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Three-valued semantic pluralism: a defense of a three-valued solution to the sorites paradox

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Abstract

Disagreeing with most authors on vagueness, the author proposes a solution that he calls ‘three-valued semantic pluralism’ to the age-old sorites paradox. In essence, it is a three-valued semantics for a first-order vague language with identity with the additional suggestion that a vague language has more than one correct interpretation. Unlike the traditional three-valued approach to a vague language, three-valued semantic pluralism can accommodate the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness and the phenomenon of penumbral connection when equipped with ‘suitable conditionals’. The author also shows that three-valued semantic pluralism is a natural consequence of a restricted form of the Tolerance principle (\(\hbox {T}_R\)) and a few related ideas, and argues that (\(\hbox {T}_R\)) is well-motivated by considerations about how we learn, teach, and use vague predicates.

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Notes

  1. Whether ‘identical with’ is a vague predicate is a controversial issue and has implications on the metaphysical issue as to whether there are vague objects. For debates regarding this issue, readers are referred to Evans (1978), Lewis (1988) and Inwagen (1988). To make the application of the view proposed in this paper more interesting, however, I will assume that ‘identical with’ is a vague predicate and note that this assumption is not crucial for what I will argue below.

  2. Almost everything, but not everything. It seems to me that one cannot, for example, ‘prove’ with the same plausibility that \(1+1=3\) via a sorites argument. More generally, one may not be able to ‘prove’ an absurd conclusion that contains only precise terms via a sorites argument.

  3. To name just a small number of such theories: epistemicism proposed by Campbell (1974), Cargile (1997), Sorensen (2001) and Williamson (1994); gap theories proposed by Halldén (1949) and Körner (1955); glut theories proposed by Hyde (1997) and Priest (2003); supervaluationism proposed by Bennett (1988), Dummett (1975), Fine (1975), Kamp (2000), Keefe (2000), Lewis (1983), McGee (1997), Przelecki (1976) and Varzi (2001); transvaluationism proposed by Horgan (1998, 2010), fuzzy theories proposed by Goguen (1969), Priest (1998) and Smith (2008); and contextualist theories proposed by Fara (2000), Raffman (1994), Shapiro (2006) and Tappenden (1993).

  4. On the other hand, it is not clear that predicates like ‘bald but not self-identical’ and ‘bald or self-identical’ are vague predicates, for it is impossible for these predicates to have borderline cases.

  5. So every property or relation is a respect, but is every respect a property or relation? Especially, is the respect \({\mathcal {F}}\) being referred to by a vague predicate F a property or a relation? I think that the answer depends on how generous one’s ontology is. Given what I will say in Sect. 2 (that there are many correct interpretations of a vague predicate), you probably will say that the answer I should give to this question is a ‘No’, for, strictly speaking, a vague predicate does not stand for a unique property or relation but stands for a set of properties or a set of relations, each corresponding to a correct interpretation. I am not, however, obliged to answer the question in this way. If I allow for ‘disjunctive properties (relations)’ or even disjunctive properties (or relations) of infinitely many other properties (or relations) in my ontology, then I can give a ‘Yes’ answer to the question. Which answer should I take? As I hint it, I take it to be a matter of ontological generosity. Lacking a strong impulse to either side of the ontological options, I will remain silent on this issue.

  6. To be more precise, S m-determines \({\mathcal {F}}\) iff (a) S determines \({\mathcal {F}}\), and (b) \(\lnot \exists T\) (T determines \({\mathcal {F}}\,\wedge \,S\) entails \(T\,\wedge \,S \ne T\)).

  7. It is assumed here that, for any predicate F, there is at least one non-empty set S that m-determines \({\mathcal {F}}\), but it is not assumed here that there is a unique set S that m-determines \({\mathcal {F}}\). If there are more than one such set that m-determines F, then the phrases ‘the set of \({\mathcal {F}}\)-relevant respects’ and ‘\({\mathcal {F}}\)-relevant respects’ will simply refer to their union.

  8. Perhaps it’s better to call it ‘the method of illustration’ or ‘the method of exemplification’. Here I intend the learning process to be a process for the first language acquisition only. I also assume here that ostension is the right answer to the question how we learn the meanings of our first words. For a good discussion and a recent defense of the view that ostension is the right answer to the question ‘How do children learn the meanings of their first words’, please see Engelland (2014).

