Note: All the following works by Xinli Wang are archived in full texts on PhilPapers: online research in philosophy ; most of them can be tracked on Google Scholar (search for "Xinli Wang, Juniata College")
Books
2007, a philosophy monograph, Incommensurability and Cross-Language Communication, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, England, pp. 374, included in Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Philosophy Series.
Online sources:
Book preview from Google Books website (about 80 selected pages, including table of content)
Book sale information from Ashgate, Amazon.com and Barnes&Noble
Local library collection of the book (collected by 124 major university libraries worldwide): OCLC WorldCat search
here (not a link!)
2009, Symbolic Logic Study Guide, University Readers, pp. 110
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Book information from Google Books
Book sale information from Amazon.com and Barnes&Noble
Articles
2012, “Alternative Conceptual Schemes and a Non-Kantian Scheme-Content Dualism,” in The Proceedings of XXII World Congress of Philosophy (August, 2008, Seoul, Korea), Volume 39, philosophy of language, 2008, by Philosophy Documentation Center (PDC), pp. 267-275, published online, October 2012.
Abstract: D. Davidson argues that the existence of alternative conceptual schemes presupposes the Kantian scheme-content dualism, which requires a scheme-neutral empirical content and a fixed, sharp scheme-content distinction. The dismantlement of such a Kantian scheme-content dualism, which Davidson calls “the third dogma of empiricism”, would render the notion of alternative conceptual schemes groundless. To counter Davidson’s attack on the notion of alternative conceptual schemes, I argue that alternative conceptual schemes neither entail nor presuppose the Kantian scheme-content dualism. On the contrary, it is exactly the abandonment of the concept-neutral content and the denial of a fixed, absolute scheme-content distinction that turns the Kantian conceptual absolutism upside down and thus makes alternative conceptual schemes possible. Proposing common-sense experience as the empirical content of alternative schemes, I construct and defend a non-Kantian scheme-content dualism based on a non-fixed, relative scheme-content distinction. The proposed non-Kantian scheme-content dualism is not only “innocent” enough to be immune from Davidson’s charge of the third dogma of empiricism, but also “solid” enough to be able to sustain alternative conceptual schemes. I conclude that in terms of our conceptual schemes, we are connected to the world as closely as possible; only through conceptual schemes can we be connected to the world.
Online Access:
Table of content of Vol. 39 from PDC
Full text from jcsites.juniata.edu: the full text in PDF
Local library collection of the proceedings: search WorldCat
2010, “A Presuppositional Approach to Conceptual Schemes,” South African Journal of Philosophy (SAJP), Vol. 29 (4): 404-421
Abstract: The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they have been focused too much on the truth-conditional notions of meaning/concepts and translation/interpretation in Tarski's style. It is exactly due to such a Quinean interpretation of the notion of conceptual schemes that the very notion of conceptual schemes falls prey to Davidson's attack. I argue that what should concern us in the discussions of conceptual schemes and related issues, following the initiatives of I. Hacking, T. Kuhn, and N. Rescher, is not the truth-values of assertions, but rather the truthvalue-status of the sentences used to make the assertions. This is because the genuine conceptual innovation between alternative theories/languages does not lie in differences in determining the truth-values of their sentences, but turns on whether these sentences have truth-values when considered within the context of a competing one. The core of conceptual relativism does not consist in the claim that different conceptual schemes may yield incommensurable truth claims, but rather that different conceptual schemes may yield incompatible truth-value-status and therefore lead to distinct perceptions of reality. Conceptual schemes are no longer seen as sentential languages consisting of a set of sentences accepted as true, but rather seen as metaphysical presuppositions of presuppositional languages.
