Abstract
In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach does not mean to buy an ontologically deflationary approach, according to which we have to accept all the intentional objects there apparently are. Being metaphysically deflationary on intentionalia rather means that from the ontological point of view one must really allow only for those intentionalia for which one is entitled to say that there are such things; typically, for which an ontological proof is available. From metaphysical schematism plus conditional, or partial, ontological committment to intentionalia, further interesting consequences follow. First, this theoretical combination allows one to deal with the ‘too-many entities’ problem (may one fail to accept an ontological proof for an entity of a given kind if she thinks that the entity we would have to be committed to is an entity of another kind?). Second, it allows one to deal with the ‘genuinely true report’ problem (how is it that if we exercise mindreading with respect to a somehow deluded person, we want our reports to come out as really, not merely fictionally, true?).
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Notes
A typical defender of the latter position is Zalta (1988).
As implicitly suggested in Lewis (1986).
Cf. Priest (2005).
Following notoriously Kripke (1971), I believe in the thesis of identity’s being a necessary relation of an object with itself.
On this way of addressing ontological matters, cf. notoriously Quine (1961 2).
For a thorough defence of a deflationary position in ontology (at least as regards entities such as properties and propositions), cf. Schiffer (2003). On this concern note that, although in the case of intentionalia there are no ‘something-from-nothing’ transformations that lead to the postulation of such entities, as according to Schiffer is the case with properties and propositions (like “Fido is a dog iff Fido has the property of being a dog”), an ontological deflationist on intentionalia may claim that the very same ordinary language argument that for Schiffer further supports the existence of the latter entities also supports the existence of the former entities. That is, if from “Bush believes that Jesus is resurrected but Osama disbelieves that” one can seemingly infer “There is something, namely a proposition, that Bush believes and Osama disbelieves”, then from “The Scots like Nessie but the Irish dislike it” one can seemingly infer “There is something, namely an intentional object, that the Scots like and the Irish dislike”. But this strategy is dubious, for it may also lead to the opposite ontological result. That is, if one has qualms as regards intentionalia, the above similarity in inferring existential generalisations may lead her to reject properties and propositions as well.
For more on this, cf. Voltolini (2006a).
On ontological arguments for numbers, cf. e.g. Colyvan (2004).
Cf. notoriously Evans (1978).
Crane admits that ontological committment on intentionalia has to be partial, but he draws the line between merely would-be intentionalia and genuine intentionalia at the wrong point. For he takes that the ontologically dividing line runs between nonexistent and existent intentionalia, the latter being the only intentionalia that there really are. Cf. (2001a:26). Yet being a nonexistent intentionale, a characteristic that mobilises a first-order predicate of existence, is again not a genuinely metaphysical category such that it can be proved that there really are no things of that kind. One can think both of the possible offspring of certain gametes of Elisabeth I of England and of Philip II of Spain and of the impossible horse which is simultaneously all black and all white; yet their both being nonexistent entities does not eo ipso mean that there are no both things, for there are reasons for admitting the former which are reasons for not admitting the latter. For more on this cf. Voltolini (2006a, 2007).
Cf. Crane (2001a:30). In this respect, Crane reprises what Searle (1983) originally maintained. Like Searle, Crane maintains that whenever it turns out that the intentional object a thought is apparently direct upon is such that there really is no such object, the thought is not really directed upon such object but it rather has a certain intentional content. Yet unlike Searle, Crane’s appeal to schematism wants to account for the phenomenology involved in such cases: for the bearer of the thought in question, that thought is about an intentional object, it does not involve an intentional content that bearer is not aware of.
In point of fact, adverbialism’s sustainers usually present this position as a theory that wants to monadically account for the intentionality property in general. In other terms, such sustainers do not draw a distinction between cases of thoughts being about intentional objects and cases of thoughts merely having an intentional content, for they hold that intentionality in general must be thoroughly reconstructed as a monadic property, affecting either thoughts themselves or their bearers. Cf. Kriegel (2007). Yet for my purposes it is enough to consider adverbialism as a theory that wants to account monadically for the mere property of having an intentional content.
