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Counting the Consequences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

John F. Vollrath
John F. Vollrath*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point
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Extract

What makes one event have more historical importance than another event? Why, for example, do historians consider Caesar's decision to cross the Rubicon more important than Caesar's decision to shave in the morning? In this example, the answer should be obvious. The contrast is between a decision of great consequence and a decision of little consequence. Perhaps we can generalize from the example to say that the ranking of events with respect to their historical importance is a function of the magnitude of their respective consequences.

W. H. Dray holds that in some cases historical importance is determined by factors other than the size of consequences. For example, events may be important because of what they anticipate or what they reveal.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , December 1973 , pp. 225 - 233
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1973

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References

1 Dray, W. H.: “On Importance in History,” pp. 251–269 of Kiefer, H. E. and Munitz, M. K. (eds.), Mind, Science, and History, Albany, 1970.Google Scholar

2 Pages 257-258.

3 “Countable” is not used here in the standard mathematical sense. A collection is countable, in this non-standard sense, only if the number of members of the collection is an integer. This is the sense in which I propose to use “countable.”

4 The argument is reconstructed from comments on pages 259-265. Dray's replies to the argument are also on these pages.

5 This assumes that the number of “times” after any time is the same as the number of integers. Suitable adjustments can be made throughout the argument if the number of “times” after any time is the same as the number of real numbers.

6 I received helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper from Raymond Martin and from my colleagues at Stevens Point.