whether Plato considered his self-mover as ontologically and
causally prior as opposed to temporally prior, see, A.E. Taylor Platonism and its Influence
(New York: Longmans, Green, 1932); for a temporal priority view see, W.F.R. Hardie A
Study in Plato (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), pp. 107-108.
22
See Plato, Phaedrus, 245c-d.
17
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Questions are raised between the relationship of the soul and the corporeal
component of a self-mover. As Craig states “Plato would see no problem in a
soul’s eternally moving a body around in space.”23 I’m not sure if such an
interpretation is entirely correct or if it reflects more of a flaw in Plato’s system.
If the self-mover is moving from eternity and Plato believes that the corporeal
element is not eternal what accounts for the co-eternal motion between a soul
moving a body eternally? Since under such a view there is not a temporally first
moving object but just in rank which moves the rest of the objects in the universe
upon which if it ceases to move would render all the movement of the universe
impossible thus immobile. It still remains a question to be answered in Plato’s
system between the relationship between body and soul and the co-eternality of
movement if we know the body is perishable under such a system. 24 And if it is
perishable what accounts for this initial movement but again to speak of initial
would be to assume temporal precedence. Must we assume that these corporeal
entities come in and out of being while motion is caused by the soul’s eternal
propulsion? Whatever the case may be, this supposed co-eternality in Plato’s
system between the motion of the soul and body, is not at all clear. 25 Unless of
course, eternality does not entail imperishability or that celestial substances are not
subject to such perishability or corruptibility. Philoponus’ version of the
cosmological argument, will address such concerns.
Be all that as it may, Plato equates this soul with mind since for Plato the
corporeal is perishable but not the soul’s component of intellect which is
understood as immortal.26 Plato understands the source of motion to be caused by
many minds or gods. There has been much debate on the extent that we can
consider Plato polytheistic or monotheistic.27 The most prudent position it seems
would be an implicit monotheism since all these self-moved minds are of the same
23
Craig, The Cosmological Argument, p. 6.
See Phaedrus 245e-246, the self-mover is deemed to be eternal but this entails a body.
25
Craig’s and Taylor’s position does not make this at all clear but this is beyond the scope
of this paper. Craig’s statement affirms this position, see Craig, The Cosmological Argument,
p. 6: “The motion of the soul is not here temporally prior to the motion of the body; they are
co-eternal.”
26
See G.M.A. Grube, Plato’s Thought (London: Methuen, 1935), p. 122. Cf. Craig, The
Cosmological Argument, p. 8.
27
See Craig, The Cosmological Argument, p. 11. Here he examines the differing views
concerning Plato’s beliefs about the nature of the self-moving soul. These are found in the
following sources: J.M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 369; Francis MacDonald Cornford, Plato’s Cosmology (London:
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1937), p. 35; Francis MacDonald Cornford, ‘The “Polytheism”
of Plato: An Apology”, Mind 47 (1938), p. 324. and A.E. Taylor, ‘The “Polytheism” of
Plato: An Apologia”, Mind 47 (1938), pp. 183-4.
24
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supreme will and intellect.28 Plato intimates that the cause of the movement of the
universe is ultimately found in a supreme Soul or Mind as it provides the universe
with structure, motion and intelligibility hence the teleological component to his
cosmological argument. Much ink has been poured over the nature of this highest
Mind, some Plato scholars have argued that it is reflective of the Demiurge God in
Timaeus.29 Below, we will see Philoponus’ interpretation which lines up nicely
which such a view. While, others have argued that best explanation for the
Supreme Mind is the World Soul which some have argued would lead to
pantheism.30 The answer to the nature of this Supreme Mind seems open, given
the differing positions. Whatever Plato conceived as the cause of all motion is not
further discernible by his line of reasoning. Plato would indeed have to provide
further argumentation to describe the nature of such a soul or souls but he has not
done this in his Laws.
4. Aristotle’s Cosmological Argument
Although Plato was the inventor of the cosmological argument, Aristotle went into
much greater depth and rigour to enrichen it. Aristotle develops Plato’s argument
from motion by going beyond the self-mover towards his conception of an
unmoved mover which he ultimately identifies with God.31 Aristotle expounds his
cosmological argument in both the Physics and Metaphysics. His most articulate
expression of it exists in Physics. In Metaphysics, Aristotle provides several
comments and insights into the nature of his conception of god.
Fundamental to Aristotle’s cosmological argument is the distinction between
potency and act. Contrary to the Megaric School who denied potentiality32 and by
implication change in the world, Aristotle argued that change was an indispensable
component of reality. A particular thing in actuality is one thing but also at the
same time potentially many things. According to Aristotle, potency entails a
“principle in the very thing acted on which makes it capable of being changed…
[hence, the] source of movement or change.”33 He uses actuality as meaning the
existence of a particular thing. For instance, a man may actually be in a coma but
he has the potentiality to think. Through being a man, there exists the potentiality
of thinking as opposed to a rock that although is not actually thinking does not
28
See, Craig, The Cosmological Argument, p. 11.
