Abstract
There is a heated dispute among consequentialists concerning the following deontic principle:
The principle states that for any acts (or any bearers of normative status) a and b, if it is obligatory for a specific agent to do the conjunctive (or compound) act a & b, then that agent is obligated to do a and is also obligated to do b—the deontic operator of obligation distributes over conjunction. Possibilists—those who believe that we should always pursue a “best” possible course of action available to us—accept the principle as true. Actualists—those who believe that certain future facts about the actual world can generate obligations incompatible with the best possible course of action available to us—reject the principle as false. And recent commentators on the dispute—some who endorse DC, others who reject it—have attempted to dig out and defend intermediary positions, suggesting that extreme versions of each view are unsatisfactory. I’m out to defend DC from the actualist attack. Here I briefly present the central actualist argument against DC. I then show that possibilism has all of the resources to explain the phenomena with which actualists are so concerned. Next, I try to diagnose the actualists’ malcontent: The relevance of certain subjunctive conditionals to consequentialist reasoning has been vastly overemphasized. Finally, I attempt to shed some light on the nature of consequentialist conditionals by incorporating possibilist insights into a semantics for subjunctive conditionals appropriate for consequentialist theorizing.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The possibilist camp includes Goldman (1978), Greenspan (1978), Thomason (1981), Humberstone (1983), Feldman (1986), Zimmerman (1996), and Vorobej (2000). Note that Thomason (1981), Humberstone (1983), Zimmerman (1996), and Vorobej (2000) aren’t necessarily consequentialists, but consequentialist interpretations of their positions are available. Furthermore, Prawitz (1970) and Bergström (1976) appear to accept DC as well.
A “best” possible course of action available to an agent at a time is one than which no other course of action available to the agent at the time is better.
Carlson (1995) and (1999) reject DC but are hesitant to be included among the actualists, for the rejection rests upon the precise nature of the bearers of normative status and performability requirements. Vorobej (2000) calls himself a “prosaic possibilist,” but his acceptance of a restricted actualist interpretation of forms of factual detachment as valid might suggest that he holds an intermediary position rather than full fledged possibilism.
One might suggest that the dispute between possibilists and actualists is a substantially normative one, not merely a logical one. But I don’t think that the two are so easily separated. Different types of normative theories require different logical undergirdings. This was established in Alan McMichael’s observation that the explication of the concept of conditional obligation in David Lewis’s Counterfactuals is inapplicable to consequentialist theorizing, something to which Lewis whole-heartedly agreed. See McMichael (1978) and Lewis (1978).
More carefully: Most consequentialists do. Satisficing consequentialists are the exception to the norm. They don’t believe that we are required to bring about the best; rather, we are merely required to do that which is “good enough.” Slote (1984) and Slote (1989) are paradigm satisficers. Hurka (1990) seems sympathetic to satisficing versions of certain subjective forms of consequentialism. Critics of satisficing versions of consequentialism include Pettit (1984), Mulgan (1993), and Bradley (2006).
This obligation statement might be considered to be incomplete in some respects. It should also, perhaps, explicitly indicate whose obligation it is and when the obligation is in effect. I will leave these features to be gleaned from the context.
Some might believe that letting Stan know that he won’t lend Fran the cash regardless of what he agrees to do somehow undermines the case. I’m guessing that such folks find the following moral principle plausible. K∼O: If S knows of S himself that he will not perform act, A, then S cannot be obligated to do A. But K∼O is an unacceptable moral principle. Michael McKenna brought the following example to my attention to illustrate why. Frank is a racist. He hates all G-colored people. He knows that if he goes to the market, he will be obligated to perform an action of type X for a G-colored person. Knowing himself well, he knows that, for any G-type person, he will not X. Of course, he knows that he can X for a G-colored person. But he would never stoop so low. Is Frank not obligated to X because he knows that, for racist reasons, he simply won’t? I think not. The same goes for Stan. He knows that he can lend Fran the money; it’s just that he won’t.
