Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Cognitive extension, enhancement, and the phenomenology of thinking

  • Published:
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper brings together several strands of thought from both the analytic and phenomenological traditions in order to critically examine accounts of cognitive enhancement that rely on the idea of cognitive extension. First, I explain the idea of cognitive extension, the metaphysics of mind on which it depends, and how it has figured in recent discussions of cognitive enhancement. Then, I develop ideas from Husserl that emphasize the agential character of thought and the distinctive way that conscious thoughts are related to one another. I argue that these considerations are necessary for understanding why forms of cognitive extension may diminish our cognitive lives in different ways. This does not lead to a categorical rejection of cognitive enhancement as unethical or bad for human flourishing, but does warrant a conservative approach to the design and implementation of cognitive artifacts.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Though I do not think “abilities” and “capacities” are strictly synonymous, I use them largely interchangeably throughout this paper for stylistic purposes.

  2. See Thomasson (2002), Smith and Thomasson (2005), and Walsh and Yoshimi (forthcoming) for overviews of the shared history, areas of overlap, and horizon of future interaction of phenomenology and philosophy of mind.

  3. Prominent defenses include Clark (2008), Menary (2007), and Rowlands (2010). Prominent critiques include Adams and Aizawa (2008), and Rupert (2009).

  4. In contemporary analytic philosophy the terms “phenomenal character” and “phenomenology” are often used synonymously to refer to the irreducibly qualitative aspect of consciousness as experienced from the first person perspective. Block’s (1995) distinction between “phenomenal consciousness” and “access consciousness” remains a touchstone for the concept of phenomenal consciousness. See Siewert (2011) for a good clarification of this concept and the expression “what it’s like” that is so often invoked in discussions of it.

  5. Recent discussions of cognitive phenomenology have treated the concept rather loosely. At times it refers to the proprietary, distinctive, and individuative phenomenal character of the content of occurrent acts of thinking (Pitt 2004; 2011). Other discussions focus on more general phenomenon, the phenomenology of thinking (Breyer and Gutland 2015). The phenomenology of thinking would obviously include the phenomenal character of its occurrent thought contents, but could include other phenomenal characters such as an attitudinal component like wondering, doubting, or entertaining, as well as other so called “epistemic feelings” such as familiarity, surprise, confusion, or curiosity (Klausen 2008; Bayne and Montague 2011a, b).

  6. Husserl discusses motivation in the first chapter of the First Investigation of his Logical Investigations (2001b), and devotes several sections to it in Ideas II (1989), but it occurs throughout his corpus, especially in his later turn to genetic phenomenology. Walsh (2013) provides a detailed analysis of motivation in the early Husserl. Yoshimi (unpublished manuscript) devotes a chapter to the concept and its development throughout the entire Husserlian corpus. Wrathall (2005) provides an illuminating discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of motivation.

  7. Frequently cited sources from this tradition include Kirsh and Maglio (1995) and Hutchins (1995). See Dror and Harnad (2008) for an informative introduction.

  8. See Kriegel (2013a, b) for a comprehensive introduction to the phenomenal intentionality research program (PIRP), which has its origins in Horgan and Tienson (2002) and Loar (2003).

  9. While this may be true in academic philosophy, it is certainly not true in the case of science fiction (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for noting this).

  10. Classic discussions include those of Sellars (1956) Davidson (1980), Dennett (1981), Dretske (1988), and Rudder Baker (1995).

  11. See Soteriou’s (2007) discussion of Geach (1957) for a full analysis of the ontology of mental states and processes.

  12. See, e.g., Pitt (2004), the essays collected in Bayne and Montague (2011a, b) as well as those in Kriegel (Kriegel 2013a, b).

  13. This point holds in the case of the artifactual coupling imagined by Clark and Chalmers (1998) in their initial discussion of Otto, in which the information is made perceptually available. Of course, different forms of artifactual coupling might allow for degrees of vagueness. (I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this.) I return to this point in the conclusion.

  14. Merleau-Ponty makes this point, characterizing the motivation relation as an “internal relation” between the motivated and motivating phenomena, in which “rather than merely succeeding it, the motivated phenomenon makes the motivating one explicit and clarifies it, such that the motivated seems to have preexisted its own motive. (Merleau-Ponty 2013, 51).