  9. This feature does not seem to me to be a feature of any precise predicate, perhaps because the \({\mathcal {F}}\)-relevant respects of a precise predicate F are just those respects specified in the definition of F, so that everything falling within F differs saliently observationally, or cognitively in \({\mathcal {F}}\)-relevant respects from everything falling outside of F. (Consider the precise predicate ‘is an even number’ as an example.) As a result, even if one can find a sequence of possible cases \({<}\alpha , \ldots , \beta {>}\) between a positive prototype \(\alpha \) of a precise predicate F and a negative one \(\beta \) such that any two adjacent cases in it are very similar in some respects, there will still be two adjacent cases in the sequence that differ saliently in \({\mathcal {F}}\)-relevant respects.

  10. This may be a good place to cite Heller (1987) to support (\(\hbox {T}_R\)). Heller says (1987, p. 38): “we do have conventions governing the use of vague terms, and they do rule out certain resolutions.” What are these conventions? He says in Heller (1987, p. 31): “The conventions are the community’s rules for linguistic behavior. ...As long as the rules are similar enough the linguistic acts will serve their purposes in most situations.” I intend (\(\hbox {T}_R\)) to be a generalization of what Heller believes to be the set of ‘similar enough rules’ governing the use of a vague predicate in a linguistic community; without such a shared generalization, I don’t see how a community can make these different but similar enough rules serviceable in most situations.

  11. In particular, it explains why theorists in different camps on the topic of vagueness tend to have different and conflict intuitions.

  12. To be fair, this is not exactly how Wright (1973) phrases it. In Wright (1973, p. 334), Wright claims that vague predicates are tolerant, where a predicate F is tolerant with respect to a property (or ‘a concept’, as Wright calls it) \(\phi \), if “there is also some positive degree of change in respect of \(\phi \) insufficient ever to affect the justice with which F is applied to a particular case”. Though Wright does not formulate his view on vague predicates as a principle, Smith (2008, p. 160) puts it as follows:

    Tolerance If a and b are very close in \({\mathcal {F}}\)-relevant respects, then ‘Fa’ and ‘Fb’ are identical in respect of truth[-value].

    This formulation is very close to (T) below.

  13. Horgan (1998, 2010) proposes a view that he calls ‘transvaluationism’. According to this view, vagueness is logically incoherent because the essential feature of vagueness, viz., boundarylessness, has two jointly unsatisfiable conceptual poles: the individualistic pole requires that, for any individual pairs of adjacent statements in a sorites sequence, the two statements in the pair must have the same semantic status (truth, falsity, indeterminateness, or whatever), while the collectivistic pole requires that it is impermissible to iterate indefinitely the individualistic-pole requirement for successive adjacent pairs of statements, in the manner of paradoxical sorites arguments. Given this characterization of the two poles of boundarylessness, it should be clear that what Horgan calls ‘the individualistic pole’ of vagueness is actually Wright’s tolerance principle (T) as formulated in the above footnote. Since I reject (T) as plausible, it is predicable that I also reject Horgan’s transvaluationist thesis that boundarylessness and the implied incoherence is an essential feature of vagueness.

    Besides reasons given here, there is also a methodological consideration that favors (\(\hbox {T}_R\)) over Horgan’s individualistic requirement (or Wright’s (T)). I agree with Horgan that the collectivistic pole of boundarylessness is (though I think that the individualistic ‘impulse’, as I like to call it, is not) an essential feature of vagueness, and I take (\(\hbox {T}_R\)) to be a way to spell out this collectivistic requirement. I also agree with Horgan that the collectivistic requirement dominates the individualistic impulse when there is a conflict between them, so that, to the extent that these two requirements conflict, truth is determined by the collectivistic-pole requirement. However, Horgan takes both requirements to be semantic requirements, while I think that only the collectivistic requirement is so. To me, the individualistic impulse is only an epistemic or pragmatic requirement that amounts to the maxim that, if you can’t tell the difference between two objects with respect to\({\mathcal {F}}\)-relevant respects, then you should either assert or believe that both are F or deny or disbelieve that both are F. By expelling the individualistic impulse from the realm of semantics, we thus avoid positing unnecessary incoherence.

  14. There is, however, one noticeable result in these tests: though many, perhaps most, people classify some patches in the sequence as ‘borderline’, not everyone does. Perhaps due to this phenomenon, Raffman thinks that a third truth-value beyond the truth and falsity is not inevitable. Yet, according to my thesis 8 below, a classification with no possible borderline cases can’t be a correct classification. Do Raffman’s experiment then constitutes an empirical counterexample to my thesis 8 below, which is crucial for the semantics proposed in Sect. 3? Or shall I bite the bullet and insist that those who do not use ‘borderline’ to classify at least some patch of the sequence can’t be making the right classification? Actually, neither moves is necessarily for me to take, for the sequence of color patches in Raffman’s experiment, which consists only of 37 patches, may not include most, let alone all, possible color patches between the two extremes, and my thesis 8 below is about all possible cases of a vague predicate.