See A. E. Taylor, A Commentary on Plato’s ‘Timaeus’ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928),
pp. 75-78.
30
See Friedrich Solmsen, Plato’s Theology (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1942,
reprinted 1967), p. 149.
31
See, Craig, The Cosmological Argument, p. 20.
32
See Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome (London: Burns
Oates & Washbourne Ltd.,1950), p. 52 – hereafter referred to as History.
33
Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1046a10; 12.1019a15.
29
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have the potency to think.34 We will see how these distinctions between actuality
and potency in a different context take an interesting turn with Philoponus.
In Physics 7 Aristotle argues that the notion of a self-mover is an impossibility
since everything that moves requires something else to move it.35 But in Physics 8
he argues that the members in a series are ultimately moved by a self-moved thing.
Extending this logic further, Aristotle then argues that all self-movers lead to a
series of unmoved movers. We may ponder whether there is anything distinct of
the first unmoved mover in Aristotle’s thought? It is rather ambiguous as to the
exact status Aristotle gives to this first unmoved mover in contrast to all the other
unmoved movers.36 On the one hand he argues that the principle of economy and
continuous motion necessitate that there be one first unmoved mover37 but on the
other hand suggests that heavenly bodies are moved by “first principles” which
can be taken to mean anything from planetary bodies, souls or unmoved movers.38
As Aristotle states:
We should regard them to be one rather than many, or finite rather than infinite; for
if the consequences are the same, we should always posit a finite number [of causes],
since in things existing by nature what is finite and better should exist to a higher
degree, if this is possible. If it is sufficient even if it [i.e., the mover] is just one,
which, being first among the immovable [movers] and also eternal, would be the
principle of motion in all the rest.39
Nonetheless, in Physics, we are left without knowing the true nature of the first
unmoved mover nor do we possess any knowledge of how it imparts motion.40 In
order to see, Aristotle’s deduction of the nature of the unmoved mover we must
turn to Metaphysics. Here Aristotle reveals a number of attributes his god
possesses. Aristotle engages Plato while providing an argument for the attribute of
actuality and eternality (implicative through eternal motion) in his god:
Plato at least cannot even explain what it is that he sometimes thinks to be the source
of motion, i.e., that which moves itself; for according to him the soul is posterior to
motion and coeval with the sensible universe. Now to suppose that potentiality is
prior to actuality is one sense right and in another wrong; we have explained the
distinction. But that actuality is prior is testified by Anaxagoras (since mind is
actuality), and by the Empdocles with his theory of Love and Strife, and by those who
hold that motion is eternal, e.g. Leucippus.41
34
See Copleston, History, p. 52.
See Aristotle, Physica 8.6 257b2.
36
See Ibid., 8.6 258b30-259a5.
37
See Aristotle, Metaphysica 1.3 186a1.
38
See Craig, The Cosmological Argument, p. 32.
39
Aristotle, Physics, 8.6 259a10-20.
40
See Craig, The Cosmological Argument, p. 33.
41
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 12.6. 1072a.
35
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Ventureyra: Contestation in Philosophical Discourse
Aristotle also includes incorporeality: “these substances must be without
matter; for they must be eternal, at least if anything else is eternal.”42 It is important
to note that for Aristotle incorruptibility signifies co-eternality with both time and
motion. This unmoved mover’s incorruptibility is implied by eternal motion.43
Although Aristotle asserts that incorruptibility is associated with eternality and
incorporeality but that does not seem to correspond. Rather it seems a more
coherent explanation given his logic, is that incorporeality follows from a
substance being pure in actuality which is fully related to form whereas materiality
is related to potentiality.44 Thus, the nature of this unmoved mover is an
immaterial, eternal being of pure actuality.45 This unmoved mover imparts motion,
as the Aristotelian commentator W.D. Ross notes through “inspiring love and
desire” acting as an “efficient cause by being the final cause.”46
Aristotle first names the unmoved mover “God.”47 This God that Aristotle
names is “a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous
and eternal, belong to God; for this is God.”48 Moreover, God according to
Aristotle entails eternal self-contemplation since God is the ultimate eternal,
unchanging, incorporeal, most good, self-thinking mind.49 Despite these many
attributes that are shared with the God of traditional theism, Aristotle’s God is not
a creator of the universe since he is co-eternal with matter and is also not
responsible for the continued existence of the universe. Despite moving further
along than Plato in terms of rigour for a first mover, that must be also unmoved
and delineating several attributes, this God bares a semblance to a Deistic notion
of God and not one that is worthy of worship. From Aristotle we move forward to
Philoponus and a radically different view of God through the cosmological
argument.
5. Philoponus’ own reactions and influence
One of the periods (around 529 C.E. onwards) where we can most alarmingly
witness the true fruits of contestation in a dramatic way is with Philoponus’
arguments against an infinite past. Philoponus was known for his polemical
commentaries on the works of Aristotle. Even though, he was a sixth century
Christian philosopher and theologian rooted in Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic
thought, he was able think beyond the confines of these intellectual traditions, in
42
Ibid., 12.6. 1071b20.
See Ibid., 12.6. 1071b7-9.
