BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND: WITTGENSTEIN AND POLITICS

PAUL VOICE

A review of Cressida Heyes (ed.), *The Grammar of Politics: Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy* (Cornell University Press, 2003)

> We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need *friction*. Back to the rough ground.[1]

The subtitle of this collection – 'Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy' – should strike anyone with a passing knowledge of Wittgenstein's work and life as odd. Firstly, he wrote nothing that could be construed as political philosophy. Secondly, he had a lifelong antipathy to the idea that values, ethical or political, could be the subject of a philosophical *theory*. And thirdly, his own negative attitude to political activism is abundantly clear in the few reports we have of his conversations on this topic. So what is going on here?

Part of what is going on, I think, is that political philosophers who do not fit neatly into the traditional camps of liberalism and republicanism are trying to clear a path for a different approach to questions of political value. The question we might pose for this particular collection of essays is how *Wittgensteinian* is this path really. Is his work being interpreted to yield already present but hidden insights for political philosophy or is his work being plundered for ideas and suggestions to be *used* as tools for a different way of doing political philosophy?

I think the answer to this question matters. In the former case we will be concerned to ask whether the interpreters get Wittgenstein right. In the latter case this question has no real importance. In the former case we are talking of a Wittgensteinian political philosophy whereas in the latter instance the political philosophy is Wittgensteinian in a very limited sense.

There are other concerns as well. This collection puts Wittgenstein to work on behalf of a significantly left political agenda. Wittgenstein himself was no

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champion of leftwing politics as his biographers point out.[2] The very idea of using Wittgenstein's philosophy as a foundation for a left politics has been challenged on these grounds. Secondly, a more significant challenge is that Wittgenstein's philosophy has already been appropriated for a *rightwing* political agenda. This somewhat inconvenient fact has to be addressed as well. I want to pass through both of these concerns on my way to discussing in more detail the topic of a Wittgensteinian method in political philosophy which is the subject of the first part of this collection. I therefore largely limit my discussion to just one of the three parts of this collection. I will end by elaborating on something Wittgenstein *did* say about politics and explore briefly its implications for how we might think philosophically about political agency. I will use J. M. Coetzee's novel *Disgrace* to illustrate the point I want to make.

Both of the concerns mentioned at the beginning of the previous paragraph are addressed directly by Cressida Heyes in her introduction to the volume (which I will refer to as *G of P*). While she acknowledges Wittgenstein's right political orientation she asserts that 'While Wittgenstein's own political views remain of interest to historians of ideas, they are not the primary material from which this volume draws its inspiration' (*G of P*: 3). Instead '[t]he mandate of this collection ... is to assemble essays that *show* the relevance to political thought of the methods Wittgenstein outlines' (*G of P*: 3). In some respects this is right: A philosopher's personal attitudes and casual remarks are not to substitute for her considered philosophical writings. Whatever there is to be extracted from Wittgenstein's work should not be hostage to attitudes framed by his particular individual history and the time in which he lived. On the other hand, Wittgenstein himself approached questions of value as questions that were personal all the way through. For *him* the distinction between what a person writes and how she lives her life is bogus. It is no accident that the frontispiece to Ray Monk's outstanding biography of Wittgenstein quotes Otto Weininger's remark 'Logic and ethics are fundamentally the same, they are no more than duty to oneself'.[3] For the many intellectuals and artists who came of age at the end of the nineteenth century in Vienna politics represented hypocrisy, duplicity and concealment.[4] Karl Kraus and Otto Weininger, who were both important influences on the young Wittgenstein, praised a ruthless honesty that he valued throughout his life. But we should be careful not to think that Wittgenstein was apolitical. His skepticism extended to the idea that the world could be changed for the better by politicians and public service. He was for this reason disdainful of Russell's political involvements because of how they reflected on Russell *as a person*. The key to understanding Wittgenstein's attitude to politics as a well as his philosophical commitments on questions of value is his remark that one ought to 'Just improve yourself, that is all you can do to improve the world' (Monk, 1990: 17-18) Heyes links this remark with what she describes as Wittgenstein's 'solipsistic' approach to ethics. I want to make something political out of Wittgenstein's remark later, but for now I want to draw attention to the complications of neatly separating the personal from the political in the case of a philosopher for whom individual honesty and personal integrity *were* political values.

