Abstract
Vanessa Carbonell argues that sacrifices of self, unlike most other sacrifices, cannot be analyzed entirely in terms of wellbeing. For this reason, Carbonell considers sacrifices of self as posing a problem for the wellbeing theory of sacrifice and for discussions about the demandingness of morality. In this paper I take issue with Carbonell’s claim that sacrifices of self cannot be captured as prudential harms. First, I explain why Carbonell considers sacrifices of self particularly problematic. In order to determine whether some state of affairs is (or would be) harmful for someone, it is necessary to assume a particular account of welfare. In this paper, I assume the self-fulfillment account of welfare (Haybron 2008). I introduce this theory and show that it can account for the harm of sacrifices of self.
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Notes
Derek Parfit (1995) rejects this condition.
It is also a question that proponents of a Parfitian account of what matters in prudential evaluations need to address. (Parfit 1995)
Kagan does not make this proposal with regard to the self-fulfillment account of welfare, but in the context of a discussion about what matters in survival.
Proponents of a Parfitian account of what matters in prudential evaluations usually appeal to psychological continuity and connectedness. (Parfit 1995) Again, these criteria have not been discussed specifically with regard to the self-fulfillment account of welfare.
References
Carbonell, Vanessa. 2012. The ratcheting-up effect. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93(2): 228–254.
Carbonell, Vanessa. 2015. Sacrifices of self. The Journal of Ethics 19: 53–72.
Haybron, Daniel M. 2008. The pursuit of unhappiness. The elusive psychology of well-being. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kagan, Shelly. 2012. Death. London: Yale University Press.
Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Parfit, Derek. 1995. The unimportance of identity. In Identity, ed. H. Harris. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Višak, T. Sacrifices of Self are Prudential Harms: A Reply to Carbonell. J Ethics 19, 219–229 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-015-9196-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-015-9196-3