

Matthew D. Walker

Aristotle on the Utility and Choiceworthiness of Friends

Abstract: Aristotle's views on the choiceworthiness of friends might seem both internally inconsistent and objectionably instrumentalizing. On the one hand, Aristotle maintains that perfect friends or virtue friends are choiceworthy and lovable for their own sake, and not merely for the sake of further ends. On the other hand, in *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.9, Aristotle appears somehow to account for the choiceworthiness of such friends by reference to their utility as sources of a virtuous agent's robust self-awareness. I examine Aristotle's views on the utility and choiceworthiness of friends, and offer a novel reading of *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.9. On this reading, Aristotle accepts a version of *instrumental conditionalism about final value*, that is, the thesis that goods (including friends) can be choiceworthy for their own sake (i.e., possess final or end value) at least partly on account of their instrumental properties. In articulating what sort of instrumental conditionalism it is reasonable to attribute to Aristotle, I argue that Aristotle appeals to the utility of perfect friends as part of a broadly *material causal* account of why such friends are choiceworthy for their own sake. On this reading, perfect friends are not choiceworthy *for the sake of* their utility in eliciting self-awareness; rather, their choiceworthiness for their own sake is (at least partly) realized in, or constituted by, their conduciveness to the virtuous agent's self-awareness. This reading, I argue, frees Aristotle from the charge of inconsistency: Aristotle can appeal to the conduciveness of perfect friends to the virtuous agent's self-awareness as a way of explaining why such friends are choiceworthy for their own sake.

Matthew D. Walker: Assistant Professor of Humanities (Philosophy), Yale-NUS College, 6 College Avenue East, Singapore 129790, mattwalker2000@gmail.com

1 Introduction

At the beginning of *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN) IX.9, Aristotle considers a puzzle about the place of friends in the life of the happy, virtuous agent. On the one hand, this agent is self-sufficient, and his life lacks nothing important. On the other hand, friends are thought to supply one with what one cannot obtain by

oneself. If so, then why will the happy, virtuous agent be in need (δεήσεται: 1169b3f.) of friends?¹

Aristotle initially responds that this agent, *as* self-sufficient, has all good things. And because friends are the best of external goods, the virtuous agent will also have friends (1169b8–10). In other words, the virtuous agent's possession of friends is consistent with, because conducive to, his or her self-sufficiency, especially given the human being's status as a political animal naturally suited to live with others (1169b16–21). Aristotle also takes pains to clarify that the virtuous agent need not have friends of all varieties (1169b22–28). For instance, the virtuous agent need not have *utility friends*, that is, friends lovable on account of utility (διὰ τὸ χρησιμὸν: VIII.3, 1156a10), and for the sake of the further benefits they can provide, for example, wealth, military strength, and other forms of gain (VIII.3, 1156a22–27; VIII.4, 1157a27f.).² Nor will the virtuous agent need *pleasure friends*, that is, friends lovable on account of pleasure (δι' ἡδονήν), and for the sake of the pleasant emotional state they produce in one, for example, through their witty anecdotes (VIII.3, 1156a12–14).³

Having made these preliminary remarks, Aristotle goes on in *EN* IX.9 to fill in his account of why the virtuous agent will need friends. Aristotle focuses his attention on two arguments – at 1169b28–1170a4 and at 1170a14–b10 – that appeal, in similar ways, to the role that friends play in providing virtuous agents with a kind of pleasant self-awareness that such agents cannot otherwise obtain. In particular, perfect friends or *virtue friends* – that is, friends lovable on account of their goodness in character and thought (δ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν: VIII.2, 1155b19; δι' ἀρετήν: *EE* VII.2, 1236a13) – conduce to the virtuous agent's awareness of his own virtuous character and activity.⁴ For Aristotle, such self-awareness is evidently choice-worthy: (i) the happy virtuous agent (*qua* happy) certainly *chooses* (προαίρεῖται) to be aware of his own virtuous character and activity (1170a2f.); (ii) such awareness (of himself as good) makes the virtuous agent's existence choice-worthy (τὸ δ' εἶναι ἦν αἴρετόν διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος: 1170b8–10). Because such self-awareness is choice-worthy for the virtuous agent *qua* human, so too is the friend. Because the virtuous agent will need that which is choice-worthy for

¹ Although I have consulted various translations, translations in this paper are my own.

² In this context, Aristotle occasionally speaks interchangeably of the useful (τὸ χρησιμὸν) and the advantageous (τὸ ὠφέλιμον). See, for example, *EN* VIII.3, 1156a26; 28f.; *EE* VII.2, 1236a8; 13; 1238a39.

³ For this way of understanding Aristotle on pleasure friends, see, for example, Pakaluk 1998, 65f.

⁴ For a fuller account of the self-awareness that virtuous agents attain in friendship, see Walker 2010.

him *qua* human (lest his life be incomplete), the virtuous agent will need friends (1170b14–19).⁵

To explain why friends are needed, then, Aristotle appeals in *EN IX.9* to their choiceworthiness. And in accounting for such choiceworthiness, Aristotle highlights the friend's role in bringing about the good of pleasant self-awareness in the virtuous agent. To be such as to bring about a good, however, is to be advantageous or useful (ὠφέλιμον: *Topics IV.4*, 124a16; *VI.9*, 147a34; *VII.3*, 153b38). Hence, Aristotle's account in *EN IX.9* of why friends are choiceworthy highlights the *utility* of virtue friends for eliciting the virtuous agent's pleasant self-awareness. But Aristotle's focus on friends as useful sources of self-awareness should strike one as potentially problematic. For Aristotle might thereby seem in *EN IX.9* to accept a merely instrumental account of why virtue friends are choiceworthy. That is, Aristotle might seem in *EN IX.9* to hold that such friends are choiceworthy solely *for the sake of* the virtuous agent's self-awareness. Yet if Aristotle offers such an instrumental account, then Aristotle's account faces at least two worries.

First, Aristotle's account faces an *internal worry*. Aristotle indicates that if we love someone solely for the sake of further ends, we fail to love him as an end. On the contrary, what we love as ends (ὡς τέλη) are those goods that he is useful for bringing about (*EN VIII.2*, 1155b20 f.). On this basis, Aristotle denies that utility friends are friends in the authoritative sense (*VIII.4*, 1157a12–16). The same goes for pleasure friends: we love the pleasure that the pleasure friend provides, not the friend. But Aristotle insists that virtue friends – friends in the authoritative sense – *are* lovable and choiceworthy for themselves. Thus, he maintains that, as a friend, one wishes for the existence and life of one's virtue friend for the friend's sake (αὐτοῦ χάριν: *EN IX.4*, 1166a4 f.); further, he says, virtue friends wish good things to each other for their own sake (ἐκείνου ἔνεκα: *EN VIII.3*, 1156b7–10; cf. *VIII.7*, 1159a9 f.; *IX.4*, 1166a2–4). Therefore, if Aristotle thinks that virtue friends are lovable and choiceworthy solely for the sake of certain desirable cognitive states, then Aristotle risks providing an inconsistent account of why such friends are choiceworthy. Virtue friends would seem to be – and not to be – choiceworthy *for their own sake*.⁶

⁵ Aristotle also emphasizes the role of friends in eliciting self-awareness in *EE VII.12*'s parallel account. See also *MM II.15*. In n16, below, I say more about 1170b14–19 and worries one might have about it.

⁶ I take it that, on Aristotle's view, being lovable and being choiceworthy are generally coextensive ways of being an *end*. For instance, to articulate why friendship most of all exists between good people (who are good and pleasant without qualification), Aristotle appeals (in part) to the fact that “the good or pleasant without qualification seems lovable and choiceworthy (φιλητὸν μὲν καὶ αἰρετὸν)” (*EN VIII.5*, 1157b26–28). Similarly, at *EN IX.7*, 1168a6, in explaining why poets

Second, Aristotle's account of the choiceworthiness of virtue friends faces an *external worry*. If Aristotle in *EN IX.9* identifies such friends as choiceworthy solely for the sake of some further end, then we might think his view independently dubious. For it is reasonable to think that virtue friends, friends in the true and proper sense, really *are* choiceworthy for their own sake. Hence, if Aristotle is ultimately committed – in spite of himself – to the view that virtue friends are choiceworthy solely for the sake of eliciting self-awareness, then Aristotle's considered view of friendship is correspondingly implausible.⁷

In short, Aristotle's account of why the virtuous agent will need friends generates what I call *the instrumentality concern*: can we understand *EN IX.9*'s account of why friends are choiceworthy without attributing a merely instrumental account to Aristotle? In what follows, I argue for an affirmative answer to this question. I show how Aristotle can respond to the internal and external worries that I have just outlined.⁸

2 A First Response to the Worries Raised Concerning Aristotle's Account of the Choiceworthiness of Friends

A *first response* to the instrumentality concern is to deny that Aristotle's account of why friends are choiceworthy actually makes reference to their utility. For instance, according to Jennifer Whiting, Aristotle's account does not appeal to the needs of agents (and to the correlative utility of friends in meeting those needs). On the contrary, Whiting claims, we should see Aristotle in *EN IX.9* as “seeking to establish the *possibility* of a kind of love that is based not in the subject's needs but rather in her appreciation of the object's positive qualities.” As I understand Whiting's proposal, the excellent deeds and character of one's virtuous friend are simply, by themselves, pleasant and fitting objects of contemplation. To explain

love (ἀγαπῶσι) their creations, Aristotle claims that “being is, for everyone, choiceworthy and lovable (αἰρετὸν καὶ φιλητὸν).” Given *EN IX.9*'s focus on the friend's choiceworthiness, I simply refer to the friend's choiceworthiness. But this notion, I take it, includes the friend's being lovable.

⁷ For formulations of these worries, see, for example, Millgram 1987, 370n17; Whiting 2006, 294–297; Osborne 2009, 351.