Online Access:
From African Journal Online (back issue, free): astract from SAJP page; Full text from SAJP page
From Academic Search Premier (needs subscription for full texts): the table of content of the issue (you can open the full text here if you have subscription to ASP); the abstract; the full text PDF file
From jcsites.juniata.edu: the full text in PDF
Local library collection of SAJP: OCLC WorldCat search
2009 (3), “The Propositional vs. Hermeneutic Models of Cross-Cultural Understanding,” South African Journal of Philosophy (SAJP), Vol. 28(3): 312-331
Abstract: What the author attempts to address in this paper is a Kantian question: not whether, but how is cross-cultural understanding possible? And specifically, what is a more effective approach for cross-cultural understanding? The answer lies in an analysis of two different models of cross-cultural understanding, that is, propositional and hermeneutic understanding. To begin with, the author presents a linguistic interpretation of culture, i.e., a culture as a linguistically formulated and transmitted symbolic system with its conceptual core as a scheme of basic cultural presuppositions, which it referred to as a cultural language. After exploring the essential role of cultural presuppositions in cross-cultural understanding, the author discusses the traditional model of cross-cultural understanding, namely, the propositional model. Through critically examining the two popular versions of the propositional model, i.e., the projective approach and the adoptive approach to cross-cultural understanding, it is found that cross-cultural propositional understanding is doomed to failure. To move us beyond the absolutism-relativism trap embedded within propositional understanding, the author first introduces and discusses Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic understanding, and then applies Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic model of understanding to cross-cultural understanding. It is finally concluded that cross-cultural understanding is essentially hermeneutic—including the case of cultural learning, not propositional. Therefore, cross-cultural understanding is hermeneutically possible.
Online Access:
From African Journal Online (back issue, free): astract from SAJP page; Full text from SAJP page
From Academic Search Premier (needs subscription for full texts): the table of content of the issue (you can open the full text here if you have ASP subscription); the abstract; the full text PDF file
From jcsites.juniata.edu: the full text in PDF
Local library collection of SAJP: WorldCat search
2009 (2), “On Davidson’s Refutation of Conceptual Schemes and Conceptual Relativism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (PPQ), Vol. 90 (1): 140-164.
Abstract: Despite D. Davidson’s influential criticism of the very notion of conceptual schemes, the notion continues enjoying its popularity in contemporary philosophy and, accordingly, conceptual relativism is still very much alive. There is one major reason responsible for Davidson’s failure which has not been widely recognized: What Davidson attacks fiercely is not the very notion, but a notion of conceptual schemes, namely, the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and its underlying Kantian scheme-content dualism. However, such a notion simply cannot carry the weight of conceptual relativism for it does not catch the essences of conceptual relativism. Consequently, I argue that the very notion of conceptual schemes and conceptual relativism have survived Davidson’s attack. Therefore, the failure of the Quinean notion of conceptual schemes and Kantian scheme-content dualism, even if Davidson can claim victory, does not mark the end of the very notion of conceptual schemes.
Online Access:
From Academic Search Premier (needs subscription for full texts): the table of content of the issue; the abstract; the full text PDF file
From Wiley Online Library (needs subscription for full texts): the table of content of the issue; the abstract; the full text
From jcsites.juniata.edu: the full text in PDF
Local library collection of PPQ: WorldCat search
2009 (1), “Linguistic Communication versus Understanding,” Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy (PIJP), Vol. 38 (1): 71-84
Abstract: It is a common wisdom that linguistic communication is different from linguistic understanding. However, the distinction between communication and understanding is not as clear as it seems to be. It is argued that the relationship between linguistic communication and understanding depends upon the notions of understanding and communication involved. Thinking along the line of propositional understanding and informative communication, communication can be reduced to mutual understanding. In contrast, operating along the line of hermeneutic understanding and dialogical communication, the process of understanding is in essence a process of communication. However, dialogical communication should not be confused with (mutual) propositional understanding. Conversely, hermeneutic understanding should not be confused with informative communication either. The former is dialogical in nature while the latter is monological.
