

Book Reviews

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Jiang, Tao, *Contexts and Dialogue: Yogācāra Buddhism and Modern Psychology on the Subliminal Mind*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006, xi + 198 pages.

Growing numbers of individuals representing a range of fields and viewpoints have attempted to bridge the gap between Buddhism and Western psychology. In his stimulating new work, *Contexts and Dialogue*, JIANG Tao acknowledges the tremendous value of these groundbreaking efforts, but he sees a persistent problem: thus far, to one degree or another, all such efforts have suffered from the shortcoming of reading Buddhism through the lens of modern psychology and hence, frequently reconcile the two in ways that use psychology as the norm. According to Jiang, this is particularly evident in those cases that interpret the Yogācāra Buddhist *ālayavijñāna* (store consciousness) as a form of Buddhist “unconscious.”

Jiang’s work attempts to rectify this problem and provide a bit of balance in the dialogue. To that end he asks, “What do the differences between *ālayavijñāna* and the unconscious tell us about the presuppositions of the modern psychological notion of the unconscious and the Yogācāra notion of the *ālayavijñāna*?” (13). In answering this question, Jiang does not seek to reconcile the two, or privilege one over the other, but rather to further clarify their respective views. He does this by carefully explaining them in their own contexts and then, from those contexts, brings them together so that they might set each other in greater relief. The result may be a bit startling for some, especially those who have tended to see in Buddhism certain views that mirror those of psychology. It is amply clear by the end of Jiang’s important work that there are deep differences here. In fact, the differences raise questions about whether these two views can ever be reconciled without fundamentally changing one or the other.

Jiang divides the book into five chapters. He begins with the history of the *ālayavijñāna* theory and sets his discussion of that historical development within the framework of a set of metaphysical questions driving Buddhist thought. As Jiang details it, the key lies in a tension that exists between Abhidharma Buddhist views of no self and momentariness. As soon as the radical momentariness of the various early Abhidharma thinkers naturally emerged from considerations of the no-self doctrine, they faced the difficulty of explaining continuity without reintroducing some sort of an enduring and/or essentially existent self nature. Jiang refers to this as the “problematic of continuity” and as he shows, this problem eventually led to the Yogācāra School’s *ālayavijñāna* concept. Jiang’s summary of these issues in light of key questions provides a perspective from which the various viewpoints flow quite naturally one to another. Readers unfamiliar with this material should find the explanation clear and straightforward.

Following this summary of the history of the *ālayavijñāna*, Jiang’s second chapter then moves into a specific consideration of this concept in Xuanzang’s 玄藏 *Treatise on the*

Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only (Cheng Weishi Lun 成唯識論). There has been little work to date in English on this important topic and Jiang's presentation is a welcome addition to those efforts. Here Jiang details the ways in which Xuanzang first seeks to establish the primacy of consciousness through an analysis of subject and object as two (falsely) differentiated aspects of the same cognitive event. Of course, this begs questions about the ontological status of the apparent object, as well as the awareness of such objects, and Jiang clearly explains Xuanzang's views on these matters. Following this, Jiang presents Xuanzang's arguments for the continuity of consciousness as momentary phenomena with structural coherence. A key to this effort by Xuanzang is the functioning of the *ālayavijñāna's bīja* (seeds) as a necessity for the perception of both change and structural continuity. In the end then, according to Jiang, Xuanzang's view finds a way to explain continuity (both objective and subjective) without sacrificing momentariness or the key Buddhist doctrine of no self.

The third chapter leaves Buddhism to focus on Freud's and Jung's notions of the unconscious. Jiang devotes relatively less space to their views than to the *ālayavijñāna* above. The decision to be brief here is driven by the probably accurate assumption that most readers of this work will already know more about Freud and Jung than about Xuanzang and the *ālayavijñāna*. Fair enough. However, for those of us who are coming at this with more knowledge of Buddhist views than of Freud's or Jung's, an expanded explanation equivalent to his discussion of the *ālayavijñāna* would be much appreciated. That said, the information is clearly presented and tightly focused on points that are essential to Jiang's later analysis.

The fourth and fifth chapters bring the three theories together and compare them on their own terms in light of several key areas. The fourth chapter compares their views of individuality and collectivity, of their "operative presuppositions," and their objectives. Here Jiang concludes that the three paradigms are "radically" different and, accordingly, "that Xuanzang's *ālayavijñāna* is neither Freud's unconscious nor Jung's unconscious" (126). The fifth chapter continues the comparison by focusing on the status of the subliminal mind as "transcendent" and/or "immanent." Jiang clearly defines his terms here and uses them both in ways that are consistent with the stipulations. Of particular interest is his stipulation of "transcendence" to mean that the subliminal mind "lies outside the boundary of consciousness." The discussion that follows points out the ways in which Freud's notion of the unconscious has both transcendent and immanent aspects, Jung's unconscious is transcendent, and how both are not directly accessible to the individual. In contrast, Jiang concludes that Xuanzang's *ālayavijñāna* is immanent and therefore accessing it does not require the services of a trained outsider in the same fashion as Freud's and Jung's unconscious.

In the end, Jiang's analysis leaves us with contrasts that are sharply drawn. Those contrasts reveal the shortcomings of considering the *ālayavijñāna* a Buddhist form of modern psychology's unconscious. Given there is widespread and growing interest focused on finding ways to combine these views, Jiang's conclusions may be a bit startling for some. Though it exceeds the scope of his goals, it is impossible to read this study without wondering whether these views can be combined in any fashion without violating fundamental principles of one or the other. This is a matter of both metaphysics and method for, as Jiang points out, one gets a different sort of help from a traditional Buddhist teacher than one gets from a psychoanalyst, and needs that help for very different reasons and to different ends. This point may be questionable for many who are attempting to fuse these two as a form of practice—whether primarily Western psychotherapy or Buddhist, but I suspect it will be less so for those coming from a

traditional Buddhist side than the various other possible approaches. The reasons are complex but we might note, as Jiang does, that Buddhist schools historically do not advocate any practice that seeks to establish a healthy sense of self as a condition for enlightenment. Any effort to strengthen that sense of self would, from that view, be an effort that deepens suffering. From the other perspective, failure to establish a healthy and balanced self, or at least sense of self, is itself the source of various forms of psychological disorder. While it was not one of Jiang's goals to call into question the various attempts by certain practitioners to somehow marry psychotherapy and Buddhism, it does seem to be a nonetheless interesting consequence.

For precisely these reasons, Jiang's stimulating work will appeal to a wide audience. He has succeeded in balancing the needs of various readers along with methodological issues and in so doing stayed focused on his primary goals. Overall, the work is a great success, points to new possibilities for dialogue between these viewpoints specifically, and attempts at cross-cultural study more generally.

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Liu, Xiaogan 劉笑敢, *The Laozi from the Ancient to the Modern* 老子古今. Beijing 北京: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, two volumes, 2006, (21+) 1544 pages.

In his *The Laozi from the Ancient to the Modern*, LIU Xiaogan provides an invaluable resource for interpreting the *Dao De Jing*. The core of the book is a detailed comparison of five versions of the *Dao De Jing*: the Guodian bamboo strips, the Mawangdui silk manuscripts, the FU Yi 傅奕 text from the Daoist Canon, and the texts from WANG Bi 王弼 and HESHANG Gong 河上公. Each chapter begins with a side-by-side presentation of these editions, followed by a detailed discussion of their variations, often drawing in other sources like the commentaries of YAN Zun 嚴遵 and XIANG Er 想爾. These comparisons are directed toward two goals. One is to reconstruct the earliest version of the text, which includes numerous helpful discussions of how to read and interpret the Guodian manuscripts. The other goal is to examine and explain the gradual evolution of the text across time. Each chapter is followed by a series of short interpretative essays. Volume two is primarily a reference source. It includes another side-by-side printing of the various editions and separately includes three versions of the Guodian and Mawangdui texts, in their unreconstructed and reconstructed forms and in their original order and the order and chapter divisions of the received text. The bulk of volume two consists of a concordance listing all the terms appearing in any of the five editions. Taken together, these materials provide a tremendously valuable and convenient resource.

Much of the first volume consists of Liu's own commentary on the text, partly through a long introduction and partly through the short essays that follow each chapter. Those essays are listed separately in the table of contents, making it fairly easy to read them according to one's own interests. They cover almost all aspects of the *Dao De Jing*, from detailed stylistic comparisons with the *Shi Jing* 詩經 (*The Book of Poetry*) to careful analysis of particular terms to broader interpretations of the text and its relevance today. Many of these essays situate the *Dao De Jing* in relation to other texts or philosophers; in general, Liu emphasizes its continuities with Confucianism while arguing that its alignment with Legalist and Huang-Lao thought has been exaggerated. The rich and varied content of these commentaries far exceeds what can be discussed in a short review. I will discuss just a few points.

Much of the commentary focuses on hermeneutic issues in interpreting classical Chinese texts. Liu brilliantly uses the comparison of editions across time to distill certain principles by which the text has developed, examining common patterns of linguistic change, in particular, tendencies to make the text more regular by strengthening parallelism, and patterns of conceptual change, such as tendencies to strengthen the position of key terms like non-action *wuwei* 無為, *dao*, and sagely people (*shengren* 聖人). Liu calls the latter process “conceptual concentration.” An awareness of how the text evolved allows us to better guess the original nature of the text, and it is striking that some of the principles Liu finds run counter to common hermeneutic practices. For example, breaks in parallelism have often been taken to represent corruptions of the original text. Liu shows that such an approach is exactly wrong—the earlier the text, the less regular it is. Another striking thing about Liu’s analysis is that from the Guodian texts through the WANG Bi and HESHANG Gong editions, the vast majority of passages receive little significant changes in meaning, while varying considerably in their specific wording. That is a positive sign for the reliability of the received versions of other texts.