44
See Craig, The Cosmological Argument, p. 34.
45
See Ibid., p. 35.
46
W.D. Ross, Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, 1949), p. 181.
47
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 7.1072b20-25.
48
Ibid., 7.107b25.
49
See Craig, The Cosmological Argument, p. 35.
43
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contrast to Proclus, who showed an extreme veneration for the works of Aristotle
and Plato. Philoponus was a bold and innovative thinker, able to demonstrate
tensions and incoherencies, between the two, through a critical hermeneutical
method.50 Following this unique approach he wrote a substantial amount of
material combatting Aristotle’s notion of the eternality51 of the world. The
profundity of his knowledge of Neoplatonic and Aristotelian traditions allowed
him to essentially turn pagan argumentation against itself by arguing through a
series of carefully constructed arguments that showed several incoherencies with
the eternality of the universe.52 A lucid example of this is when Philoponus
interprets Plato’s Timaeus in a radically opposed way to Proclus’ eternalist
interpretation:
He reads the [sic] Timaeus as a genuine account of creation (Book VI), compatibly
with Christian doctrine. A fresh analysis of the processes of generation and corruption
renders even an idea viable which Greek philosophers of all schools never allowed:
creation out of nothing (Books VIII and IX). Yet even if it were true that creation out
of nothing never occurs in nature, God is surely more powerful a creator than nature
and therefore capable of creatio ex nihilo (IX 9).53
Philoponus’ belief that God created the universe out of nothing played a
significant role in questioning the reigning philosophy of his time. 54 It is worth
pointing out that many Christians and Jews were embarrassed by the doctrine of
creation ex nihilo and were divided over whether God created from pre-existing
matter through reorganizing it as opposed to creating matter itself from nothing.55
The reason for this embarrassment was precisely because of the natural
philosophical consensus that pointed towards an eternal past. As philosopher,
Richard Sorabji notes: “Up to AD 529, Christians were on the defensive. They
argued that a beginning of the universe was not impossible. In 529, Philoponus
50
See Christian Wildberg, "John Philoponus," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Fall
2008
Edition),
Edward
N.
Zalta
(ed.),
URL
=
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/philoponus/>. Accessed August 16,
2016.
51
I will use the terms eternality and eternity interchangeably. I will also use the terms world
and universe interchangeably.
52
See Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600 AD. (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 175.
53
Wildberg, “John Philoponus.”
54
The prevailing philosophic (pre-scientific) view from the time of the pre-Socratic
materialists up until as recent as the early 20th Century modern science was that the universe
was beginningless (eternal in the past).
55
See Richard Sorabji, “Infinity and Creation,” in Philoponus and the Rejection of
Aristotelian Science, Second Edition, ed. by Richard Sorabji (London: Institute of Classical
Studies, 2010), p. 208 – hereafter referred to as Philoponus.
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Ventureyra: Contestation in Philosophical Discourse
swung round into the attack. He argued that a beginning of the universe was
actually mandatory, and mandatory of the pagans’ own principles.”56 Instrumental
to Philoponus’s approach was that he saw a separation between Creator and
creation. This belief not only allowed him to argue for the finitude of the past but
also that the sun is made of fire, which he acknowledged as a terrestrial substance,
as opposed to a celestial substance.57 Thus establishing that heavenly bodies are
not divine and are subject to decomposition, thereby collapsing a central
Aristotelian doctrine before a Christian doctrine.
Philoponus’ Christian worldview permitted him to also create a coherent
system of thought where he could provide argumentation and evidence to support
his belief system. One that was fruitful to scientific discovery. Some examples
include not only his criticism of Aristotle’s doctrine of the eternity of the world
but his criticism of Aristotle’s theory of light58 and also the Aristotelian view of
dynamics. Historians of science have noted that Philoponus’ rigour was beneficial
to the future direction of cosmology.59 Moreover, he was able to do so without
solely recourse to sacred texts but through arguments grounded in experience.60
Philoponus’ integrative approach of what he observed in reality with his Christian
faith allowed him to develop a cosmological argument adhering to the principle of
determination, in other words the impossibility of an infinite temporal regress into
the past. Variations of Philoponus’ argument have been advanced throughout the
centuries up until the present with Islamic, Jewish and Christian theologians and
philosophers.
As history has shown, in many instances, that philosophy and theology have
played a large role in the rise of modern scientific theories. Philoponus was an
early example of such an influence. According to Sorabji, interestingly, Galileo
makes mention of Philoponus more recurrently than Plato in his early works. In
order to get a real sense and appreciation for Philoponus’ thought one must realize
the impact of Philoponus’ ideas on medieval and early modern philosophy and
science. Sorabji, who’s spent a significant amount of time studying Philoponus’
works, notes that Bonaventure was falsely attributed with Philoponus’ ingenious
arguments against an eternal past.61 Bonaventure was merely recycling the same
arguments 700 years later which were preserved by Muslim theologians.
56
Ibid., p. 210.
See David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers, God & Nature: Historical Essays on the
Encounter between Christianity and Science (Los Angeles: UCLA, 19860, pp. 38-39 –
hereafter referred to as God & Nature.