  15. What I claim here is that 8–11 follow from 1–7 with, of course, some supplementary but plausible assumptions, such as the assumption that there is an extension as well as an antiextension of every vague predicate F and the assumption that no positive (or negative) prototype of a vague predicate F should also be a negative (or positive) case of F. Given these assumptions and 1–7, the following argument, then, seems to me to be quite persuasive to show why 8 follows from 1–7. Let F be a vague predicate, s be a competent speaker of F, and o be an arbitrary occasion. Let \(\mathbf {S}\) be the set of all possible cases to which the predicate F can be meaningfully applied. By fact 5 (or facts 1–4), there is at least a positive prototype \(\alpha _1\) in \(\hbox {F}^+\) and there is at least a negative prototype \(\alpha _n\) in \(\hbox {F}^-\). By fact 6, there is a sequence of possible cases of F \({<}\alpha _1\), ..., \(\alpha _n{>}\) between the positive prototype \(\alpha _1\) and the negative prototype \(\alpha _n\) such that the overall dissimilarity in \({\mathcal {F}}\)-relevant respects between any two adjacent cases in the sequence is not salient to s. Now, for the sake of reductio, suppose also that \(\hbox {F}^+\cup \hbox {F}^-\) for s on o were equal to \(\mathbf {S}\). In this case, there would be two adjacent cases, \(\alpha _i\) and \(\alpha _{i+1}\) in the sequence such that \(\alpha _i\in \,\hbox {F}^+\) while \(\alpha _{i+1}\in \,\hbox {F}^-\), for, if there were no such two cases, \(\alpha _n\) would be in \(\hbox {F}^+\) by a sorites argument, and this would make \(\alpha _n\) both in \(\hbox {F}^+\) and in \(\hbox {F}^-\), contradicting the assumption that no negative prototype should also be a positive case of F. But the dissimilarity between \(\alpha _i\) and \(\alpha _{i+1}\) is not salient, so the existence of such \(\alpha _i\) and \(\alpha _{i+1}\) contradicts the proviso of (\(\hbox {T}_R\)) in fact 7 that the overall difference in \({\mathcal {F}}\)-relevant respects between any member of \(\hbox {F}^+\) and any member of \(\hbox {F}^-\) should remain salient for s on o. Therefore, Given our initial assumption, \(\hbox {F}^+\cup \hbox {F}^-\) for s on o cannot be equal to \(\mathbf {S}\) by reductio. This completes the argument for 8. Given 8, 9–11 seem to follow with further plausible assumptions.

  16. I thus exclude glut theories and epistemicism from further consideration. Since point 8 also implies that some objects in the domain will remain ‘indeterminate’ as to whether they are F or not, I henceforth suggest that we formally define a vague predicate to be a predicate that has possible borderline cases.

  17. What I have in mind are some of the restrictions that Fine (1975) would put on what he calls ‘admissible specifications’. To be sure, Fine’s specifications are all ‘complete’ in the sense that, for any vague predicate F, \(\hbox {F}^+\cup \hbox {F}^-\) exhausts the whole domain. For me, a correct interpretation of a vague predicate F must be a ‘partial specification’.

  18. I thus also exclude fuzzy theories from further consideration.

  19. \(\hbox {D}_{\mathfrak {M}}^2\) is the set of all ordered pairs of objects of \(\hbox {D}_{\mathfrak {M}}\); in other words, \(\hbox {D}_{\mathfrak {M}}^2\) = {\({<}\alpha \), \(\beta {>}\,|\,\alpha \in \)\(\hbox {D}_{\mathfrak {M}}\) and \(\beta \in \)\(\hbox {D}_{\mathfrak {M}}\)}.

  20. That Assumption (A) and Assumption (A\(^{*}\)) are equivalent, given that every object in the common domain has a name, is not difficult to prove and is left as an exercise for readers.

  21. Note that Assumption (B) says only that that one correct model assigns something to \(\hbox {F}^+\) while another assigns it to \(\hbox {F}^-\) is a sufficient condition for its being a borderline case of F. So it is incorrect to say that, in order to correctly classify a borderline case of F as being so, my account ‘requires’ that one model assigns it to \(\hbox {F}^+\) and another assigns it to \(\hbox {F}^-\). As readers will see clearly below, there are ‘pure’ borderline cases of a vague predicate F in my account that do not even satisfy the antecedent of Assumption (B); these are cases that everyone can agree that they are vague.