Another significant discussion of hermeneutical issues centers on the use of concepts from European philosophy to interpret classical Chinese texts. Liu’s position is fairly moderate—he concedes that attempts to make Chinese thought relevant now must make connections with European philosophy and he himself includes several such discussions. The main target of his criticism is a narrow form of what he calls a method of “reverse analogical interpretation.” He begins with a discussion of “analogical interpretation” (*ge yi* 格義), the method by which Indian Buddhist thought was interpreted and translated through more familiar, indigenous Chinese concepts. Liu nicely shows both the temporary necessity and the ultimate limits of such an approach. “Reverse analogical interpretation” (*fan xiang ge yi* 反向格義), in contrast, attempts to understand the more familiar texts of one’s own tradition through less familiar, foreign concepts, in this case, those of European philosophy. Liu argues that “reverse analogy” has been the dominant approach used by Chinese philosophers since HU Shi 胡適. He brings out the problems inherent to such an approach through the examination of two case studies, the attempts of Chinese scholars to determine whether or not the *Dao De Jing* represents materialism or idealism and the attempts to determine whether *dao* is a fact or a value. He takes as an analogy the fact that in English there is only the word “uncle” for what the Chinese distinguish with several names, claiming that this difference exists because, in the context in which English developed, there was no need for such distinctions, not because they somehow confused the differences between father’s older (*bo fu* 伯父) and younger (*shu fu* 叔父) brothers. Applying this to the *Dao De Jing*, he writes, “In the same way, Laozi does not clearly designate whether or not his *dao* is material or immaterial, fact or value, because he did not think of this kind of need, not because he created an illogical concept or because he confuses the dichotomous concepts of Western philosophy” (83). Liu makes a persuasive argument that the narrow use of European terms both makes the original texts more difficult to understand and obscures the internal coherence and plausibility of those texts. His focus is on understanding the *Dao De Jing* in its own terms, and he does not clearly address whether or not different philosophical traditions are incommensurable and thus does not ultimately address the validity of using concepts from one tradition to evaluate those of another. His position seems to be that such comparative issues could only be adequately and fairly addressed once one has developed a philosophy out of the *Dao De Jing* itself.

Liu’s overall interpretation centers on *ziran* 自然 (spontaneity or naturalness), which he takes as the highest value in the *Dao De Jing*. *Dao* is valued because it most fully embodies *ziran* and *wuwei* (non-action) is valued because it is the means for achieving a state of

ziran. In contrast to *wuwei*, Liu takes *ziran* not simply as a way of acting or way or happening but also as referring to the balanced and harmonious conditions that arise through that way of happening or, as he puts it, conditions of “natural harmony and natural order” (*ziran de hexie he zhixu* 自然的和諧和秩序) (56). He argues forcefully and decisively against imposing a European distinction between the natural and the human onto the *Dao De Jing*, using the term “humanistic naturalness” (*renwen ziran* 人文自然) instead of simply *ziran* as a way of emphasizing this point. This “humanistic naturalness” manifests itself on three levels: in the world as a whole (*zongti* 總體) (based on chapter 25 of *Dao De Jing* on “dao models *ziran*”), in particular communities and political bodies (*qunti* 群體) (based on chapter 17 on “I am *ziran*”), and in individual things (*geti* 個體) (based on chapter 64 on “aid the *ziran* of the ten thousand things”). Of this third level, Liu says, “Thus, Laozi’s *ziran* as a value and principle includes respect, concern, and care for all particular things” (55). Insofar as *ziran* extends through the social world, it is a more inclusive concept than “nature,” but Liu argues that in another sense *ziran* is less inclusive. *Ziran* describes a way of happening that is gradual, harmonious, and non-violent; some events in the natural world, such as earthquakes, do not fit these criteria, and Liu claims that they cannot be considered *ziran*. This interpretation makes sense of a number of aspects of the text, but it also leaves an unaddressed gap in the *Dao De Jing*’s account of the world: if *ziran* accounts for only some natural changes, how do we account for the rest of nature? Overall, Liu’s interpretation succeeds in revealing the *Dao De Jing* as fundamentally an ethical and political text, one which does not simply or absolutely oppose culture or government or ethics. Integral to this interpretation is an emphasis on the active dimensions of sagely people, showing that *wuwei* does not mean doing nothing while simply letting nature take its course. All of these factors help bring out the contemporary relevance of the text.

As one reads through this book, the significance of “today” in the title becomes clear. This book is clearly meant to position the *Dao De Jing* as a viable and valuable resource in current attempts to construct a Chinese value system with which to address the contemporary world. Such attempts have been almost entirely dominated by Confucianism. It struck me that, having read numerous papers on “Confucianism and democracy,” I had never even thought about “the *Dao De Jing* and democracy,” in spite of the fact that whatever proto-democratic spirit one finds in early Confucian texts—such as Mengzi’s insistence on the genuine support of the people or the claim that *tian* 天 sees and hears as the people see and hear—all appear more clearly in the *Dao De Jing*. Liu particularly emphasizes two aspects of the *Dao De Jing* in this context—letting things freely develop and tolerance for differences. His discussion of the latter is particularly interesting, perhaps most clearly formulated around the contrast between the *Dao De Jing*’s “repay resentment with virtue [*de* 德]” (chapter 63) and the *Lun Yu*’s 論語 “repay resentment with straightness and repay virtue with virtue” (603–606). Liu explains that although the *Dao De Jing* maintains ethical principles, it values harmony and non-coercion more highly than the strict enforcement of those principles, which in turn requires tolerance for disagreement, even for those labeled as bad. I found these points excellent and thought-provoking. At the same time, Liu does not evaluate the deeper assumption behind the *Dao De Jing*’s position, which is that freedom and tolerance will naturally produce harmony rather than conflict, an assumption that most Confucians would probably reject. In any case, Liu’s analysis shows that the *Dao De Jing* should be taken seriously as an ethical/social philosophy, at the very least as a corrective to Confucian approaches to politics.

Doing the history of philosophy well demands too much of any single person, as it requires the patience and attention to detail of a historian and philologist and the

philosophical skills needed to reconstruct a coherent system of thought and apply that to broader philosophical questions. Liu is one of those rare people up to the task. This book can be seen, though, as more than an excellent work in the history of philosophy. Given the vicissitudes of China's twentieth century and the legacy of European imperialism, it is difficult now to say what it would mean to do *Chinese* philosophy in the contemporary world, in the sense that we speak of doing *European* or *Anglo-American* philosophy. Such a task would surely be more than careful studies of the thought of the *Mengzi* 孟子 or the *Zhuangzi* 莊子, and it would surely be different from doing contemporary analytic philosophy or Heideggerian phenomenology while using bits and pieces from Chinese texts. In so far as Liu builds his problems and concepts out of the *Dao De Jing* itself and then applies them more broadly to contemporary concerns, *The Laozi from the Ancient to the Modern* is fine example of just doing Chinese philosophy.

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Meng, Peiyuan 蒙培元, *Humans and Nature: The Ecological Dimensions of Chinese Philosophy* 人與自然：中國生態哲學. Beijing 北京: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 2004, 440 pages.

The book *Humans and Nature: The Ecological Dimensions of Chinese Philosophy* inquires into the question of humans' relation to nature within the traditional framework of Chinese philosophy in light of ecological considerations. Quite obviously, the book is written as a direct response to the urgency of the current environmental challenge, as well as to the increasing interest in the ancient Eastern traditions as China and the Western world search for possible inspirations and answers for the plethora of questions concerning the ontological reconstruction of humans' relation to nature. Despite the fact that concepts like "ecology" and "ecological studies," as Meng has pointed out in the preface of the book, are derived from the discourse emerging from the environmental crisis of Western modernity, the "environmental consciousness" in a broader sense has always been present throughout the human history. The analytic methodology that the author employs in his project is to identify ecological arguments and the related issues first and then "trace those issues back to the primordial point" (*yuandian* 原點) of Chinese philosophy (2), as he puts it. In doing so, the author attempts to "uncover" the ecological dimensions of Chinese philosophy and connect Chinese thought to contemporary philosophical discourse.

The main body of the book is divided into five parts. In Part One, the author identifies several issues that have been under debate in the past decade, such as the Confucian conception of unity of heaven and human beings, human rationality with regard to instrumentalism and purposiveness, humanism and anthropocentrism, and the spiritual aspects of Confucianism. Most of these issues are further discussed in the following parts of the book. In Part Two, the author focuses his concern on the ecological implications of Classical Confucianism which includes Kongzi 孔子, the *Yizhuan* 易傳, the *Zhongyong* 中庸, Mengzi 孟子, and Xunzi 荀子. The author presents a vision of life and ethical teachings *à la* the early Confucian tradition based upon the close relationship between humans and nature. In Part Three, the author turns to Daoism, pointing out that the Daoist vision of a cosmic oneness implied in the notion of the Dao has a direct connection to ecological questions. The discussion includes two key figures in Daoist philosophy, Laozi 老子 and Zhuangzi 莊子, as well as two key figures in Neo-Daoist philosophy (i.e., the *Xuanxue* 玄學), WANG Bi 王弼 and GUO Xiang 郭象. In Part Four, the author goes back to Confucianism but concentrates

on the Song-Ming period, known as Neo-Confucianism, which includes four important thinkers of the period, i.e., ZHANG Zai 張載, CHENG Hao 程顥, ZHU Xi 朱熹, and WANG Yangming 王陽明. This is the part where the author explores the onto-cosmological structure provided by Neo-Confucianism, and explains how this onto-cosmic totality opens up to various questions concerning ecological ethics. In Part Five, the author introduces two contemporary New Confucian thinkers, XIONG Shili 熊十力 and FENG Youlan (FUNG Yulan) 馮友蘭, contending that the ecologically related questions are further expanded in the modern era by incorporating the Western philosophical system into traditional Chinese thought. The book also contains a short preface and two short supplemental articles.