58
See Jean Ann Christensen, “Aristotle and Philoponus on Light” (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard
University, 1979).
59
See Lindberg and Numbers, God & Nature, p. 39.
60
Ibid.
61
See Sorabji, “Infinity and Creation,” p. 210.
57
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Furthermore, recent scholarly works traces the scientific revolutionary notion of
the introduction of impetus theory (the force with which a body moves) into
dynamics back to Philoponus becoming known through Muslim philosophers to
Europe.62 Philoponus’ work criticizing the eternality of the universe are found in
three major phases. First, Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World (de
deternitate mundi contra Proclum) in 529. Sorabji states that this text is “one of the
most interesting of all post-Aristotelian Greek philosophical texts, written at a
crucial moment in the defeat of paganism by Christianity.” 63 Second, Against
Aristotle On the Eternity of the World (de aeternitate mundi contra Aristotelem)
estimated to be written between 530-534.64 In this second phase, Philoponus
examines Aristotle’s work On the Heavens.65 Third, a treatise titled On the
Creation of the World (de opificio mundi) that survived in fragments providing a
series of arguments for creation ex nihilo.66
It will be important to first briefly outline Aristotle’s conception of infinity in
order to understand Philoponus’ arguments. It is worth pointing out here that the
concept of eternity applies strictly to time while infinity can be applied to both
space and time. Both are important to our discussion. The concept of time is
inevitably correlated to spatiality. Just as Philoponus denied the possibility of an
eternal or infinite past, he also denied that space was infinite.67
Aristotle argued for a particular conception of the infinite which can be called
an “extendible finitude.”68 Two consequences follow from this. First, the infinite
For further details see Richard Sorabji, “John Philoponus,” and “Infinity and Creation” in
Philoponus.
63
See Philoponus, Against Proculus’s “On the Eternity of the World 1-5,” tr. by Michael
Share, Preface by Richard Sorabji, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. vii. See
again, Wildberg, "John Philoponus."
64
See Wildberg, "John Philoponus," and Herbert A. Davidson, “John Philoponus as a Source
of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation,” Journal of the American Oriental
Society, Vol. 89, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1969), pp. 357-359 – hereafter referred to as Source.
65
According to Herbert A. Davidson, it is unclear how accurately Simplicius actually quotes
Philoponus since his vitriol may indicate the possibility of deliberate misrepresentation
which is evidenced by several incongruences. There is also reason to believe that through the
Arabic thinkers such as Farabi there are independent sources of Philoponus’ work on Against
Aristotle from that of Simplicius’ commentaries. This work has been lost but is mainly known
through citations in Simplicius’s commentaries on Aristotle's On the Heavens (De Caelo)
and Physics.
66
See Herbert A. Davidson Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in
Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 86116, and also Davidson, Source, pp. 357-359.
67
See Sorabji, “John Philoponus,” p. 55; in Physica 582, 19-583, 12.
68
Sorabji, “Infinity and Creation,” p. 211.
62
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is only potential and not actual.69 Second, that an actual infinite, can never be
traversed, that is to say it can never be crossed.70 The qualification that is necessary
here is that actual infinity would be more than a finitude (a determinate totality),
so an extendible finitude is to be understood as a potential infinity and not an actual
one.71 The fact that infinity can never be traversed elicits another qualification from
Aristotle in response to Zeno’s paradox of half distances,72 namely that we can
traverse a potential infinity of divisions but not an actual one, otherwise we would
never be able to leave this room after my presentation, for instance.
Philoponus developed numerous arguments criticizing infinity. I will focus on
two significant ones. The first argument involves the necessity of the universe
having a temporal beginning, therefore not having an eternal past. Philoponus
points out that Christianity must be correct in arguing for a beginning, since if it
did not have a beginning, the universe would have been traversed an infinite
number of years.73 Moreover, this infinity would have to be an actual infinite not
merely an extendible finitude.74 He further suggests that infinity would have been
crossed when Socrates died in the fourth century B.C. and since then it would have
crossed again more than an actual infinity. The second argument, indicates that
infinity would also have to be increased75 which of course would lead to various
absurdities. It is vital to understand that here Philoponus is not necessarily
assuming that an actual infinite cannot exist but that time or the temporal series of
events cannot exist as one since that would entail successively adding one unit after
another as a standard view of time seems to necessitate.76 For instance, if there
had been an actual infinite number of years by 2015, how many more years will
See Sorabji, “Infinity and Creation,” p. 213; Philoponus, in Physica 3.6, 206a 14-23;
206b13.
70
See Sorabji, “Infinity and Creation,” p. 213; Philoponus, in Physica 3.5, 204b9; 6.2,
233a22; 6.7, 238a33; 8.8, 263a6; b4; b9; 265a20; Philoponus, in De Caelo 1.5, 272a3;29;
3.2, 300b5; Philoponus in Metaphysica 2.2, 994b30; Philoponus in Analytica posteriora 1.3,
7.2b11; 1.22, 82b39; 83b6.