⁸ In what follows, and unless otherwise specified, “friends” will refer to friends in the authoritative sense, that is, perfect friends or virtue friends.

why friends are choiceworthy for the virtuous agent, then, it suffices to appeal to the excellence of such friends. As Whiting writes, the virtuous agent “*should* have excellent friends, but not because she *needs* to.”⁹

There is something importantly right about Whiting’s proposal. For Aristotle, perfect friends are not utility friends, and they are not choiceworthy merely for the sake of meeting an agent’s needs. In this way, at least, Aristotle does not base the choiceworthiness of friends in the needs of virtuous agents. Further, in certain contexts, Aristotle may think that it *does* suffice to make reference to the excellence of the virtue friend to explain why that friend is choiceworthy for his own sake. Because a virtue friend is lovable *for his own sake* (ἐκείνου ἔνεκα), and not for the sake of further ends, a virtue friend is lovable *on account of himself* (δι’ αὐτόν). The friend is choiceworthy on account of himself, insofar as *he* is a final cause, that is, insofar as *he* (and not some further benefit) is choiceworthy for his own sake (as an end of contemplation, enjoyment, etc.).¹⁰ But the friend is identifiable, most of all, with his essential nature as a rational being, which is fully realized by and manifest in his virtue.¹¹ Accordingly, to love *the friend* for his own sake, as an end, is to love the friend *for the sake of his virtue*. For the friend to be choiceworthy for the sake of his virtue, however, is for him to be choiceworthy *on account of his virtue* (δι’ ἀρετήν), where “on account of” (*dia*) has a final causal sense. In short, for a friend to be choiceworthy for his own sake (and so, choiceworthy on account of himself, in a final causal sense) is for him to be choiceworthy on account of his virtue (at least in a final causal sense).¹² In certain contexts, then, Aristotle accounts for the friend’s choiceworthiness for his own sake solely by reference to his virtue. And in such *formal causal* contexts, in which one seeks to specify *what it is* for a friend *to be* choiceworthy for his own sake, appeal to the friend’s virtue may suffice.

In short, Whiting’s proposal is well motivated. Nevertheless, if Whiting proposes that *EN IX.9* does not base the choiceworthiness of perfect friends in the needs of virtuous agents *in any way at all*, then her proposal has trouble making sense of the chapter’s argument. For *EN IX.9* indeed does base the choiceworthiness of friends (at least partly) in the needs of agents and in the utility of friends

⁹ Whiting 2006, 297.

¹⁰ For evidence of the equivalence of these notions, cf. *Rhetoric* I.5, 1361b37 and II.4, 1380b37 (noted by Price 1989, 151n27).

¹¹ See, for example, Cooper 2009c, 324 f.; Nehamas 2010, 225–227; Rogers 1994; Stern-Gillet 1995, 73–77; Whiting 2006, 287; cf. Badhwar 1987.

¹² As Stern-Gillet 1995, 76, writes: “Whenever we love our friend primarily for what he essentially is, we therefore do like him for his own sake rather than for ours.”

for meeting those needs. In what follows, I explain how. By doing so, I show that this first response, as stated, is insufficient.

3 Why the First Response does not Suffice

According to Aristotle's first argument (1169b28–1170a4), the activity of the virtuous agent is good and pleasant in itself (καθ' αὐτήν: 1169b28–32). Thus, for the virtuous agent, contemplating activity that is one's "own proper" (οἰκεῖον) activity would also be good and pleasant in itself (1169b33).¹³ Yet one encounters obstacles in contemplating one's own proper activity: "We can contemplate (θεωρεῖν) our neighbors more than ourselves and their actions [more] than our own proper [actions] (τὰς οἰκείας)" (1169b33–35). Nevertheless, one can contemplate virtuous friends who perform and display one's "own proper" sorts of actions and character (1169b35–1170a1). Hence, the virtuous agent "will be in need of" (δεήσεται) virtuous friends, because he chooses to contemplate actions and character of his "own proper" variety (1170a2–4).

In this first argument, Aristotle explicitly appeals to certain essential cognitive limitations that human beings possess. In particular, human beings face obstacles contemplating themselves as virtuous. Aristotle does not explain why we can contemplate our neighbors better than ourselves, but the following idea seems to be implicit: in acting, we focus on achieving the ends for the sake of which we act; but to attain these ends, we typically must remain in the background of our activity. To concentrate directly on oneself while functioning is to impede one's functioning.¹⁴ Thus, these limitations of our agency, along with the choiceworthiness of having a clear view of ourselves, establish certain cognitive needs, viz., for self-awareness. But friends help to meet these needs by enabling

¹³ Two points: (i) I take it that, for Aristotle, for some good G to be good, pleasant, or choiceworthy in itself (καθ' αὐτήν) is also for G to be good, pleasant, or choiceworthy for G's own sake. See, for example, *EN* I.7, 1097a30–b6. (ii) Aristotle's argument plays on two senses of the word οἰκεῖον. On the one hand, where A and B are virtue friends, B's action, as performed jointly with A, will (also) be A's *own* action. On the other hand, the friend's actions are οἰκεῖον in the normative sense of being *proper* for one. So, if B is virtuous, then B performs the actions that are proper for A to perform as a human being – that is, the actions constitutive of living well. In this way, the friend performs those actions that are the virtuous agent's "own proper" actions.

¹⁴ Cf., for example, Kraut 1989, 143; Price 1989, 121 f.; Simpson 2001, 318. Whiting 2006, 301 makes a similar observation, yet she does not address how it squares with her claim that Aristotle's account does not appeal to the needs of virtuous subjects.

us to contemplate our “own proper” activity. Aristotle’s first argument, then, does base the choiceworthiness of friends (at least partly) in a virtuous agent’s needs.

What about Aristotle’s second argument (at 1170a14–b10)? This argument – which claims to show “more with reference to nature” (φυσικώτερον) why friends are choiceworthy for the virtuous agent – is puzzling in many ways. It is long and tangled, and it is unclear how it improves on Aristotle’s first argument, aside from making more explicit metaphysical and psychological claims (e.g., about the role of cognitive capacities in human nature).¹⁵ Here is my compressed reconstruction:

1. The virtuous agent’s perception of his being active is good and pleasant for its own sake for the virtuous agent (*qua* virtuous human being). (1170a14–b5)
2. The friend is “another self” (ἕτερος αὐτός): the virtuous agent bears the same relation toward the friend as he bears toward himself. (1170b5–7)
3. The friend’s being active (when the virtuous agent perceives it) is choiceworthy for its own sake for the virtuous agent (*qua* virtuous human being) – and indeed, nearly as choiceworthy for its own sake as the virtuous agent’s own being active is for himself (*qua* virtuous human being). (1170b7 f.) [From 1 and 2.]
4. The virtuous agent needs (δεῖ) that which is choiceworthy for its own sake for the virtuous agent (*qua* virtuous human being) (“or in this respect he will be needy”: ἢ ταύτη ἐνδεής ἔσται). (1170b14–18)¹⁶

¹⁵ I concur with Price 1989, 122, that the second argument is “more impressive in structure than illuminating in detail.”

¹⁶ This premise might initially appear dubious. One might worry that a vast panoply of items are choiceworthy for their own sake, but not therefore required by the virtuous agent. For instance, as Cooper (1999b, 339n5) asserts, card games are choiceworthy for their own sake. But virtuous agents, in general, do not need card games to be happy.

In response, one must be clear about the level of generality at which Aristotle proceeds, both here at 1170b14–18 and throughout IX.9 (for example at 1169b8 f.). As I understand Aristotle, he does not hold that virtuous agents, in general, require every good that is choiceworthy for its own sake. On the contrary, Aristotle holds only that virtuous agents, in general, require every good that is choiceworthy for its own sake *for virtuous human beings as such*. Aristotle is concerned, in other words, only with those fairly broad goods, worth having for themselves, without which *a human life as such* would be incomplete. In *EN IX.9*, I take it, Aristotle aims to show that friends are choiceworthy for their own sake, and needed, in this sense.

Granting Cooper’s assumption that card games *are* choiceworthy for their own sake, then, Aristotle need not accept the absurdity that virtuous agents, in general, require card games. First, Aristotle can say that if card games are choiceworthy for their own sake, they are so choiceworthy only for a certain set of virtuous agents (e.g., virtuous card game aficionados). Second, he can say that if card games are choiceworthy for their own sake for virtuous agents under the description “card game aficionados,” that is because (i) card games are a *particular specification*

5. Hence, the virtuous agent will need (δεήσει) (virtuous) friends. (1170b18f.)
[From 3 and 4.]

This second argument, I maintain, at least implicitly appeals to the virtuous agent's essential cognitive limitations and needs to explain why friends are choiceworthy for him. Like the first argument, the second argument bases the choiceworthiness of friends (somehow) in the virtuous agent's needs.¹⁷

Thus, while spelling out the second argument at IX.9, 1170a29–31, Aristotle holds that a certain self-awareness arises in all of our acting. For human beings, however, living is marked by perception and thinking (1170a19), that is, by ways of being aware. Therefore, Aristotle thinks that such self-awareness is an awareness of our living – and indeed, of our *being* (1170a33–b1). And because the virtuous agent's being active is good and pleasant for its own sake, his *awareness* of his own being active is good and pleasant for its own sake.

But the question then arises: does this self-awareness *suffice* for the virtuous agent *qua* virtuous (and happy)? If it did suffice – if the virtuous agent were capable of contemplating himself and his activity whenever he wished – the virtuous agent would possess self-sufficiency in isolation from others. Yet this thought – viz., that the virtuous agent can self-sufficiently perceive his own activity by himself – would conflict with points to which Aristotle has already committed himself in *EN IX.9*. First, it would stand at odds with Aristotle's initial point (at 1169b16–21) about the relational self-sufficiency that is appropriate to the politi-

of leisured play, and because (ii) leisured play is one of the fairly broad goods that is choiceworthy for its own sake and required for the happiness of virtuous agents (*qua* human). Card games, then, may well be choiceworthy for their own sake, and required, for the happiness of at least *some suitably situated* virtuous agents (viz., virtuous card game aficionados). But virtuous agents, in general, do not require card games to be happy. For virtuous agents, in general, do not require each (or any one particular) specification of those fairly broad goods required by virtuous human beings as such. Virtuous agents, in general, require only those fairly broad goods.