Online Access:
From jcsites.juniata.edu: the full text in PDF
Local library collection of PIJP: WorldCat search
2008, “Epistemology” (认识论 ), Series on Western Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Philosophy Volume, [哲学(西方人文社科前沿述评)], editors, Jiyuan Yu & Zhewei Zhang, Renmin University Press, Beijing, China, pp. 1-47
Abstract: This article surveys the current state of affairs and some important new developments of epistemology in the past 10 years. It first introduces some necessary theoretical background (the Gettier problem, the closure principle, and internalism vs. externalism), and then focuses on (i) the rise and development of modest forms of foundationalism, (ii) recent debates on epistemic skepticism, (iii) epistemic infinitism, (iv) epistemic contextualism and its contributions and problems, (v) two models of virtue epistemology, its merits and existing issues. It ends with a brief review of the theoretical crisis faced with contemporary epistemology and its opportunities.
内容提要：本文综合评述当代认识论的现状以及主干近10 年来主要发展趋势和最新理论贡献。 它首先介绍一些必要的理论背景：盖梯尔难题，闭合原则，内在论与外在论之争 (第 2节)，然后分 6 节集中讨论、评述：(i) 温和基础主义的兴起及发展 (第 3 节) ； (ii) 对认知怀疑论的最新表述及回应 (第 4 节) ； (iii) 认知无限辨明论 (第 5 节) ；(iv) 认知语境主义的兴起，其理论贡献，以及存在的问题；(v) 德性认识论的二个模型，它们的优点,和现有的问题。最后简单讨论当代认识论面临的危机与机遇。
Online Access:
From jcsites.juniata.edu: the full text in PDF
2007, “Conceptual Schemes and Presuppositional Languages,” The Proceedings of the XXI World Congress of Philosophy (August, 2003, Istanbul, Turkey), Volume 6 (Epistemology, 2007), by Philosophy Documentation Center, pp. 119-124.
Anstract: The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they are based on a tacit assumption that the difference between two schemes consists in the different distributions in truth-values. I argue that what should concern us, in the discussions of conceptual schemes and related issues, is not truth-values of assertions, but rather the truth-value-status of the sentences used to make the assertions. This is because the genuine conceptual innovation between alternative theories / languages does not lie in differences in determining truth-values of their sentences, but turns on whether these sentences have truth values when considered within the context of a competing one. This new interpretation of the notion of conceptual schemes, which I refer to as presuppositional languages, is not only good in itself--to establish the intelligibility and tenability of the notion, but the effect on other related issues is quite beneficial.
Online Access:
Abstract from Philosophy Documentation Center
From jcsites.juniata.edu: the full text
Local library collection of the proceedings: WorldCat search
2003 (2) , “Where Are Facts? -- A Case for Internal Factual Realism,” Diálogos, Vol. 38, number 82: 7-30.
Abstract: What is the ontological status of facts? Are facts linguistic or extra-linguistic entities? If facts are extra-linguistic entities, are they mind-independent or relative to languages, theories or conceptual schemes? Based on a minimal definition of facts, the author argues that what are specified by true statements are not identical to true propositions expressed, so facts are not linguistic entities. Furthermore, what are specified by true statements are not to which a true statement corresponds, so facts are not mind-independent, either as concrete entities in the universe or as abstract entities in the world as it is. Last, the author presents an internal factual realist answer: although facts are neither in the world as it is, nor in a language, facts are real and exist in a world under consideration. A fact, as a non-linguistic correlate of a true statement of a language, exists in a world specified by the language.
Online Access:
From jcsites.juniata.edu: the full text in PDF
Local library collection of the journal: WorldCat search
2003 (1), “Presuppositional Languages and the Failure of Cross-Language Understanding,” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review (DCPR), Vol. 42 (1): 53-77.