71
See Sorabji, “Infinity and Creation,” p. 213.
72
Ibid.
73
See Sorabji, “Infinity and Creation,” p. 213.
74
This argument against infinity serves as a prototype for subsequent argumentation over
generations which is applicable today to offer philosophical support for the second premise
of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA), as will be discussed below.
75
This is a second philosophical argument against infinity, namely that infinite sets may exist
but that they cannot be added to or increased, and this second argument against the eternal
past appears in a modern form which is used by contemporary philosophers to support the
second premise of the KCA.
76
Please see for further details William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, pp.
102-110. Here Craig explains why you cannot form an actual infinite by successive addition
which mirrors this second argument of Philoponus.
69
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Études maritainiennes / Maritain Studies
there have been by 2016? An infinite number of them plus one. What about the
days? Well, infinity multiplied by 365.77 Anything conceived to be larger than
infinity leads to these obvious absurdities and contradictory ideas.
Sorabji, notes that Philoponus was successful in finding a contradiction in
Greek pagan philosophy between their conceptions of infinity and their rejection
that the past is finite. This is a fact that went unrecognized for roughly 850 years.78
The cosmological argument that Philoponus devised is a simple deductive
argument which can be summarized with the following syllogism:
1. Whatever comes to be has a cause of its coming to be.
2. The universe came to be.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its coming to be.79
This is a good place to transition into our discussion regarding contemporary
debates revolving around the cosmological argument.
6. Contemporary Debates
In recent years, philosophers of religion have published rigorous treatments of all
three major types of the cosmological argument. The cosmological argument based
on the principle of sufficient reason has been defended by philosopher and
mathematician Alexander Pruss.80 Pruss has written a book long treatment titled,
The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment published with Cambridge
University Press where he examines its applicability to the cosmological argument
and issues in science and philosophy of science. Robert C. Koons professor of
philosophy at the University of Texas, has defended the cosmological argument
based on the principle of causality.
However, I will focus on the cosmological argument based on the principle of
determination. This particular argument which finds its roots in Philoponus’ sixth
century work81 has become the focus of great attention by both theistic and
nontheistic philosophers in recent times. William Lane Craig who is regarded as
See Sorabji, “Infinity and Creation,” p. 213.
See Ibid., p. 220. Aristotle living from 384–322 BCE to the point of Philoponus’ arguments
in 529. On the same page, Sorabji provides an interesting reflection stating that: “This
contradiction had gone unnoticed for 850 years. Moreover, the materials for beginning to
answer Philoponus’ puzzle about increasing infinity were not even assembled until Henry of
Harclay and others, some 800 years later.”
79
As outlined in Mark R. Nowacki, The Kalam Cosmological Argument for God (New York:
Prometheus Books, 2007), p. 13 – hereafter referred to as Kalam.
80
See list articles.
81
Islamic philosophers and theologians have thoroughly documented Philoponus’ influence
in their bibliographic notes. Herbert Davidson has traced Philoponus’ undeniable direct
impact in an extraordinarily researched article published in 1969. See Davidson, Source.
77
78
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the most notable defender of the argument, utilizes the term kalam to label this
form of the cosmological argument because of the substantive contribution of
medieval Muslim philosophers.82 For well over thirty-five years the Kalam
Cosmological Argument (henceforward, KCA) 83 supporting creation ex nihilo
has enjoyed a revival.
The debates that were ignited by Philoponus have continued throughout the
ages with al-Ghazali versus Averroes, Saadia versus Maimonides, and
Bonaventure versus Aquinas. Immanuel Kant even took a deep interest in the
argument with his First Antinomy.84 And in recent years with contemporary
philosophers, aside from Craig, in support of it, such as Stuart Hackett,85 Gerald
See William Lane Craig, “The Kalam Argument,” ed. by J.P. Moreland, Chad Meister and
Khaldoun A. Sweis in Debating Christian Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013),
p. 7.
83
It is the medieval Arabic term for natural theology or philosophical theology. It was revived
by philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig and was the subject of his dissertation
completed in 1977 at Birmingham University. It was subsequently published in 1979. It also
refers to the family of arguments that seek to demonstrate God’s existence from the finitude
of the past. The term Kalam, to classify this subset of cosmological arguments was designated
by Craig due to its great influence in Medieval Islamic philosophy. For a thorough historical
context on the KCA please see Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, pp. 1-60 and
Herbert A. Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). The KCA alongside
the majority of the revival of arguments for the existence of God are predominantly an AngloAmerican phenomenon. As I have noted for quite some time, the paucity of engagement
with the renaissance of the arguments for the existence of God among Continental philosophy
and their philosophers is noteworthy. This was glaringly obvious to me in the response I
received when I posed a question regarding the renaissance of Christian philosophy and the
reaction from European-continental philosophy to philosopher and theologian, Philippe
Capelle-Dumont at his lecture titled “Le Retour de Dieu en Philosophie?” at the Dominican
University College in April 2014. Nowacki notes that Craig’s work has been ignored after
performing a survey of the literature of Continental philosophy. See Nowacki, Kalam, p. 23,
endnote 5.