Some might still take offense to the claims that SC is true and that Stan knows that SC is true, seemingly central assumptions of our case. These assumptions, however, can be softened without dampening the strength of the argument. One can imagine the case to be modified in this way: Let the subjunctive probability of ∼L given Y be extremely high and let Stan believe SC to be true to an extremely high degree.
Cf. Zimmerman (1996), p. 189.
Curiously, Carlson (1999), a writer who rejects DC, believes that the act consisting of Stan providing an affirmative response to Fran’s loan request lacks normative status while the act consisting of Stan failing to do so comes out morally wrong. For details, see Sect. 1 of his (1999).
An objector might have some problem with the Stan and Fran Case; such is frequently the case in discussions of moral philosophy. So here is a different but structurally similar case that has been used to make the same point in Jackson and Pargetter (1986), p. 235. “Professor Procrastinate receives an invitation to review a book. He is the best person to do the review, has the time, and so on. The best thing that can happen is that he say ‘yes’, and then writes the review when the book arrives. However, suppose it is further the case that were Procrastinate to say ‘yes’, he would not in fact get around to writing the review. Not because of incapacity or outside interference or anything like that, but because he would keep on putting the task off. (This has been known to happen.) Thus, although the best that can happen is for Procrastinate to say ‘yes’ and then write, and he can do exactly this, what would in fact happen were he to say ‘yes’ is that he would not write the review. Moreover, we may suppose, this latter is the worst that can happen. It would lead to the book not being reviewed at all, or at least to a review being seriously delayed. Should Procrastinate accept the invitation to review the book? Or if we suppose that he in fact declines—perhaps because he knows that he would not get around to writing the review—did he do the right thing in declining? According to Possibilism, the fact that Procrastinate would not write the review were he to say ‘yes’ is irrelevant. What matters is simply what is possible for Procrastinate. He can say ‘yes’ and then write, that is best; that requires inter alia that he say ‘yes’; therefore, he ought to say ‘yes’. According to Actualism, the fact that Procrastinate would not actually write the review were he to say ‘yes’ is crucial. It means that to say ‘yes’ would be in fact to realize the worst. Therefore, Procrastinate ought to say ‘no’.”
Cf. Sect. 6.2.1 of Zimmerman’s (1996) where Zimmerman presents a list of principles that actualists are committed to rejecting.
McKinsey (1979) suggests that there are different “levels” of obligation that will disarm the problem of so-called incompatible obligations.
Jackson and Pargetter (1986) claim that something may be deemed obligatory in light of a certain set of options, but should that set of options be reduced to a smaller set, different—in fact incompatible—obligations might emerge. Apparently, Jackson and Pargetter (1986) believe that in certain situations, what we actually ought to do is behave in accordance with the obligations generated by the smaller sets, and that this somehow disarms the problem of incompatible obligations. We might call ‘restricted obligations’ those that are generated by the smaller, restricted sets of options.
McKinsey (1979) seems to believe that obligations of different levels are equally important: “By saying that an obligation is secondary (or tertiary, or n-ary, where n > 1), I do not mean that it is any less of an obligation than a primary one. In my view, it is just as incumbent upon a person to fulfill his secondary obligations, as it is incumbent upon him to fulfill his primary ones.” (391)
See Chap. 2 of Feldman’s (1986) for a precise characterization of the normative theory sketched here.
The analyzing of conditional obligation has an interesting history. Initial attempts were made by Rescher (1958) & (1962) and von Wright (1964) & (1965). Substantial criticisms and improvements were introduced by Hansson (1969) and van Fraassen (1972). Lewis (1973) provided further substantial improvements; see Sect. 5.1 of his (1973)—perhaps the most popular analysis of conditional obligation via a possible worlds framework. Notice also that some possibilists, notably Humberstone (1983), advocate that we analyze conditional obligation in the way Lewis (1973) suggests. See Sect. 4.4 of Feldman’s (1986) for a fully general consequentialist account of conditional obligation. See Chap. 4 of Zimmerman’s (1996) for a deontically neutral account of conditional obligation.