Rather than treating nature as the raw material of culture and technology as one sees in modern Western metaphysics, the ancient Chinese tradition (both Confucianism and Daoism) regards nature as an organic “living thing” that has a value of its own. “The primordial point” as such, says Meng, points to a fundamental and coherent argument throughout the tradition of Chinese philosophy. This argument, according to Meng’s interpretation, is the one about life or the life-world (4–6, 408–409) that in turn, makes its central theme the study of the “meeting point between heaven and humans” (*tianrenzhiji* 天人之際). Hence, Chinese philosophy should be seen as a form of “life philosophy” (*shengming zhexue* 生命哲學) in the sense that its major philosophical concern is on human nature and its intrinsic relationship to the life force of cosmic nature, implied by the Confucian conception of life (*sheng* 生). The term “life” here entails threefold meaning: (1) it is a life principle that points to a dynamic creation, growth, and transformation (in contrast to the ontological conception of “being” in Western philosophy); (2) it emphasizes the idea that the natural world has an intrinsic value and purpose of its own as suggested by such concepts as “the Dao of the heaven” (*tiandao* 天道) and “the virtue of the heaven” (*tiande* 天德); (3) the life principle constitutes a moral awareness (including its ecological implications) that considers the meaning of human life in terms of an all inclusive and harmonious coexistence between humans and nature (4–5). To follow this line of thinking, the author focuses his discussion on the Confucian cosmological triad of heaven, earth, and humans (*sancai* 三才), expressed in Confucianism in general and in the *Yizhuan* in particular, contending that the Confucian notion of life force as “production” or “growth” should be understood both onto-cosmologically and (eco)-ethically. In other words, the psycho-physical interconnectedness (e.g., the vital force, *qi* 氣) between humans and nature is also an eco-ethical interconnectedness between the internal value of humans and the external value of heaven. For instance, Confucius’ and Mencius’ recognition of the connection of humans to heaven/earth makes their arguments on love and benevolence (*ren* 仁) possible in that it is through his/her interrelatedness with others (i.e., other human beings as well as other things in nature) that a human being actualizes his/her potential virtue and thus achieves the all-embracing humanity endowed by the life force of heaven–earth. The relationship of humans to nature is also suggested by the Confucian concept of harmony (*he* 和) that emphasizes not only a harmonious relationship among human beings but also one between human beings and the natural world. To illustrate this point, Meng offers specific examples from Classical Confucianism, such as Kongzi’s insistence on simplicity in terms of one’s choice of life-style, Mengzi’s argument on the importance of protection of environment, and Xunzi’s theory on the necessity of preservation of resources.

Whenever we speak of the relationship between humans and nature in the Chinese tradition, the first thing that comes into our minds is the Confucian conception of the “unity of heaven and humans” (*tianren heyi* 天人合一), which is perhaps one of the most frequently cited yet most controversial phrases in Confucianism. It remains a question as how the

concept should be (or, could be) understood within the matrix of Confucian cosmology, morality, and spirituality. Meng tries to reconceptualize the cosmological triad of heaven (*tian* 天), earth (*di* 地), and humans (*ren* 人) as indicated in the *Yizhuan*, a Confucian rendering of the *Yijing* 易经, and then offer a more systematic explanation of this idea in the fourth part of the book when he turns to the onto-cosmic principle of the Neo-Confucian tradition, particularly the concept of “unity” or “oneness” postulated by ZHANG Zai, CHENG Hao, and ZHU Xi. In Neo-Confucian vocabulary, the way of heaven (*tiandao*), principle (*li* 理), the heavenly principle (*tianli* 天理), the supreme ultimate (*taiji* 太極), and nature (*ziran* 自然) basically entail a similar meaning in that they represent “great virtue” (*dade* 大德, a term introduced by the *Yizhuan*) of humanity. For Neo-Confucians, the unity of heaven and humans is both an onto-cosmological argument and an existential/ethical experience since the “fusion” indicated by “unity” has blurred the differentiations between the mind and body, theory and practice, subject and object. This “unity” as inter-subjectivity can only be actualized, according to Meng, when one has realized what ZHANG Zai calls a “big heart–mind” (*daxin* 大心) that enables one to transcend the limit of ego–self (*wo* 我) and cognitive knowing (*zhi* 知) to experience (corresponsively) and love (wholeheartedly) all things in the natural world (278–284).

However, has the Confucian, especially the Neo-Confucian, vision of unity moralized the life-enabling and life-accomplishing principle of the cosmic nature by speaking of the “fusion” of two virtues? Meng’s answer to this question is no. By employing ZHANG Zai’s distinction between nature and human beings in terms of “will” (*yi* 意), “mind” (*xin* 心), and emotion (*qing* 情), Meng argues that although the natural state of heaven and earth possesses no such human qualities as “will,” “mind,” and “emotion,” it has its own intrinsic virtue characterized by its life force via creativity and productivity, which in turn underlines the moral principles of humanity. The separation (*fen* 分) of heaven and human, in Meng’s view, makes the ultimate unity (*he* 合) possible (272–277). Here, it seems that Meng attempts to avoid two theoretical tendencies: (1) an anthropocentric interpretation of nature with which one denies that nature has values of its own (i.e., mechanic vs. organismic); and (2) a naturalistic interpretation of nature with which one downplays the role of the human mind (*renxin* 人心), or what Meng calls human “subjectivity” (*zhutixing* 主體性), a term the author has borrowed from Western philosophy (274). The argument leads to a question which is more important for the author as well as readers: Can the Confucian notion of “unity” be treated as a philosophic argument for environmental thinking? Meng’s answer is yes, but his argument is not quite convincing, since he emphasizes the moral aspect of the heaven in terms of heavenly virtue but fails to elucidate how the argument on heavenly virtue has been transformed into a detailed argument for protecting the earth.

With regard to Daoism, Meng’s presentation is wide-ranging, covering various topics in Daoist philosophy from Laozi’s primordial state of naturalness to Zhuangzi’s cosmic oneness, from WANG Bi’s concept of corresponsiveness to GUO Xiang’s idea of letting things go their own way. Meng’s discussion is interesting insofar as he shows how the Daoist promotion of the natural forces as a primordial nonhuman condition is open to an alternative way to look at the totality of the cosmic life, yet does not necessarily lead to a form of naturalistic determinism (192–197). One of the issues here is Laozi’s concept of *ziran* 自然, a key term in understanding Laozi’s philosophical position. Meng renders *ziran* as a “cosmic natural world” (*yuzhou ziranjie* 宇宙自然界) (199), of which both human beings and other living things are parts. On other occasions, Meng interprets *ziran* as the “natural” processing and functioning aspect of the Dao (193), which is closely associated with the Daoist idea of non-coercive or non-dominating action (*wuwei* 無為). Meng then points out that Laozi’s naturalistic philosophy is different from that in the West because the

latter is characterized by either mechanic determinism or pragmatic utilitarianism. Laozi's Daoism, on the other hand, demonstrates a contrarian view in that it refuses to reduce the "cosmic natural world" to something that is purposive, pragmatic, or utilitarian to human beings (195). *Ziran* as such means being natural, spontaneous, self-so-ing, and self-unfolding. This notion of naturalness and spontaneity is further explicated by Zhunagzi's idea of "equalization of things" (*qiwu* 齊物) and "wandering along with the spirit of heaven and earth" (*yu tiandi jingshen wanglai* 天地精神往來). It is in this sense that Meng contends that the Daoist concept of *ziran* constitutes ecological sensibilities. Other examples that are directly associated with environmental issues in a modern sense include Laozi's argument of simplicity, upon which the Daoist calls for a communal and less-resource-consumptive way of life, and Zhuangzi's attitude toward animals and other non-human living things that raises the question whether a non-human life has a value of its own. Daoism, particularly Zhunagzi, advocates a kind of inter-subjectivity (i.e., the cosmic totality of self and other) that entails the idea of inter-involvement via an on-going process of inter-exchanges, inter-plays, and inter-transformations in a cosmic world.

In general, Meng's philosophical inquiry of environmental issues is significant in that it tests the possibility of constructing a meaningful discourse that brings in a dialogue between the philosophic-religious tradition of China and contemporary environmental ethics. The book is particularly important given that the study of environmental and ecological ethics is relatively weak in the arena of Chinese ethics, and there is a significant lack of moral and practical responsiveness to the environmental crisis in China today. Nevertheless, in the way the overall presentation is covered and treated, the book leaves one unsatisfied and wanting more. The book is entitled *The Ecological Dimensions of Chinese Philosophy*, but it might fit the description better if a subtitle "A Confucian Perspective" were added. Buddhist views are not covered, even though Buddhist philosophy has a lot to offer in terms of an interdependence of all things in nature. Perhaps the author does not consider Buddhist philosophy an indigenous part of the Chinese tradition. However, one could at least bring in Chan Buddhism. In the section on WANG Yangming's argument on parallelism between humans and the life system of grasses and trees from the perspective of innate knowledge (*liangzhi* 良知) (350–357), the author could connect Wang's idea to the Chan concept of all sentient beings in the environing lifeworld, as a trans-human ethics is exactly the position maintained by Chan Buddhism.