  22. Again, the equivalence between Assumption (B) and Assumption (\(\hbox {B}^{*}\)), given that every object in the common domain has a name, is not difficult to prove and is left as an exercise for readers.

  23. Remember that we are assuming that all correct interpretations of a vague language \({\mathfrak {L}}\) assign the same extension and anti-extension to every precise predicate, so that an atomic sentence that is true in one and false in another correct interpretation cannot contain a precise predicate.

  24. Recall what I say in the beginning of Sect. 1: “if we want to characterize vague predicates as predicates having borderline cases, it seems better that we take into account all possible cases of these predicates as well as all actual ones. I may even put things in this way: what I will call ‘the extension’ of a vague predicate in this paper may be called by other philosophers its ‘intension’.” It should now become obvious that an implicit assumption of the whole paper is that a correct interpretation of a vague predicate should contain all its possible cases in the domain.

  25. Note that, for each correct interpretation \({\mathfrak {M}}\), the singleton set of \({\mathfrak {M}}\) satisfies both Assumptions (A) and (B), and there are other sets that satisfy both assumptions as well.

  26. Define a set of models to be an \({\mathbb {S}}\)-set when it satisfies both Assumptions (A) and (B). One can also define validity in terms of truth-simpliciter-preserving in every \({\mathbb {S}}\)-set. This definition, however, validates the same logic as we define here, which is left to interested readers as an exercise.

  27. Note that, my account, like most three-valued accounts, does not treat the sentence p \(=\) ‘There is an n such that an n-haired guy is bald but an \(\hbox {n}+1\)-haired guy is not bald’ as true, nor does it treat any instance of it as a witness of the truth of p. As one can easily check: the sentence p is neither true-in-\({\mathfrak {M}}\) nor false-in-\({\mathfrak {M}}\) for any correct interpretation \({\mathfrak {M}}\) of \({\mathbb {S}}\); therefore, it is neither true \(simpliciter \) nor false \(simpliciter \) and is actually a first-order vague sentence in my account. On the other hand, no instance of p is ever true-in-\({\mathfrak {M}}\) for any correct interpretation \({\mathfrak {M}}\), and each instance of p is actually either false simpliciter or neither true \(simpliciter \) nor false \(simpliciter \) in my account. Nevertheless, it is still true in my account, but not so in Fine’s, that an existential sentence is true simpliciter iff one of its instance is. This is why my account doesn’t have the problem of missing witness while Fine’s account does.

  28. A similar but somewhat different dilemma about how to treat atomic sentences by supervaluationism can be found in Smith (2008, p. 93) where Smith says: “We cannot have the truth values of atomic sentences being assigned by the supervaluation, for this violates our most basic intuitions about truth—in particular, about the way truth is determined by the meanings of our words together with the way the world is. But then if the truth values of atomic sentences are assigned by the base model, while those of compound sentences are assigned by the supervaluation, we have the bizarre situation in which (for example) the individual truth assessments of two atomic sentences operate in a completely different way from the truth assessment of their conjunction.”

  29. It may be argued, as Horgan does (1998, p. 322), that the ‘problem’ of missing witness actually ‘offers us one way of implementing the dominance of the collectivistic pole ...over the individualistic pole’, and this is supposed to be an advantage of supervaluationism and a disadvantage of my view here.

    But how does supervaluationism implement this dominance? Consider the series of sentences ‘\(\hbox {B}\alpha _0 \wedge \,\lnot \hbox {B}\alpha _1\)’ ...‘\(\hbox {B}\alpha _{n-1} \wedge \,\lnot \hbox {B}\alpha _n\)’, each of which asserts that the cut-off point between being bald and not so is located somewhere between 0 and n-1. Horgan then asks us to imagine that we do a force march from the first to the last sentence, asking with respect to each sentence in turn “Is it true?” The supervaluationist will certainly answer to each query with a “No”. Thus, Horgan concludes, “...[t]he individualistic pole in the notion of boundarylessness ...comes to the surface when we consider a forced march through the respective [sentences]”, and this seems to the way for Horgan that supervaluationism implements the dominance of the collectivistic pole over the individualistic pole. However, if it is indeed the way that supervaluationism implements this dominance, then I fail to see why it is, if it really is, an advantage of supervaluationism alone: if you do the same force march test and ask me the same questions, you will receive the same responses. So why is it the case that supervaluationism can—while the three-valued pluralism cannot—offer us a way, if it is indeed a way, of implementing the dominance of the collectivistic pole over the individualistic pole?