84
Craig explores the antinomy; he finds solid argumentation on behalf of the thesis but weak
on behalf of the antithesis. Please see, Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, Appendix
2: The Kalam Cosmological Argument and the Thesis of Kant’s First Antinomy, pp. 189205.
85
Stuart Hackett in his book The Resurrection of Theism: Prolegomena to Christian Theism
originally published in 1957 had a version of the KCA which came to heavily influence
William Lane Craig. So much so that he wanted to pursue his doctoral studies on the KCA,
in order to revive the argument in modern philosophy. This testimony can be found on the
Evangelical Philosophical Society website:
http://www.epsociety.org/library/articles.asp?pid=140
82
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Études maritainiennes / Maritain Studies
James Whitrow, 86 Mark Nowacki,87 and James Porter Moreland88 versus those
who are skeptical such as Wesley Morriston, Graham Oppy, Adolf Grunbaum,
Richard Swinburne, Arnold Guminski and Quentin Smith.89 The KCA was the
subject of Craig’s doctoral dissertation in the late 1970s. Today, the KCA has been
both defended and criticized extensively in professional philosophy journals.90
Atheist philosopher Quentin Smith, notes the wide interest revolving around the
KCA, stating: “The fact that theists and atheists alike ‘cannot leave Craig’s Kalam
argument alone’ suggests that it may be an argument of unusual philosophical
interest or else has an attractive core of plausibility that keeps philosophers turning
back to it and examining it once again.”91
The KCA’s modern formulation can be best described with the following
deductive argument:
1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.92
In defense of the second premise two lines of scientific evidence have been
offered. The first, the expansion of the universe which is intimately connected with
big bang cosmology. The second, the second law of thermodynamics. This argument
suggests that given a sufficient amount of time the universe and all its processes will
run-down and reach a state of equilibrium or maximum entropy. For instance, the sun
cannot burn and produce light ad infinitum, in lieu of this fact, the question arises as
to why it hasn’t burned out already if it has existed from eternity past. In addition to
86
A philosopher and mathematician who took interest and published on the subject of the
KCA and studying the nature of time.
87
See Nowacki, Kalam
88
See, J.P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City: A Defense of Christianity (Grand Rapids:
Baker, 1987), 18-42; and “A Response to a Platonistic and a Set-Theoretic Objection to the
Kalam Cosmological Argument,” Religious Studies 39 (2003), pp. 373-90.
89
For a list of published books and articles including defenses and objections up until May
2009, please see: http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=1637
90
For a substantive taxonomy up until 2007 please see, Mark Nowacki’s chapter 2: A
Taxonomy of Objections and Replies in The Kalam Cosmological Argument for God, pp.
103-162.
91
Quentin Smith, “Kalam Cosmological Arguments for Atheism,” in M. Martin (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Atheism, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 183.
92
See Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, p. 63. The warrant I provide for the first
two premises of this argument are quite brief in comparison to the treatments provided by
Craig and many of the supporters of the KCA. My intention is to very briefly outline strong
reasons to support this argument in lieu of Philoponus’ reasoning in the sixth century. I will
not engage in all the criticisms and objections to these premises since that would extend far
beyond the objective of this paper.
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Ventureyra: Contestation in Philosophical Discourse
scientific evidences, two philosophical arguments with intriguing examples have been
provided. First, on the impossibility of an actual infinite existing, so, that the finitude
of the past is predicated on the impossibility of an infinite temporal regress of events.
“Hilbert’s Hotel”93 is used as a “thought experiment” to illustrate the various
absurdities that arise in envisioning the existence of an actual infinite.94 The second
philosophical argument in support of the second premise entails, that it is impossible
to form an actual infinite by “successive addition.” The thought experiment of
93
See Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, p. 84-86. A good illustration of the
incoherency of an infinite number of things existing in reality is David Hilbert’s Hotel. This
peculiar hotel begins with a finite number of rooms without any vacancies, so that a new
guest is turned away. But then the hotel is transformed into one with an infinite number of
rooms which are all filled up. Now when a new guest arrives she can go to the first room
while the manager shifts every other guest from room 2 to 3, 3 to 4 and so on unto infinity.
Things get stranger when an infinite number of guests show up, each customer is shifted into
a room number twice the previous’ room number, leaving all the odd numbered rooms
vacant. Thus accommodating all the infinite number of guests into the odd numbered vacant
rooms and again having an infinite number of rooms filled, even though an infinite number
of rooms were previously occupied with zero vacancies. Things can get even more bizarre
than this if all the people in the odd numbered rooms check out. Even though an infinite
number of guests would have been checked out; an infinite number would still remain. It is
important to note that even though infinity may have fruitful applications when applied to
Georg Cantor’s set theory where it plays a well-defined role devoid of absurdities. Craig
indicates that: “[m]odern set theory, as a legacy of Cantor, is thus exclusively concerned with
the actual as opposed to the potential infinite.” (Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument,
p. 67.) Recall our discussion earlier that an actual infinite involves a determinate totality
whereas a potential does not since it is an “extendible finitude”. Nonetheless, the
aforementioned examples serve to demonstrate that infinity leads to a series of contradictions
when applied spatially and temporally, that is to say the real world. As David Hilbert,
explicates:
We have already seen that the infinite is nowhere to be found in reality, no matter what
experiences, observations, and knowledge are appealed to. Can thought about things be so
much different from things? Can thinking processes be so unlike the actual processes of
things? In short, can thought be so far removed from reality? Rather is it not clear that, when
we think that we have encountered the infinite in some real sense, we have merely been
seduced into thinking so by the fact that we often encounter extremely large and extremely
small dimensions in reality?... It neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for
rational thought… The role that remains for the infinite to play is solely that of an idea. This
statement is confirmatory of what Craig is setting out to demonstrate with examples of
infinity that lead to absurdities in reality. See David Hilbert, “On the Infinite,” in Philosophy
of Mathematics, ed. Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983), 183-202.