These ideas of honesty and integrity were fundamental to both his philosophy and his life. While many of his thoughts on language changed after the *Tractatus* the notion that ethics is something personal, a 'wordless faith',[5] persisted to the end. Any politics that mattered for Wittgenstein could only be personal. Russell's attempts to change the world were on a par with trying to teach ethics; both misunderstood the personal nature of values, political as much as ethical.

This leaves us with three options. Firstly, to say that if politics is personal in the sense that all politics is personal, then Wittgenstein's personal political attitudes are what constitutes a Wittgensteinian politics. This is what Heyes seeks to defend herself against by separating Wittgenstein's politically conservative remarks and attitudes from the construction of a Wittgensteinian approach to political philosophy. Secondly, we can follow Heyes and her contributors in setting aside the idea of the political as fundamentally and entirely personal and instead 'transpose' Wittgenstein's methods in the philosophy of language to political philosophy. This volume demonstrates the value of this approach. However, there is a third option that I will briefly canvas at the end of the essay. We might take seriously the idea of the political as personal and the idea that it is a genuinely political act to change oneself. I will suggest that changing oneself is to change the world and to 'improve' oneself is to 'improve' the world, and that once we escape the oppositional duality of the personal and the political we free ourselves from a particularly attractive but misleading picture.

The second area of concern is the claim that when Wittgenstein's philosophical method is 'transposed' on to political theory it supports conservative conclusions. Heyes and several of her contributors argue against this conclusion. David Cerbone in 'The Limits of Conservatism: Wittgenstein on "Our Life" and "Our Concepts"', puts the challenge in this way (*G of P*: 44):

> the depiction of our 'concepts' as constrained by our 'form of life' can, and often is taken to, underwrite, and so legitimate, a hostile attitude toward political change; equally, the endorsement of such a depiction very often affects the attitude one takes toward the nature and possibility of social political criticism, whether, for example, such criticism can be rationally motivated or adjudicated.

The charge here is that Wittgenstein's disavowal of universal principles to adjudicate the particular practices of communities leaves the philosopher bereft of a rational footing to make critical political judgments. We have 'our' life guided by 'our' concepts (and 'they' have theirs) and there are no critical resources beyond our particular 'form of life'. In other words, we are caged by our circumstances and there is no philosophical traction to be gained by appealing to universal norms. According to J. C. Nyiri and others,[6] our 'spade is turned' very soon after we start digging for a justification of our political, economic, and social practices.

Cerbone challenges the picture implied by these claims of conservatism. In typically Wittgensteinian fashion he identifies both poles of the dualism that form the structure of the argument. On the one hand, the case for Wittgenstein's conservatism correctly identifies his rejection of transcendental points of judgment (which is one pole of the duality) while taking Wittgenstein to *therefore* endorse the opposite pole; namely, a radical form of relativism that disqualifies criticism and endorses quietism. In countering this picture Cerbone makes the argument that attributing this position to Wittgenstein supposes that he accepts the proposition that we can identify the facts that constrain our judgments, that is, we can pick out the bars of the cage that limit and shape 'our' concepts. But Wittgenstein rejects this idea. We can only identify a limit if we can access 'the other side' so that a proper boundary can be drawn. However, if the 'other side' can be seen and articulated then we are not limited in the way claimed. In other words, the charge of relativism can only be made cogent by supposing that we can identify 'two discrete realms', one that constrains (the facts constituting our 'form of life') and one that is constrained ('our' concepts). But if our concepts are constrained in the way claimed, then it is nonsense to *speak* of a realm freed from being shaped by 'our' concepts.[7]

I think Cerebone successfully makes the case that Wittgenstein's approach does not yield a conservative political philosophy, at least not in the way that has been claimed. What is persuasive is Cerebone's employment of Wittgenstein's own *method* to defend him against the charge rather than relying *entirely* on Wittgenstein's enigmatic remarks. Cerebone's argument thus illustrates the strength of the Wittgensteinian approach which is well represented in this collection. The 'pictures'[8] that enthrall us usually have an 'either/or' structure and we too often yield to the temptation to shift between the poles of the disjunction.[9] Even philosophers who take Wittgenstein as their authority to advance progressive political philosophy, such as Richard Rorty, have been accused of falling into the 'either/or' trap.[10] Once the picture is revealed, philosophy has done its work.

