Abstract
In Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza propose an account of moral responsibility according to which an agent is morally responsible for an action just when that action is the product of her own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, where reasons-responsiveness is explained in terms of the mechanism’s regular reasons-receptivity and weak reasons-reactivity. In a review of Fischer and Ravizza’s book Mele contends that their weakly reasons-reactivity condition is inadequate, constructing a case in which, according to their theory, an extreme agoraphobic is morally responsible for his staying in his home. In this paper I modify Fischer and Ravizza’s account of moral responsibility in light of Mele’s problematic example, suggesting a refinement of their weakly reasons-reactivity requirement via a distinction between weakly sufficient reasons and strongly sufficient reasons.
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Notes
In Fischer and Ravizza’s conception of possible worlds, the actual mechanism does not include all conditions of the past from the actual world, and hence the possible worlds can vary with regard to conditions (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, p. 52).
According to Fischer and Ravizza’s account, ownership of mechanism and moderate reasons-responsiveness are individually necessary conditions and jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for moral responsibility: Fischer and Ravizza state that “guidance control is the freedom-relevant condition necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility” (1998, n. 2, p. 241). They further explain that “on our view, guidance control should be understood in terms of two elements: the agent’s ‘ownership’ of the mechanism that actually issues in the relevant behavior, and the ‘reasons-responsiveness’ of that mechanism” (p. 241).
See Fischer and Ravizza 1998, pp. 207–239.
They contend that “an agent may acknowledge that a reason justifies a certain course of action – it is all things considered, his strongest or best reason for action – without being motivated by that reason” (1998, n. 13, pp. 41–42).
In a related move, McKenna (2005) develops other types of problematic cases for Fischer and Ravizza’s weak reasons-reactivity condition that feature “highly idiosyncratic” agents. He argues on the basis of such cases that agents who appear to display severely systematically defective mechanisms may still satisfy moderate reasons-responsiveness (pp. 134–135). I will introduce and discuss one of McKenna’s cases in section 4.
One might object that this weak* reasons-reactivity condition is somewhat vague. However, insofar as intuitions about moral responsibility are vague, it might be that any satisfactory account of moral responsibility will capture this vagueness. In section 5, I will say more about the grounds for the distinction between weakly and strongly sufficient reasons.
It should be noted that Fischer has acknowledged in response to other criticisms, specifically to the Fred case, that he is open to a stronger requirement for reasons reactivity (e.g., a pattern of reactivity). He points out that problematic cases such as the case of Edwina and the case of Fred can be addressed via such a refinement of the reasons-reactivity requirement while still holding “a guidance-control compatibilistic theory, according to which moral responsibility is an essentially historical (and even suitably subjective) phenomenon” (Fischer 2006, pp. 328–329).
McKenna stipulates that the sense of “same” used in his proposal is “looser than one that would involve a hyper-restricted requirement of sameness down to micro-details of an agent’s brain” (McKenna 2005, p. 137). One clear advantage, McKenna notes, of his modified reasons-reactivity requirement over weak reasons reactivity is that it provides a closer link between the agent’s mechanism and the actual circumstances, and thus better approximates the incompatibilist position that free will and moral responsibility require an agent’s ability to do otherwise based on actual consideration (McKenna 2005, p. 141). McKenna’s additional condition for reasons-reactivity concerns an agent’s ability via the actual (kind K of) mechanism to react to the actual reason to do otherwise (albeit in near possible worlds), whereas Fischer and Ravizza’s weak reasons-reactivity condition concerns an agent’s ability via the actual (kind K of) mechanism to react to any sufficient – perhaps different – reason to do otherwise.
To see why idiosyncratic Edwina is not morally responsible, consider the fact that Edward’s lopping off his toe is plausibly a strongly sufficient reason for her to aid him in his injury, and this reason is the only reason that Edwina recognizes and reacts to. Thus, there is no weakly sufficient reason that Edwina both recognizes as a sufficient reason to aid Edward and would aid Edward on the basis of that reason.
This claim does not entail that any agent that fails to satisfy weak* reasons-reactivity in A-ing qualifies as an agent driven by psychiatric illness. My proposal leaves it open that there may be cases in which a normal agent acts from her own regularly reasons-receptive mechanism but whose mechanism is not weakly* reasons-reactive and so is not morally responsible for her action. Furthermore, the contention here is that insofar as there are paradigmatic cases of weak-willed actions featuring morally responsible agents, my proposed weak* reasons-reactivity requirement (in conjunction with Fischer and Ravizza’s other conditions) will capture those cases. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pushing me to clarify these points.
For further discussion on the project of offering an account of free action that distinguishes akratics from those compelled to act, see Mele 2002.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Alfred Mele, John M. Fischer, Michael McKenna, Carolina Sartorio, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and feedback.
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Waller, R.R. Revising Reasons Reactivity: Weakly and Strongly Sufficient Reasons for Acting. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 17, 529–543 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9460-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9460-1