The chapter on Daoism is relatively weak, as the author touches upon certain important issues but fails to treat them with more sophisticated explications. Another flaw is that very often the author appropriates the Daoist philosophy from a Confucian perspective. For instance, Meng identifies Laozi's "mystical virtue" (*xuande* 玄德) with the Confucian concept of heavenly virtue (*tiande* 天德), implying that there is no fundamental difference between the two traditions. In his discussion of Zhuangzi's argument on "what is heaven is within, and what is human is without," Meng makes the statement that Zhuangzi tries to dissolve the within/without dichotomy and thus fails to realize that Zhuangzi's statement is a direct critique of the hierarchy of beings in Confucian anthropocentrism (228–229). Meng's claims that Zhuangzi's Daoism "internalizes" and "humanizes" nature (248) and that Zhuangzi's description of "bird flying in the sky and fish swimming in the water" represents a Confucian notion of freedom (136) show the author's eagerness to seek a coherent and unified whole within the Chinese tradition. Meng's rejection of the dichotomous view on Ru and Dao is understandable, yet it is still problematic to say that the Confucian concept of *renyi* 仁義 and the Daoist concept of *ziran* 自然 are more or less the same thing, and that both of them come from the same source and indicate the same philosophical idea, i.e., the idea of unity of heaven and human beings (202–203).

In recent years, more and more scholars have engaged in the dialogue between traditional Chinese thought and contemporary discourse on environmental issues. One of the best examples is the Harvard University series on Chinese philosophy/religion and ecology (i.e., *Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth and Humans* edited by Mary E. Tucker and John Bertherong, and *Daoism and Ecology: Ways within a Cosmic Landscape*, edited by N. J. Giradot and LIU Xiaogan). Unfortunately, Meng does not address any of those studies, even though these writings were published a few years ahead of his book. In fact, the author seldom mentions any other scholars who have done similar research. When he disagrees with someone on something, he always phrases it as, “some people said so and so” without mentioning the specific names and works. It would be helpful to the reader should he offer more detailed information, at least in footnotes.

Another thing I would like to add is that there is a difference between “ecologically-attuned philosophy” and “ecological philosophy.” The fact that Chinese philosophy has a lot to say on the issue of ecology does not make it ecological philosophy. Meng attempts to “greenize” the Chinese tradition by claiming that Chinese philosophy is a form of ecological philosophy, and that Confucianism is a form of “nature religion” (*ziran zongjiao* 自然宗教), which addresses ecological issues (85–90). These claims, however, are suspicious, for ecological philosophy or environmental philosophy as a special technical (scientific) discipline and a form of discourse arises as a reaction to the problem of modernity. What the author calls “the environmental consciousness” in Chinese philosophy is a product of a pre-modern agrarian society, based upon an intuitive understanding (ethically and aesthetically) of humans’ interconnectedness to nature. The idea of interconnectedness itself does not lead directly to the solution of the problems of modern society except inasmuch as it may challenge various viewpoints linked to modernity as well as the whole process of modernization. Because of these limitations, we have not seen the kind of large scale humanitarian and heroic intervention to real environmental problems in China today. There is no question that a Chinese should turn to his or her own tradition, reconstructing and developing a Confucian, Daoist, or Buddhist environmental ethics, but the reconstruction can only be done when one has acknowledged the potentials and limits of the tradition.

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Moeller, Hans-Georg, *The Philosophy of the Daodejing*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, xii + 168 pages.

It is difficult to underestimate the influence or exaggerate the appeal of the *Daodejing*. Moeller’s book offers a creative and revealing interpretation of this classic that seeks to describe its distinctive message and explore its importance for contemporary philosophy. A primary virtue of this volume is the author’s willingness to take a stand on the text and say what he thinks it means. It is clear that he has thought deeply about what to say. In some cases, I disagree with Moeller’s reading, but there are several points about which we agree and quite a few that I found new and insightful.

The book consists of a very short introduction, ten chapters, and two short appendices. Each chapter focuses upon some philosophical theme that Moeller finds central to the *Daodejing*. The first appendix offers some notes on the history of the text, and the second comments on several English language translations. I will offer brief sketches and comments on each of the chapters.

Moeller begins by arguing that since the *Daodejing* “does not have an identifiable author,” “is not...written to be read in a specific sequence,” and “has no obvious point” (3), we should read it as a hypertext, the kind of work that comes into being on the internet, as a result of various, anonymous contributions. Such texts are loosely organized around common issues that provide “links” between parts of the text but often lack an overall, organizing theme. Moeller offers splendid expositions of some of the central metaphors of the *Daodejing*. For example, his discussion of the image of the “root” (18) is particularly lucid and penetrating. However, his suggestion to read the text as a hypertext warrants further consideration. He is right that the text is anonymous, but he overstates the degree to which it lacks authorial voice. He claims that when we do find an authorial first person, it “is not the ego of an individual who speaks to us” (3). However, chapter 20, cited by Moeller (68), offers a decisive counterexample to this claim, which he repeats elsewhere (137). There is also the worry that his proposed erasure of the author imposes a modern Western set of concerns on this ancient Chinese text. Chinese scholars have always read the text as having an author. Those devoted to it created a personality to go with the voice they heard. Moreover, while I agree that readers should not look for sustained and developed arguments, it seems mistaken to say the text lacks any organizing ideas. It is the *jing* 經 “classic” of the *dao* 道 “Way” and *de* 德 “Virtue” (in whatever order we find the text and even before it had this as its name). The latter two concepts are its central themes.

In chapter 2, Moeller does an excellent job showing that, like several of the other themes it discusses, the text explores sexuality as a natural phenomenon; it is not focused upon human sexuality much less an erotic conception of sex. His fundamental point is well illustrated in the contrast he draws between Eryximachos, whom Moeller describes as defending a “pre-Socratic” view, and Plato’s Socrates. For both Eryximachos and Laozi, sexuality is seen as a feature of nature and its function is not anthropomorphized and charged with moral value. In contrast, “For Socrates, Eros and sexuality are set apart” (32). The highest expression of the former not only transcends nonhuman sexuality, it has very little to do with the physical aspects of human love as well.

In the following chapter, Moeller presents brief accounts of five central concepts in early Chinese philosophy: *yin* 陰, *yang* 陽, *qi* 氣, *dao*, and *de*. He has interesting things to say about each of these, but I am not convinced by some aspects of his interpretation. For example, he translates *de* as “efficacy.” However, as Moeller notes (42), in a number of contexts *de* means something more like “charisma” and in general connotes the characteristic power or *virtus* of a person or thing. His translation replaces an inner disposition with one of its qualities. Moreover, it requires that he read the title of the work not as “the classic of *dao* and *de*” but as “the classic of *dao* and its *de*.” Such a reading contradicts his earlier claim that the text “has no obvious point,” for it says the text is all about the Dao. The concept of *de* has been discussed in a number of important articles, but here, as in most cases, Moeller does not engage or point readers toward seminal secondary literature.

Moeller begins chapter 4 with the signature theme of his interpretation: “The *Laozi* is certainly not a humanist text” (55). He is right if we mean that it is not anthropocentric in its metaphysics or ethics. I am less sure about his claim that for Laozi, “there is nothing special about human beings.” It is true that humans are not singled out as privileged in the Dao, but they are singled out as the unique source of corruption, suffering, and disorder. Humans *are* special, just not especially good. This is important both for Moeller’s discussion of what the text meant and for its contemporary significance. He does a fine job highlighting the “negative” dimension of Laozi’s philosophical program. Roughly, this is to work against the human propensity toward self-aggrandizement and the proliferation of desire. These

attitudes, which only humans display, are the greatest threat to the inherent harmony of the Dao. However, there is a more positive side to Laozi's philosophy, which Moeller does not bring out; it is found in the invitation to join in the harmony and grandeur of the Dao. Abandoning human arrogance and losing a strong sense of a discrete self as the locus of all that is important in the world, opens up the possibility of embracing the Dao and gaining an enlarged sense of the self. Toward the end of this chapter, Moeller offers insightful comments about the "challenge to include...nonhuman interests in...political theory" (73). However, as I believe Moeller understands, the *Daodejing* is not just seeking *inclusion* but a radical, Nature or Dao-centered view. Within this view there is an unfamiliar yet attractive picture of human beings as members of a larger, flourishing, universal community; this picture has important implications for cultivating and engendering a profound sense of concern for the natural world.