I suspect that the truth of this sort of counterfactual conditional has led theorists such as Jackson and Pargetter (1986) to endorse the view that Stan is obligated to see to the truth of ∼Y: Among the restricted set of accessible worlds (the ∼L-worlds), ∼Y-worlds are best. But I might be wrong about this. Regardless, Jackson emphatically stated that he continues to reject DC at the 2005 Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies at Dartmouth College.
Jackson and Pargetter (1986), pp. 238–239. Jackson and Pargetter distance themselves from this claim in their (1987), but, by doing so, they seem to be distancing themselves from actualism as well. See Sect. 6.3.3 of Zimmerman’s (1996) for a clear presentation and criticism of the views put forth in Jackson and Pargetter’s (1986) and (1987).
Cf. his (1996), p. 117.
Arguments of this sort for the invalidity of factual detachment for conditional obligation and for the validity of a modified version of the factual detachment rule can be found in Greenspan’s (1978), pp. 81–82, Humberstone’s (1983), pp. 20–23, Feldman’s (1986), pp. 90–92, and Chap. 4 of Zimmerman’s (1996).
Feldman also believes that this might be at the root of the disagreement between actualists and possibilists; see his (1986), pp. 53–55.
Perhaps it is this feature—that Stan could have done much worse—that leads some actualists to endorse his act as morally permissible.
This point is made in Humberstone’s (1983), p. 23.
Virtually the same point is made in Feldman’s (1986), p. 53.
The token/type distinction seems to be playing some kind of role here. Regarding coin flipping cases, I don't have the type-ability to flip heads: I lack the ability to ensure a flip of heads every time I flip a coin. But there's a sense in which I have some token-ability to do it. (I just did it.) My claim is that in fair coin flipping cases, heads-worlds (as well as tails-worlds) are accessible despite the fact that attempts to access them might result in failure. It seems to me that this kind of token-ability must be accounted for in consequentialist theorizing. It also seems that subjunctive probabilities (or probabilistic subjunctive conditionals of some sort) are required to elucidate its importance in many cases, especially when considering whether we should attempt feats at the borders of our abilities (athletes, snipers). Possibilist views lacking subjunctive elements—it appears—fail to account for these type/token "can" differences in a satisfactory way. See Vessel (2007) for an extended, thorough argument supporting this claim. Also see Zimmerman (2006) for arguments aimed at showing that possibilist views like Feldman’s fail to articulate adequately the role that risk plays in determining the normative statuses of actions.
Pure possibilists who believe that subjunctive elements aren’t required in consequentialist evaluations of action can ignore much of the following. Those who prefer subjunctive formulations of consequentialism should realize that there is a possibilist version out there for them, one that doesn’t violate DC.
Lewis (1973) and (1979). Notice that L doesn’t quite capture Lewis’s preferred view. L invokes the Limit Assumption—an assumption that Lewis rejects because it amounts to ignoring the possibility of infinite chains of more and more similar worlds. Invoking the Limit Assumption for simplicity’s sake is harmless in this context, for it won’t be playing any role in the upcoming arguments. For Lewis’s argument against the Limit Assumption, see his (1973), pp. 19–21.
Lewis (1979).
As before, I recognize that some just won’t accept the conditional as true in standard English. The case can be modified slightly by making a probabilistic subjunctive conditional true, which I hope will satisfy certain critics.
I argue in my (2003) that the semantics for consequentialist subjunctive conditionals, though not ordinary subjunctive conditionals, must be weakly-centered as well—entailing that the truth of both the antecedent and the consequent isn’t sufficient to ensure the truth of the conditional itself.
Zimmerman does just this in Sect. 4.4.2 of his (1996). On this possibilist account, however, failing to attend one’s primary obligations by attending to one’s secondary obligations is never justified.
References
Bergström, L. (1976). On the formulation and application of utilitarianism. Noûs, 16, 121–144.
Bradley, B. (2006). Against satisficing consequentialism. Utilitas, 18, 97–108.
Carlson, E. (1995), Consequentialism reconsidered. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Carlson, E. (1999). Consequentialism, alternatives, and actualism. Philosophical Studies, 96, 253–268.