17 To resist the thought that Aristotle bases the choiceworthiness of friends in the needs of subjects, Whiting (2006, 296 f.) argues that we should translate δεήσει in 1170b18 as “should have.” To be sure, “should have” is a possible translation of δεήσει in certain contexts; and Whiting is correct that the δεῖ at IX.8, 1168a28 may reasonably be translated as “should.” Nevertheless, there exist two strong reasons for favoring the translation “will need” in IX.9. The first reason: in the preceding line (at 1170b17), Aristotle makes reference to what a virtuous agent requires lest he be lacking (ἢ ταύτη ἐνδεής ἔσται). The second reason: the appearance of δεήσεται at the very beginning of IX.9 (1169b3) cannot be construed other than “will be in need of.” Moreover, Whiting 2006, 294, accepts this translation. As this use guides the discussion that follows in IX.9, “will need” is preferable at 1170b18.

cal animals that human beings are. Second, it would clash with the first argument's insistence that human beings face essential limitations in cognizing their own activity. Although Aristotle's second argument allows that the virtuous agent is aware of his own activity by himself in *some* sense, the self-awareness that the second argument grants to the virtuous agent is fairly limited: it is the restricted, incidental awareness of himself that he possesses in cognizing other objects. Hence, it is far from anything like a robust self-awareness in which the virtuous agent's own action stands in the foreground of his attention. Once more, the obstacles to direct self-contemplation to which the first argument alludes come to light. Contrary to what I take to be Whiting's approach, then, the second argument at least implicitly appeals to the needs of virtuous agents (and the utility of friends) in explaining why friends are choiceworthy for virtuous agents. The first response fails.¹⁸

4 Further Ways to Dissolve the Instrumentality Concern

Another approach to the instrumentality concern is to try to dissolve the problem. According to what I call *the second response*, we can distinguish two kinds of choiceworthiness: (i) the choiceworthiness of *friends* and (ii) the choiceworthiness of *friendship*. Wielding this distinction, the second response says that whereas (i) *friends* might be choiceworthy on account of their virtue, (ii) *friendship* might be choiceworthy on account of its conduciveness to self-awareness. If we distinguish the choiceworthiness of friends from the choiceworthiness of friendship, the second response says, it is not clear that *EN IX.9* must run afoul of Aristotle's claim that friends are choiceworthy for their own sake. Rather, perhaps Aristotle alludes to the conduciveness of friends to self-awareness simply to account for the choiceworthiness of *friendship*.¹⁹

There are deeper questions here about how Aristotle should think of the relations among friends, friendship, and their respective modes of choiceworthiness.

¹⁸ As Cooper 1999b, 351 f., rightly observes, Aristotle's arguments concerning friendship "emphasize human vulnerability and weakness." The sort of vulnerability and weakness that Aristotle highlights, I have argued, is a certain essential human limitation in attaining robust self-awareness. Given the essential constraints of human agency, we cannot attain this rich sort of self-awareness without friends.

¹⁹ I am not aware of any formulations of this proposal in the literature. Nevertheless, various audiences to whom I presented early versions of this paper raised this proposal.

But given at least how Aristotle *does* appear to think of these relations, it is doubtful that Aristotle can accept this second response. For on Aristotle's view, if some good G is the good on account of which a friendship with some friend F is choiceworthy, then G is also the good on account of which F is choiceworthy or lovable as a friend. Thus, for Aristotle, if utility-for-E is the good on account of which my friendship with F is choiceworthy, then utility-for-E (and ultimately E itself) is also the good on account of which F is choiceworthy or lovable as a friend (*EN VIII.3*, 1156a6–24). Hence, Aristotle will have trouble allowing that my friend can be choiceworthy or lovable on account of one good, but that my friendship with that friend can be choiceworthy on account of another good. To put the issue another way, suppose that Aristotle held that my perfect friendships were choiceworthy solely for promoting further ends (money, pleasure, etc.). Then Aristotle should think that my interactions with, and my wishing well to, my friends – the activities constitutive of friendship – are also choiceworthy solely for promoting these further ends. But if so, then it is hard to understand how Aristotle can still maintain that my friends themselves are choiceworthy or lovable in any way *for their own sake*, that is, as *ends* (of interaction and well-wishing). Further, the second response has trouble accounting for Aristotle's explicit interest in the choiceworthiness of *friends* (at 1170b14–19). The second response, then, does not get Aristotle off the hook.

A *third response* to the instrumentality concern notes that Aristotle allows for goods to be choiceworthy *both* for their own sake *and* for the sake of higher ends. For instance, at *EN I.7*, 1097b1–5, Aristotle identifies honor, intellect, and every virtue as choiceworthy for their own sake and for the sake of happiness. Therefore, one might think, if *EN IX.9* holds that friends are instrumentally choiceworthy for the further end of self-awareness, it does not follow that Aristotle faces either the internal or external worry spelled out earlier. For Aristotle can still allow that friends are choiceworthy for their *own* sake as well.

This third response sees correctly that, for Aristotle, goods can be choiceworthy for their own sake and for the sake of other ends. Yet, as stated, this third response does not free Aristotle from the instrumentality concern. For *EN IX.9* begins with the puzzle of whether (and why) a self-sufficient virtuous agent needs friends. And it is precisely through the arguments of *EN IX.9* that Aristotle explicitly seeks to answer this question and explain why, for the virtuous agent, “the friend would be among the things to be chosen” (ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρετῶν εἶη) (1170b14–19). Therefore, it is plausible to read *EN IX.9* as Aristotle's central account of why friends are choiceworthy for the virtuous agent. But if Aristotle's *central* account of why friends are choiceworthy is a merely instrumental one – that is, if Aristotle's central account fails to explain why or how friends are choiceworthy *for their own sake*, but shows only that friends are instrumentally

choiceworthy for the sake of self-awareness – then Aristotle’s central account, at least, remains saddled with the instrumentality concern.

Moreover, the third response effectively concedes that, in *EN IX.9*, the only sort of choiceworthiness that Aristotle attributes to friends is instrumental choiceworthiness for the sake of self-awareness. But one should resist that concession, lest *EN IX.9* become hard to understand. For in this chapter, Aristotle calls attention to the status of friends as choiceworthy by nature and for themselves (at 1170a14–16; b14–17). Further, as already noted, Aristotle emphasizes at 1169b22–28 that the virtuous agent does not need merely instrumental friends (e.g., utility and pleasure friends).²⁰ Thus, it is more plausible to read *EN IX.9* as Aristotle’s effort to account for why friends are choiceworthy for their own sake. If *EN IX.9* fails to offer such an explanation, then Aristotle fails to accomplish the task that he sets out for himself in that chapter. It is true, of course, that Aristotle also makes *some* kind of appeal in *IX.9* to the conduciveness of friends to the virtuous agent’s self-awareness. The task, then, is to understand this appeal while doing justice to Aristotle’s evident concern to explain why friends are choiceworthy for their own sake.

According to a *fourth response*, the instrumentality concern might be resolved by appealing to a distinction between (i) an agent’s *justification* for choosing and loving the friend and (ii) an agent’s *motivation* for doing so. On this proposal, Aristotle appeals to the instrumental choiceworthiness of friends for eliciting self-awareness *to justify* the virtuous agent having friends. Yet, the fourth response argues, Aristotle’s account need not be instrumentalizing. After all, the virtuous agent *qua* virtuous will not be *motivated*, and will not *intentionally aim*, to attain self-awareness in his interactions with his friend. Rather, the virtuous agent *qua* virtuous will choose and love the friend for the friend’s own sake.

If successful, the fourth response prevents Aristotle’s account of friendship from counting as instrumentalizing in one sense. Aristotle need not attribute an instrumentalizing viewpoint to the virtuous agent. Nevertheless, the fourth response still renders Aristotle’s account instrumentalizing in another sense, viz., in how it accounts for the friend’s choiceworthiness. For according to the fourth response, the possession of virtue friends is ultimately *justified by*, and virtue friends are ultimately *worth choosing for*, their instrumental role in eliciting the virtuous agent’s self-awareness. This is so regardless of whether the virtuous

²⁰ Hitz 2011, 19, notes these reasons as grounds for thinking that *EN IX.9* seeks to offer an account of why friends are choiceworthy for their own sake. But Hitz thinks that Aristotle’s “appeal to instrumental considerations within the chapter suggests that intrinsic value is not Aristotle’s primary concern here.” In this paper, I argue against this sort of reading of *EN IX.9* (at least if Hitz identifies something’s intrinsic value as its choiceworthiness for its own sake).

agent intentionally aims at self-awareness in choosing such friends. Therefore, the fourth response implies that virtue friends are ultimately instrumentally choice-worthy for the sake of their utility (in eliciting self-awareness). Self-awareness, in other words, still serves as *the end for the sake of which* friends are worth choosing.

One might reply that, even if the fourth response has this implication, it does not follow that the fourth response is objectionably instrumentalizing. After all, according to the fourth response, the friend (and not the virtuous agent himself) remains the virtuous agent's object of concern. Yet so long as virtue friends are ultimately *instrumentally choice-worthy for the sake of their utility* (in eliciting self-awareness), it is hard to see how virtue friends are different in kind from utility friends (even if the virtuous agent does not intentionally aim at self-awareness in choosing them). The fourth response, then, still has trouble maintaining Aristotelian distinctions. Furthermore, the fourth response faces another difficulty: if the friend is *worth choosing* instrumentally for the sake of the virtuous agent's self-awareness, then it is not clear on what basis the virtuous agent is, in practice, to avoid intentionally choosing the friend for the sake of self-awareness.

Perhaps one can reformulate the fourth response in a way that avoids these difficulties. Thus, according to a *fifth response*, one should consider Aristotle's views on the relation between virtue and happiness. As the third response above notes, virtue, for Aristotle, is choice-worthy for its own sake and also for the sake of happiness. But that claim, *prima facie*, generates a tension in Aristotle's view. On the one hand, Aristotle holds that the virtuous agent will choose virtuous actions for their own sake. On the other hand, Aristotle thinks that the virtuous agent will somehow choose virtuous actions for the sake of happiness. And if Aristotle holds that the virtuous agent *qua* virtuous will *intentionally aim* at attaining happiness by performing virtuous actions, it is hard to see how Aristotle can consistently hold that the virtuous agent will choose virtuous actions for their own sake. To avoid such inconsistency, it is plausible to attribute the following view to Aristotle: (i) the virtuous agent intentionally aims at performing virtuous actions for their own sake, but (ii) the virtuous agent nevertheless chooses virtuous actions for the sake of happiness just insofar as the virtuous actions that he chooses for their own sake are *constitutive of* happiness. Choosing virtuous actions for their own sake, the thought goes, is simply a way of choosing happiness.²¹

²¹ For such "inclusive" readings of the teleological relation between virtuous actions and happiness, consider Ackrill [1974] 1980, 21; Whiting 2002, 283f. Exclusivist readers of Aristotle, who hold that happiness consists exclusively in contemplation, will deny this proposal. But as they do not raise this proposal, I bracket their view.