Chapter 5, "On War," contains a number of interesting insights and shows the connection between Laozi's treatment of war and his political philosophy. As Moeller notes, one of the primary aims of the sage ruler is "the prevention of war" (76), and he works to achieve this end by a dramatic reduction in his own and other people's desires. Here again the text bases its view on a picture of human nature as prone to excess and harmful embellishment and a belief that such tendencies are the cause of the greatest strife and unhappiness. Excessive desire leads to contention, and nothing more directly or dramatically upsets the harmony of the Dao. Moeller describes the process of paring away excessive desires as "dehumanization" (76), but de-socialization seems more accurate. Laozi claims that authentic human desires—those we have by nature and which enable us to live in harmony with Nature—are really few in number and low in intensity. Our true nature is to be—as Zhuangzi says—"a thing among things." Moeller notes that the text claims "self-restraint in the ruler causes a self-restraint in society" (77). This is correct, but one wants to know *how* this is achieved. The Daoist concept of *de* 德 "Virtue"—discussed above—provides the answer. The sage's charisma puts people at ease and moves them to lessen their desires and turn back toward a simpler, natural life. Moeller makes a number of insightful comments about Laozi's distinctive conception of war, but I am not sure why he claims that Laozi provides "no 'good reason' to go to war" (84) and does not condemn war based upon "compassion or commiseration for human individuals" (86). Moeller himself shows that, reluctantly, the sage will go to war in order to return the world to peace. In fact, the text has clear views about *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello*, and even *jus post bellum*. While Moeller is correct that Laozi does not explore the psychology of combatants, he makes penetrating observations about the horror of war, focusing on the non-combatants, who always are swept up into it.

In chapter 6, Moeller describes Daoist sages as "masters of satisfaction." Building on earlier insights about how excessive desire is the cause of war, social unrest, and general misery, he argues that the sage excels in finding satisfaction in a quite modest set of desires. At one point, Moeller describes this view as "a paradoxical hedonism" (94). This feature of his analysis strikes me as problematic. Laozi does not aim at optimizing the satisfaction of desires in order to yield the best result for an individual (egoism) or the greatest number of sentient beings (utilitarianism). It is a bit misleading to translate *zhi zu* 知足 as "masters of *satisfaction*" (92). One can satisfy a desire without being content; the latter only comes when one realizes some life ideal, and for the Daoist this accords with the Dao. For the same reasons, it seems wrong to describe the goal of Daoists as "optimizing pleasure" (93). Unfortunately, Moeller's approach leads him to say some unusual things about the Daoist attitude toward desire. For example, "one eats in order to not desire to eat anymore" (92). However, a Daoist aims at according with the Dao not simply the cessation of desire. She

eats because she is hungry, stops when she is full, and rests content in the Dao. What she has eliminated is the human tendency toward gluttony and unending refinement of cuisine. Moeller also compares the Daoist view with that of Confucians, which often is helpful, but one should not describe Confucians as “behaviorists” (89). No Confucian believed that “in behaving a certain way one would have the corresponding feelings” (89). Many did believe that practicing certain behaviors helped to shape dispositions, but this was only part of what was needed. They worried about people who only *acted* properly instead of *acting out of* proper dispositions.

In chapter 7, Moeller argues that Laozi is “in Nietzschean terms, beyond good and evil” (106). He explains this by saying that the “sage does not take sides in moral quarrels.... [H]e does not ultimately know what is good or bad” (106). Moeller is right to say that the Daoist sage does not hold some *theory* of morality as a standard to judge what things are right or wrong, good or bad, but that does not mean that he lacks all sense of what is better and worse or that this sense does not guide his actions. There is an ethical standard in the *Daodejing*. That standard is the Dao or roughly a sense for what is natural. When we act according to our natures, we follow the Dao. A sage does so unselfconsciously, with little or no intervening deliberation or subsequent reflection. However, the Dao moves him to act in certain ways rather than others. I agree with Moeller that the Daoist sage, like his Confucian counterpart, would save the child about to fall into a well and that “this would not be done for ‘moral’ reasons” (109). Yet it does not follow that “the sage would do it *indifferently*” (109). Sages act spontaneously, not indifferently, and their actions describe the particular nature of the kind of creature that they are. Moeller is right to call such other—regarding concern a “*natural impulse*,” but his attempt to efface the distinctive nature of human beings is not supported by the text and is empirically implausible. He claims that “even a dog would react in such a way if its puppies were about to be harmed” (109). However, this is not analogous to Mengzi’s thought experiment about the child and the well. Mengzi is clear that the person saving the child is *not related* to the child and has *no motive* to save the child other than a general concern for others. This is not “beyond good and evil” but a spontaneous expression of the best aspects of human nature.

In chapter 8, Moeller offers a revealing comparative discussion of conceptions of the nature and significance of time. He shows with great clarity the importance of the Daoist conception of “permanence” and how different it is from classic Western conceptions of “eternity.” Daoist permanence describes the unending cyclical patterns and processes of the natural world. Daoists are concerned with things that disrupt or deform the spontaneous flow of nature and seek to facilitate its smooth and uninterrupted flow. Moeller contrasts this view with St. Augustine’s discussion of time in the *Confessions*. Augustine’s concept of eternity renders Daoist goals like “living out one’s years” insignificant. In fact, everything that occurs in Nature is at best a pale reflection of or a shadow obscuring the real, eternal Truth of God. Moeller sums up these contrasting views nicely when he notes that for the Daoist, “passing time is affirmed, and long (but not inappropriately long) duration is cherished” while, for Augustine, passing time is “a realm of ‘error’ and ‘dark clouds’” (119).

In the following chapter, Moeller offers his reflections on Laozi’s view of death and the use of the death penalty. In regard to the former, Moeller presents a convincing case for reading passages that emphasize longevity not as advocating immortality—an interpretation that figured prominently in later forms of Daoism—but as expressing the ideal of living out one’s years. On such a view, death is not to be avoided but embraced as part of a natural cycle; at the same time, one should seek to live out one’s natural span of years and avoid bringing upon oneself or others an early death through foolish or rash actions. Picking up themes raised in his prior chapter, Moeller offers a helpful comparative contrast: “Unlike in

Christianity, death is not overcome by eternal life, it is rather accepted in its natural equality with life” (125). Given the absence of any afterlife, the ideal of living out one’s years, and the prohibitions about early death, Moeller goes on to argue that Daoists regarded capital punishment with particular dread and that ideal rulers use it as an effective form of both “prevention and deterrence” (127). Such a ruler functions as a representative of the Dao and brings early death to the worst criminals in the same way that cirrhosis kills those who overindulge in alcohol or accidents strike down the reckless. The worst criminals are like a disease and the ruler is not so much “the cure” as the one who brings forth the natural response to such behavior. Moeller goes on to contrast this view with important strands of Western penal theory: the idea that capital punishment is the proper response to sin and a justified form of revenge. On these alternative views, criminal acts are highly personalized: the criminal sins and those he harms are justified in seeking revenge. Daoists take a more impersonal point of view, seeing capital punishment as simply a feature of a properly functioning cosmos. All of this seems right and important, though we should add that Laozi regards the need for any form of punishment as a cause for regret and as potentially dangerous for the executioner. The ideal is to let the Dao do the killing; even the sage is reluctant to act in the role of Heaven, the “Chief Executioner” (chapter 74), who eventually brings death to all. Such reluctance is similar to the Daoist attitude toward war discussed above.

In his final chapter, Moeller uses a passage from the *Zhuangzi* to present his idea that the ideal Daoist avoids evaluative judgments of all kinds and thereby “affirms *everything*” (135). This chapter reiterates and sums up what I have called the signature theme of his interpretation: that Laozi espouses a “non-humanist philosophy” (137). As noted earlier, Moeller is right regarding Laozi’s insistence that human beings are not the center of the world or the measure of all things. However, this more “negative” aspect of his teachings should not obscure his “positive” message. When human beings take their proper place in the great Dao and join in the spontaneous operation of Heaven, they fulfill their true nature in the harmonious contribution they make to the larger natural order. Such a life is not bereft of pleasures or joys, and *only* such a life offers the Daoist’s distinctive, expansive sense of self and reassuring feeling of being at home within the Dao. Such a life affirms everything in Nature, but it turns away from anything that disrupts or harms the natural order. As Moeller notes, this is quite different from Confucian expressions of humanism as well as traditional Western conceptions. Such a view, though, is not bereft of a conception of human nature or its proper flourishing; instead, it offers a radically different account of what these things might be.

I have presented my understanding of some of the more important features of Moeller’s reading of the *Daodejing* and noted places where my own interpretation of the text differs. Whatever readers think about our differences, all will agree that Moeller has done a commendable job of taking this text seriously and drawing out a range of valuable themes and issues.

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Shu, Jingnan 束景南, *The Great Biography of ZHU Xi: A Multi-dimensional Cultural Study* 朱子大傳 : 多維文化視野中的朱熹, two volumes. Beijing 北京: Shangwu Yinshuguan 商務印書館, 2003, 1148 pages.

Could ZHU Xi serve as a mirror of traditional Chinese culture? Might it be the case that his psychological development reflects his ethico-metaphysical system? Is it true that it

was not ZHU Xi who created Dao Learning but rather that Dao Learning created ZHU Xi (1123; 1119)?

Influenced by the Western philosophical, psychological, and sociological theories of George W. F. Hegel, Carl G. Jung, Evans E. Prichard, and Thomas Carlyle, Shu believes that to grasp the nature of a culture is to investigate three factors: the “culture,” the people living in the culture, and the society in which the people and the culture jointly comprise an integrated whole. To this end, Shu applies a particular method in the *Biography*, which is termed by Shu a “cultural reconstruction” (*wenhua huanyuanfa* 文化還原法). It consists of reconstructing the philosophical, moral, and political ideals of a historical period as a cultural and psychological personality (5). This method, according to Shu, “gets rid of the prevailing methods applied by philosophical books, for they analyze and separate an infinitely complicated person from a multi-dimensional culture using logical formulas of ontology, epistemology, and ethics; they are helpless in describing the mingling details and profound waves of a person’s mind or psychological processing. By those methods the infinitely vivid and abundant psychological whole would be torn into pieces” (10). He lets the “sage” ZHU Xi—including the culture and society of his time, which both nurtured and distorted him—return to his original historical environment. Shu critically comments that Zhu’s humanistic ethico-metaphysical system emphasizes “ethical reason” and moral self-cultivation rather than knowledge-acquisition; the society rather than the individual; politics rather than the economy; moral value rather than truth; and the relation between heaven and humanity rather than the relation between the subjective and the objective aspects of a person (1116–1118).