Feldman, F. (1986). Doing the best we can. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Goble, L. (1993). The logic of obligation, ‘Better’ and ‘Worse’. Philosophical Studies, 70, 133–163.
Goldman, H. S. (1976). Dated rightness and moral imperfection. The Philosophical Review, 85, 449–487.
Goldman, H. S. (1978). Doing the best one can. In A. I. Goldman, & J. Kim (Eds.), Values and morals (pp. 185–214). Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Greenspan, P. S. (1978). Oughts and determinism: A response to Goldman. The Philosophical Review, 87, 77–83.
Hansson, B. (1969). An analysis of some deontic logics. Noûs, 3, 373–398.
Humberstone, I. L. (1983). The background of circumstances. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 19–34.
Hurka, T. (1990). Two kinds of satisficing. Philosophical Studies, 59, 107–111.
Jackson, F., & Pargetter, R. (1986). Oughts, options, and actualism. The Philosophical Review, 95, 233–255.
Jackson, F., & Pargetter, R. (1987). Two puzzles about conditional obligation. Philosophical Papers, 16, 75–83.
Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Lewis, D. (1978). Reply to McMichael. Analysis, 38, 85–86.
Lewis, D. (1979). Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow. Noûs, 13, 455–76. Reprinted with postscripts in Lewis (1986): 32–66.
Lewis, D. (1986). Philosophical papers: Volume II. New York: Oxford University Press.
McKinsey, M. (1979). Levels of obligation. Philosophical Studies, 35, 385–395.
McMichael, A. (1978). Too much of a good thing: A problem in deontic logic. Analysis, 38, 83–84.
Mulgan, T. (1993). Slote’s satisficing consequentialism. Ratio, 6, 121–134.
Pettit, P. (1984). Satisficing consequentialism, Part II. Aristotelian Society, 58, 165–176.
Prawitz, D. (1970). The alternatives to an action. Theoria, 36, 116–126.
Rescher, N. (1958). An axiom system for deontic logic. Philosophical Studies, 9, 24–30.
Rescher, N. (1962). Conditional permission in deontic logic. Philosophical Studies, 13, 1–5.
Slote, M. (1984). Satisficing consequentialism, part I. Aristotelian Society, 58, 139–164.
Slote, M. (1989). Beyond optimizing: A study of rational choice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sobel, J. H. (1976) Utilitarianism and past and future mistakes. Noûs, 10, 195–219.
Sobel, J. H. (1982). Utilitarian principles for imperfect agents. Theoria, 48, 113–126.
Thomason, R. H. (1981). Deontic logic and the role of freedom in moral deliberation. In R. Hilpinen (Ed.), New studies in deontic logic (pp. 177–186). Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Vallentyne, P. (2000). Review of Fred Feldman’s utilitarianism, hedonism, and desert. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 734–735.
van Fraassen, B. (1972). The logic of conditional obligation. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1, 417–438.
Vessel, J. P. (2003). Counterfactuals for consequentialists. Philosophical Studies, 112, 103–125.
Vessel, J. P. (2007). The probabilistic nature of objective consequentialism. Theoria, LXXIII, 46–67.
von Wright, G. H. (1964). A new system of deontic logic. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 1, 173–182.
von Wright, G. H. (1965). A correction to a new system of deontic logic. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 2, 103–107.
Vorobej, M. (2000). Prosaic possibilism. Philosophical Studies, 97, 131–136.
Zimmerman, M. J. (1996). The concept of moral obligation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zimmerman, M. J. (2006) The relevance of risk to wrongdoing. In R. Feldman, K. McDaniel, J. Raibley, & M. J. Zimmerman (Eds.), The good, the right, life, and death (pp. 151–170). Aldershot: Ashgate Press.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to audiences at the meetings of the American Philosophical Association, the International Society for Utilitarian Studies, and the New Mexico/West Texas Philosophical Society. Special thanks to Fred Feldman, Michael Zimmerman, and an anonymous referee from Philosophical Studies.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Vessel, JP. Defending a possibilist insight in consequentialist thought. Philos Stud 142, 183–195 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9182-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9182-0