The fifth response, then, proposes that a parallel reply resolves the instrumentality concern generated by *EN IX.9*. The fifth response contends that perhaps Aristotle can hold the following view: (i) the virtuous agent *intentionally aims* at loving, benefiting, and contemplating the friend for the friend's own sake, but (ii) the virtuous agent nevertheless loves, benefits, and contemplates the friend for the sake of self-awareness insofar as the friend whom he loves, benefits, and contemplates is *constitutive of* his self-awareness.

This fifth response is correct to hold that the choiceworthiness of friends and of virtuous actions may be importantly similar in certain respects. Indeed, I explore this point later in this paper. Can this fifth response get Aristotle off the hook, however? For the sake of argument, I grant that this general strategy works for reconciling the apparent tension generated by Aristotle's views on the relation between virtue and happiness. For the suggested parallel to hold in the case of friends and self-awareness, then, the virtuous agent's friend has to constitute the virtuous agent's self-awareness, just as the virtuous agent's virtuous actions constitute the virtuous agent's happiness. Therefore, in contemplating the friend, the virtuous agent would have to contemplate himself, so that the virtuous agent's contemplating the friend would *just be a way of* contemplating himself. Accordingly, the friend and the virtuous agent would have to be, in some metaphysically robust way, the same object of awareness, the same person.

To be sure, Aristotle, on some readings, denies a strong distinction between self and other in the case of friends. But these readings face worries of their own: (i) At *EN IX.8*, 1169a26–36, Aristotle evidently does accept a strong distinction between self and other in the case of friends. There, Aristotle argues that the virtuous agent, *qua* noble self-lover, has greater reason to benefit himself than his friend. (ii) If Aristotle blurs the boundaries between self and other in the case of friends, then Aristotle will still have trouble explaining how the friend can be loved for his own sake. For if I see *myself* when I contemplate my friend, it is unclear how I can take pleasure in my friend *himself*. And if I cannot take pleasure in my friend *himself*, then I am not in a position to take pleasure in my friend for *his own sake*. (iii) Such readings are underappreciative of the sense in which the friend-as-other self is *allos* (*EN IX.4*, 1166a32; *EE VII.12*, 1245a30), *heteros* (*EN IX.9*, 1169b6; 1170b6; *MM II.15*, 1213a13; a24), and *diairetos* (*EE VII.12*, 1245a35), that is, other, different, and separate.

In short, the friend is akin to, and similar to, the virtuous agent. And contemplating the friend *gives rise* to the virtuous agent's self-awareness. Yet because the friend is not constitutive of the virtuous agent's identity, the friend, when contemplated, is not constitutive of the virtuous agent's self-awareness. Therefore, the fifth response's approach to the instrumentality concern also fails.

5 Can Instrumental Conditionalism Provide the Solution?

As I have argued, Aristotle aims in *EN IX.9* to account for the choiceworthiness of friends – in particular, their choiceworthiness for their own sake. At the same time, he appeals to the conduciveness of friends to the virtuous agent’s self-awareness. By appealing in this way to the utility of friends, however, Aristotle confronts the instrumentality concern. Yet the five preliminary responses that I have considered all fail to free Aristotle from this concern. So how can Aristotle address the worries that his account generates?

To answer this question, it will be helpful to consider how certain contemporary philosophers attempt to explain an item’s choiceworthiness for its own sake, that is, its *final value*, or “value as an end.” In particular, it will be helpful to consider contemporary *conditionalist accounts of final value*.²² According to conditionalism about final value, accounts of why certain items are valuable as ends (of choice, or pursuit, of aspiration, etc.) can appeal not only to those items’ intrinsic or internal properties, but also to their relational properties. On the conditionalist view, an item’s final value can (at least in part) be realized in, or constituted by, its relational properties. Thus, according to some conditionalists, the choiceworthiness of an item – for example, a certain painting – for its own sake (at least in part) can be realized in, or constituted by, for example, its uniqueness.²³

According to one type of conditionalism about final value – which I call *instrumental conditionalism* – an item’s instrumental properties can count among the relational properties in, or by, which an item’s final value can be realized. To support the initially surprising claim of instrumental conditionalism, Shelly Kagan offers the example of gourmet cooking skills.²⁴ On the one hand, such a skill is useful as a means for producing enjoyable meals, and we often do value it (at least in part) for its usefulness. On the other hand, it is plausible to say that such a skill is also valuable for its own sake. After all, we admire and honor fine chefs for their skill in producing scrumptious meals. As Kagan argues, however, the final value of cooking skill cannot be fully explained without some appeal to its usefulness (e.g., for nourishing people). For although the gourmet cooking skill is valuable for its own sake, it would lose this status if it were useless. Thus,

²² For conditionalist accounts of final value (which vary in their particulars), see Slote 1983; Korsgaard 1983, 1986; Kagan 1998; Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen 1999; Olson 2004.

²³ On uniqueness, see, for example, Kagan 1998, 282f.

²⁴ See Kagan 1998, 284 f. For a similar example (in a different context), see Kraut 1989, 302f.

although various features apart from the utility of such a skill – for example, the intelligence and creativity that it can reveal – may underlie its final value (at least in part), those features cannot fully explain its final value. On the contrary, to explain the status of a gourmet cooking skill as an end worthy of admiration (or pursuit) for its own sake, one must also appeal to its utility for pleasantly nourishing beings like us. Thus, as Kagan suggests, “if we no longer needed food, and if it no longer gave us pleasure,” a gourmet cooking skill “would lose at least some (and perhaps all)” of its choiceworthiness for its own sake. For the instrumental conditionalist, then, the utility of a gourmet cooking skill can play a role in explaining its final value. Its usefulness, the instrumental conditionalist can say, serves as a necessary material condition for its final value; the final value of this skill is realized (at least in part) in, or by, its instrumental properties. And according to the instrumental conditionalist, the same follows for the final value of many other items, for example, luxurious clothing, exquisite chairs, and fine china.²⁵

Instrumental conditionalism about final value is a controversial position, and a full discussion of the view lies outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, I take it to be a plausible position. If there is a main worry about the view, it is the following: if X is choiceworthy for its own sake (at least partly) in virtue of X’s utility for attaining Y, then an agent should choose X (at least partly) for *the reason that X is useful for attaining Y*. If so – the worry goes – then the agent’s *reason for choosing X* is ultimately an instrumental one. In claiming that X can be chosen for its own sake for the reason that X is useful for attaining Y, instrumental conditionalism about final value is committed to the absurd view that X can be chosen as an *end for* some further purpose, viz., attaining Y. But it is logically impossible for an item to be an “end for” some further purpose. Hence, according to its critics, instrumental conditionalism about final value is incoherent.

The instrumental conditionalist, however, has a ready response to this worry. When the instrumental conditionalist says that X’s utility for attaining Y is (part of) the reason why X is choiceworthy for its own sake, X’s utility need not be a reason of the sort the objector assumes: X’s utility for attaining Y need not be a *purpose* or *goal for the sake of which* one chooses X. Again, when the instrumental conditionalist says that X’s utility is (part of) the reason why X is choiceworthy for its own sake, the instrumental conditionalist identifies X’s utility merely as a *necessary material condition* for such choiceworthiness. (Thus, some contemporary instrumental conditionalists identify an item’s utility as a supervenience base for its final value.) In short, the instrumental conditionalist insists that X’s

25 Cf. the examples and discussion in Korsgaard 1983, 185.

utility may (at least partly) account for X's choiceworthiness for its own sake – in this restricted way. Yet the instrumental conditionalist need not be committed to any obvious absurdity.²⁶

Having drawn this sketch of instrumental conditionalism about final value, I now offer my main proposal: if the Aristotle of *EN IX.9* offers something like an instrumental conditionalist analysis of why friends are choiceworthy for their own sake in *EN IX.9*, Aristotle can avoid the instrumentality concern. He can say that the choiceworthiness of friends for their own sake may well *depend on* (and so, at least partly be *explained by*) their utility, that is, their conduciveness to a virtuous agent's self-awareness. Hence, in *EN IX.9*, it makes sense for Aristotle to highlight the conduciveness of friends to the virtuous agent's self-awareness. Yet Aristotle need not thereby hold in *EN IX.9* that friends are choiceworthy *for the sake of* such utility, or that their choiceworthiness for their own sake is *reducible to* such utility.

Is there any evidence, however, that Aristotle can accept an instrumental conditionalist analysis of the friend's choiceworthiness for his own sake? To answer this question, consider how the instrumental conditionalist appeals to an item's utility. For the instrumental conditionalist, I have suggested, an item's utility can serve as a *necessary material condition* for an item's final value – that is, as an ongoing condition in, or by means of, which that final value is realized. But in *Physics II.3* Aristotle distinguishes final, formal, efficient, and material causes as explanatory factors to which an account can appeal. So, given Aristotle's causal distinctions, Aristotle could well identify utility as (at least something like) a *material cause* of an item's choiceworthiness for its own sake, or (at least) as a relevant factor in a broadly *material causal account* of an item's choiceworthiness for its own sake.

Let me say a word to clarify this perhaps initially odd-sounding thought. When Aristotle calls X a material cause of Y, he means that X is that by which Y is constituted, that in which Y is realized, or that out of which Y is generated. Without stones and a foundation, for instance, no city wall exists; stones and a foundation thus “cause” the wall as necessary material conditions for the realization of the wall (e.g., *Physics II.9*, 200a7–10). The wall depends on the stone and the foundation as a suitable material base for its realization – a base without which the wall would not exist. Yet the wall is not simply reducible to the stone and foundation, either: the wall is “not on account of these things, except as matter” (200a6; 9 f.; 26 f.).

²⁶ Cf. Olson 2004, 35.