Shu regards Zhu as a great “King of Confucian scholars” (881), whose philosophical system and psychological structure reflected the vitality and intensity of traditional Chinese culture. Accordingly, it is claimed that Zhu served as a mirror of traditional Chinese culture. He devoted himself to Dao Learning, and simultaneously Dao Learning forged him. His Dao Learning is characterized by a “sincerity of mind” and a “manifestation of the clear character,” which, in Shu’s view, amounted to a criticism of the absolute authority of the emperor of his time and displayed both his determination toward an ideal of social reform and his courage against the Jin invaders. Zhu’s psychology and personality are well-knitted by Shu through Zhu’s three reviews of his Dao Learning. Shu marks these three reviews as representing the three milestones of Zhu’s humanistic system, and details Zhu’s psychological changes both before and after the three reviews as encompassing the trails by which we can closely follow Zhu’s thought.

Zhu’s first review took place in 1177, after he digested the influential doctrines of Buddhism and Daoism, and after the three meetings of Hanquan 寒泉, Ehu 鵝湖, and Sanqu 三衢. Zhu described this review as an experience of sudden enlightenment. The three meetings influenced him to complete the *Collected Explanations of the Four Books of the Great Learning*, the *Analects*, the *Mencius*, the *Doctrine of the Mean* (*Sishujizhu* 四書集注). This, for the first time, established the foundation of his ethico-metaphysical humanistic system of the Dao Learning. He realized that the two components of his method, namely, those of “honoring the virtuous nature (*zundexing* 尊德性)” and “pursuing inquiry and study (*daowenxue* 道問學)” were problematic. In his letter to LÜ Zuqian 呂祖謙, he wrote that his sudden enlightenment manifested itself in a realization that his approach of *zundexing* consisted in a lack of the nourished and preserved mind, and that his approach of *daowenxue* pointlessly discussed too much fragmented and unproductive detail, which might show the “breadth” of his learning but, in fact, could not grasp the essential. He concluded that LU Jiuyuan’s 陸九淵 problem was his one-sided emphasis on *zundexing*, while his own problem pertained to an exclusive emphasis on *daowenxue*. After the Sanqu

Meeting, he soberly realized that the way to resolve these problems would be found in the unity of *zundexing* and *daowenxue*. With the attitude of “reverential attention,” we take *zundexing* as substance and transform *daowenxue* from extensive breadth to a grasp of the essential. In this way, we properly arrange a plurality of accumulated materials into a refined essence (383–384). Scholars who studied Zhu before Shu preferred to emphasize his commitment and adherence to Li Dong 李侗 as evidence of his return to Confucianism, while ignoring Zhu’s engagement with Buddhism and Daoism in his early years. Shu uncovers (1) that, when Zhu was approximately 20 years old, he accepted Daoist master Xuguzi 虚穀子 as his mentor, and (2) that his *Muzhaijinggao* 牧齋淨稿 (*Pure Texts of Mu Hall*) was a result of his acceptance of the doctrine of the Chan master Daoqian 道謙. He was passionately interested in Chan Buddhist and Daoist meditative epistemology, and simultaneously read the texts of both the Cheng 程 brothers and ZENG Gu 曾鞏 with great concentration. These studies gradually led him into his philosophy of mind: to understand the principle of heaven and the mind of the Sage through one’s own mind. After the Ehu Meeting, he completed *Shishilun* 釋氏論 (*On Buddha*) which criticized Buddhism and Daoism. Generally, Zhu attacked Buddhism as a heretic religion and superstition. However, he also regarded Buddhism as a culture that follows a different Dao, and he appreciated the Buddhist method of systematic and coherent speculation and analysis. He even used it to explore Confucian concepts and thinking. For example, he borrowed some Buddhist practices such as “quiet sitting” for training *jing* 敬 (reverence). This made his approach radically different from thinkers before him (408). His approach to human nature showed his belief that Confucianism can borrow Buddhism to clarify its doctrine, but it does not mean that Buddhism and Confucianism can share the same Dao (238). For example, in his commentary on the *Mencius*, Zhu interpreted the original goodness of human nature claimed by Mencius as “original nature” rather than “material nature”; and Mencius’s concept of the Four Sprouts (*siduan* 四端) was interpreted by him as the Four Indications *xu* 緒. Because of the manifestation of these feelings as *xu*, one can glimpse the original state of one’s nature and cultivate oneself. Shu does not explicitly indicate that epistemologically Neo-Confucianism accepted the Buddhist method of “directly pointing to one’s original nature (*ming xin jian xing* 明心見性).”

Zhu’s second review finds expression within his works in 1189, during which he was constantly engaged in debate with other scholars. Shu discovered that the review could be traced back to 1186, when Zhu finished his Introduction to the *Book of Changes* (*Yixueqimeng* 易學啓蒙), and also to 1189, when he completed his second revised version of the *Commentaries on the Daxue and the Zhongyong by Chapters*. He added *Xiaoxue* 小學, the *Lesser Learning*, to the *Sishujizhu*, and thereby rendered his system coherent. He unified the ontological systems of the *Diagram of Pre-Heaven* (*Xiantian Tu* 先天圖) and the *Diagram of the Great Ultimate* (*Taiji Tu* 太極圖), thus unifying the metaphysics and cosmology of SHAO Yung 邵雍 and ZHOU Dunyi 周敦頤. In his view, “the great ultimate is ultimately included within the realm of the pre-heaven.... Their physical principles are the same, and their images and numbers are not different either. The only difference between them is that one of them embraces bigger realms, while the other embraces smaller realms; and one of them is detailed, while the other is general” (776–778). Thus, Zhu built his ethico-metaphysical system of *Li* 理 (principle), out of the books he wrote during this period, such as the *Explanation* of ZHOU Dunyi’s *Penetrating the Book of Changes* (*Tongshuzhu* 通書注) and *The Essence of the Book of Changes* (*Zhouyibenyi* 周易本義). His anti-traditionalist system is threefold. First, according to him, the *Book of Changes* is a book for divination, its sixty-four hexagrams and three hundred eighty four lines are all symbolic images on the basis of which divinations are performed, and through divinations

the universal principle, *li*, is derived (793–794). Second, his *Commentaries on the Poetry* (*Shijizhuan* 詩集傳) established a new methodology within the study of the *Poetry*, which frees the study of the *Poetry* from the rigid restrictions of the Han Dynasties. He urged scholars to “directly point to the original meaning of the poems,” effectively denying the method of *Maouxu* 毛序 for having drawn false conclusions from inadequate analogies (795). Last, he criticized the traditional approach of the *Classics of Rites* 禮經, claiming that *Yili* 儀禮 (the *Ceremonials*) should be regarded as the standard (*jing* 經) of the *Classics*, while *Liji* 禮記 (*The Book of Rites*) should be considered its interpretation and explanation (*zhuan* 傳) (803). His study of classics firmly retained the principle of separating the original texts from later interpretations of them. He thought that the latter reduced the holiness of the former; and in this way, he centered Neo-Confucian learning on the original texts themselves as opposed to “later interpretations” of them, thereby bringing Neo-Confucian learning, as it were, back to the originals (802). These various projects manifested the maturity of his humanistic system.

Zhu’s third review of his Dao Learning, Shu observes, explicitly explored his personality and the society in which he lived through the persecution of the years of Qingyuan (*Qingyuandangjing* 慶元黨禁). During the persecution of Dao Learning, Zhu struggled doggedly. The study of *li* (principle) was forbidden—he engaged in *pu* 樸 study (collation and textual criticism) and corrected and revised HAN Yu’s 韓愈 writings via a comparison of all previous editions. Moreover, he indirectly borrowed Han’s influence, which improved his Dao Learning (1042). He completed the *Hanwekaoyi* 韓文考異 (*Annotation of the Writings of HAN Yu*) during the persecution. When Dao Learning came under criticism, Zhu turned his attention to literature. He interpreted the *Chuci* 楚辭 (the *Songs of Chu*), expressing his tremendous anxiety and worry about society. In his *Chucihouyu* 楚辭後語 (*Postscripts of the Songs of Chu*), he offered the following critical remark: “QU Yuan’s 屈原 loyalty to the ruler was excessive, and QU Yuan’s tragedy was his loyalty” (1049). Doctrines of ZHOU Dunyi and the Cheng brothers were forbidden, and Zhu sought freedom within the “heretic” Daoist world as a Daoist master (*kongtongdaoren* 空同道人), nourishing his soul with the Dao. With CAI Yuanding (蔡元定), he finished the *Examination of Zhouyicantongqi* 周易參同契考 (*An Examination of the Alchemic Classic of Triple Unity Based on Yijing Exegesis*), which advocated the application of Confucian principles concerning the judgment of right and wrong with respect to “heresies.” During the persecution, when the shadow of death approached this great Confucian master, his desire for life and freedom drove him to study the *Classic of Alchemy* (*Cantongqi* 參同契) and to write *An Examination of the Pivotal Meanings of the Esoteric Talismans of Daoist Gymnastics* (*Yinfuli Kaoyi* 陰符經考異) (1055). As a great Confucian philosopher, Zhu never forgot his mission and was determined to fulfill his duty by once more studying the *Five Classics*. He devoted special attention to the *Classics of Rites* and the *Book of History*.