  30. For a further classification of impure borderline sentences into ‘\(\uparrow \)-’, ‘\(\downarrow \)-’, and ‘obscure’ ones, please see Wang (2016).

  31. In an earlier draft, I used the term ‘three-valued plurivaluationism’ to name my view. To my knowledge, the term ‘plurivaluationism’ was first used by Smith (2008). Smith named his theory ‘fuzzy plurivaluationism’ and also attributed the term ‘plurivaluationism’ to Varzi’s and McGee’s theories. However, Varzi and McGee take their own theories to be versions of supervaluationism, so I am not sure whether they would agree with Smith’s attribution. The name has not gain popularity in the past years and an anonymous reviewer of this paper suggests the new name ‘three-valued semantic pluralism’ for it. This new name seems better, so I take it without hesitation.

  32. There is a more general and more radical form of this and the next objections to a theory that allows for a transition from truth to falsity in a certain way: it has been argued by Horgan (1998, 2010) that not only does the individualistic requirement of vagueness forbid an abrupt transition from truth to falsity, it also forbids any transition from truth to falsity at all—a fortiori, it forbids a transition, gradual or not, from truth to a third truth-value and then another transition, gradual or not, from the latter to falsity. For a brief reason why I reject this objection, please see footnote 13 of Sect. 2.

  33. Early in Williamson (1994, p. 111) considers Halldén’s definition of ‘\(+\)’ (which for the present purpose may be thought as an alternative definition for the operator ‘it is definite that’) in a weak \(\hbox {K}_3\) semantics, but rejects it as inadequate for the undesirable consequence that ‘\(++\)A’ turns out to be valid.

  34. This is not the only way to define the operator ‘\(\bigtriangleup \)’. Another way is to set the condition for ‘\(\bigtriangleup \)A’ to be false in \({\mathfrak {M}}\), i.e., \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(\(\bigtriangleup \)A) \(= 0\), to be such that either \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(A) \(= 0\) or \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(A) \(= n\) for every correct interpretation \({\mathfrak {M'}}\) of \({\mathbb {S}}\), while keeping the remaining conditions the same as before. Either way gives us what we want: ‘\(\lnot \bigtriangleup \)A \(\wedge \,\lnot \bigtriangleup \lnot \)A’ is still true simpliciter if A is a first-order vague sentence, while ‘\(\bigtriangleup \bigtriangleup \)A \(\vee \bigtriangleup \lnot \bigtriangleup \)A’ may not be true simpliciter if A is a higher-order vague sentence. For a third, more complicated, but more plausible way of defining ‘\(\bigtriangleup \)’, readers are referred to [38]. It will be interesting to compare these different ways of defining the operator ‘\(\bigtriangleup \)’ and see what inferences involving ‘\(\bigtriangleup \)’ are valid according to them. I leave this issue as a topic for a future research.

  35. It doesn’t seem to me right to say the same thing about a higher-order vague sentence. Consider, for example, an impure borderline case \(\alpha \) of a vague predicate F that falls, in a sorites sequence for F, between a positive case of F and a pure borderline case of F. In this case, it doesn’t seem right to say of \(\alpha \) that it is not definitely F. Therefore, it doesn’t seem right to say of \(\alpha \) that it is neither definitely F nor definitely not F. A similar argument applies to impure cases that fall between a negative case of F and a pure borderline case of F.

  36. It seems to me, however, right to say the same thing about a first-order vague sentence. After all, if it is right to say of a pure borderline case that it is not definitely so, then whether it is definitely so is definite.

  37. Horgan (1998) would probably call this ‘iterated three-valued pluralism’, analogous to what he calls ‘iterated supervaulationism’.

  38. To be sure, Smith (2008) is not defending a three-valued account of vague predicates, but I think that he would say the same thing as I do here were he to defend it.

  39. I think that the following intuition is also pervasive within the three-valued camp. To cite just one example, van Inwagen writes (1988, p. 272): “If it is neither definitely true nor definitely false that John is rich, then it is not definitely true that John is either rich or not rich. If this were definitely true, then it would be definitely true, true without qualification, that either Tom (who contends that John is rich) or Tim (who contends that John is not rich) was right. But it is not definitely true that either Tom or Tim is right.”

  40. This is not a forced conclusion, to be sure. One can introduce Lukasiewicz’s conditionals, i.e.,

    both to keep the connective ‘if ...then ...’ truth-functional and to make sentences of the form ‘if A then A’ etc. true. For reasons that cannot be explained here, however, philosophers and logicians in general do not favor this option.

  41. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this issue up.