For Aristotle, various homoiomerous stuffs – such as stone, wood, bronze, and flesh – often play the role of material cause. Yet, as Monte Ransome Johnson observes, “This kind of cause or explanation is only by synecdoche called ‘matter’ or ‘the material cause’.”²⁷ Thus, construing material causes as principles of constitution necessary for the realization of various ends, Aristotle expands the set of material causes to include more than homoiomerous stuffs. Notably, Aristotle allows *immaterial* entities to serve as material causes: thus, letters are matter for syllables (*Physics* II.3, 195a16–19; II.7, 198b7 f.; *Metaphysics* V.2, 1013b17–21). Similarly, Aristotle thinks that the premises and middle term of a syllogism serve as material causes for the conclusion: the conclusion comes to be out of the premises and middle term (*Posterior Analytics* II.11).²⁸ In short, Aristotle’s conception of material causality operates with a relatively broad notion of matter.

Thus, I propose that in *EN* IX.9, it is open for one to read Aristotle as offering a broadly material causal account of the choiceworthiness of friends for their own sake. Just as Aristotle accounts for walls, in some explanatory contexts, by appeal to their necessary material conditions (e.g., the stones and foundations without which they would not exist), so too in *EN* IX.9, he accounts for the choiceworthiness of friends for their own sake by appeal to the necessary material conditions of such choiceworthiness. Further, in the context of *EN* IX.9, it is reasonable for Aristotle to offer this sort of material causal account. For in *EN* IX.9, Aristotle faces the problem of explaining why friends are choiceworthy for their own sake for, and so needed by, the self-sufficient, virtuous agent. Aristotle must explain, in other words, how it is possible for such a friend to *stand in relation to such an agent as an end* (of choice, pursuit, or love).²⁹ Given this task, it makes sense for Aristotle to appeal to those properties of the friend in, or by, which such choiceworthiness can be realized – including certain of the friend’s relational properties.³⁰ Among such relational properties, I suggest, it is open for Aristotle to appeal to the friend’s instrumental properties – in particular, the friend’s conduciveness to a virtuous agent’s self-awareness. Were the virtuous agent (*qua* human) lacking needs for self-awareness, and were the friend *not* conducive to a virtuous agent’s self-awareness, the friend could not be an end for a virtuous agent.

²⁷ Johnson 2005, 45. On the material cause as a cause *sine qua non*, see Miller 1999, 334.

²⁸ As Pellegrin 1986, 143 observes, “Thus, it seems that the relationship that we think of as the most ‘formal’ (in the modern logical sense), that of premises to conclusion, is for Aristotle a material relationship.”

²⁹ Cf. Whiting 2006, 296.

³⁰ For the view that a friend’s choiceworthiness for his own sake may be relational, cf., for example, Badhwar 1987, 2n4.

My proposal, then, attributes to Aristotle instrumental conditionalism about the choiceworthiness of friends for their own sake. This proposal possesses a surface similarity to John M. Cooper's way of understanding the force of "on account of" (*dia*) in Aristotle's distinctions among friendships "on account of" utility and pleasure.³¹ According to Cooper, when Aristotle says that a friend is loved *dia* utility or pleasure, we should understand *dia* as having a retrospective sense, not necessarily a prospective one. Thus, when Aristotle identifies the utility friend as a friend *dia* utility, Aristotle suggests merely that a utility friendship arises in response to, and in recognition of, the friend's utility, not necessarily "for the sake of" the friend's utility. On this reading, even utility friends are lovable for their own sake (ἐκείνων ἔνεκα). Cooper proposes such a reading to avoid attributing to Aristotle the problematic view that utility friends should be loved in a "wholly self-centered," exploitative way.

Cooper is rightly concerned to avoid an "exploitative" reading of Aristotle, and he offers a reasonable proposal. Although a full discussion – and assessment – of Cooper's proposal lies outside the scope of this paper, I nevertheless believe that the textual evidence counts against it. Against Cooper's reading, I accept A.W. Price's proposal that *dia* in the relevant contexts can be understood, interchangeably, as "ground and goal."³² Thus, utility friends love each other only "insofar as they have hopes of [obtaining some] good" (ἐφ' ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ: *EN* VIII.3, 1156a28–30); likewise, pleasure friends are chosen in the expectation that they will provide certain kinds of pleasure, "for the sake of which they loved [each other]" (ὧν ἔνεκα ἐφίλουσιν: *EN* IX.1, 1164a8–10). For this reason, perhaps, Arius Didymus' epitome of Peripatetic ethics identifies the advantageous and the pleasant as among the ends (τέλη) of friendship: "For all those who engage in friendship in any way at all choose friendship *on account of* some one of these or all of them" (δι' ἓν τι τούτων ἢ διὰ πάντα: 2.143.8–11. Wachsmuth 1884; my emphasis).³³

Furthermore, even if Aristotle thinks that utility friends are lovable *dia* utility in a prospective, final causal sense, Aristotle need not hold that they should be loved in an exploitative manner. For even if one rejects Cooper's proposal, utility friends and pleasure friends nevertheless enjoy sufficient cooperation, mutual dependence, trust, agreement, and shared interests to count as friends in a quali-

³¹ Cooper 1999c, 320–323.

³² Price 1989, 151 f.

³³ Translation from Sharples 2010.

fied sense.³⁴ Although Aristotle believes that such friends are not lovable for their own sake, he need not thereby hold that they are lovable as *mere* means, and in an exploitative way.

Accordingly, it is important to see that my proposal differs essentially from Cooper's. Unlike Cooper, I do not appeal to the usefulness of *utility* friends to explain why utility friends are choiceworthy for their own sake. On my reading, Aristotle denies that they are. Rather, my proposal appeals to the utility of *virtue* friends to explain, at least in part, why virtue friends are choiceworthy for their own sake (ἐκείνων ἕνεκα), on account of themselves (δι' αὐτούς), and on account of their virtue (δι' ἀρετήν). As I have suggested, all three of these expressions refer, in the relevant contexts, to the same kind of choiceworthiness: to say that virtue friends are choiceworthy for their own sake is to say that they are choiceworthy on account of themselves (in a final causal sense); and because such friends are most of all identifiable with their virtues, to say that virtue friends are choiceworthy on account of virtue (in a final causal sense) is to specify what it is for them to be choiceworthy on account of themselves (in a final causal sense). Again, on my proposal, the perfect friend's choiceworthiness as an end for a virtuous agent, which Aristotle describes in these various ways, is (at least in part) materially constituted by, or realized in, the friend's usefulness for the virtuous agent.³⁵

³⁴ See Alpern 1983. Nehamas 2010 argues that in all forms of friendship one wishes well to the friend for the friend's sake, but that only in virtue friendship does one wish well to the friend for the friend's "own sake in a strict Aristotelian sense" (226–228; 244 f.). Although I do not take a position on Nehamas' reading, my own reading is at least consistent with his: for I hold that only in virtue friendship is the friend loved as an *end* in any strict way (a status that I take Nehamas' phrase "for his own sake" to pick out).

³⁵ Pangle 2003, 44 wonders whether it is "not a little absurd to say that a good man loves his good friend truly for his own sake, for what he is in himself [...] and yet only if the friend also happens to be good for him?" In reply, this thought need not be absurd if one keeps in mind that the friend's being good for the good man serves only as a necessary material condition for the friend's being lovable for his own sake, not primarily as a purpose for the sake of which the friend is lovable.

Incidentally, it is reasonable to think that the choiceworthiness of friends for their own sake also depends (at least partly) on their *pleasantness*. Thus, although Aristotle distinguishes virtue friends from pleasure friends, and must deny that virtue friends are choiceworthy primarily *for the sake of* their pleasantness, he nevertheless does think that virtue friends will be pleasant for each other (see, e.g., *EN* VIII.3, 1156b18–24; IX.9, 1169b35f.; *EE* VII.2, 1236b27–32; 1237a26–33; b2–5). Moreover, Aristotle suggests that you can be a friend only if you are pleasant for the other, for if the other finds you unpleasant, the other cannot bear to spend time with you (*EN* VIII.5, 1157b13–24; *MM* II.11, 1209b38–1210a5).

6 Three Additional Kinds of Textual Support for the Reading Offered

Thus far, my proposal. As Aristotle has reason to avoid the instrumentality concern, and because my proposal can explain *EN IX.9*'s appeal to the utility of friends in a way that frees Aristotle from the instrumentality concern, Aristotle at least has good reason to accept my proposal. In this section, however, I offer three additional kinds of positive textual support for my reading. I show that they provide us with good reasons to attribute to Aristotle instrumental conditionalism about the choiceworthiness of friends for their own sake.

6.1 Aristotle's Remarks on Gods, Mortals, Needs, and Choice-Worthiness

Just as a gourmet cooking skill would lack whatever final value it possesses if human beings no longer had a need for food, Aristotle suggests that friends would lack choiceworthiness for their own sake if human beings no longer had any needs, period. Thus, Aristotle emphasizes that friends lack choiceworthiness for gods, including choiceworthiness as ends, precisely because gods have no needs (*EE VII.12*, 1244b7–11; 1245b18 f.; cf. *EE VIII.3*, 1249b16; *MM II.15*, 1212b34–1213a7; *NE VIII.7*, 1159a5–12). In particular, gods lack needs for self-awareness, for on Aristotle's view, gods engage in, and even are, the activity of eternal, self-sufficient self-contemplation (*Metaphysics XII.7*, 9). Hence, although Aristotle does not say that friends are choiceworthy solely as means, he suggests that one cannot fully account for their choiceworthiness for their own sake in separation from their usefulness for beings like us. Were it not for our essential human cognitive limitations, and were it not for the way in which friends meet our corresponding needs, friends would not stand to us as potential ends of choice, love, pursuit, and enjoyment. Thus, it is plausible that the utility of friends (for us) serves as a necessary material condition for their choiceworthiness for their own sake (for us).

Aristotle's similar remarks on the choiceworthiness of ethically virtuous actions – which I already briefly addressed earlier – provide further evidence for my proposal. On the one hand, throughout the *EN*, Aristotle emphasizes the choiceworthiness of virtuous actions for their own sake (e.g., at *EN II.4*, 1105a32; *VI.12*, 1144a19). Elsewhere, he insists that one performs a virtuous action only coincidentally if one performs it *for the sake of* further ends, for example, for the sake of external goods (*EE VIII.3*, 1248b37–49a16). Ethically virtuous actions are choiceworthy for their own sake (at least partly) in virtue of their internal order.

