Abstract
Is the flavor of mint reducible to the minty smell, the taste, and the menthol-like coolness on the roof of one’s mouth, or does it include something over and above these—something not properly associated with any one of the contributing senses? More generally, are there features of perceptual experiences—so-called novel features—that are not associated with any of our senses taken singly? This question has received a lot of attention of late. Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of what it means to say that a feature is associated with a sensory modality in the first place. Indeed, there is only one fully developed proposal in the literature, due to Casey O’Callaghan. I argue that this proposal is too permissive to inform the debate over novel features. I go on to argue that all attempts to formulate a better proposal along these lines fail. The corollary of my arguments is that the question of the existence of novel features is poorly formed. Furthermore, the problem generalizes, with the result that we should not rely on our pre-theoretical notions of the senses as the basis of theorizing about the features (contents and phenomenal character) of perceptual experiences.
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Notes
A bit more, but still too little, attention has been paid to another unresolved problem that undermines the attempt to answer this question—namely, that there is no uncontroversial demarcation of the senses on which to base these associations. While I focus on the problem of feature association, I will engage with the further problem of individuating the senses to the extent necessary to address that first problem (see, especially, Sect. 4.2).
Others have recently adopted O’Callaghan’s proposal (e.g., Briscoe 2019), but none have held it up to scrutiny as I shall do. Fulkerson (2011, 2014) proposes his own partial rule based in feature binding. By his own admission, though, binding is “at best a sufficient condition” for features to be associated with a given modality (2014b, p. 34). Adjudicating the novel feature debate requires a complete remedy. So I will set Fulkerson’s proposal aside (but seen. 44).
I follow the dialectic of the novel feature debate in speaking of perceptual experiences. While the experience/sub-experiential distinction does seem to be at play in explaining some of the intuitions I discuss, all that will matter for my arguments—particularly with respect to perceptual contents—is that the intuitions regarding the Aristotelian senses are what they are.
An anonymous reviewer for this journal pointed out the intriguing possibility of features that are mistakenly attributed to a modality. Such features are either: (a) features that ought to be associated with one modality but are, due to interaction of the two senses, apparently associated with another [see Spence (2016) on oral referral as a potential instance of this] or (b) features that aren’t properly associated with any modality but are mistakenly thought to be. Features of type (a) would not be novel. Features of (b) would be novel. Making sense of mistaken feature associations will, of course, depend on a rule for associating features with modalities—just as understanding novel features does.
And the modalities involved should suffice for the resulting experience to include the novel feature. Being a bit of pine wood is not a novel feature of an experience in which one picks up a stick and smells it to ascertain what sort of wood it is because, though one needs the olfactory input along with visual and/or tactile input for the experience to include that property in its contents, one will also need cognitive inputs (e.g., a pine concept) for this property to work into the contents of the experience.
See, e.g., Connolly (2014) and O’Callaghan (2014a, b, 2015, 2017a, 2019) for (somewhat guarded) defenses of flavor as a novel feature type. For more on the various inputs to flavor perception see Auvray and Spence (2008) and Spence (2015b). Again, Spence and Bayne (2014) offer reason to doubt that we have multisensory experiences, including the experience of multisensory objects. See also Spence and Frings (2020) for a discussion of one particular approach to multisensory feature integration.
See especially O’Callaghan (2014a).
The term ‘ventriloquism effect’ is sometimes used in a broader sense to include the spatial capture of audition by any other sense (see Caclin et al. 2002). I will focus on the audiovisual ventriloquism effect described above.
Cf. Bayne (2014), with respect to contents. See Connolly (2014) for a reply. One might also push back on this claim by noting that cross-modal illusions do induce some meta-cognitive uncertainty about the reliability of the experience (Deroy et al. 2016). However, the uncertainty is not a feature of the first order experience itself; it is an assessment of the reliability of that first order experience. (We don’t hear that there is uncertainty, we have uncertainty about what we hear). Since novel features, if there are any, are features of the perceptual experience, metacognitive uncertainty won’t undermine the intuition that cross-modal illusions don’t produce novel features.
