Abstract
This paper shows that the resources mobilized by recent arguments against individualism in the philosophy of mind also suffice to construct a good argument against a Humean-style skepticism about our knowledge of extra-mental reality. The argument constructed, however, will not suffice to lay to rest the attacks of a truly global skeptic who rejects the idea that we usually know what our occurrent mental states are.
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De Vries, W. Burgeoning skepticism. Erkenntnis 33, 141–164 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00166330
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00166330