In attaining the mean, they display that fitting proportion and lack of excess and deficiency constitutive of the *kalon* (see, e.g., *EN* II.6, 1106b9–14; IV.2, 1122a35–b6).

On the other hand, Aristotle thinks that when one considers the lives of the gods, it becomes apparent that the harmonious internal order of virtuous actions, as such, fails fully to explain their choiceworthiness for their own sake:

For we have understood the gods, most of all, to be blessed and happy. But what sort of actions is it necessary to assign to them? Just actions? Or will they appear laughable entering into contracts and returning deposits and such things? Courageous actions – enduring the fearful and running risks because [it is] fine? Or generous actions? But to whom will they give? And it [is] strange if there will also be currency, or something of that sort, for them [to use]. And temperate actions – what would they be? Or is the praise vulgar, that they do not have bad appetites? And for those going through them, all the things that concern action appear petty and unworthy of gods. (*EN* X.8, 1178b8–18)

Because gods are self-sufficient without qualification, that is, as gods lack any needs, such actions lack choiceworthiness for their own sake for gods, no matter how fine these actions may otherwise be. For needy mortals, however, ethically virtuous actions have a different character. For human beings, virtue is useful: it is “a power productive of good things” (δύναμις εὐεργετική), a power “creative” (ποιητική) of good results (cf. *Rhetoric* I.9, 1366a36–38 and 1366b16–19), and one “most useful for others” (ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας: 1366b3f.). In the *EN* X.8 passage above, then, it is plausible to read Aristotle as holding the following view: although ethically virtuous actions *are* choiceworthy for their own sake, they have this status only for the needy and mortal political animals that human beings are. Ethically virtuous actions are choiceworthy for their own sake, but such choiceworthiness is (at least in part) realized in, or by, the usefulness of such actions for meeting essential human needs.³⁶

³⁶ My discussion here is influenced by Korsgaard 1986, esp. 494f. Although Korsgaard does not address Aristotle’s discussion of friendship, she argues that the various sorts of “middle-level” goods (i.e., goods choiceworthy for their own sakes and for the sake of other ends) that Aristotle mentions at *EN* I.7, 1097b1–5 have conditional final value in two ways. First, their final value is dependent on our being “human beings living in human conditions”; second, their final value is dependent on their contribution to contemplation. Although Korsgaard’s claims are suggestive, I am not necessarily committed to Korsgaard’s stronger claim (at 494) that human conditions are (necessarily) “wrong or imperfect” and “flaw[ed]” by comparison with divine conditions. Against Korsgaard, Gottlieb 2009, chp. 3 argues that even if human conditions are not divine, Aristotle does not necessarily identify them as defective.

Whiting 2002 suggests that one can fruitfully compare Aristotle’s views on the value of virtuous actions for their own sake with his views on the value of friends for their own sake. As Whiting argues (at 277–280), virtuous actions characteristically aim at certain kinds of external results,

Thus, it is plausible to read Aristotle as holding that the conduciveness of temperate actions to one's health and the usefulness of courageous actions in securing the safety of one's *polis* and one's fellow citizens is a necessary material condition for the (respective) choiceworthiness of temperate actions and courageous actions for their own sake. Utility for meeting the needs of others would also materially constitute (at least part of) the choiceworthiness of generous and just actions for their own sake. Finally, it is plausible to think that, for Aristotle, the conduciveness of ethical virtue to contemplation (at least partly) materially constitutes the choiceworthiness of ethically virtuous action for its own sake. (i) The ethical virtues moderate the non-rational desires of the human soul, desires that the eternally active gods lack: these virtues dispose one to experience non-rational desires in a way that any embodied organism must (if one is to maintain oneself in the best condition for performing one's life-functions, including contemplation). (ii) Such virtues minimize the interference of non-rational desires with one's contemplation. (iii) Ethically virtuous actions, as performed in war and politics, maintain the sort of peace and leisure that human contemplation requires (*EN* X.7, 1177b1–26).³⁷

Ethically virtuous actions, like friends, are both choiceworthy for their own sake and useful. There is good reason to think that Aristotle holds that the utility of ethically virtuous actions serves as a necessary material condition for their choiceworthiness for their own sake. Hence, it is reasonable to attribute to Aristotle a similar view about friends.

6.2 Aristotle's Remarks on Other External Goods

In *EN* IX.9 Aristotle identifies friends as the greatest of external goods (1169b10). But Aristotle's remarks on how other external goods are choiceworthy for their own sake give us strong evidence that he thinks that an external good's utility can play a broadly material causal role in explaining why that good is worth choosing for its own sake. Consider, for example, Aristotle's views on wealth. On the one hand, Aristotle identifies wealth – along with friends and political power – as

and these external results play at least some role in determining those actions as the sorts of virtuous actions they are: thus, generous actions count as generous in virtue of aiming at benefiting people. For similar views about virtuous actions and their external results, see Korsgaard 1996, 216; Scott 2000, 220–222. Virtuous actions are useful, I suggest, insofar as they are such as to bring about these external results. Kagan 1998, 288 f., argues that the final value of helping people might depend, at least partly, on its utility for meeting others' needs.

³⁷ On ethical virtue's conduciveness to contemplation, see also Tuozzo 1995, 309.

choiceworthy “just as instruments” (καθάπερ δι’ ὀργάνων), viz., for noble, virtuous action (*EN* I.8, 1099a33–b2). Hence, wealth – like the friend – is useful: Aristotle identifies both as “productive of many things” (*Rhetoric* I.6, 1362b18–20). On the other hand, Aristotle includes wealth, along with victory and honor, in a list of items “choiceworthy in themselves” (αἰρετὰ [...] καθ’ αὐτά: *EN* VII.3, 1147b29–31). And because what is choiceworthy in itself (τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ αἰρετόν) is choiceworthy for its own sake (*EN* I.7, 1097a30–b6), Aristotle identifies wealth as belonging to the class of “ends” (τέλη), that is, goods choiceworthy for their own sake (cf. *EN* I.7, 1097a25–28 with *EE* VIII.3, 1248b18 f.). Similarly, in distinguishing four types of goods that agents can pursue, *Magna Moralia* I.2, 1183b26–37 includes wealth in the set of “powers” (δυνάμεις), that is, the same set of goods as authority, strength, and beauty – goods that are worth choosing for their own sake, even if they are also worth choosing for the sake of other ends.³⁸ The *Magna Moralia* notably does *not* place wealth in the set of auxiliary goods, which include gymnastic exercises, and which are identified as merely instrumentally choiceworthy, that is, as merely “preservative and productive of [a] good” (1183b36 f.; cf. Plato, *Republic* II, 357c–d). Aristotle’s views on wealth present one with a puzzle: if wealth is choiceworthy just as instruments are, but wealth is also choiceworthy in itself and for its own sake, exactly what sort of choiceworthiness does wealth possess? How can *wealth*, whose instrumental value no one disputes, be choiceworthy for its *own* sake?

For clarity on these matters, I consider a proposal offered by Alexander of Aphrodisias (3rd century C.E.), a commentator always worth taking seriously. As Alexander writes, “Insofar as [wealth] possesses, in its own nature, [the feature of] being an instrument (ὄργανον) for the virtuous person for activities according to virtue, [...] it is good and choiceworthy in itself (καθ’ αὐτόν ἐστὶν ἀγαθός τε καὶ αἰρετός); for it possesses, in its own nature, [the feature of] being useful (χρήσιμος).”³⁹ On Alexander’s reading, then, wealth for Aristotle is choiceworthy in itself – and thus, choiceworthy for its own sake – at least partly, and perhaps wholly, in virtue of its special utility for the virtuous agent. Again, it is reasonable to think that the utility of wealth for the virtuous agent “causes” wealth’s choiceworthiness for its own sake as a necessary material condition of such choiceworthiness.

³⁸ Even if the *Magna Moralia* is not by Aristotle, I take it to present Aristotle’s views. Simpson 2014, ix–xxvii, forcefully argues that the traditional arguments against the work’s authenticity consistently fail.

³⁹ *Commentary on the Topics*, III.1.2, 243, 5–8. I borrow, with slight emendations, Tuozzo’s translation of this passage in Tuozzo 1995, 302. My discussion of wealth owes much to Tuozzo’s stimulating paper.

To be clear, Alexander is presumably *not* saying that an item's usefulness *as such* renders that item choiceworthy in itself and for its own sake. After all, some items – such as painful surgery or gymnastic exercise – possess “merely” instrumental choiceworthiness for producing and preserving goods; and these “merely” instrumental goods, however useful they may be, lack choiceworthiness for their own sake. But some instrumental goods, for example, wealth, are also worth choosing for themselves. This claim might initially sound strange: contemporary philosophers are prone to identify wealth as a “merely” instrumental good, choiceworthy solely for attaining further ends. Yet, although there is more to be said on this issue, it is not clear that Aristotle's and Alexander's claims about wealth are really so counterintuitive. As it turns out, agents typically *do not* pursue (at least a certain degree of) wealth *solely* as a means to other ends. They do not pursue wealth in the “merely instrumental” way in which they pursue, say, a colonoscopy. On the contrary, they also (often) pursue wealth for its own sake as well. (To make this modest point about the finality of wealth is not to insist on the different, and implausible, claim that wealth is the *highest* end for human beings, or even an end of *especially significant* finality.⁴⁰ Nor is it to insist that the tedious labor often required to attain wealth is also choiceworthy for its own sake.)

To explain how wealth can be worth choosing for itself, assuming that it is, Alexander makes an interesting move: he appeals to the very utility of wealth (for virtuous agency). Alexander thus attributes to Aristotle a striking claim about why wealth is choiceworthy for its own sake as well as for the sake of other ends. On Alexander's reading, Aristotle is committed to a *virtuous agency account* of why wealth is choiceworthy for its own sake. On a plausible construal of this account, wealth is “useful” (i) as a necessary constituent of certain kinds of virtuous action, for example, liberal giving and just repayment of debts (*EN* X.8, 1178a28–30). But wealth is also “useful” (ii) for contributing constitutively to the

⁴⁰ At *EN* I.5, 1096a6f., Aristotle denies that wealth is the sort of good that can serve as the highest end within a happy life, and that wealth is final without qualification. But this denial is consistent with Aristotle's maintaining that wealth is choiceworthy for its own sake. Even if wealth is not final without qualification, wealth can still be a final end. Cf. Tuozzo 1995, 301, who also usefully discusses Aristotle's distinctions among kinds of goods.