If you are already satisfied that explanations of the contents and phenomenal character of perception ultimately need to be grounded in the physical (e.g., stimulation states of sensory receptors and subsequent neural processing), then you can skip the remainder of this section.
The closest account we get is that of Richardson (2014). Richardson addresses causal influences of one sense on another, but not the possibility of novel features.
And there are features that, while not seeming to ground any further associations, are non-dependent and are intuitively associated with an Aristotelian sense—e.g., silence is associated with audition and empty space is associated with multiple senses: I can see the space between two objects, or I can feel the empty space in front of me when I have my hand about.
The point applies to experience with non-perceptual contents, too. I could be thinking about circles (or whatever else) while looking at a blank wall. Why shouldn’t the intuitively non-perceptual content get paired with some perceptual phenomenology and, on the strength of that pairing, be associated with one of our sensory modalities? Presumably we distinguish perceptual contents from non-perceptual contents because the former, and not the latter, are the result of a perceptual mechanism. But this has us appealing to mechanisms, so it can’t be the answer for the content/phenomenology pairing approach.
If you are inclined to respond with an appeal to the relative determinacy of visual v. tactile shape discrimination, substitute this example: We can feel and see the location of a pin prick on our fingertip.
Since mechanisms are partially defined in terms of their response to stimuli, there is no disentangling the two. There are proposals that don’t rely, directly, on Grice’s criteria (esp. Nudds 2004) but appeal to conventions—e.g., those features count as visual that we conventionally associate with vision. However, such accounts—by their own admission—won’t deliver unambiguous verdicts in the controversial cases.
O’Callaghan’s formulation focuses only on phenomenal features. I adjust it here to include content.
All the proposed rules should be read as relativized to normally functioning sensory mechanisms. Notice, also, that the rules are formulated in terms of feature instances. A novel feature type will be one with no instances that are associated with any modality. We can say that a feature type is associated with a modality if some unimodal experience of that modality instantiates that feature. Finally, recognize that the association relation cannot be a function—we must leave open the possibility that a feature is associated with more than one modality if we are to accommodate common sensibles. It might be that the association relation is a function for phenomenal features, but that is a substantive philosophical thesis that is more often assumed than argued for.
To be fair, O’Callaghan (2014b) does discuss the problem of learned correlations, drawing a distinction between two kinds of unimodal experience: pure and mere experiences of a modality. The former are perceptual experiences had by a creature whose past and present experiences have only been in that modality. The latter are those had by a creature whose experience is presently, but not historically, restricted to that modality. O’Callaghan inclines towards ‘yes’. Others—most notably Strawson (1959) in his discussion of sounds and a ‘no space world’—have said ‘no’. De Vignemont’s (2014) multimodal account of bodily awareness also depends on a ‘no’ answer. O’Callaghan does not discuss stimulus-independent inputs.
One might also worry that there is no uncontroversial way of individuating the senses and, so, no way of identifying what, say, vision is—let alone what features should be associated with it (Coady 1974; Fulkerson 2014c; Gray 2013; Grice 1962; Heil 1983; Keeley 2002; Macpherson 2011b, c, 2014; Matthen 2015; Nelkin 1990; Nudds 2004; Roxbee-Cox 1970). However, the cases considered in the individuation of the senses literature concern determinable senses—the sort of senses that might be shared by creatures with differing sensory mechanisms and capacities associated with that sense (e.g., a sense of vision that can be had by humans, bees, and pit vipers). The novel feature debate, on the other hand, concerns a characterization of our experiences. If we focus just on the (relatively) determinate senses that we, as a species, share (as O’Callaghan does in his discussion), we might get a workable individuation of the Aristotelian senses. [I borrow the determinate/determinable sense distinction from O’Callaghan (2019, chapter 6)].
Indeed, it isn’t entirely clear whether or not cognitive inputs ought to be included in the sensory mechanisms, not least because it isn’t clear where the line between perception and cognition should be drawn. If cognitive resources are required in order to give rise to experience, then they will certainly be involved in the relevant mechanisms. Specifying which cognitive resources are included will have ramifications for the debates over rich/thin contents of perceptual experience and cognitive penetration.