  42. A metaphysical conception of an analytic truth characterizes it as a truth which is true purely in virtue of meaning.

  43. Forge about Quine’s famous objections; here we simply assume that there is a distinction between analytic truths and synthetic ones.

  44. Actually, I think that it is quite absurd for any theory to say that one has to assent to any sentence in a sorites in order to understand the sentence. After all, sentences in a sorites are typical cases of synthetic sentences, and it is absurd to say that understanding them is sufficient for assenting to them.

  45. Perhaps the impression that it does follow comes from reading the phrase ‘tacitly accepts’ in ‘every speaker s competent in the use of a vague predicate F tacitly accepts (\(\hbox {T}_R\))’ too strongly as implying a constituting principle of meaning or understanding. This is, however, not the intended interpretation, as readers will see in a moment.

  46. In an ad hoc way, I would say. But I will not emphasize this point.

  47. Almost every bit of the present paper—except this section—was completed before I read Raffman new work. When I read it, I am very surprised to learn how similar my account is with her new position now. As a result, I can’t help but agree with her on most of the things she says in the book except those parts that I briefly mention in this subsection. I would like to take this opportunity to thank an anonymous reviewer of this paper for reminding me the existence of Raffman’s new work.

  48. Things are more complicated if a sentence or an argument contains more than one vague predicate. Such cases, however, can be set aside for the sake of simplicity.

  49. Raffman (2014, pp. 143–145) appeals to ‘underlying mechanisms’ or ‘subpersonal mechanisms’ to explain why we suddenly change our verbal dispositions in a forced march sorites, but this seems to me to be appealing to something mysterious to explain a mystery.

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Correspondence to Wen-fang Wang.

Appendix

Appendix

Our goal in this appendix is to prove Theorem 1, i.e., that a disjunction is true simpliciter iff at least one of its disjuncts is true simpliciter. Throughout this appendix, ‘(\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))...’ is short for ‘\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}}\)(\({\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}} \rightarrow \ldots \))’ while ‘(\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))...’ is short for ‘\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}}\)(\({\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}} \wedge \ldots \))’. I first restate here two assumptions that I made in Sect. 3:

Assumption (A)

(\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\forall {\mathfrak {M'}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))((\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(p) = \(n\,\wedge \,v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(q) = n) \(\rightarrow \) (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\mathfrak {M^{*}}\,\le {\mathfrak {M}}\,\wedge \,\mathfrak {M^{*}}\,\le {\mathfrak {M'}}\,\wedge \,v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(p) = \(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(q) = n)), for any atomic sentences p and q.

Assumption (B)

((\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(p) \(\ne 1\)) \(\wedge \) (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M'}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(p) \(\ne 0\))) \(\rightarrow \) (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\)) (\(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(p) \(= n\)), for any atomic sentence p.

With these two assumptions, we will prove, as lemmas of Theorem 1, that Assumption (A) and Assumption (B) are not only true of atomic sentences but also true of complex ones. Before giving the proofs, however, we state, without giving the proof, a very famous result about strong \(\hbox {K}_3\) and many other three-valued semantics, i.e., Proposition 1. In Proposition 1, the relation \(\le \) between truth-values is defined as: \(n \le n, 0 \le 0, 1 \le 1, n \le 0\), and \(n \le 1\).

Proposition 1

If \({\mathfrak {M}} \le {\mathfrak {M'}}\), then \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(\le v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(A), for every sentence A of \({\mathfrak {L}}\).

We now set out our task. We will prove that Assumption (A) can be generalized to all sentences, i.e., Lemma 2. As a midway to Lemma 2, we prove Lemma 1 first.

Lemma 1

Let p be any atomic sentence and B be any sentence. Then (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\forall {\mathfrak {M'}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))((\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(p) \(= n\,\wedge \,v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B) \(= n\)) \(\rightarrow \) (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M}} \wedge \mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M'}}\,\wedge \,v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(p) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\))).

Proof

We prove Lemma 1 by induction on the number of connectives in B. For simplicity, we assume that ‘\(\wedge \)’ is defined in terms of ‘\(\lnot \)’ and ‘\(\vee \)’ and we omit the quantificational case.

  • Base case This is automatically true by Assumption (A).

  • Inductive step Assume that Lemma 1 is true of sentences C and D whose numbers of connectives are less than that in B. Two cases:

  • Cases 1 B is ‘\(\lnot \)C’

    Assume that \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(p) \(= n\) and \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B) = \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(\(\lnot \)C) \(= n\) for some \(\mathfrak {M, M'} \in {\mathbb {S}}\). Then \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(C) \(= n\). By inductive hypothesis, (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M}} \wedge \mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M'}} \wedge v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(p) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(C) \(= n\)). But then \((\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M}} \wedge \mathfrak {M^{*}}\,\le {\mathfrak {M'}} \wedge v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(p) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(C) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(\(\lnot \)C) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\)).