  15. Recent discussions of understanding in analytic epistemology have focused on its role in explanation and its relation to propositional knowledge (See, e.g., Grimm 2006; Kvanvig 2003; Khalifa 2013; Strevens 2013; Trout 2002). For my purposes in this essay it is sufficient to regard understanding as an intellectual virtue or cognitive achievement with prima facie value.

  16. I am grateful to Jeff Yoshimi and an anonymous reviewer for comments and provocations.

References

  • Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2008). The bounds of cognition. Malden: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bayne, T., & Montague, M. (Eds.). (2011a). Cognitive phenomenology. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bayne, T., & Montague, M. (2011b). Cognitive phenomenology: An introduction. In Bayne & Montague (Eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Bernecker, S. (2014). How to understand the extended mind. Philosophical Issues, 24, 1–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences, 18, 227–47.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boghossian, P. (2012). What is inference? Philosophical Studies, 169, 1–18.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Breyer, T., & Gutland, C. (Eds.). (2015). Phenomenology of thinking: Philosophical investigations into the character of cognitive experiences. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buller, T. (2013). Neurotechnology, invasiveness and the extended mind. Neuroethics, 6, 593–605.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Byerly, R. (2014). The special value of epistemic self-reliance. Ratio, 27, 53–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, A. (2007). Re-inventing ourselves: the plasticity of embodiment, sensing, and mind. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 32, 263–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, A. (2009). Spreading the joy? Why the machinery of consciousness is (probably) still in the head. Mind, 118, 963–93.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58, 7–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clowes, R. (2015). Thinking in the cloud: the cognitive incorporation of cloud-based technology. Philosophy & Technology, 28, 261–96.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crane, T. (2013). “Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought.” In Kriegel (Ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality, 156–73. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Daniels, N. (2000). Normal functioning and the treatment-enhancement distinction. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 9, 309–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and events. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Dennett, D. (1981). True believers: The intentional strategy and why it works. In Heath (Ed.), Scientific explanation (pp. 150–67). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Dretske, F. (1988). Explaining behavior: Reasons in a world of causes. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dreyfus, H. (2002). Intelligence without representation—Merleau-Ponty’s critique of mental representation and the relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1, 367–83.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dror, I., & Harnad, S. (2008). Cognition distributed: How cognitive technology extends Our minds. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Geach, P. (1957). Mental acts. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Georgalis, N. (2006). The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.

  • Grimm, S. (2006). Is understanding a species of knowledge? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57, 515–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grimm, S. (2012). The value of understanding. Philosophy Compass, 7, 103–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heersmink, R. (2011). Defending extension theory: A response to Kiran and verbeek. Philosophy and Technology, 25, 121–28.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heersmink, R. (2013). A taxonomy of cognitive artifacts: function, information, and categories. The Review of Philosophy & Psychology, 4, 1–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. Macquarrie and Robinson (trans.). New York: Harper & Row.

  • Horgan, T., & Kriegel, U. (2008). Phenomenal intentionality meets the extended mind. The Monist, 91, 347–373.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (2002). The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. In Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings (pp. 520–33). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Husserl, E. (1973). Experience and judgment; investigations in a genealogy of logic. Churchill and Ameriks (trans.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

  • Husserl, E. (1989). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: studies in phenomenology of the constitution. Rojcewicz and Schuwer (trans). Dordrecht: Springer.

  • Husserl, E. (2001a). Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis: lectures on transcendental logic. Steinbock (trans.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

  • Husserl, E. (2001b). Logical investigations, Vol. 1. Findlay (trans.). London: Routledge.

  • Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ihde, D. (2011). Husserl’s Galileo needed a telescope! Philosophy and Technology, 24, 69–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Khalifa, K. (2013). The role of explanation in understanding. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64, 161–87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kiran, A., & Verbeek, P. (2010). Trusting our selves to technology. Knowledge, Technology and Policy, 23, 409–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kirsh, D., & Maglio, P. (1995). On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action. Cognitive Science, 18, 513–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klausen, S. (2008). The phenomenology of propositional attitudes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7, 445–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein, G., Calderwood, R., & Clinton-Cirocco, A. (2010). Rapid decision making on the fire ground: the original study plus a postscript. Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making, 4, 186–209.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kriegel, U. (2003). “Is Intentionality Dependent Upon Consciousness?” Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271–307.