In developing his sensory pluralism, Fulkerson (2014c) notes that different individuations (chosen for different purposes) will give different results for different experiences. He doesn’t question that there will be some individuation of the senses that will be acceptable for answering the general question that is in dispute in the novel feature debate. (See Macpherson 2011b, c for a similar sensory pluralist view).
Things get a little trickier for the other senses but, I think, not unbearably so.
We might think that this gives us an alternative rule: A feature of a perceptual experience is associated with a given modality just in case we lose those features of the experience in a corresponding situation differing only in that there is no stimulation of the primary receptor. However, this test won’t work. Consider the McGurk effect: If we omit stimulation of the basilar membrane (primary auditory receptor), we lose/da/phenomenology (i.e., the sound of someone pronouncing /da/), so this feature is associated with audition. But if we omit retinal stimulation, we also lose that phenomenology, so it will also be associated with vision. But intuitively, /da/ phenomenology should only be associated with audition.
Such imagery is another non-stimulus input of the sort discussed in relation to OCR, above. It remains an open question whether or not the mechanisms of imagery ought to be included in those of one of our Aristotelian senses and, relatedly, whether or not imagery is properly thought of as perceptual. Settling the question will have consequences for applications of the association rules to follow.
While there is some evidence, from a select number of long-time users of sensory substitution devices, that stimulation in one modality can result in some rudimentary phenomenology characteristic of another, this is due to recruiting resources of the latter modality to the processing of input to the former, in which case we are dealing with a different mechanism (one including the recruited resources) than the one with which we began (the ordinary touch mechanisms). The point here is that no acceptable demarcation of the ordinary mechanism of touch has, as a matter of fact, the ability to produce pitch phenomenology on its own, though it is conceivable that it could.
Alternatively, you might think that a feature will be associated with a modality just in case it is one of the disjuncts in the disjunction of possible features resulting from the actual stimulus state of that modality’s mechanism plus whatever effects can be generated on its output by the other mechanisms under a range of stimulation. Such a rule will need a non-question begging means of identifying the experiential results of a causal influence of one mechanism on another to avoid associating every feature of the experience with each modality. This will require a fuller specification of the dependencies of phenomenal features on informational content carried by the sensory mechanisms. See Sect. 5.3 for reasons to think this won’t help adjudicate the novel feature debate.
This result doesn’t depend on any resolution of the conflict between information carried by the visual and tactile mechanisms, as in work on the visual dominance of touch (Rock and Victor 1964; Rock and Harris 1967). It depends on the fact that there is a possible stimulus similar to the actual stimulus that would make a content accessible to vision that is only accessible through touch in the actual experience—i.e., the visual mechanism plays no part in contributing that content to the original experience.
This is not to say that the test could not be salvaged for content. Perhaps one could make a response along the lines of Nudds’s (2009) distinction in the determinateness of experiences of common sensibles perceived with different modalities or an appeal to the total content characterizing the experience in which the content in question is embedded. Or perhaps we could try to restrict ‘substantially similar’ to rule out these cases. But these will require taking on theoretical commitments that might not pan out.
Such recalibration for greater precision does not presuppose greater accuracy, as the case of the ventriloquism effect should make clear.
Having already seen that the rule must operate on determinate mechanisms and that no loosening of the variation in the simulation between the actual and the counterfactual situations will, on its own, get us an acceptable rule, this is all that is left to us.
Also note that, for these aliens, taste—at least in the range of tastes of sugary soft drinks—is not a proper sensible. Nothing in the example depends on this, nor does this case rely on the feature association intuitions of constraint (2).
If you don’t find ‘Joan’ and ‘June’ sufficiently similar, substitute the French (and alien) name ‘Jeune’ for ‘Joan’.
This conclusion follows even if there are no creatures that work according to the stipulations we have introduced to describe Lexi. The point is simply that the rule is not adequately tied to the mechanisms that produce the features to be associated.
To drop the restriction to the deliverances of the individual mechanisms would be make novel features impossible, in violation of the third condition on our association rule.