  • Case 2 B is ‘C \(\vee \) D’

    Assume that \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(p) \(= n\) and \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B) \(= v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(C \(\vee \) D) \(= n\) for some \(\mathfrak {M, M'} \in {\mathbb {S}}\). There are three sub-cases. In each sub-case, we prove that \((\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M}} \wedge \mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M'}} \wedge v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(p) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(C \(\vee \) D) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\)).

  • Sub-case 2a\(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(C) \(= n\) but \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(D) \(= 0\).

    In this case, \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(p) \(= n\) and \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(C) \(= n\). So, by inductive hypothesis, (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M}} \wedge \mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M'}} \wedge v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(p) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(C) \(= n\)). Since \(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M'}}\), it follows that \(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(D) \(\le v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(D) by Proposition 1. Since \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(D) \(= 0\) and \(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(D) \(\le v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(D), it further follows that \(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(D) \(= 0\) or \(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(D) \(= n\). Either way, (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M}} \wedge \mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M'}} \wedge v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(p) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(C \(\vee \) D) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\)).

  • Sub-case 2b\(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(C) \(= 0\) but \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(D) \(= n\).

    The proof of sub-case 2b is similar to that of sub-case 2a.

  • Sub-case 2c\(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(C) \(= n\) but \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(D) \(= n\).

    The proof of sub-case 2c is similar to that of sub-case 2a. \(\square \)

Lemma 2

(\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\forall {\mathfrak {M'}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))((\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= n \wedge v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B) \(= n\)) \(\rightarrow \) (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M}} \wedge \mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M'}} \wedge v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(A) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\))), for any sentences A and B.

Proof

We prove Lemma 2 by induction on the number of connectives in A. Again for simplicity, we assume that ‘\(\wedge \)’ is defined in terms of ‘\(\lnot \)’ and ‘\(\vee \)’ and we omit the quantificational case.

  • Base case This is automatically true by Lemma 1.

  • Inductive step Assume that Lemma 2 is true of sentences C and D whose numbers of connectives are less than that in A. Two cases:

  • Cases 1 A is ‘\(\lnot \)C’

    Assume that \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(\(\lnot \)C) \(= n\) and \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B) \(= n\) for some \(\mathfrak {M, M'} \in {\mathbb {S}}\). Then \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C) \(= n\). By inductive hypothesis, (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M}} \wedge \mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M'}} \wedge v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(C) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\)). But then (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M}} \wedge \mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M'}} \wedge v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(C) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(\(\lnot \)C) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(A) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\)).

  • Case 2 A is ‘C \(\vee \) D’

    Assume that \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C \(\vee \) D) \(= n\) and \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B) \(= n\) for some \(\mathfrak {M, M'} \in {\mathbb {S}}\). There are three sub-cases. In each sub-case, we prove that (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M}} \wedge \mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M'}} \wedge v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(A) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(C \(\vee \) D) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\)).

  • Sub-case 2a\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C) \(= n\) but \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(D) \(= 0\).

    In this case, \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C) \(= n\) and \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B) \(= n\). So, by inductive hypothesis, (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M}} \wedge \mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M'}} \wedge v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(C) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\)). Since \(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M}}\), it follows that \(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(D) \(\le v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(D) by Proposition 1. Since \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(D) \(= 0\) and \(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(D) \(\le v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(D), it further follows that \(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(D) \(= 0\) or \(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(D) \(= n\). Either way, (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M}} \wedge \mathfrak {M^{*}} \le {\mathfrak {M'}} \wedge v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(A) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(C \(\vee \) D) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\)).

  • Sub-case 2b\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C) \(= 0\) but \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(D) \(= n\).

    The proof of sub-case 2b is similar to that of sub-case 2a.

  • Sub-case 2c\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C) \(= n\) but \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(D) \(= n\).

    The proof of sub-case 2c is similar to that of sub-case 2a. \(\square \)

Lemma 3

((\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(\ne 1\)) \(\wedge \) (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M'}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(\ne 0\))) \(\rightarrow \) (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(A) \(= n\)), for any sentence A.

Proof

We prove Lemma 3 by induction on the number of connectives in A. Again for simplicity, we assume that ‘\(\wedge \)’ is defined in terms of ‘\(\lnot \)’ and ‘\(\vee \)’ and we omit the quantificational case.

