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Distinguishing general theory, doctrine and evidence in criminal responsibility: a response to Lacey

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Notes

  1. I questioned whether she was previously sufficiently sensitive to this idea in an earlier paper, Tadros (2002).

  2. See Tadros (2005) for an analysis of the correspondence principle that suggests why this might be the case at greater length.

  3. Lacey, 2007, DOI 10.1007/s11572-006-9025-7, this issue, p.235.

  4. For critique of the Hegelian and Marxist supposition that this is so, see Cohen (2002).

  5. [2003] UKHL 50.

  6. This is arguably a justification for the rules on hearsay evidence.

  7. Lacey, 2007, DOI 10.1007/s11572-006-9025-7, this issue, p. 243.

  8. Lacey, 2007, DOI 10.1007/s11572-006-9025-7, this issue, p. 243.

  9. Lacey, 2007, DOI 10.1007/s 11572-006-9025-7, this issue, p. 234.

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Correspondence to Victor Tadros.

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Tadros, V. Distinguishing general theory, doctrine and evidence in criminal responsibility: a response to Lacey. Criminal Law, Philosophy 1, 259–265 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-006-9023-9

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