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An argumentation framework for contested cases of statutory interpretation

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Abstract

This paper proposes an argumentation-based procedure for legal interpretation, by reinterpreting the traditional canons of textual interpretation in terms of argumentation schemes, which are then classified, formalized, and represented through argument visualization and evaluation tools. The problem of statutory interpretation is framed as one of weighing contested interpretations as pro and con arguments. The paper builds an interpretation procedure by formulating a set of argumentation schemes that can be used to comparatively evaluate the types of arguments used in cases of contested statutory interpretation in law. A simplified version of the Carneades Argumentation System is applied in a case analysis showing how the procedure works. A logical model for statutory interpretation is finally presented, covering pro-tanto and all-things-considered interpretive conclusions.

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Notes

  1. For previous work on the project see Macagno et al. (2012), Sartor et al. (2014), Walton et al. (2014).

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Acknowledgments

Douglas Walton would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for award of Insight Grant 435-2012-0104 (2012–2018). Fabrizio Macagno would like to thank the Fundação para a Ciência ea Tecnologia for the research Grants IF/00945/2013 and PTDC/MHC-FIL/0521/2014.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric (CRRAR), Department of Philosophy, University of Windsor, 312 Essex Hall, Windsor, ON, N9B 3P4, Canada

    Douglas Walton

  2. EUI Law Department, European University Institute, Casale 23 Via Boccaccio 121, 50133, Florence, Italy

    Giovanni Sartor

  3. Instituto de Filosofia da Linguagem, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Av. de Berna 26C – 4º andar, 1069-06, Lisbon, Portual

    Fabrizio Macagno

Authors
  1. Douglas Walton
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  2. Giovanni Sartor
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  3. Fabrizio Macagno
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Correspondence to Douglas Walton.

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Walton, D., Sartor, G. & Macagno, F. An argumentation framework for contested cases of statutory interpretation. Artif Intell Law 24, 51–91 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-016-9179-0

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