At *EN* I.7, 1097a26–28, Aristotle suggests that wealth – like flutes and other instruments, and unlike honor, pleasure, and virtue – lacks choiceworthiness for its own sake. In this passage, I take it that Aristotle has small amounts of wealth in mind, whereas he has great amounts of wealth in mind at *EN* VII.3, 1147b29–31. So, whereas a few drachmae may be choiceworthy merely for the sake of other ends (see 1097a26–28), a great fortune may be choiceworthy for its own sake as well (see 1147b29–31).

virtuous agent's preferred conditions for action, that is, to those favored (and favorable) circumstances under which the virtuous agent can exercise the virtues fully, pleasantly, and without impediment.⁴¹ On Alexander's reading of Aristotle, wealth is choiceworthy as an end insofar as it promotes, and is used by the virtuous agent to promote, virtuous agency in these two ways. By contrast, to the extent that wealth promotes – and is used by a virtuous agent to promote – vicious agency, wealth lacks choiceworthiness as an end. For wealth, in this case, is harmful both to the virtuous agent and to others (*EE* VIII.3, 1248b26–34; cf. *Politics* VII.13, 1332a23–25).⁴²

Now, just as Aristotle accepts a virtuous agency account of the choiceworthiness of wealth, Aristotle may also, at times, accept a virtuous agency account of the choiceworthiness of friends. In *EN* IX.9, for instance, Aristotle alludes to the role that friends play as useful constituents of certain kinds of virtuous actions (e.g., beneficent actions: 1169b10–13). Further, Aristotle observes that friends make it possible for the virtuous agent to engage more continuously in virtuous action (1170a5–11). But then, it might seem that my proposal for reading the two main arguments of *EN* IX.9 runs into trouble. For those two arguments appeal to the friend's role in eliciting pleasant self-awareness in the virtuous agent, not in promoting his virtuous agency.

I offer two replies in response to this worry. The first reply: although Aristotle provides a virtuous agency account of how wealth can be choiceworthy for its own sake, he does not necessarily insist that utility for virtuous agency must be the *only* sort of utility that can (material causally) explain an item's choiceworthiness for its own sake. The second reply: a virtuous agency account of why friends are choiceworthy for their own sake (i.e., an account that makes reference to their utility for virtuous agency) need not conflict with a self-awareness account (i.e., an account that makes reference to the utility of friends for eliciting self-awareness). On the one hand, the two accounts could simply be different, but mutually consistent kinds of accounts. On the other hand, they could be two importantly similar kinds of accounts. For instance, Aristotle may well accept that

⁴¹ On the role of external goods in unimpeded and pleasant virtuous action, see *EN* I.8, 1099a31–b8; I.9, 1099b27 f.; VII.13, 1153b14–19; for later Peripatetic views, see Arius Didymus, 2.134.20–135.10, Wachsmuth 1884. For a fuller discussion, see Cooper 1999d and Tuozzo 1995. By insisting that a particularly tight – proximate – connection obtains between goods like wealth and virtuous action, Aristotle can deny that not just anything useful for virtuous action is thereby choiceworthy for its own sake. For instance, although surgery is useful for regaining health, and although health is useful for virtuous action, the remote relation between surgery and virtuous action allows Aristotle to deny that surgery is choiceworthy for its own sake.

⁴² For further discussion, see Broadie 1999.

the pleasant self-awareness that the virtuous agent enjoys in friendship approximates the pleasant self-awareness that God enjoys in eternal self-contemplation. And Aristotle presumably thinks that such self-awareness, like virtuous action, is choiceworthy for its own sake (see, e.g., *EN* IX.9, 1170b8–10). Hence, Aristotle may well accept that a self-awareness account of the friend's choiceworthiness is largely continuous with a virtuous agency account. Just as the choiceworthiness of wealth for its own sake is materially constituted, at least partly, by its utility for the virtuous agent's good activity, the friend's choiceworthiness for his own sake is materially constituted, at least partly, by his conduciveness to the virtuous agent's good self-awareness.⁴³

For now, I leave these issues to the side. No matter how one answers them, the point remains that Aristotle's remarks on wealth show that it is reasonable to attribute to Aristotle the view that the choiceworthiness of an external good for its own sake can (at least partly) be realized in, or by, its special utility for virtuous agents. And if so, there is good reason to think that Aristotle can allow the same to hold for other external goods.⁴⁴

6.3 Aristotle on the Choice-Worthiness of Tragedy

As a final item of support for my proposal, I consider the sort of choiceworthiness that it would be reasonable for Aristotle to attribute to certain kinds of mimetic poetry, viz., tragic drama. Of course, friends and tragic dramas differ in important respects. Most obviously, we hope that our friends' stories have happy endings. Moreover, whereas friends are tied by reciprocal bonds of affection and well-

⁴³ I have argued that the choiceworthiness of virtuous actions for their own sake is itself dependent (at least partly) on their usefulness. I leave open the issue of whether a similar story holds for self-awareness.

⁴⁴ In holding that the utility of perfect friends plays a role in explaining why they are choiceworthy for their own sake, my proposal might imply that the choiceworthiness of such friends is uncomfortably like that of wealth. (I owe this worry to Noell Birondo.)

In response to this worry, it is true that, on my proposal, Aristotle believes virtue friends and wealth to have the same kind of choiceworthiness – at least in the limited sense that their respective utility is a material cause of their respective choiceworthiness for their own sake. Yet my proposal need not hold that virtue friends and wealth have “the same kind” of choiceworthiness in the different (and objectionable) sense that both are *equally choiceworthy* for their own sake, or choiceworthy in *just* the same way. My proposal can easily accept that friends make a richer, more central, and more lasting contribution to one's happiness than wealth. It can also accept that how one should treat one's friends is significantly different from how one should treat one's wealth.

wishing, the theatergoer's interaction with a tragic drama lacks such reciprocity. Nevertheless, the comparison here seems useful, for such mimetic poetry shares three relevant similarities with the friend.⁴⁵

First, the contemplation of a tragic drama, like the contemplation of a friend, is choiceworthy for its own sake. At least Aristotle thinks so. We view a dramatic performance at the Dionysia “not on account of some different [end], but on account of itself” (οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον ἀλλὰ δι' ἑαυτήν) (*Protrepticus* IX.53.15–26 [Pistelli 1888]/B44 [Düring 1961]). Thus, we do not watch a dramatic performance to gain money. On the contrary, we spend money on the actors.

Second, such drama presents us with characters who bear interesting (structural) similarities to the friend as “another self.” Although Aristotle does not think that we are *friends* with the heroes of tragic drama, Aristotle thinks that the hero of a tragic drama, like the friend, should be “like us” (ὅμοιον: *Poetics* 13, 1453a5). His story appears within a *mimetic representation* of human character, passion, and action (1, 1447a28). And like the virtue friend, the tragic hero should be good (χρηστός: 15, 1454a16–19; ἐπιεικέις: 1454b13 [cf. *EN* IX.12, 1172a10 f.]), capable of stirring our pity and fear (*Poetics* 13, 1453a7–11).

Third – and most importantly – although the contemplation of a tragic drama, like the contemplation of a friend, is choiceworthy for its own sake, the contemplation of the drama can still fulfill cognitive needs in the spectator. Audiences enjoy contemplating poetic representations, for in such contemplation they learn and make inferences about what is represented (συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστόν: 4, 1448b14–17).⁴⁶ Further, if the “catharsis through pity and fear” that provides the proper pleasure of a tragic drama (6, 1449b22; 14, 1453b12) is primarily a cognitive “clarification” about certain universal possibilities facing human beings, including the spectator – a point I shall not defend here, but which is nevertheless plausible – then the catharsis that Aristotle thinks tragic dramas accomplish *qua* tragic dramas will even *be* the eliciting of a certain self-awareness.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ The similarities between fictional works and Aristotelian friends are explored from different angles by Booth 1988 and Osborne 2009, 362–365.

⁴⁶ Such discrimination will go beyond recognizing simple likenesses of things represented. As Halliwell 1992, 249 argues, audiences will make inferences about “the rich totality of people, actions, emotions, events, arguments, and so forth, with all their various facets and interrelationships; and to ‘reason’, or ‘infer’, will accordingly imply an intricate, unfolding process of attentive comprehension.”

⁴⁷ See Golden 1962 and Nussbaum 1992, esp. 142–147. Cf. Rorty 1992, 15 f.

Now, the good tragic drama possesses more than merely instrumental value. The good tragic drama is not simply a tool for eliciting self-awareness in its audience. Audiences do not take the proper pleasure in theatergoing when they approach a given tragic drama from a narrowly utilitarian standpoint, as a “catharsis device” or a complicated instrument *for the sake of* eliciting audience self-awareness. And so, outside of certain limited contexts (e.g., bibliotherapy), audiences would seem to be missing the point if they were to approach a tragic drama (or other form of mimetic poetry) solely from an instrumental standpoint.⁴⁸ Good tragic dramas are also choiceworthy for their own sake, as *ends* (of pursuit, of contemplation, of engagement, of enjoyment).

To explain a tragedy’s choiceworthiness for its own sake, Aristotle appeals – at least partly – to its internal order (7, 1450b34–37). Like the character of a virtuous friend, and like a well-proportioned virtuous action, a good tragedy exemplifies the *kalon*. Yet although the internal order of a tragedy is essential to its choiceworthiness for its own sake (at least in part), such order does not fully suffice for such choiceworthiness. Rather, the needs of an audience and the special utility of tragic drama also play ineliminable roles. Again, tragic dramas, like friends and virtuous actions, would lack any sort of choiceworthiness for gods. As the *EN* X.8 passage discussed earlier suggests, the sphere of ethical action with which tragic drama deals would be too trifling for such an audience, an audience active in eternal, self-sufficient self-contemplation. Moreover, gods, *qua* eternally active and completely self-sufficient, are not subject to passion. Incapable of pity and fear, they would be unreceptive to the proper pleasures of tragic drama.