Abstract: Why is mutual understanding between two substantially different comprehensive language communities often problematic and even unattainable? To answer this question, the author first introduces a notion of presuppositional languages. Based on the semantic structure of a presuppositional language, the author identifies a significant condition necessary for effective understanding of a language: the interpreter is able to effectively understand a language only if he/she is able to recognize and comprehend its metaphysical presuppositions. The essential role of the knowledge of metaphysical presuppositions in understanding is further strengthened by developing a truth-value conditional theory of understanding. It is concluded that if the interpreter approaches an incompatible alien language from the standpoint of the interpreter's own language by projecting the metaphysical presuppositions of his/her own language upon the alien language, then the mutual understanding between the two language communities is doomed to failure.
Online sources:
From Cambridge Journal online (needs subscription for full texts): abstract
From POIESIS: Philosophy Online Serials, by philosophy documentation center (needs subscription for full texts)
From jcsites.juniata.edu: the full text in PDF
Local library collection of DCPR: WorldCat search
2002, “Taxonomy, Truth-Value Gaps and Incommensurability: A Reconstruction of T. Kuhn's Taxonomic Interpretation of Incommensurability,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (SHPS), Vol. 33 (3), 465-485.
Abstract: Kuhn's alleged taxonomic interpretation of incommensurability is grounded on an ill-defined notion of untranslatability and is hence radically incomplete. To supplement it, The author gives a different reading of Kuhn's taxonomic interpretation of incommensurability based on a combination of a logical-semantic theory of taxonomy, a semantic theory of truth-value, and a semantic theory of cross-language communication. According to such a reconstruction, two scientific languages are incommensurable when core sentences of one language, which have truth-values when considered within its own context, lack truth-values when considered within the context of the other due to the unmatchable taxonomic structures underlying them.
Online Access:From Science Direct, Elservier (needs subscription for full texts): abstract
From jcsites.juniata.edu: the full text in PDF; a Chinese translation
Local library collection of SHPS: WorldCat search
2001, “Hume Is Not A Skeptic about Induction,” Diálogos, Vol. 36, Number 78: 41-54.
Abstract: On the basis of the distinction between logical and factual probability, epistemic justification is distinguished from logical justification of induction. It is argued that, contrary to the accepted interpretation of Hume, Hume believes that inductive inferences are epistemically legitimate and justifiable. Hence the beliefs arrived at via (correct) inductive inferences are rational beliefs. According to this interpretation, Hume is not a radical skeptic about induction.
Online Access:
Abstract in Spanish from Refdoc est un service
From jcsites.juniata.edu: the full text in PDF
Local library collection of the journal: WorldCat search
1999, “Is the Notion of Semantic Presupposition Empty?” Diálogos, Vol. 34, number 73: 61-91.
Abstract: This paper is an attempt to clarify the notion of semantic presupposition and to refute Böer and Lycan's critique of that notion. The author presents a feasible and coherent formal definition of semantic presupposition after examining several popular definitions of the notion. In terms of this definition, two central arguments against semantic presupposition presented by Böer and Lycan are analyzed and responded to with care. It is concluded that the notion of semantic presupposition is not empty but rather is philosophically interesting and fruitful.
Online Access:
Abstract in Spanish from Refdoc est un service
From jcsites.juniata.edu: the full text in PDF
A Chinese version of the paper is published in Contemporary Inquiries Into the Foundational Issues of Philosophy, the Commercial Press, Beijing, China, 2002, pp. 190-224.
Local library collection of the journal: WorldCat search
1998, “A Critique of the Translational Approach to Incommensurability,” Prima Philosophia, Vol. 11 (3): 293-306.
Abstract: According to the received translational interpretation of incommensurability, incommensurability is viewed as untranslatability due to radical variance of meaning or reference of the terms in two competing scientific languages. The author argues that the translational approach to incommensurability does not effectively clarify the concept of incommensurability. Since it cannot provide us with tenable, integrated concept of incommensurability, it should be rejected.
Online Access:
From jcsites.juniata.edu: the full text in PDF
Local library collection of the journal: WorldCat search
The page updated: August, 2013