Now that the two concerns identified above have been addressed (the political biography of Wittgenstein and the claim that his philosophy suggests a conservative political orientation) we can now turn to the positive features of the Wittgensteinian method for political philosophy. The volume opens with a piece by James Tully. It is a revised version of a paper that appeared first in 1989.[11] Tully's 'Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: Understanding Practices of Critical Reflection', helped open up the space for thinking about political theory in a new way and appropriately this volume walks the path Tully first indicated.

Tully's essay rejects two approaches to political thought that he describes as foundationalist; Jürgen Habermas's requirement for validating agreements to ground political practices and Charles Taylor's interpretative model of critical

reflection. Tully sets these up as competing accounts so that the rejection of the one leads the unwary thinker into the arms of the other. Again we are asked to see ourselves as captivated by a picture structured as an 'either/or'. The therapeutic method Wittgenstein advocates is aimed at curing us of our temptations by showing that the picture in question is not general but at best it represents two ways of going about things among many others. Tully complicates the matter by showing that there are two overlapping pictures here. One is the claim that either we accept Habermas's validation approach to critical reflection or Taylor's alternative, or, if we reject both, we must therefore 'embrace the abdication of critical thought' (*G of P*: 18). Tully challenges both pictures.

It is unnecessary to rehearse the details of Tully's arguments here. What I want to bring to the surface is the Wittgensteinian approach at work in his essay. He shows how Habermas's 'activity' of validation is one among many ways of offering reasons and is a 'practice' among other practices that 'presupposes customary, intersubjective ways of acting with words' (*G of P*: 26). Likewise he rejects Taylor's insistence that 'the activity of interpretation is our basic way of being in the world' (*G of P*: 36). He bases this rejection on an argument, anchored in the *Philosophical Investigations*, that shows that understanding is different from interpretation – 'Interpretation is a reflective activity that we engage in when we are in doubt about how to grasp or understand a sign that is in question' (*G of P*: 38). Interpretation, like validation, cannot therefore play its assigned foundational role.

It is important to note that Tully is not saying that critical reflection is not *sometimes* a request for validation or an interpretative practice. His claim is that these are not foundational to the nature of critical reflection. He is not attempting to replace these foundational approaches with an alternative. Instead we are encouraged 'to see the enlightening multiplicity of conceptions of critical reflection available to us' (*G of P*: 40). We escape the 'bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language' (Wittgenstein, 1953: 109) by breaking through the layered 'either/ors' and accepting the plurality and diversity of our ways of being in the world. Critical reflection then is messy, confusing, and inexact.

If one of the pictures that typically 'enchants' us is the idea that our language receives its sense by reflecting or mirroring a reality, then we are quickly led into another familiar temptation; namely, to suppose that political critique aims at pointing out falsehoods, identifying contradictions and inconsistencies. And, to put in place the other half of the disjunction, if language doesn't mirror reality then there are no falsehoods as such and political critique is a mere matter of 'opinion'. Denis McManus in his essay 'Wittgenstein, Fetishism, and Nonsense in Practice' constructs a different understanding of political criticism: It is not that a mistaken political thinker advances a falsehood, but that she speaks 'nonsense', engages in mere 'talk', and remains on the level of 'superficialities'. Meaningfulness, as we have noted, requires a background agreement among speakers and this presupposes a 'shared form of life'. However, says McManus, we can carry on talking when the form of life and the background agreement have 'slipped away'. In these cases we have nothing to 'say' because the meaningfulness of our statements and judgments has become unanchored.

McManus offers a variety of examples of cases where we keep on talking although we no longer retain the sense of our words. Here are two brief illustrations of his point. Firstly, he points to the use of mathematical models in contexts where the 'object' in question is not something that can be measured. For example, happiness is not measurable mathematically. When we treat human conduct as 'something' quantifiable we have moved away from the context in which the idea of a quantity makes sense. When we do this we no longer know what we are talking about. Secondly, McManus argues, rights-talk that is extended from the central cases of the protection of life, freedom, and property to the trivial pursuits of the wealthy (the right to drive to work for example) is to dilute the significance of the notion of rights and render the profound superficial. McManus concludes (*G of P*: 81): 'The vice we seek to expose is not that of speaking falsely or acting contrary to principle. Rather it is the descent of our talk into meaningless chatter and our action into token gesture.' The task then of the Wittgensteinian is to expose cases where political thinkers make use of concepts that have been wrenched from 'the language-game which [was] their original home' (Wittgenstein, 1953: 116).