The *Biography* was published with introductions by CHEN Rongjie 陳榮捷 (Wing-tsit Chan) and ZHANG Dainian 張岱年, and included a convincing postscript by YANG Qing 楊青. Furthermore, PAN Fuen 潘富恩 and XU Hongxing 徐洪興 jointly wrote a commentary on it after it was published. They all appreciated greatly Shu’s achievement of investigating traditional Chinese culture through Zhu’s biography, which should have been done a century ago by Chinese thinkers (1120). It should be mentioned that Shu is also the author of the *Examination of ZHU Xi’s Anecdote Writings* 朱熹佚文輯考 and *The Long Chronicle of Zhuzi* 朱子年譜長編. ZEN Chunhai 曾春海 provided a commentary on the latter.

Shu’s unique contributions to the studies of Zhu are indelible in several respects. First, he discovered Zhu’s Chan Buddhist lineage from DAO Qian 道謙 to ZONG Gao 宗杲. Second, he explores Zhu’s exposition of ZHOU Dunyi’s studies of the *Book of Changes* and

the Daoist *Alchemy*. Third, he relates Zhu's doctrine of *zhonghe* 中和 (harmony and equilibrium)—which was formed in Tanzhou 譚州—to Zhu's psycho-epistemological path from *wu* 悟 (understanding) via *jing* 靜 (quiescence) to *jing* 敬 (reverence), when he was returning from Chan Buddhism to Confucianism. Fourth, he firmly defends the view that CHEN Liang 陳亮 was not a utilitarian supplemented with the goal “to apply both righteousness and profit and carry on both benevolent government and hegemony.” Fifth, he offers certain additional details, notably, the fact that in order to refine his Dao Learning, Zhu debated with Buddhists, scholars of Hunan 湖南 and Zhenjiang 浙江, as well as specialists of the *Book of Changes* such as CHENG Jiong 程迥.

Here, I wish to highlight a few other points. First, Shu proves that the *jiali* 家禮 (*Family Rituals*) was authored by Zhu rather than by someone who wrote in Zhu's name. Comparing Shu's study with the studies of Zhu in Chinese history, we can see that Shu provides more information and facts pertaining to Zhu's mother, wife, daughter, and sons. Zhu's objective attitude toward and influence on women of his time is also noteworthy. For example, Shu proves that the prostitute YAN Rui 嚴蕊 was in fact not the composer of the poem *Pusuanzi* (卜算子), as widely believed. Shu points out that Zhu's awareness of women's status pervaded his policies during his “One-hundred-Day Reform” in Changsha 長沙, where he allowed young widows to sue with a piece of “white paper” as their written complaints. In my view, Shu could have drawn a clearer picture of Zhu's view of women based on his ethoc-metaphysical system, his reforms, and his personal life. If possible, I would like to see how Shu would evaluate Zhu's conception of the “Three Bonds and the Five Relations (*san gang wu chang* 三綱五常) (949). There is no unanimous conclusion among scholars of Zhu's studies.

Second, Zhu was “the mentor of the emperor” (917) and had knowledge of the crises of the Nan Song Dynasty. Shu cites poems by Zhu, which convey the extent to which Zhu urged the emperor to make reforms and to defeat the Jin invaders. However, Shu reasons, Zhu placed a great deal of hope on the emperor's “rectification of mind and sincerity of will,” which explained all the failures of Zhu's reforms. Zhu's humanistic system is essentially a “static cultural system” with ethical substance deposited as sediment of the nation's psychological structure, exerting a subtle influence on the people's thinking, disposition and lifestyle (1116).

Finally, the Jin court once asked a Nan Song envoy in Jin about Zhu's life, an event displaying the influence of Neo-Confucianism (925) as well as the sophistication of the Jin “barbarian culture.” Shu observes that Zhu was not a bookworm—his political and military talents were clearly displayed when he held positions as an official in all of Nankang 南康, Zhang Zhou 漳州, and Changsha.

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Stalnaker, Aaron, *Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature and Spiritual Exercises in Xunzi and Augustine*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2006, xxi + 330 pages.

Aaron Stalnaker's *Overcoming Our Evil* makes compelling reading for several different audiences. To begin with, it offers a good deal to scholars of Xunzi and of Augustine, thanks both to the many careful evaluations of others' interpretations and, more importantly, to the new light that Stalnaker is able to shed on each thinker, because of

the ways that comparative study reveals previously “overlooked details or themes” (1). In particular, Stalnaker employs a device he calls the “bridge concept” in order to focus his comparison and reveal previously obscured significance in his authors. He defines bridge concepts as “general ideas, such as ‘virtue’ and ‘human nature,’ which can be given enough content to be meaningful and guide comparative inquiry yet are open to still greater specification in particular cases” (17). They are not generalized “thin concepts” because they are developed inductively, with the goal of making specific comparisons fruitful. Neither are they hypotheses about transcultural universals. Rather, they derive from a patient triangulation of three factors: a scholar’s antecedent interests deriving from contemporary contexts (e.g., the questions of “virtue ethics”); issues that are obviously salient in one half of a comparison, which lead one to look for ideas doing corresponding work in the other (e.g., the prominence of will/*voluntas* in Augustine leads Stalnaker to ask about “will” in Xunzi); and scrupulous attention to each individual thinker’s distinctive vocabulary and concerns. A putative bridge concept must avoid being given too much specific content, so that it does not “move beyond guiding inquiry to determining it” (17). The book revolves around four bridge concepts—human nature, spiritual exercise, person, and will—and for each of these, Stalnaker provides a nuanced discussion, balancing the three factors just listed, explaining how he arrived at the specific formulations he uses.

Bridge concepts enable Stalnaker to put his subjects into dialogue with one another and underlie his announced goal of critically engaging with their respective views (146, 300). He is not interested in wholesale evaluation of “rival traditions,” but instead draws insightfully on his authors so that they can interrogate one another. This process, of which I will offer an example or two later, will surely be stimulating to philosophers interested in the larger themes indicated by the book’s bridge concepts. Anyone concerned with moral psychology, moral education, or virtue ethics will find a great deal in *Overcoming Our Evil*. Lest I be misunderstood, let me make clear that Stalnaker does not pry ideas like “habit” or “desire” loose from their conceptual frameworks and offer them up as independent items, to be consumed willy-nilly by contemporary theorists. To the contrary, he insists on the importance of his subjects’ metaphysical views for understanding their ethics, and gently criticizes Yearley’s pioneering *Mencius and Aquinas* (SUNY Press, 1990) for endeavoring to separate “practical theory” from “secondary theory” (295). Still, his methodology allows him to suggest that there is a weakness in, say, Xunzi’s confidence in our ability to reach a state of transparent self-understanding. Even if we are skeptical of Augustine’s explanation of why our motives can remain opaque even to ourselves, the dialectic can nonetheless push us toward progress in our own philosophical theorizing.

Two of Stalnaker’s bridge concepts require additional comment. First, I want to applaud the care and rigor with which he investigates the topics grouped together by the bridge concept “will.” In fact he finds nothing very much like our contemporary idea of will (insofar as there is a single commonsense notion) in either Augustine or Xunzi. As someone who has argued in this journal against understanding *zhi* 志 as “will” (see “Sagely Ease and Moral Perception,” *Dao* V:1), I found Stalnaker’s discussion, which emphasizes the importance of developing long-term “reflective commitment” (282), to be incisive. I am not sure that rendering *zhi* as “intent” is ideal, but this is a minor terminological issue. Second, I find the category of “spiritual exercise” to be of considerable importance to our contemporary efforts to engage in philosophical dialogue across traditions. It is all too common to read the contemporary practice of “philosophy” in the West backward into earlier thinkers like Augustine or Plato, and thus to understand “philosophy” as concerned almost exclusively with reasoned reflection rather than with practical self- (or community-) improvement. For many in China and in the West, this means that early Chinese thinkers

should not be saddled with the label “philosopher” because of the importance they gave to such practical matters. (For some, this putative Chinese difference is something to celebrate; for others, to regret.) By highlighting the research on ancient Western spiritual exercises that has been done by Pierre Hadot and others, Stalnaker thus helps us to see that “philosophy” once was a broader category in the West, whatever we make of the current situation, which makes it easier to find ways for students of Chinese and Western traditions to learn from one another. In addition, by bringing Chinese thinkers explicitly into our theorizing about “spiritual exercises,” Stalnaker is able to offer some immediate correctives to Hadot’s more narrowly based claims (278, 298).

The bulk of *Overcoming Our Evil* comes in two sections, each with three chapters. Chapters 3 through 5 concentrate on moral psychology, as Stalnaker moves from Xunzi’s views of human nature and person, to Augustine’s corresponding views, to a critical and dialogical engagement. On this basis, he then explores spiritual exercises and the will in chapters 6 through 8: for Xunzi, the main topics are study, ritual, and music; for Augustine, reading, eating (physical and symbolic), and prayer. Attention is also paid to each thinker’s understanding of the various stages of ethical/spiritual development, and this trio of chapters ends with another explicitly comparative chapter. It is impossible in a short review like this to give due attention to all the issues these rich chapters raise; as a substitute, I turn now to one of the key similarities Stalnaker sees between the two thinkers, after which I will explore some of their most important differences.

