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Dismantling the Asymmetry Argument

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Notes

  1. Precursors of the asymmetry argument include Olga Plumacher, “Pessimism”, Mind 13 (1879): 68–89, p. 82–85; Peter Wessel Zapffe, “Fragments of an Interview”, Aftenposten (1959), as quoted in Thomas Ligotti, The Conspiracy Against the Human Race (New York: Hippocampus Press, 2011), p. 63; and Hermann Vetter, “Utilitarianism and New Generations”, Mind 80 (1971): 301–302. None addresses the objections that I am going to raise.

  2. Benatar thinks BT holds true for each and every human person who has ever lived, is alive, or is yet to live. He also laments over all sentient beings, of which human persons are, on the terminology employed in this article, a subset. He is most explicit about human persons, though. He also thinks that for each merely possible sentient being that would suffer some harm it is better never to come into existence. However, for the sake of brevity I focus just on his claims about actual human persons.

  3. Cf. Melinda Roberts and David Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons (Dordrecht/Heidelberg/Boston/New York: Springer, 2009); David Benatar, “Every Conceivable Harm”, South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (2012): 128–164; David Benatar, “Still Better Never to Have Been”, Journal of Ethics 17 (2013): 121–151; Christine Overall, Why Have Children? (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012); David Benatar and David Wasserman, Debating Procreation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Sarah Hannan, Samantha Brennan and Richard Vernon (eds.), Permissible Progeny? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Benatar’s continually updated list of replies (published in English) at http://www.philosophy.uct.ac.za/philosophy/staff/benatar/selectedbooks/betternevertohavebeen.

  4. David Benatar, “Why It Is Better Never to Come into Existence”, American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 345–355, p. 347, 349; David Benatar, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. VII, 1, 5, 13–15, 44; Benatar, “Every Conceivable Harm”, op. cit., p. 128–129, 134–138, 146, 158, 163; Benatar, “Still Better”, op. cit., p. 121, 123, 126, 134.

  5. Benatar, “Still Better”, op. cit., p. 125.

  6. Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 48–49; likewise p. 3, 28–30, 43–44.

  7. Ibid, p. 3–5. Please note the parentheses as I will be omitting them from now on.

  8. Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 4–5.

  9. Ibid, p. 20–21.

  10. See Joel Feinberg, “Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming”, in Freedom and Fulfilment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 3–36, p. 16; Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 21–22.

  11. See David Boonin, “Better to Be”, South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (2012): 10–25, p. 12–13. Cf. Hilary Greaves and John Cusbert, “Comparing Existence and Non-Existence” (in progress), slides from the eponymous talk by Greaves available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert2255/talks/existence.pdf.

  12. Benatar, “Why It Is Better”, op. cit., p. 350. See also Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 1, 22, 30–31; Benatar, “Still Better”, op. cit., p. 125–126; and Benatar and Wasserman, Debating Procreation, op. cit., p. 22.

  13. Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 20. Similarly ibid, p. VII, 29, 202, 207–208; Benatar, “Why It Is Better”, op. cit., p. 345; Benatar, “Every Conceivable Harm”, op. cit., p. 163.

  14. See Benatar, “Why It Is Better”, op. cit., p. 346; Better Never, op. cit., p. 199; “Still Better”, op. cit., p. 123; and Benatar and Wasserman, Debating Procreation, op. cit., p. 24.

  15. See Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 60–61.

  16. See Campbell Brown, “Better Never to Have Been Believed”, Economics and Philosophy 27 (2011): 45–52, p. 45–46, 51–52; Brian McLean, “What’s So Good About Non-Existence?”, Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (2015): 81–94, p. 83–85; and John J. Parry, “The Procreator’s Guide to Modality”, Philosophical Writings 43 (2014): 12–23, p. 13–15.

  17. In personal communication (June 1, 2018), Benatar simply suggested that BT has a special meaning because, in ethics, coming into existence is a special type of event. Cf. fn. 24 below.

  18. Benatar, “Why It Is Better”, op. cit., p. 352; likewise Better Never, op. cit., p. 99.

  19. See Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 95, 207, 211; “Every Conceivable Harm”, op. cit., p. 146; “Still Better”, op. cit., p. 123–124. Also Benatar and Wasserman, Debating Procreation, op. cit., p. 40.

  20. See Benatar, Better Never, op. cit. p. 209–211. In his latest book The Human Predicament (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 59–63, 136–138, 210–212, 225, Benatar also promotes reasonability or appropriateness of attitudes such as (moderate, not extremely intensive or protracted) regret over one’s own terminal sickness, fear of one’s own death, and pessimism about the human condition in general.

  21. Benatar, “Every Conceivable Harm”, op. cit., p. 130. Likewise his Better Never, op. cit., p. 35–36, 204; and “Still Better”, op. cit., p. 123; and Benatar and Wasserman, Debating Procreation, op. cit., p. 26–27.

  22. See Kevin Mulligan, “From Appropriate Emotions to Values”, The Monist 81 (1998): 161–168; “Emotions and Values”, in P. Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 475–500.

  23. See Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 210.

  24. See Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 53; and “Still Better”, op. cit., p. 126, 135–137. Likewise, in The Human Predicament, op. cit., p. 114–118, he also views coming out of existence as quite special.

  25. Benatar and Wasserman, Debating Procreation, op. cit., p. 23. Similarly Benatar, “Why It Is Better”, op. cit., p. 345–348; Better Never, op. cit., p. 30–44, 52–58.

  26. See Benatar, “Why It Is Better”, op. cit., p. 348; Better Never, op. cit., p. 40–42; “Still Better”, op. cit., p. 128.