David Owen's essay 'Genealogy as Perspicuous Representation', which is the final one in the section on a Wittgensteinian method in political philosophy, takes us further into the ways in which we can be captivated by 'pictures' and the political consequences of our entrapment by language. Owen diagnoses this political ailment as 'aspectival captivity'. We fall 'under the spell' of 'inherited ways of thinking' and become, so Owen argues, unable to make sense of ourselves as agents. The cure is genealogy in roughly the sense that Foucault understands it. He praises the work of Quinton Skinner on the genealogy of our concept of liberty and Tully's work on constitutionalism[12] as examples of perspicuous representations of how our thoughts about liberty, for example, have been constructed into what Foucault would call an 'historical a priori'. Genealogical critique, when successful, resolves necessities into contingencies. Owen suggests then that we release ourselves from the constraints of false necessities by cultivating 'practices of political philosophy that are oriented to particular cases and are characterized by a historical or comparative sensibility' (*G of P*: 96).

The second and third parts of this collection focus more tightly on a Wittgensteinian politics and the application of the Wittgensteinian method to particular issues. For example, Allan Janik in 'Notes on the Natural History of Politics' argues that a Wittgensteinian political philosophy 'establishes how constraints are built into those rules through which our very ability to act is constituted' (*G of P*: 116). This in turn points to the nature of political conflict

that is 'rooted in rule-following' (*G of P*: 116). Wendy Lynne Lee's '"But One Day Man Opens His Seeing Eye": The Politics of Anthropomorphizing Language' explores how anthropomorphizing language fits in with a logic of oppressive patriarchal institutions and practices. These essays and their companions, apart from being of great interest in themselves, fill out the picture of what a Wittgensteinian can achieve when she turns her attention to the political and aims the resources Wittgenstein developed in his later work at a new problem.

For many readers the approach to politics exemplified in Heyes's collection will seem distant from the concerns of political *action*. Although some essayists focus on questions of autonomy (and how our concepts constrain it), political agency as such is given little attention. What can a citizen *do* to affect her world politically? The answer we can glean from this volume is ambiguous: appeal to a transcendental ideal is mere metaphysics and a stoic acceptance of the unchangeable mere skepticism. As political thinkers we can point out, reveal and expose political language that has 'gone on holiday', but political thinkers are some distance from the barricades of political struggle.

My criticism of the essayists in this volume is that they too readily accept the left's dash to distance the personal from the political in elaborating a Wittgensteinian approach to political thought. We have already canvassed the reasons for this in so far as Wittgenstein's own personal political views are incompatible with leftwing political thinking. But there is a deeper reason lurking behind the impulse to separate the political from the personal (in the sense Wittgenstein might have meant this distinction). We might even think of this reason as constituting a 'picture'. This is the idea that if an act or judgment is personal it cannot also be political. It is important to understand that I don't mean to refer to the now commonplace idea that 'everything is political' which merely *extends* the concept of the political to cover the personal. Instead I want to suggest that Wittgenstein's insistence on the importance of the personal in his discussion of values marks a challenging new way of thinking about political agency.

To make sense of this we should return to Wittgenstein's exhortation to 'just improve yourself – that is all you can do to improve the world' (Monk, 1990: 17-18). It is tempting to read this as an expression of skepticism about political agency but there are other readings that have been missed and that are missed in this collection. There are two terms in play here – self and world. The skeptic's reading presupposes a firm separation between self and world so that one cannot change the world if one only changes oneself. So if politics is about changing the world (as is assumed here) then changing only the self has no political effect. The opposite idea that the self can indeed change the world also presupposes the same firm separation between self and world. The self here, the political actor, *works on* the world like a carpenter works on a piece of wood and changes it while the actor's own self remains the same. The thought that everything is political supposes that everything we do, even the personal things we do, are, or are potentially, world-changing – that is, political.

There is a picture here complete with its 'either/or' structure. Either citizens as political agents, in standing outside the world are capable of changing the world or citizens cannot change anything other than themselves. The Wittgensteinian rejects the first part of this disjunction; we are too entangled in the web of language (forms of life) to transcend the world and change it (because this presupposes an autonomy that we don't possess). But the Wittgensteinian doesn't want to accept the second half of the disjunction either. This would be to abdicate politics and, as Heyes says, embrace a 'solipsistic' ethical individualism (*G of P*: 2); hence the ambiguous nature of political agency for Wittgensteinians.

