-
Views
-
Cite
Cite
Brian Weatherson, VII—The Bayesian and the Dogmatist, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 107, Issue 1_pt_2, 1 August 2007, Pages 169–185, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2007.00217.x
- Share Icon Share
Abstract
It has been argued recently that dogmatism in epistemology is incompatible with Bayesianism. That is, it has been argued that dogmatism cannot be modelled using traditional techniques for Bayesian modelling. I argue that our response to this should not be to throw out dogmatism, but to develop better modelling techniques. I sketch a model for formal learning in which an agent can discover a posteriori fundamental epistemic connections. In this model, there is no formal objection to dogmatism.
This content is only available as a PDF.
© The Aristotelian Society, 2007
Issue Section:
Original Articles
You do not currently have access to this article.