Southwest Philosophy Review

Volume 31, Issue 1, January 2015

Sarah Vincent
Pages 139-146

Interspecies Intersubjectivity: On its Possibilities and Limitations

The present work explores interspecies intersubjectivity, including its content and limitations, through the paradigmatic instances of such relationships that are present among companion species. I aim both to defend the claim that meaningful relationships are possible and do in fact occur between humans and nonhuman animals by appealing to both philosophical and empirical literature and to begin to delineate the content and limitations of these interspecies relationships. I will conclude by proposing that, for any relationship to be “meaningful” (interspecies or intraspecies), the following conditions must be met: (1) At least one party in the relationship must be a moral subject or a moral agent. (2) The party or parties referred to in (1) must act as if the other party possesses certain morally salient characteristics. (3) And both parties must reliably seek out the companionship of the other party.