The structure of this dilemma rests on a disguised Cartesian separation of world and self where the idea of the political is annexed to the former term. Either the self is not political or the self is engulfed by the world and made political. If we question the Cartesian distinction between self and world, then the dilemma dissolves and a new and a uniquely Wittgensteinian notion of political agency emerges. Moreover, the gap between what Wittgenstein says about values, their fundamentally personal meaning, and the idea of a Wittgensteinian politics is potentially closed.

I will try to express what this Wittgensteinian notion of political agency might mean by a reference to a profoundly political choice made by a character in J. M. Coetzee's *Disgrace*. I am not offering a general interpretation of this complex novel. Instead I want to bring to the surface an idea of political agency that is not an act of pure Kantian autonomy and is also not agency denied; not either autonomy or acquiescence.

The main character in Coetzee's novel is David Lurie, a former university professor forced to resign from his teaching position following a scandal involving one of his female students. Lurie is a displaced 'enlightenment man' in post-apartheid South Africa struggling unsuccessfully to understand the changed world around him. His liberal politics are adrift in the 'new' South Africa. In one way he is man of principle, refusing to issue a false apology to keep his job but he is also a predator; a thoughtless exploiter of women. He places his trust in Byron, the English poets, the law and 'the comforts of theory' (Coetzee, 1999: 98). Politically he is passive. After the transfer of power from apartheid's racial oligarchy to a democratically elected government, the power to 'change' the world has been stripped away from him. Even his own language is suspect. In a passage reminiscent of McManus's idea of 'mere talk' as a form political critique, Lurie remarks to himself that 'The language ... [is] tired, friable, eaten from the inside as if by termites. Only the monosyllables can still be relied on, and not even all of them' (Coetzee, 1999: 129).

The contrasting character is Lurie's daughter Lucy. It is her political choices that suggest a different understanding of the political; an understanding that is Wittgensteinian. Lucy lives on a smallholding outside the small city of Grahamstown in the Eastern Cape. On her land lives a black family whose head, Petrus, does odd jobs for her. While Lurie is visiting his daughter, escaping the shame of his scandal, the house is attacked by three black men who rape Lucy. It is this terrible event that crystallizes the central political question for white South Africans: Can the former colonizers and political masters find a place in a democratic South African society?

Lurie's response is to call the police and seek justice. He suspects Petrus, who happened to be away during the attack, and is eager to confront him and others who he believes were involved. Lucy resists her father's attempts to cast the trauma in the language of a simple crime requiring the intervention of an outside order. She resists his attempts to 'talk rationally' about what happened and about what to do about the future. He fears for her safety if she remains and argues that if law and justice cannot be imposed, then she should leave for the city suburbs or travel to Holland where he has relatives. We can see Lurie's thinking: Either the situation can be changed or, if not, then the situation must be left behind. The bifurcation between world and self forms the structure of his response.

It is easy to read Lucy's very different response as acquiescence to her circumstances. After the attack the power on the smallholding shifts from her towards Petrus, who gains ownership of some of the land as a result of land reform. Lucy recognizes that her safety depends not on the police but on Petrus. If she chooses to be his 'third wife' or his concubine she will be protected by becoming a part of the rural community that has previously been invisible to white eyes. When she announces to her father that she will return to her house after the attack she says: 'It was never safe, and it's not an idea, good or bad. I'm not going back for the sake of an idea. I'm just going back' (Coetzee, 1999: 105). She rejects the entire scheme of Lurie's thinking. She accepts that *she must change* if she is to live as white person in rural South Africa. This is the political dimension that she has control over. However, her change is not merely personal but, I would argue, profoundly political. The world is not left untouched by her personal choice. Her decisions reverberate, unsettling the assumptions of her father, the white 'ladies of Grahamstown', and doubtlessly her choice will have its affects on Petrus and his community.

Lucy provides an alternative answer to the political dilemma of white South Africa but this answer is not neat and easily digestible. She calls on no grand validating theory to explain her actions and decisions and so we are left puzzled and forced to attend to the uncomfortable details of her life. Like Lurie we will likely question the idea of becoming a 'third wife' and allowing another person to have such power over oneself. The Kantians among us will be quick to point out that the brutal rape she suffered significantly diminished her capacity for genuine choice. The Wittgensteinian has the same questions and is puzzled in the same way. What a Wittgensteinian doesn't do though is allow herself to be batted back and forth between describing Lucy's political choices in terms of *either* acquiescence *or* an act of individual autonomy. *It's not that simple*.

