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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
The Object of this paper is the development of a view of punishment which incorporates what is of importance in retributive and utilitarian justifications of the practice of punishment. This proposed theory was noted and referred to as the plene esse, but not fully worked out, in the course of a discussion paper (‘Mr Quinton on “an odd sort of right”’) in which my concern was to offer an alternative view, to that of Mr Anthony Quinton, by construing ‘the right to punishment’ as meaning that ‘the offender has the right to be regarded as responsible for his actions’.
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