  27. Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 30–31; added emphasis. Likewise his “Why It Is Better”, op. cit., p. 350; “Every Conceivable Harm”, op p. 134; “Still Better”, op. cit., p. 125–126; and Benatar and Wasserman, Debating Procreation, op. cit., p. 22.

  28. See Ben Bradley, “Benatar and the Logic of Betterness”, Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy (Mar 2010): 1–5; Elizabeth Harman, “David Benatar. Better Never to Have Been”, Noûs 43 (2009): 776–785, p. 781–782; Chris Kaposy, “Coming into Existence”, Human Studies 32 (2009): 101–108, p. 103–107; Campbell Brown, “Better Never to Have Been Believed”, Economics and Philosophy 27 (2011): 45–52, p. 45–49; Campbell Brown, “Reply to Benatar”, Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy (Sep 2013): 1; David DeGrazia, “Is It Wrong to Impose the Harms of Human Life?”, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (2010): 317–331, p. 321–324; Thaddeus Metz, “Are Lives Worth Creating?”, Philosophical Papers 40 (2011): 233–255, p. 239–245; Rivka Weinberg, “Is Having Children Always Wrong?”, South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (2012): 26–37, p. 26–32, 36–37; Boonin, “Better to Be”, op. cit., p. 10–15; and McLean, “What’s So Good About Non-Existence?”, op. cit., p. 83–86.

  29. For a similar point, cf. Julio Cabrera, “Quality of Human life and Non-Existence”, Revista Redbioética/UNESCO 2 (2011), No. 3: 25–35, p. 27–29; and Christian Piller, “On What Might Be Wrong the Asymmetry Argument” (in progress). Note that A3.1 renders BT false if BT is read as the claim that non-existence has an advantage but no disadvantage over existence.

  30. Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 45, 47. Similarly ibid, p. 42; and his “Why It Is Better”, op. cit., p. 348; “Every Conceivable Harm”, op. cit., p. 143–144; and “Still Better”, op. cit., p. 137–138.

  31. An anonymous reviewer notes that perhaps Benatar sees the transition from the basic asymmetry to the conclusion as abduction rather than entailment. However, I only propose that the logical relation is one of (material) implication, not that it is one of (necessary) entailment. Also, even abductive arguers view their conclusions as implied, though typically not as entailed, by their premises. Moreover, Benatar argues abductively only when he makes his case for the asymmetry from intuitions in reproductive and population ethics; never when he argues from the asymmetry to the conclusion (BT).

  32. Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 42–43.

  33. Aaron Smuts, “To Be or Never to Have Been”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2014): 711–729, p. 717.

  34. Jason Marsh, Creating and Raising Humans (Unpublished dissertation: The University of Western Ontario, 2012), p. 19.

  35. I set aside cases such as cure treatments that save our health but cause radical changes to our thick selves. Perhaps we can be glad about them yet regret them rationally. Cf. Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 77–78; and Travis Timmerman, “Doomsday Needn’t Be So Bad”, Dialectica (forthcoming).

  36. See Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 60–92; Benatar and Wasserman, Debating Procreation, op. cit., p. 40–121, 150–181; and Benatar, The Human Predicament, op. cit., p. 64–91.

  37. Benatar, Better Never, op. cit., p. 207.

  38. The description is adapted from Daniel Haybron, Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 113–127.

  39. Anthony de Mello, Rediscovering Life (New York: Image Books, 2012), p. 19–20, 32.

  40. Amongst blessings not just in blessed but also in typical contemporary lives, Marsh highlights close relationships: “When I think about the value of our relationships with other persons – family, friends, partners, and certain communities – I cannot think of anything bad in a typical life that really competes […]” Jason Marsh, “Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2014): 436–466, p. 460.

  41. See David Myers and Ed Diener, “The Pursuit of Happiness”, Scientific American (May 1996): 54–56; Ed Diener and Carol Diener, “Most People Are Happy”, Psychological Science 7 (1996): 181–185; Ed Diener and Martin Seligman, “Very Happy People”, Psychological Science 13 (2002): 81–84; Andrew E. Clark et al., The Origins of Happiness (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018), p. 15–30.

  42. Christine Overall, Why Have Children? (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012), p. 108. Cf. Daniel Haybron, “Do We Know How Happy We Are?”, Noûs 41 (2007): 394–428; and Jason Marsh, “Why Skepticism Defeats Pessimism” (in progress).

  43. Cf. Overall, Why Have Children?, op. cit., p. 108–110. On a personal and introspective note, since I have practised, for about three years, mindfulness meditation and few other techniques recommended by positive psychology, my regular displeasures and frustrations plummeted and most of my wakeful time I have felt neutral or mildly good. Cf. Kennon M. Sheldon and Sonja Lyubomirsky, “Is It Possible to Become Happier? (And If So, How?)”, Social and Personality Psychology Compass 1 (2007): 129–145.

  44. See Marsh, “Quality of Life”, op. cit., p. 442–443, 449; Marsh, “Why Skepticism Defeats Pessimism”, op. cit.; and Iddo Landau, Finding Meaning in an Imperfect World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 31–48.

  45. For comments on earlier versions of this article I thank William Vallicella, David Benatar, Christian Piller, Jan Votava, Travis Timmerman, and the reviewers.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Ostrava, Reální 5, 701 03, Ostrava, Czech Republic

    Vlastimil Vohánka

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Vohánka, V. Dismantling the Asymmetry Argument. J Value Inquiry 53, 75–90 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-018-9638-9

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