94
For an example of a common objection, see, Craig’s response to Richard Swinburne’s
objection against an actual infinite existing in time:
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/swinburne-on-the-kalam-cosmological-argument
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Études maritainiennes / Maritain Studies
Tristam Shandy95 who takes a year to write a day of his life, is offered as an example
to illustrate the various absurdities that arise with the formation of an actual infinite
via successive addition. Bertrand Russell suggested that if Tristram Shandy were
immortal the book could be completed, since one year and one day would both be
infinite. However, such a notion is impossible since the future represents a potential
infinity or as we have already discussed, an extendible finitude. So, although Shandy
would write for eternity he would get more behind as time passes never catching up
to his chronological age. Thus, Russell’s one-to-one correspondence between days
and years is rendered absurd. The two scientific lines of evidences coupled with the
two philosophical arguments has indeed given the KCA a very empirical robustness
in favour of the contemporary development of the KCA over previous historical
periods.
Moving onto the first premise. A defense of this, typically relies on the
metaphysical intuition that things cannot come into existence from nothingness.
Admittedly most of the defenses of this first premise have been flimsy and not very
thorough. Indeed, Craig in his 1979 extensive treatment of the KCA devotes very little
attention to the first premise. It comprises 7 pages of a book of 216 pages. That
amounts to about 3% of the book.
It is worth mentioning that all of these arguments and others have been vigorously
disputed not only in peer review articles in profession philosophy journals but also in
numerous edited volumes with major academic presses. Both of the premises, the
conclusion and all of the lines of defenses have been attacked by a variety of both
theistic and nontheistic critics. Nowacki in his 2007 book The Kalam Cosmological
Argument for God provides an extremely useful taxonomy of all of the major
objections and responses to the KCA from 1979 until 2007. Nowacki has been a keen
observer of the debates ensuing between defenders and detractors of the KCA as his
rigorous documentation of the objections and responses attest to.
It is precisely here, again, we see the fruits of contestation regarding the
cosmological argument. Now, in contemporary debates, we witness Nowacki’s
95
See, Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, Creation out of Nothing: A Biblical,
Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), pp.
213-216. One can argue that an infinite collection could never be made by beginning at a
certain point and just adding members. In, essence one cannot count from one to infinity nor
from infinite to one. This dilemma is known as the impossibility of traversing the infinite. A
helpful illustration of this, is the paradox of Tristram Shandy. This paradox, as developed
by Craig, shows the impossibility of forming an actually infinite collection of things by
adding one member after another. Shandy writes his autobiography at an incredibly slow
pace whereby it takes him a year to record one day of his life. The paradox can be ultimately
summed up with this statement: “If Tristram Shandy would have finished his book by today,
then he would have finished it yesterday.” (Copan and Craig, Creation out of Nothing, 216.)
So, we can ultimately argue that if the universe does not have a point of beginning then we
have no reason for the present moment to have arrived but commonsensically it has, therefore
we know that the events of the physical past are not without beginning.
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discontents regarding Craig’s rough defense of the KCA’s first premise when he
states:
For my own part, Craig’s curious lack of suasive power on this subject was one of
the factors that motivated development of the theory of substantial possibility
presented in chapters 3 and 4 of [his book on the KCA]. Craig’s underdetermined
and somewhat quirky views on causation make it difficult for him to respond to critics
who base their objections to the KCA on the mere logical possibility of instantiating
an actual infinite. Although Craig himself is aware of the differences between logical
possibility and stronger notions of possibility – he firmly asserts that the KCA must
be situated within a modal context richer than that of logical possibility – just what
Craig means by his frequent invocations to stronger notions of possibility is
unacceptably vague.96
Nowacki attempts to strengthen the KCA by refining it and demonstrating that its
progress should be situated in a substance-based metaphysics.97 Nowacki builds his
argument by restricting the notion of possibility from mere logical possibility to
factual possibility this allows him to offer a more robust defense of both premises and
the thought experiments that coincide to support the second premise. By factual
possibility, Nowacki means, through quoting philosopher David Braine:
I mean a kind of possibility which can only be asserted of something, P, relatively to
some situation causally or temporally prior to P, or to some group of facts which are
causally or temporally prior to P, and which consists in a certain relation between P
and this particular situation or group of facts – the relation, namely, whereby this
prior situation or group of facts has left it open that P should be or become a fact (it
has not, for instance, causally excluded this).98
Essentially what Nowacki seeks to maintain is that in order to defend a more
persuasive model of the KCA it must be situated in factual possibility over the
category of logical possibility. Nowacki is adamant of focusing his defense on the
actual world, as opposed to “esoteric though experiments”99 as in the case of
“Hilbert’s Hotel”. This use of factual possibility, allegedly also protects the KCA’s
vulnerability to attack from B-theorists of time, that is he claims that it can operate
well with a B-theory of time, not just the A-theory.100 As Craig has stated with respect
to his development of the KCA:
96
Nowacki, Kalam, p. 28.
