Journal of the History of Philosophy

Notes and Discussions Shadow History in Philosophy 1. The shadows of great philosophers, elongated and distorted, extend far into the future . They constitute a shadow history of philosophy that is more influential than the history of philosophy itself. Perhaps this makes it more important, as well--not more important than the original philosophers in their day, but more important than the history of them now. This shadow history is not hidden; it is everywhere, and most prominently in the most important books in our tradition--from Plato and Aristotle to Russell and Rorty. The history of philosophy as practiced by distinguished historians such as Kristeller and Gilson is an attempt to mirror the ideas and systems of philosophers in their times as they intended them. Gilson wants to know how the Medieval tradition actually influenced Descartes, how Descartes himself absorbed the philosophy of his predecessors , and what Cartesianism really is in the context of the problems Descartes and his contemporaries were trying to solve. We are to see the living philosophy of the great dead philosophers, brought to life by meticulous historical research and scholarship. This is a calling--the history of philosophy--with all the dignity that designation implies. Wherever there is a noble task there are desecrators. In our time there are "history" historians of philosophy who have virtual apoplexy at the mere mention of certain "analytic" historians of philosophy. Gregor Sebba states the opposition as a differentiation "between a concern with philosophical problems--let us call it 'philosophizing'and a concern with the history of philosophizing. Philosophizing is a problem-solving enterprise .... If somebody writes a study of Hume on causality in order to understand Hume on causality, he is doing history of philosophy. If he writes on the same theme in order to study causality, he is philosophizing."' And for Sebba, philosophizing in the guise of doing the history of philosophy is anathema. The b~te noire in our time for pure historians of philosophy is Jonathan Bennett. His Locke, Berkeley, Hume" has been taken as a worst-case example of work by someone who either misuses or does bad history of philosophy. In fact, Bennett does neither. In the first sentence of his book, he makes clear that he could have titled it Meaning, ' Gregor Sebba, "What Is 'History of Philosophy'?"Journa/oftheHistory ofPhilosophy 8 097o): ~5z. 'Jonathan Bennett, LockL,Berkeley,Hume: Central Themes (London: Oxford University Press, 197x)- [951 9 6 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 31:~ JANUARY 1993 Causality, Objectivity rather than Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and, had he done so, many historians would have paid no attention to it.~ Indeed, Bennett announces outright: "I do not aim to be scholarly, except in the limited sense that I sometimes attend closely to textual details. Nor are my concerns historical: they relate primarily to three topics, and only secondarily to three philosophers. I hope.., to get a firm hold on the logic of what they wrote."4 So why d/d Bennett title his book Locke, Berkeley, Hume rather than Meaning, Causality, Objectivity? Partly because these are, as he indicates, central themes in these philosophers. But I should suppose also because he comes from a long line of British philosophers who delight in poking a stick in the lion's ear. Why not? Bennett philosophizes. His philosophizing is in the scope of what Sebba calls "doctrinal analysis.., the study of philosophical concepts, propositions, doctrines and systems, to determine their precise meaning, structure, and internal validity."s What incensed Sebba about Bennett's work (as Sebba was once incensed about mine 8) is that Bennett takes the wrong turn (according to Sebba's notions) by using doctrinal analysis of historical figures to solve philosophical problems rather than to understand history. Philosophizing such as Bennett's that originates in doctrinal analysis is often called (as I do above) "analytic history of philosophy," but this is a misnomer, even if all practitioners are not as explicit as is Bennett himself about what they are doing. Even Sebba somewhat grudgingly admitted that it is permissible to philosophize on the basis of doctrinal analysis; he just did not like to see such work designated as history of philosophy, which...