Thus, Aristotle thinks that tragic dramas are choiceworthy for their own sake. Yet he is not a modern aesthete who denies that the value of tragic dramas can or should make *any* reference to their utility. On the contrary, I contend, Aristotle defends a more moderate position: tragic dramas are choiceworthy for their own sake, but this choiceworthiness is conditioned, at least partly, by their capacity to meet the cognitive needs of their intended human audiences – in particular, needs for self-understanding. Such needs arise given that the intended audiences for tragedy – outside the theatrical performance’s bounded, festive setting – are ordinarily engaged in action for the sake of various ends. Like those whom *EN* IX.9 identifies as requiring friends, these audiences cannot contemplate them-

⁴⁸ In *Politics* VIII.7, 1341b32–1342a18, Aristotle suggests that certain melodies are valuable for the sake of catharsis in those who are excessively prone to pity, fear, and enthusiasm. Yet, for Aristotle, such a therapeutic use of music differs from ordinary uses of music (and of poetry), which are to be enjoyed by non-pathological agents.

selves acting without interrupting their own action. And so, like the heroes of tragic drama – such as Oedipus (*Poetics* 11, 1452a24; 14, 1453b3–7) – these audiences face cognitive impediments, for example, ignorance or forgetfulness about certain possibilities that they face as human beings.⁴⁹

In short, if a tragic drama is worth beholding for its own sake (as a tragic drama), we can explain this fact (at least partly) by reference to the drama's utility for clearing up cognitive impediments in the audience. Such utility underlies the drama's choiceworthiness for its own sake as a necessary material condition. And given the similarities between friends and tragic dramas already noted, we have reason to think that Aristotle holds a similar view concerning the choiceworthiness of friends.

7 Conclusion

In conclusion, in *EN IX.9*, Aristotle argues that the virtuous agent will need friends because friends are choiceworthy for virtuous agents. And Aristotle accounts for the choiceworthiness of friends for virtuous agents by appealing, at least in part, to the conduciveness of the former to the self-awareness of the latter. Yet, I have argued, Aristotle appeals to such conduciveness in a way that sidesteps both the “internal” and the “external” worries with which I began this paper. For Aristotle, friends are not choiceworthy merely for the sake of their conduciveness to self-awareness; they are choiceworthy for their own sake as well. As I have argued, however, their conduciveness to self-awareness serves as a broadly material causal factor in explaining their choiceworthiness for their own sake. Aristotle's remarks on the utility of friends in *EN IX.9* thus remain consistent with his claim that perfect friends are choiceworthy and lovable for their own sake. Hence, although it raises additional questions, as any interesting view about friendship

⁴⁹ On some of these limitations of tragic audiences, see Nussbaum 1992, 146 f. One might object that tragic dramas can deliver insight into the needs of others, the nature of suffering, etc., and that the choiceworthiness of a tragedy need not depend on its eliciting self-awareness. Yet I take it that these other kinds of insight are best understood as constitutive of the relevant sort of self-awareness that a tragedy elicits *qua* tragedy, that is, an awareness of one's tragic limitations *qua* human, limitations that one shares with one's fellow human beings.

It might be objected that truly virtuous spectators have no need for such clarification (cf. Lear [1988] 1992, 318). But this objection assumes (wrongly) that Aristotle's virtuous agent is infallible. For useful correctives to this assumption, see Drefcinski 1995 and Curzer 2005; cf. Nussbaum 1992, 145 f.

must, Aristotle's account in *EN IX.9* of why friends are choiceworthy can address the instrumentality concern.⁵⁰

- Ackrill, J. [1974] 1980. "Aristotle on Eudaimonia". In *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*. Ed. A. Rorty. Berkeley, CA, 15–33.
- Alpern, K. 1983. "Aristotle on the Friendships of Utility and Pleasure". *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 21, 303–315.
- Badhwar, N. 1987. "Friends as Ends in Themselves". *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 48, 1–23.
- Booth, W. 1988. *The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction*. Berkeley, CA.
- Broadie, S. 1999. "Aristotle's Elusive *Summum Bonum*". In *Human Flourishing*. Eds. E. Paul/F. Miller/J. Paul. Cambridge, 233–251.
- Cooper, J. (ed.). 1999a. *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory*. Princeton, NJ.
- . 1999b. "Friendship and the Good in Aristotle". In Cooper 1999a, 336–355.
- . 1999c. "Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship". In Cooper 1999a, 312–335.
- . 1999d. "Aristotle on the Goods of Fortune". In Cooper 1999a, 292–309.
- Curzer, H. 2005. "How Good People Do Bad Things: Aristotle on the Misdeeds of the Virtuous". *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 28, 233–256.
- Drefcinski, S. 1995. "Aristotle's Fallible *Phronimos*". *Ancient Philosophy* 16, 139–154.
- Düring, I. (ed.) 1961. *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction*. Goteborg.
- Golden, L. 1962. "Catharsis". *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 93, 51–60.
- Gottlieb, P. 2009. *The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics*. Cambridge.
- Halliwel, S. 1992. "Pleasure, Understanding, and Emotion in Aristotle's *Poetics*". In *Essays on Aristotle's Poetics*. Ed. A. Rorty. Princeton, NJ, 241–260.
- Hitz, Z. 2011. "Aristotle on Self-Knowledge and Friendship". *Philosophers' Imprint* 11, 1–28.
- Johnson, M. R. 2005. *Aristotle on Teleology*. Oxford.
- Kagan, S. 1998. "Rethinking Intrinsic Value". *The Journal of Ethics* 2, 277–297.
- Korsgaard, C. 1983. "Two Distinctions in Goodness". *Philosophical Review* 92, 169–195.
- . 1986. "Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value". *Ethics* 96, 486–505.
- . 1996. "From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action". In *Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty*. Eds. S. Engstrom/J. Whiting. Cambridge, 203–236.

50 For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I thank Anthony Carreras, Verity Harte, Sean McAleer, and Carrie Swanson; audiences at Florida State University, Rutgers University, the University of Hong Kong, the University of Miami, Wellesley College, and the Pacific APA (where my commentator was Noell Birondo); and anonymous referees for this journal. I have also benefited from an American Council of Learned Societies New Faculty Fellowship at Rutgers University.

- Kraut, R. 1989. *Aristotle on the Human Good*. Princeton, NJ.
- Lear, J. [1988] 1992. "Katharsis". In *Essays on Aristotle's Poetics*. Ed. A. Rorty. Princeton, NJ, 315–340.
- Miller, F., Jr. 1999. "Aristotle's Philosophy of Soul". *The Review of Metaphysics* 53, 309–337.
- Millgram, E. 1987. "Aristotle on Making Other Selves". *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 17, 361–376.
- Nehamas, A. 2010. "Aristotelian Philia, Modern Friendship?". *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 39, 213–247.
- Nussbaum, M. 1992. "Tragedy and Self-Sufficiency: Plato and Aristotle on Pity and Fear". *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 10, 107–159.
- Olson, J. 2004. "Intrinsicism and Conditionalism about Final Value". *Ethical Theory and Social Practice* 7, 31–52.
- Osborne, C. 2009. "Selves and Other Selves in Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* VII.12". *Ancient Philosophy* 29, 349–371.
- Pakaluk, M. 1998. *Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII and IX*. Oxford.
- Pangle, L. S. 2003. *Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship*. Cambridge.
- Pellegrin, P. 1986. *Aristotle's Classification of Animals: Biology and the Conceptual Unity of the Aristotelian Corpus*. Trans. A. Preus. Berkeley, CA.
- Pistelli, H. (ed.) 1888. *Iamblichi Protrepticus*. Leipzig.
- Price, A. 1989. *Plato and Aristotle on Love and Friendship*. Oxford.
- Rabinowicz, W./T. Ronnow-Rasmussen. 1999. "A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake". *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 100, 33–49.
- Rogers, K. 1994. "Aristotle on Loving a Friend for His Own Sake". *Phronesis* 39, 291–302.
- Rorty, A. 1992. "The Psychology of Aristotelian Tragedy". In *Essays on Aristotle's Poetics*. Ed. A. Rorty. Princeton, NJ, 1–22.
- Ross, W. (ed.) 1924. *Aristotle: Metaphysics*. Oxford.
- . 1955. *Aristotle: Parva Naturalia*. Oxford.
- . 1956. *Aristotelis: De Anima*. Oxford.
- . 1957. *Aristotelis: Politica*. Oxford.
- . 1959. *Aristotelis: Ars Rhetorica*. Oxford.
- Scott, D. 2000. "Aristotle on Posthumous Misfortune". *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 18, 211–229.
- Sharples, R. 2010. *Peripatetic Philosophy, 200 B.C. to A.D. 400: An Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation*. Cambridge.
- Simpson, P. 2001. "Aristotle's Idea of the Self". *Journal of Value Inquiry* 35, 309–324.
- . 2014. *The Great Ethics of Aristotle*. New Brunswick, NJ.
- Slote, M. 1983. *Goods and Virtues*. Oxford.
- Stern-Gillet, S. 1995. *Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship*. Albany, NY.
- Susemihl, F. (ed.) 1883. *Aristotelis: Magna Moralia*. Leipzig.
- Tuozzo, T. 1995. "Aristotle's Theory of the Good and Its Causal Basis". *Phronesis* 40, 293–314.
- Wachsmuth, C. (ed.) 1884. *Stobaeus: Eclogae*. Berlin.
- Walker, M. 2010. "Contemplation and Self-Awareness in the *Nicomachean Ethics*". *Rhizai* 7, 221–238.
- Wallies, M. (ed.) 1881. *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis: Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria*. Berlin.
- Walzer, R. R./Mingay, J. M. (eds.) 1991. *Aristotelis: Ethica Eudemia*. Oxford.

- Whiting, J. 2002. "Eudaimonia, External Results, and Choosing Virtuous Actions for Themselves". *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65, 270–290.
- Whiting, J. 2006. "The Nicomachean Account of *Philia*". In *The Blackwell Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. Ed. R. Kraut. Malden, MA, 276–304.