Abstract
The Argumentative Adversariality debate is over the question of whether argument must be adversarial. A particular locus of this debate is on skeptical challenges in critical dialogue. The Default Skeptical Stance (DSS) in argument is a practical manifestation of argumentative adversariality. Views about the on-the-ground value of the DSS vary. On one hand, in “The Social & Political Limitations of Philosophy” (2012), Phyllis Rooney argues that the DSS leads to epistemic injustice. On the other, Allan Hazlett in his recent piece “Critical Injustice” (2020) argues for the virtues of the skeptical stance in terms of epistemic justice. Both Rooney and Hazlett are concerned with the role skeptical engagement plays in argument, but they assign opposite values to it. In this essay, I review Rooney and Hazlett’s examples and (i) show that the epistemic dysfunction in the two scholar’s going cases is one and the same, and (ii) argue that the cause of both is a lack of proper skeptical engagement. Skeptical engagement is a requirement for epistemic justice. Together (i) and (ii) constitute an initial defense of the Adversarialist position against objections regarding the social epistemic risk of the skeptical stance.
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Notes
As Hazlett explains, critical uptake indicates respect. It acknowledges the other’s equal intellectual status and their role in the intellectual community. It allows individuals to strengthen their position, discard false beliefs and cultivate epistemic virtue. I discuss this in full in Sect. 4.
Throughout this paper, argument is treated as dialectic, and thus, as commitment-based, rather than belief-based.
Of course, some of Leiter’s supporters are plausibly also women and members of minority groups. But, women’s oppression isn’t always readily evident to women. It takes epistemic work to understand one’s social position. This fact accounts for women who support Leiter. And, it underscores the importance of Penaluna’s contributions.
Patrick Bondy (2010) considers argumentative injustice, too. I am sympathetic with Bondy’s analysis, but maintain that critical uptake via skeptical norms is more actionable, stable and reliable than his adapted policy of metadistrust. Metadistrust, like norms of cooperativeness, relies on interlocuters’ goodwill, which is not guaranteed, especially in cases of social difference, where it counts the most. For a related analysis of the issue, see Sherman (2016).
In “Dislocating Cultures” (1997) Uma Narayan makes a related point. She observes that the testimony of Third-World feminist is often treated as different from testimony from expertise. It is seen as mysterious, and so beyond critique, which is ultimately harmful. I owe this connection to an anonymous reviewer.
Silence is not always silencing. Silence is a varied phenomenon, which can indicate disagreement or agreement, depending on context. My contention is simply that in this context it is. For further consideration of the role of silence in argument, see Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public, edited by Casey Rebecca Johnson.
My view here is in good company. Fernando Leal (2020) holds that critical questions are a necessary part of argumentation. Just as the burden of proof belongs to the protagonist in argument, a burden of questioning belongs to the antagonist. And, just as there is a right way to shoulder the burden of proof, there is a right way to question. It is not only the antagonist’s duty to ask critical questions, but to do so well (2020: 418). Leal lays out what he takes should be the norms for these questions. On his view, critical questions should be clarifying, precise and persistent. As we will see, Leal’s proposed norms for good critical questioning are just the same as the norms prescribed by the skeptical stance.
See Cicero (Ac. 2.60) and Sextus Empiricus (PH I.8, I.10).
While this is what models of argument typically encourage, I flag it here, because the particular concern with the DSS is that it doesn’t entail, or even discourages, this kind of critical uptake.
I owe this very helpful characterization to an anonymous reviewer.
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Vollbrecht, L.A. Why We Need Skepticism in Argument: Skeptical Engagement as a Requirement for Epistemic Justice. Argumentation 36, 269–285 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-021-09565-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-021-09565-z