See Ibid, pp. 174-176, for modal distinctions between factual, judgemental and volitional
modalities – factual is the is what concerns the KCA.
98
Ibid., p. 176. See for original source, David Braine, “Varieties of Necessity,” Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. Vol. 46 (1972): pp. 146-147.
99
Nowacki, Kalam, p. 237.
100
A-theory of time represents a tensed theory (a “presentism”) of time whereas a B-theory
entails a tenseless theory of time where the universe exists tenselessly under a fourdimensional space-time block, and therefore there is no beginning to the universe. For
Nowacki’s claim that it is more defensible with respect to a B-theory of time see, Mark
97
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From start to finish, the Kalam cosmological argument is predicated upon the ATheory of time. On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being
or become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional
space-time block that is finitely extended in the earlier than direction. If time is
tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest
for a cause of its coming into being is misconceived.101
Most recently, Arnold T. Guminski,102 a critic of Nowacki’s version of KCA has
expressed various misgivings suggesting Craig’s version of the KCA remains
superior.103 In turn, Nowacki has responded in defense of his novel version of the
KCA.104
Concluding Remarks
A study like this begins to barely scratch the surface regarding the various
complexities and varieties involved in the number of historical debates revolving
around the cosmological argument. Nonetheless, we are able to witness the
tremendous value of contestation in the brief examples we have surveyed. First, we
examined Plato’s formulation of the cosmological argument with respect to motion
which mostly likely in Plato’s own view is causally terminated with a plurality of selfmovers which he identified with a soul or mind. Based on Plato’s argumentation in
Laws one cannot conclude the true nature of such a mind or minds. Aristotle then
built on Plato’s prototypic cosmological argument with much more rigour leading up
to not a self-mover but an unmoved mover to explain the continuous motion
experienced in the world. The logical deduction of the nature of this unmoved mover
is an immaterial (incorporeal), eternal being of pure actuality. We then examined how
Philoponus utilized Aristotle’s definitions of potential and actual infinites while
applying them to the past. He argued for creation ex nihilo through a cosmological
argument based on the principle of determination. Moving to the present context,
philosophers continue to debate the cosmological argument, as objections are raised
and responses provided, creativity is inspired in solidifying the argumentation even
further. This is true in the case of Nowacki, as he has fortified the KCA with his
proposed notion of factual possibility over that of logical possibility. This has carried
the debate to a new level which has no doubt inspired a new set of objections to
Nowacki’s program. Indeed, this opens the door to even more research and further
Nowacki “Assessing the Kalam Cosmological Argument,” Philosophia Christi 12
(2010): pp. 201-212.
101
William Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair, “The kalam cosmological argument” In The
Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, eds.,
(Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 183-184.
102
See Arnold T. Guminski, “A Critical Examination of Mark R. Nowacki's Version of the
Kalam Cosmological Argument," Philosophia Christi 10 (2008): pp. 377-91
103
See Ibid., conclusion.
104
See Mark Nowacki “Assessing the Kalam Cosmological Argument,” Philosophia
Christi 12 (2010), pp. 201-212.
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argumentation supporting or criticizing the KCA. What can be gleaned from these
brief analyses regarding the value of contestation? It is this questioning, thinking,
rethinking, contesting, disputing, arguing, debating and reassessing previous notions
that helps progress stumbling blocks in human knowledge. It could be that the legacy
left behind by Plato and Aristotle will continue to inspire fascination and awe
revolving around the various types of cosmological arguments, so much so, that the
ongoing debates are not likely to subside anytime soon.105
Doctoral Candidate, Department of Theology
Dominican University College
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
I wanted to thank Dr. Walter Schultz for suggesting the “spin” of contestation with respect
to the cosmological argument. This was inspired by a discussion in June of 2015, I had with
professor William Sweet regarding Philoponus and Aristotle as it related to Bonaventure and
Thomas Aquinas. He laughingly said “you’re siding with the Franciscans over the
Dominicans” and I retorted “no, I’m just following the evidence where ever it leads” to which
he responded “Scott you’re a dangerous man!” At the time, I wasn’t sure how to take that
comment since it was my first time meeting Will, but a good friend (David Bellusci) said I
should take it as a compliment. This was the initial inspiration to this paper. So, I wanted to
take the time to give a special thank you to both Walter and Will.
105
71