  • Kriegel, U. (Ed.). (2013a). Phenomenal intentionality. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Kriegel, U. (2013b). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In Kriegel (Ed.), Phenomenal intentionality (pp. 1–26). New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Kvanvig, J. (2003). The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Levy, N. (2007). Rethinking neuroethics in the light of the extended mind thesis. American Journal of Bioethics, 7, 3–11.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loar, B. (2003). Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content. In Reflections and replies: essays on the philosophy of Tyler Burge (pp. 229–58). Cambridge: MIT Press.

  • Luhmann, N. (1988). Familiarity, confidence, trust: problems and alternatives. In Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: making and breaking cooperative relations (pp. 94–107). Cambridge: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Menary, R. (2007). Cognitive integration: Mind and cognition unbounded. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Merleau-Ponty, M. (2013). Phenomenology of perception. Landes (trans.). New York: Routledge.

  • Mohanty, J. N. (1971). Husserl’s concept of intentionality. In Tymieniecka (Ed.), Analecta Husserliana (pp. 100–132). Dordrecht: Springer.

  • Nes, A. (2015). The sense of natural meaning in conscious inference. In Breyer and Gutland (Eds.), Phenomenology of thinking. Routledge. 1-22. Accessed from http://philpapers.org/archive/NESTSO-2.pdf.

  • Pitt, D. (2004). The phenomenology of cognition, or, what is it like to think that P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69, 1–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pitt, D. (2011). Introspection, phenomenality, and the availability of intentional content. In Bayne and Montague (Eds.), Cognitive phenomenology (pp. 141–173). New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Plato. (1892). Phaedrus. Jowett (trans.). The dialogues of plato in five volumes. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Putnam, H. (1967). The nature of mental states. In Capitan & Merrill (Eds.), Art, mind, and religion (pp. 223–31). Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of ‘meaning’. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7, 131–93.

    Google Scholar 

  • Radoilska, L. (2010). An Aristotelian approach to cognitive enhancement. Journal of Value Inquiry, 44, 365–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rowlands, M. (2010). The new science of the mind: from extended mind to embodied phenomenology. Cambridge: MIT Press.

  • Rudder Baker, L. (1995). Explaining attitudes: A practical approach to the mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rupert, R. (2004). Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition. Journal of Philosophy, 101, 389–428.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rupert, R. (2009). Cognitive systems and the extended mind. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sellars, W. (1956). Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1, 253–329.

    Google Scholar 

  • Siewert, C. (1998). The significance of consciousness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Siewert, C. (2011). Phenomenal thought. In M. Bayne (Ed.), Cognitive phenomenology (pp. 236–267). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, D. W., & Thomasson, A. (2005). Phenomenology and philosophy of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Soteriou, M. (2007). Content and the stream of consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives, 21, 543–68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steinbock, A. (2004). Affection and attention: on the phenomenology of becoming aware. Continental Philosophy Review, 37, 21–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sterelny, K. (2004). Externalism, epistemic artefacts and the extended mind. In Schantz (Ed.), The externalist challenge (pp. 239–54). Berlin: De Gruyter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strevens, M. (2013). No understanding without explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44, 510–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomasson, A. (2002). Phenomenology and the development of analytic philosophy. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 40, 115–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Trout, J. D. (2002). Scientific explanation and the sense of understanding. Philosophy of Science, 69, 212–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Walsh, P. (2013). Husserl’s concept of motivation: the logical investigations and beyond. Logical Analysis & History of Philosophy/Philosophiegeschichte Und Logische Analyse, 16, 70–83.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walsh, P., Yoshimi, J. Forthcoming. Philosophy of mind in the phenomenological tradition. In Kind (Ed.), Philosophy of mind in the 20th and 21st centuries. Routledge.

  • Weiskrantz, L. (1986). Blindsight: A case study and implications. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wrathall, M. (2005). Motives, reasons, and causes. In Carmen & Hansen (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to merleau-ponty (pp. 111–128). New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yoshimi, J. A unifying formalism for Husserlian phenomenology. Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Merced.

  • Zagzebski, L. (2001). Recovering understanding. In Steup (Ed.), Knowledge, truth, and duty: Essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zahavi, D. (2015). Self and other: Exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 185 Humanities Instructional Building, Irvine, CA, 92697, USA

    Philip J. Walsh

Authors
  1. Philip J. Walsh
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Philip J. Walsh.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Walsh, P.J. Cognitive extension, enhancement, and the phenomenology of thinking. Phenom Cogn Sci 16, 33–51 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9461-3

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9461-3

Keywords

Search

Navigation