Abstract
We speak of products in two senses: in one, we speak of types of products, in the other we speak of the particular objects that are instances of those types. I argue that types of products have the same ontological status as that of material stuffs, like water and gold, which have a non-particular level of existence. I also argue that the relationship between types of products and their instances is logically similar to the relation of constitution, which holds between, say, gold and a ring made of gold. In my approach, types of products are concrete entities, having spatiotemporal properties. This picture fits our commonplace conception of types of products better than alternative approaches according to which types of products are universal, abstract, or mereological entities.
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Notes
Cf. Strawson (1959).
Cartwright (1970) proposes quantification over quantities of stuff, in a sense of “quantity” according to which the gold in Jane’s ring now might be the same quantity of gold as the quantity that was in her mother’s earrings some years ago. Laycock (1975) criticizes Cartwright’s view and holds that, say, the water in the basement constitutes a quantity of water but cannot be identified with a quantity of water, and it does not fall under the concept quantity of water. The water in the basement is not an F of any kind, not even a quantity of water; hence, it is not a particular object.
For an assessment of Strawson’s view see Laycock (1972).
One might look for an alternative analysis avoiding the notion of constitution. For example, one might analyze (c) into (c″): ∀y(water-element(y) → Colorless(y)). I prefer (c′) to (c″), since we do not say that a water molecule is colorless. Alternatively, one might analyze (c) into (c″′): ∀xs(∀y(y∠xs → water-element(y)) → colorless(xs)). But then, “colorless” is either distributive or non-distributive. If it is distributive, we are forced to say that a water molecule is colorless, which goes against our intuitions. On the other hand, I have no clear intuition about what being collectively colorless is for water molecules. Moreover, the analysis (c′) accords with the idea that what is true of all individual objects that are (correctly, or in normal conditions) constituted by A-elements plays a decisive role in determining what can be truly predicated of the stuff A. The idea is that there is a systematic relation between the property designated by a predicate when it is truthfully predicated of objects constituted of A-elements and the property designated by that predicate when it is truthfully predicated of the stuff A. In general, for any predicate P that can be predicated of a stuff A, if there is some property P′ which P stand for and is such that it is impossible that something is (correctly, or in normal conditions) constituted of A-elements and lack the property P′, then P is true of stuff A. In other words, to say that water is liquid amounts to saying that every object that is constituted (correctly, or in normal conditions) of water is liquid.
One might take constitution and parthood to be temporal indexed relations: \( {C_{\rm{t}}}{\hbox{xsy}}{ \equiv_{\rm{def}}}\forall z\left( {z\angle {\hbox{xs}} \to z{ <_{\rm{t}}}y} \right) \wedge \forall w\left( {w{ <_{\rm{t}}}y \to \exists o\left( {o\angle {\hbox{xs}} \wedge {{\hbox{{\rm O}}}_{\rm{t}}}o{\hbox{w}}} \right)} \right) \). To read: the objects xs constitute the object y at t if and only if for any object z, if z is one of the xs then z is a proper part of y at t and for any object w, if w is a proper part of y at t, then there exists an object o such that o is one of the xs and o and w overlap at t.
See footnote 7 on the need for the notion of constitution.
Here, the object z might be a quantity in Cartwright’s sense (see Cartwright 1970).
Cf. Laycock (1975) p. 435.
I borrow this example from Laycock (2006) pp. 22–24.
See, for example, Burke (1980).
Here, I draw on Laycock (1972) p. 24.
A superplurality is a plurality of pluralities, i.e., a plurality to which pluralities belong. Quantification over superpluralities is not singular quantification over a new kind of entities, nor is it plural quantification over pluralities. Rather it is a new kind of quantification—superplural—over individuals. See Rayo (2006) and Linnebo and Nicolas (2008).
I am not claiming that “widespread” is always superplural, i.e., takes always superpluralities as arguments. Obviously, “widespread” can take pluralities as arguments too. The analysis of (a) requires superplural quantification because in order for “the Aston Martin DB5 is widespread in P” to be true it is not sufficient that there is a plurality of aston_martinDB5-elements that is widespread in G. There must be several pluralities of aston_martinDB5-elements widespread in G.
It must be noted that very often both material stuffs and products1 are packaged in specific forms due to human interests, or even other natural reasons. So we speak of “one beer”, “two beers”, “three rocks”, and “one Aston Martin DB5”, “two Aston Martin DB5”. My claim is that when we use such expressions we mean one bottle of beer, two pints of beer, three lumps of rock, one car of the model Aston Martin DB5 (= one car constituted of the Aston Martin DB5), etc. This point is stressed in Laycock (1972) p. 18.
Though fundamental in many other fields, questions about copyrights, intellectual properties, legal monopolies etc. do not have any bearing on the ontological status of products1.
Although sets are abstract entities and outside space and time, one might introduce special properties that sets might have in virtue of having members with certain physical, spatiotemporal properties, to the extent that a set of, say, pieces of gold might be said, in a certain sense, to be located where its members are located.
Here, I draw on Lowe (1998).
I must concede that my objections against the view that products1 are properties exemplifiable by particulars are far from conclusive, especially if properties are conceived of as in rebus universalia as, for instance, Armstrong holds.
It might be objected that someone could enjoy a certain shade of redness at the very first encounter with it. I concede the point but only in the sense that when someone enjoys a certain shade of a color, he is in contact with a trope, and tropes—contrary to properties—are not universal entities. On the other hand products1 cannot be identified with tropes.
References
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H.M. Cartwright, “Quantities”, Philosophical Review, 79 (1970): 25–42.
H. Laycock, “Some Questions of Ontology”, The Philosophical Review 81 (1972): 3–42.
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H. Laycock, Words without Objects, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.
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E.J. Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998.
A. Rayo, “Words and Objects”, Nous 36 (2002): 436–464.
A. Rayo, “Beyond Plurals”, in A. Rayo and G. Uzquiano (eds), Absolute Generality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, pp. 220–254.
P.F. Strawson, Individuals, Methuen, London, 1959.
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This work is supported by the FP7 EU Large-scale Integrating Project OKKAM—Enabling a Web of Entities (no. 215032). For more details, visit http://www.okkam.org/. I am grateful to Andrea Bianchi and Claudio Masolo for their very helpful comments on an early draft of this paper.