What kind of political agency does Lucy exhibit? She certainly does not demonstrate agency in the full Kantian sense. She does, however, make choices in the most difficult of circumstances. There is not an ideal for her to appeal to (she remarks at one point that 'there is no higher life. This is the only life there is' (Coetzee, 1999: 74). She has to make out the best she can and try to be a 'good person' (Coetzee, 1999: 216). This is not, however, an example of 'ethical solipsism'. Her attempt to be a good person is simultaneously a political act; for Lucy the self and the world are fused.

Readers will rightly feel some dissatisfaction with this reading and with the idea of agency that I have advanced. Firstly, they will question the meaning of the quotation I used as the starting point of the discussion. If all one can do is 'improve' oneself, then what standard is being used to judge improvement? Lucy might change but why does this make her a 'good person'? In response to these questions it is perhaps too easy to reply that there is no general 'principle of improvement' that takes the measure of our actions and which constitutes a standard in the required sense. I think that Wittgenstein himself probably understood himself to mean that a life led with an unflinching honesty and personal integrity was one that 'improved' on other possible lives.

It might be tempting here to move along the path of claiming 'authenticity' as a Wittgensteinian virtue and, perhaps from a political point of view, drawing comparisons with Heidegger's radical individualism and disparagement of 'the They'. There is not enough space here to explore these connections. However, what does need to be said is that a life can stand as an example of an honest way to live without a need to reach beyond it for a measure. There is no standard that 'tells us' that Lucy's choice is an 'improvement' over the life her father urges for her. There is however a set of details, a context and shape associated with her choice that exemplifies a life that seeks no easy way out. Furthermore, her decisions radically challenge the prevailing political discourses of liberalism and racism. When Wittgenstein urges us to 'look' not 'to think' (Wittgenstein, 1953: 66) he doesn't mean us to gaze vacantly at the world; rather he encourages us to attend to our subject before we impose our existing standards and expectations. We should there look at Lucy's life and her decisions before we 'think' about them and rush to take their measure.

The dry, hard soil of the Eastern Cape is a good example of the 'rough ground' of political choice. If we are going to follow the advice of the contributors to this volume and avoid the general in favor of the particular, seek diversity and plurality, and attend to actual practices rather than ideal forms, then we invite complexity and roughness. If we seek to avoid becoming 'bewitched' by language and dazzled by 'pictures' we have to question our own strongest responses. This collection of essays succeeds in shifting the reader's perspective and introducing her to the discomfort of a political philosophy that, as Wittgenstein would demand, 'does not spare someone the trouble of thinking' (Wittgenstein, 1953: viii).

Notes

1 Wittgenstein, 1953: 107.

2 Although he did attempt to travel to the Soviet Union in the 1930s and expressed sympathy for the communist regime. This sympathy however was premised on a romantic view of the value of labor that owed more to Tolstoy than it did to Marx or Lenin. The project was abandoned when the Soviets made it clear that they expected Wittgenstein to teach philosophy rather than work in a factory. See Monk (1990: 340-4).

3 Monk (1990). The original quotation is from Weininger's controversial book *Sex and Character*.

4 See Janik and Toulmin (1973), chapters 2 and 3 for a full account of the background to the young Wittgenstein's intellectual life.

5 As Wittgenstein's close friend Paul Engelman characterized Wittgensteinian ethics, quoted in Janik and Toulmin (1973: 24).

6 See for example, Nyiri (1981 and 1984), Gellner (1975), Winch (1958), and Bloor (1983).

7 This argument echoes Wittgenstein's puzzles about the limits of language in the *Tractatus*.

8 The idea of a 'picture' is ubiquitous in Wittgenstein's later work and in this collection. David Owen's essay 'Genealogy as Perspicuous Representation' (*G of P*: 82-98) usefully discusses pictures in terms of 'systems of judgments'.

9 This is most clearly demonstrated in Wendy Lynne Lee's '"But One Day Man Opens His Seeing Eye": The Politics of Anthropomorphizing Language' (*G of P*: 167-85).

10 See Alice Crary (2000: 118-245).

11 In *Political Theory* 17(2), 1989.

12 See Skinner (1998) and Tully (1995).

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