Cf. Kriegel (2007).
Fodor addresses these criticisms against what he labels “the fusion view”. Cf. (1981:179–81).
For this example, cf. originally Twardowski (1982:106).
One might think that “Indy-ly” and “Whack-ly” express noncumulable adverbial modifications; a sentence construed along the lines of (5t-a) such as “S thinks Indy-Whackly” is utterly meaningless. It may be the case that non-cumulability tells a pair like (7)–(8) from sentences like “S thinks intensely” and “S thinks loosely”, where cumulation is possible: “S thinks intense-loosely” sounds acceptable. (I owe this suggestion to Bill Fish). Let me put aside the problem that it is not clear whether this is the right way to pick up a certain class of sentences (how does the fact that adverbial modifications like those expressed by “Indy-ly” and “Whack-ly” are cumulable have to do with the fact that (7)–(8) intuitively predicate having an intentional content of different intentional states?). It remains that adverbs like “seriously” and “make-believedly” express noncumulable adverbial modifications as well (“S think serious-makebelievedly” is unacceptable). Alternatively, a thought-modifier adverbialist might try to account for the supposed commonality between the intentional states reported by (7)–(8) in terms of their similarity in inferential role. (I owe this suggestion to Farid Masrour.) For example, by relying perhaps on some meaning postulates, she might try to say that, unlike (9)–(10), (7)–(8) entail that someone cogitates of something. True enough, if there were such a commonality, the thought-modifier adverbialist would have managed to show why, unlike the states reported by (9)–(10), the states reported by (7)–(8) share a general intentionality property. Yet it is hard to show that there is such a commonality once inferences from (7)–(8) to the thought that someone cogitates of something are to be blocked for a thought-modifier adverbialist. For if she did not block these inferences, she would have then precisely got the for her unwelcome result that the general intentionality property is relational.
Kriegel (2007) goes precisely in this direction, by maintaining that the monadically reconstructed general intentional property is a phenomenal property which is merely described in adverbialist terms. Let me put aside the fact that this account presupposes at least two controversial premises: first, that all basic intentional states are also phenomenal states; second, that the fact that they are phenomenal is relevant for their also being intentional. The problem with this account is that, as there are various phenomenal characters, there should be a distinct intentionality property for each such character, hence for states endowed with different phenomenal characters. As a result, not only thinking of Indy and waiting for Whack, if they were endowed with distinct phenomenal characters, would not instantiate one and the same allegedly monadic property of having an intentional content, but this would also (and quite counterintutively) hold of, say, the two states of having the impression of seeing Whack and of having the impression of hearing Whack, insofar as, again, these two states are endowed with different phenomenal characters.
In this respect, the thought-modifier adverbialist might bite the bullet and say that, unlike further sentences like “S runs seriously”, “S’ eats makebelievedly” etc., (7)–(10) all entail that someone cogitates of something. Yet this move is precluded to her again for the reasons I said before: that inference is blocked for a thought-modifier adverbialist.
For an account of being about an object and having an intentional content that make them two different relational intentionality properties, cf. Haldane (1989:18).
For this distinction between the two notions of true-at and true-in, cf. for instance Adams (1981:22).
This example again comes from Twardowski (1982:106).
Cf. Kripke (1980:76–7). Kripke limits himself to make this point as regards reference, but its extension to truthconditions is obvious.
A previous version of this paper has been presented to the Conference on Intentional Objects held at the University of Auckland on 25–26 August, 2007, and at a seminar at the Center for Consciousness, Australian National University, Canberra, November 1, 2007. I thank all the participants to these events for their stimulating remarks. I also thank Uriah Kriegel and Elisabetta Sacchi for their insightful comments.
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Voltolini, A. Consequences of schematism. Phenom Cogn Sci 8, 135–150 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-008-9108-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-008-9108-0