Stalnaker argues that both Xunzi and Augustine exemplify an approach to ethics that he calls “chastened intellectualism.” Both approaches are intellectualist “because they think text-based learning and intellectual reflection on this learning are prerequisites for living well as human beings” (275). According to both thinkers, humans come into existence ignorant of the most important truths, and because these truths are complex and difficult to learn, serious study and thoughtful deliberation are crucial. Indeed, mastery of ethical theory is “indispensable to living rightly,” and both authors believe that such mastery requires teachers, extended practice, and (especially for Augustine) some form of “transhuman aid” (276). However, the intellectualism of both is “chastened” in several ways, which leads Stalnaker to say that the two theories are “more sophisticated and promising than the kind of modern ethics that concentrates only on theories of the right or the good, leaving the question of how to actually appropriate and live such theories to the side as a nonissue” (276). The chastening has several aspects. First, both Xunzi and Augustine put forward highly critical accounts of human nature, which emphasize that good human agency is an achievement, needing “significant outside assistance” to achieve. In various ways both thinkers have emphasized the need for a supportive community, teachers, and so on. Second, Stalnaker nicely explains that the tendency of each thinker to combine “cognitive” and “affective” dimensions of human action shows why intellectual activity, on its own, cannot be sufficient. (For sinologists used to telling others about the distinctive combination of cognitive and affective in the *xin* 心, it will be refreshing to learn about the similar combination in Augustine’s *mens*.) As Stalnaker puts it, this combination helps to ground the necessity of spiritual exercises, since “the interplay of settled conviction and emotional responsiveness, and thus of habitual inclinations to action, can only be changed by reforming all these elements in tandem” (278).

One final element of chastened intellectualism is that “commitment to an only partially understood path of personal formation is required for full understanding to ever become possible” (279). In other words, without what Stalnaker calls “voluntary submission to an authoritative teaching,” there will be no underlying justification to one’s project of reform. He notes that the conscious assent involved distinguishes it from coercive “thought

reform,” but there are elements of “conditioning” involved. Thus, Stalnaker concludes, the two thinkers “both insist on the need for faith in the efficacy of a chosen religious path.” While I agree with the general direction of Stalnaker’s reasoning here, I believe he goes too far in reading a need for “faith” into Xunzi (for another mention of “faith” in Xunzi, see 131). For Augustine, to be sure, a strong version of faith is needed; as Stalnaker tells us elsewhere, no matter how things appear, we are always to have confidence that God’s plan is being worked out (228). On Stalnaker’s own telling, though, Xunzi has a different view. For instance, “For Xunzi, we need to be exposed to the excellences of the Confucian Way, which will attract many people sufficiently for them to commit to the more onerous program of cultivation he advocates, which in turn can slowly strengthen their commitment to the Way until it is indestructible” (257). We receive empirical feedback that helps to motivate us to deepen our commitment. The ultimate perfection of the Way does outrun our evidence, but nothing like “faith” in Augustine’s sense is needed.

Stalnaker explores some important differences between his two subjects on topics that range from habits (whether in general positive or negative), to desires (whether their satisfaction inevitably leads to growth and demand for more), to a general difference in approach that he describes, following the lead of Jack Kline, as “outside-in” (Xunzi) versus “inside-out” (Augustine) approaches to personal transformation. In each case, Stalnaker not only identifies differences, but also explores the strengths and weaknesses of each view. In order to illustrate Stalnaker’s approach in a bit more detail, let me focus on one particular difference, namely the perpetual necessity of anxiety for Augustine, as versus the more sanguine, assured stance that can be adopted by a Xunzian who is well along the path of moral development. This has several dimensions, implicating their disparate understandings of memory and the relative ease with which seemingly positive desires can be perverted. Stalnaker shows that once “obsession” has been overcome, Xunzi sees the relevant difficulties as completely dissolved, while for Augustine, “the momentum of past sins continues to trouble us even after we have repudiated them and tried for years to eradicate their aftereffects” (134). Stalnaker’s analysis of the pros and cons of the respective views is quite subtle. He notes that Augustine’s ability to delve deeply into our resistance to moral goodness “comes at a high price,” namely losing the ability to endorse “habit” as a tool of reformation, and is also premised on the “religious hope for a revolutionary end to [our] vulnerability” (135, 132). Neither thinker’s view emerges unscathed; in other words, the clear, if implicit, suggestion is that we ought to seek a view that makes adequate account for lingering, perhaps unconscious sources of difficulty, without necessarily going as far as Augustine.

Let me now turn to two topics that contemporary students of virtue ethics are sure to find extremely interesting, though neither is a main focus of Stalnaker’s discussion. This is perfectly consistent with his goal of stimulating contemporary thinkers by enabling the retrieval of historical approaches to virtue ethics that are not widely studied today (3, 19). First, consider the challenge that “situationism” poses to virtue ethics, as pressed by John Doris and others (see Doris’s *Lack of Character*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). The basic idea is that, at least on one interpretation, experimental results in social psychology suggest that there may be no such thing as a robust “character” made up of robust traits (like compassion or courage) that manifest themselves across a wide variety of situations. Instead, individual reactions seem to be strongly affected by various configurations of the situation itself, including seemingly irrelevant or trivial aspects. Doris and others argue, therefore, that both individual moral improvement and broad institutional design should aim at putting people in situations in which they will act well, rather than shaping global character traits (Doris: 91, 120).

A recent essay by Eric Hutton considers evidence that Xunzi may be a situationist, but concludes that, despite “occasionally displaying situationist leanings,” Xunzi is deeply committed to the existence and importance of the kind of robust character that Doris attacks (Eric Hutton, “Character, Situationism, and Early Confucian Thought.” *Philosophical Studies* 127 [2006]: 49). Stalnaker’s discussion of Xunzi, however, implies a deeper way in which Xunzi might appreciate the insight of situationism. First, all sides to the debate agree that experimental evidence shows *at most* that robust, cross-situation character traits are rare: it cannot show that they do not exist. Second, Stalnaker explains that the goals and effects of spiritual exercises are very different, depending on one’s stage of moral development. For the large majority of us, beginners on the moral path, we rely on rituals and music to “manipulate reality” so that certain emotions are generated and others guarded against (177); with regard to one particular type of ritual/music performance, Stalnaker writes that “This shared exertion, *as long as it continues*, incarnates the beauty, goodness, and harmony of the Way” (184, emphasis added). More generally, Stalnaker sees that Xunzi’s “ethical challenge is to create a form of life that can satisfy everyone’s desires in a beautiful, harmonious, and just way” (283). In each case, we can give these claims a situationist gloss, seeing Xunzi as aiming at creating situations that enable flawed people to live well together. At the same time, Xunzi is clearly also interested in inner personal transformation, which means he believes in the possibility of robust character. Stalnaker makes this explicit (though without reference to situationism): “For the sage, this harmony of inner and outer is sustained through all variations in circumstance” (177). I would argue that Xunzi sees no tension between his twin goals because he believes that the spiritual exercises he recommends work on two levels, short-term and long-term. Much of his language is ambiguous between these two perspectives, but sometimes he is clearly focused on one or the other. Contemporary philosophers would do well to consider whether Xunzi provides a model that enables us to have the cake of situationism and eat it too—namely, to continue to take seriously the transformative goals of virtue ethics.

Another, related, way in which contemporary philosophers should find Xunzi stimulating is the connection between what Stalnaker labels his “outside-in” model of personal formation and Xunzi’s conception of right action. Stalnaker emphasizes the difference between Augustine’s “rightly directed will” conception of right action and Xunzi’s view, according to which “right action must be manifest in correct outward form, although to be perfect such action must be matched by appropriate emotions and desires” (265). Xunzi’s view can be fruitfully compared to certain contemporary Western efforts that aim to articulate how a virtue-based ethic can nonetheless provide the kind of “action guiding” role that societies seem to need, if their inhabitants—largely devoid of advanced moral education—are to live peaceably together. For example, in *Virtue Ethics* (Oxford University Press, 2003), Christine Swanton articulates the idea of the “target of a virtue,” on the basis of which Swanton argues that we should distinguish between “acting from a state of virtue,” which stresses one’s internal state but may fail to hit the virtue’s target, and a “virtuous act,” which hits the target but may fail to express fine inner states. Whereas for Xunzi, the connection between form and inner state is indirect (for learners, at least), in that the form conduces to the long-term development of the state, for Swanton the tie is more intimate and particularistic: the “target” of the virtue is determined by the type of moral responsiveness that is called for in that context. One could argue that Xunzi’s view therefore has an important advantage, in that his norms of (thin) right action—ritual observance, musical performance, and so on—can be more readily institutionalized, which may be important to the success of a virtue-based view today.

I have focused somewhat more on Xunzi than on Augustine in this review because of both my own interests and this journal's readership, but I agree with Stalnaker that we learn a great deal about both thinkers by seeing each in the relief provided by the other. In addition, I feel that I have only scratched the surface of the stimulating richness waiting here for contemporary philosophers. Stalnaker is right that virtue ethics has been driven by retrievals of historical views, and that current work can only be enhanced by broadening the range of views on which we draw. No doubt Stalnaker is also right to emphasize that our philosophical work needs to take very seriously the "antisocial" side of humans, which receives so much attention in both Xunzi and Augustine. As Stalnaker's "piecemeal evaluation" and my own engagement here with the book's figures are meant to indicate, furthermore, historical retrieval is only one part of a broader process of philosophical construction and criticism, best conducted in a spirit of openness to the relevance of philosophical traditions from around the globe.

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