

would people do if allowed to construct diagrams. How many alternative diagrams would they construct for indeterminate problems? Would they construct them in the predicted order? Would the diagrams contain unnecessary visual detail?

Knauff discusses at the end of the book the boundary constraints of the spatial layout model and is cautious in making generalizations to others areas of visual/spatial reasoning.

He proposes that people use an abstract spatial strategy to solve Hegarty's pulley problem but it seems conceivable that a visual representation of the particular objects might be important, at least initially. Schwartz and Black argued that, even for simpler objects, students initially simulated the details of gears, then abstracted them to form circles, and finally induced rules. The problems used by the Gestalt psychologists should be good candidates for abstract spatial representations although metric relations are required for some and the solution is often suddenly found after rejecting incorrect arrangements.

I discuss these and many other types of problems in my book *Thinking Visually*. I hope that Markus Knauff eventually writes a sequel to *Space to Reason* that applies his theory to these other types of problems.—Stephen K. Reed, *San Diego State University*

KREEFT, PETER. *Summa Philosophica*. South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 2012. xviii + 254pp. Cloth, \$30.00—Having tried his hand at several Socratic dialogues, Peter Kreeft now turns to the form of dialogical writing employed by the Scholastics of the late Middle Ages, namely, the question-article, objection-answer-reply format that can be found in the great *summae*. Hence the title of the work: *Summa Philosophica*. Kreeft's book, however, lacks the scientific coherence of these medieval *magna opera* that inspire his endeavor. Instead, he opts for a more inelastic and "arbitrary" (as Kreeft himself admits) division of philosophical inquiry into ten questions with ten articles each. This fact alone may make one question the degree to which this work should be likened to the medieval *summae*. Given the wide range of topics that Kreeft covers and the arbitrary order in which he covers them, *Summa Philosophica* resembles more the *quaestiones quodlibeta* ("whatever questions") or perhaps the *quaestiones disputatae* ("disputed questions") that the medieval masters undertook during the penitential seasons of the year. In reading this book, one can easily imagine Kreeft standing before a group of undergraduates, suggesting a topic of philosophical inquiry, and then responding to his students' questions within that topic. Indeed, the colloquial mode of expression found throughout the book makes it easy to envision such a scenario, and I imagine that some readers—perhaps especially younger ones with little experience in philosophy—will find Kreeft's approach appealing.

The ten questions through which Kreeft moves correspond with what he calls the "Ten Divisions of Philosophy," which he treats in the following order: logic and methodology, metaphysics, natural theology, cosmology, philosophical anthropology, epistemology, general ethics, applied ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics. Following these ten questions is a final question called "Sample Questions in Ten Extensions of Philosophy," which includes articles relating to philosophy of religion, philosophy of history, philosophy of science, and the like. In sum, then, the reader is treated to 110 different articles, which (Kreeft explains) "put[s] a limiting frame around a work that could easily expand indefinitely, since every great answer in philosophy tends to produce at least one more great question, and usually many more, like parents producing children." In addition, Kreeft includes a nine-page introduction ("Why This Book?"), two appendices ("Fifteen Recommended Philosophical Classics" and "Meta-philosophical Evaluation of All the Above"), and two indices ("Index" and "Index of Biblical Citations").

Within a given question, it is difficult to discern any order among the ten articles it contains. In fact, Kreeft tells the reader forthrightly that "[t]hrough everything follows logically within each Article, the topic of one Article does not follow with logical necessity from the previous one." Many of the articles deal with philosophical problems that are recognizable to those who are aware of modern and contemporary currents in philosophy that flow against, broadly speaking, more traditional ways of thinking philosophically rooted in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas. So, for example, in the first question (concerning logic and methodology) one is asked to consider in Article Two whether philosophy begins in wonder and in Article Three whether philosophy should use the method of universal doubt. As another example: in the seventh question (concerning general ethics) one is asked to consider in Article Two whether there are any universal, exceptionless norms and in Article Three whether "ought" is a kind of "is." Lurking in the background, of course, are the ghosts of Descartes, Kant, and Hume, whose ways of thinking have in some way framed these questions.

And just as Kreeft does not claim originality in the format he employs, nor would he, I think, in the content of his answers. In other words, Kreeft is not attempting to break new ground in *Summa Philosophica*. Rather, he wants to exemplify for his readers—especially those who are novices in philosophy—how someone who is both grounded in the history of philosophy and committed to a more traditional approach might pursue wisdom by dealing straightforwardly with fundamental philosophical problems. Thereby he becomes, of course, an apologist for that tradition in light of modern and contemporary objections to it. Moreover, as his tone and choice of words often indicate, Kreeft is having fun here—even as he earnestly addresses 110 important philosophical questions. The result is a sort of reference work that a

traditionally-minded novice in philosophy might keep by his bedside and dip into from time to time for fun as well as for some enlightenment.—
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LAMPERT, Jay. *Simultaneity and Delay: A Dialectical Theory of Staggered Time*. Continuum Series in Continental Philosophy. London: Continuum, 2012. x + 260 pp. Cloth, \$120.00—Jay Lampert's latest book, *Simultaneity and Delay*, has two key objectives. First, it analyzes central texts in the history of philosophy in order to comprehend what major philosophers and scientists have understood by the concepts of simultaneity and delay. Second, the monograph develops a theory of staggered time through a certain understanding of simultaneity and delay. The book begins by introducing a thesis: ". . . [T]he moment where many things happen 'at the same time' is constructed out of converging rhythms and then unfolds in delayed reactions. Time becomes a shifting continuity of events at a distance. The dialectic of simultaneity and delay organizes time into elastic rhythms. With this model, we can analyze the time-structures of such diverse phenomena as atonal music, political decision-making, leaps of memory and the boredom of waiting, and simultaneities and delays in everyday experience and behaviour." Lampert also presents us with his operational definitions of simultaneity and delay. The former refers to the "convergence of two or more objects whose individual time lines follow different rhythms," whereas the latter "describes the situation where events seem as though they should be happening at the same time, but one of them lags behind."

In order to prove his thesis the author begins with a discussion of the Husserlian analysis of time as well as the phenomenologies of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Lampert does this in order to focus on what it is for us to experience both simultaneity and delay as well as make the important distinction between the scientific understanding of time and our phenomenal experience of it. Husserl's texts on time consciousness are read in order to show that simultaneity can arise out of a simultaneous intentionality that rises out of our synthesizing different time flows. "The problem of simultaneity begins with the breakdown of a single Now into many object-directed time-lines; divergent stopping points have to be synchronized; the solution requires a paradoxical staggered simultaneity and a back-step into convergence." Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger are read to show how Husserl anticipates the notion of delay, but does not quite see its force. Lampert asks, "Can Heidegger's breakdown of anticipation, with its overlay of normal and disturbed intentionalities, generate new experience in the delay, without bypassing ontic concern?"

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