For the sake of thoroughness, we should acknowledge the possibility of chains of inheritance—e.g., one modality inheriting a feature from a mechanism that inherited the feature from yet a third mechanism. At some point chains of inheritance will need to bottom out in a mechanism that has non-derivatively supplied the feature.
How the coordination of perceptual objects across modalities actually goes will be addressed in more detail below.
This circularity worry is noted by Fulkerson with respect to his binding-based feature association condition (2014, p. 38). He attempts to block the worry by appeal, in part, to proper sensibles: Given an antecedent association of proper sensibles to modalities, we can type perceptual objects by the proper sensibles they contain and then group any other features that are bound to that object according the modality of the object. This might be sufficient for his purpose, which is to show that haptic touch is unisensory. However, it won’t help our case: We are seeking a thorough going association rule that will tell us, among other things, which sensory modalities the proper sensibles belong to. But that is the very thing Fulkerson assumes.
As noted above, this sort of intuitive classification of perceptual objects leads to a circularity worry, if it is to be used in associating perceptual features with sensory modalities. A better way of typing perceptual objects by modality is to do so in terms of the mechanisms that produce them (by binding features into those perceptual objects). Perceptual objects typed in this way can factor in a rule for associating features with modalities (see below).
Notice that the basic mechanism for mere recalibration and inheritance is the same, which supports treating the McGurk and ventriloquism effects as broadly similar. Inheritance is a special case of recalibration.
The sub-experiential recognition of this sort of relation between (proto-)perceptual objects is called the ‘unity assumption’ in the empirical literature. See Chen and Spence (2017) for a review.
Of course, it is possible that there are non-adaptive inheritance-like phenomena that we might want to capture under the label “inheritance”. I have no strong leanings as to whether the resulting features should be associated with the “inheritor” mechanism. If so, then we can drop the shared determinable restriction in clause (b). Whether or not the feature satisfies the shared determinable restriction simply sorts the normal (adaptive) instances of inheritance from the odd ones.
Mm ‘inherits information’ when it receives informational input from Mk that (partially) determines an instance of F, where no unimodal stimulation of Mm would carry that information and where Mk does carry that information in the sub-experiential processing resulting in E, either non-derivatively or through a chain of inheritance bottoming out in a mechanism that carries the information non-derivatively.
On this view the content might be associated with one (or more) modality, the resulting phenomenology with another. For example, we might continue to associate the localization content inherited, in the ventriloquism effect, with vision while associating the localization phenomenology with audition. This can accommodate a view like that of Bayne (2014) on which the contents of perceptual experiences involving sensory integration are multisensory while maintaining our guiding intuitions with respect to phenomenal features.
See Ohsu et al. (2010), Ueda et al. (1990); see also Brennan et al. (2014), Maruyama et al. (2012), Yamamoto et al. (2020), Yang et al. (2019). A plausible candidate for the emergent information on which the kokumi phenomenology supervenes is information pertaining to expected caloric content (Tang et al. 2020).
Regarding the counterfactual strategy, the only room left to maneuver concerns what it is to count as a result of the stimulation of a mechanism, but we’ve covered all the obvious ground there. Any further proposal will be both ad hoc and unlikely to help.
One could, of course, pursue the thick/thin debate without adverting to specific sensory modalities. But this is just to concede the point that our pre-theoretical notions of the senses are not an adequate basis for theorizing about such matters.
Indeed, the results canvased here suggest that the relevant mechanisms won’t divide into perceptual and conceptual any more neatly than they will divide into perceptual modalities.
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to James Van Cleve, Janet Levin, John Hawthorne, and participants in the European Philosophy of Language and Mind Network’s fifth annual meeting for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks also to two anonymous referees for this journal, whose comments led to many improvements.
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Appendix
Appendix
Tables summarizing the association rules, how they fared with respect to the four constraints on an acceptable association rule, and—for those that failed to satisfy constraint 2 (regarding our guiding feature association intuitions), how they fared with respect to intuitions concerning proper sensibles, the McGurk effect, and the ventriloquism effect, are given below (Tables 1, 2, 3).
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Wadle, D.C. Sensory modalities and novel features of perceptual experiences. Synthese 198, 9841–9872 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02689-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02689-x