  • Base case This is automatically true by Assumption (B).

  • Inductive step Assume that Lemma 3 is true of sentences B and C whose numbers of connectives are less than that in A. Two cases:

  • Cases 1 A is ‘\(\lnot \)B’

    Assume that (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(\(\lnot \)B) \(\ne 1\)) and (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M'}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(A) \(= v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(\(\lnot \)B) \(\ne 0\)). Then (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 0\)) and (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M'}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B) \(\ne 1\)). So (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\)) by inductive hypothesis. So (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(A) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(\(\lnot \)B) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\)).

  • Case 2 A is ‘B \(\vee \) C’

    Assume that (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B \(\vee \) C) \(\ne 1\)) and (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M'}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(A) \(= v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B \(\vee \) C) \(\ne 0\)). By the fact that (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B \(\vee \) C) \(\ne 1\)), it follows that (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 1\)) and (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C) \(\ne 1\)). And, by the fact that (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M'}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(A) \(= v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B \(\vee \) C) \(\ne 0\)), it follows that either (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 0\)) or (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C) \(\ne 0\)). We prove by cases in what follows that either case leads to the conclusion that (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(A) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B \(\vee \) C) \(= n\)).

  • Case 2a (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 0\))

    In this case, (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 1\)) and (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 0\)). So, by the inductive hypothesis, (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\)). Now, (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C) \(\ne 1\)). So, either (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C) \(= 0\)) or (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C) \(= n\)), otherwise it will contradict the inductive hypothesis that the lemma holds for C. If (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C) \(= 0\)), then the model \(\mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\) such that \(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\) will also be a model in which \(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(A) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B \(\vee \) C) \(= n\). And if (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C) \(= n\)), then, since (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n\)), there will be a model \({\mathfrak {M'}}\) such that \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B) \(= v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(C) \(= n\) by Lemma 2 and therefore \(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(A) \(= v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B \(\vee \) C) \(= n\). So, if (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 0\)), then (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(A) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B \(\vee \) C) \(= n\)).

  • Case 2b (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(C) \(\ne 0\))

    The proof of Case 2b is similar to that of Case 2a.

Now we prove the main theorem: if a disjunction is true simpliciter, then at least one of its disjuncts is true simpliciter, i.e.:

Theorem 1

If (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A \(\vee \) B) \(= 1\)), then (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= 1\)) or (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(= 1\)).

Proof

Assuming that (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A \(\vee \) B) \(= 1\)), we prove the consequent of the theorem by reductio. Suppose that it is neither the case that (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= 1\)) nor the case that (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(= 1\)). So, (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(\ne 1\)) and (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 1\)). Four possibilities:

  • Possibility 1 (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= 0\)) and (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(= 0\)). In this case, (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A \(\vee \) B) = 0), which contradicts our initial assumption.

  • Possibility 2 (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= 0\)) but not \((\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(= 0\)). In this case, (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 0\)). Since (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 1\)) and (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 0\)), it follows by Lemma 3 that (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(= n\)). So, (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(= n\,\wedge \,v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= 0\)). Therefore, (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A \(\vee \) B) \(= n\)), which contradicts our initial assumption.

  • Possibility 3 (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(= 0\)) but not \((\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= 0\)). In this case, (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(\ne 0\)). Since (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(\ne 1\)) and (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(\ne 0\)), it follows by Lemma 3 that (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= n\)). So, (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= n\) and \(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(= 0\)). Therefore, (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A \(\vee \) B) \(= n\)), which contradicts our initial assumption.

  • Possibility 4 Neither (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= 0\)) nor (\(\forall {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(= 0\)). So (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(\ne 0\)) and (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 0\)). It follows from the facts that (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(\ne 1\)) and (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(\ne 0\)), by Lemma 3, that (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= n\)). Similarly, it follows from the facts that (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 1\)) and (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(B) \(\ne 0\)), again by Lemma 3, that (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M'}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B) \(= n\)). So, (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M}}\)(A) \(= n\)) and (\(\exists {\mathfrak {M'}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_{\mathfrak {M'}}\)(B) \(= n\)). By Lemma 2, it follows that (\(\exists \mathfrak {M^{*}} \in {\mathbb {S}}\))(\(v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(A) \(= v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(B) \(= n = v_\mathfrak {M^{*}}\)(A \(\vee \) B)), which contradicts our initial assumption.

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Wang, Wf. Three-valued semantic pluralism: a defense of a three-valued solution to the sorites paradox. Synthese 195, 4441–4476 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1517-6

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