Introduction
1
Introduction
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
We introduce this volume with a brief preview of its overall concerns
(Section I), followed by a précis of the individual contributions (Section II)
and an overview of the most important literature with a similar or related
focus (Section III). The preview will show that this is not a collection of
specialty scholarship, but a volume rightly intended for the broadest possible learned readership. The uniqueness of its approach is tempered by the
generality of its concerns. The précis then situate each contribution in the
larger context of the book’s philosophical and interdisciplinary ambitions,
while the last section situates the book in the broader context of today’s
intellectual landscape, where a growing body of literature reinforces its cause
without anticipating its results.
In this Introduction, we adopt the following conventions in referring to
the chapters that follow. (1) Chapters are identified by authorship. Contributors’ proper names, including those of the editors, refer to their respective
contributions to Parts II–V. Proper names do not reference the contributions
to Part I, which resulted from collaboration (chapters 1 and 2) or consensus
(chapters 3 and 4) between the editors. These chapters in Part I we refer to
simply as the contributions of “the editors.” “Contribution(s) of the editors”
does not refer their individual contributions in Parts IV and V. (2) Source
and locus will not be given for quotations if they are taken from the chapters
that follow. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations in this Introduction
are from the named author’s contribution to the present volume.
Main Themes of the Book
Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy was a protest against the compartmentalization of knowledge. A specialized subfield of philosophy focused
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
1
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 1
8/12/09 2:02:29 PM
2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
on Whitehead interpretation is therefore something of a paradox. Given the
daunting complexity of Whitehead’s writing, literal exegesis and historical
scholarship aiming at an “immanent” interpretation of his thought have a
continuing and obviously important role to play, but Whitehead himself
would scarcely recognize such activities as his rightful legacy. A failure of
Whiteheadians to be sufficiently Whiteheadian in this regard may well be
the reason Whitehead’s ideas have seemed at times to be threatened with
extinction and mostly available in fossil form. If this is changing, it is at
least partly because outsiders are storming the museum. Straightaway this has
opened vast avenues of new dialogue with unsuspected partners, to which
this book bears witness.
This volume brings multiple disciplinary perspectives to bear on Whitehead’s psychology (which, in a way, is his whole philosophy—a metaphysics
of experience) in order to analyze it in terms of relevance to contemporary
consciousness studies. Accordingly, we have gathered contribution from scholars
whose areas of research are diverse and often do not include Whiteheadian
process philosophy as a subfield of expertise, but whose own intellectual paths
have led them to recognize an important kinship with Whitehead.
The area of consciousness studies proves to be a busy intersection: a
place where one can’t help but meet everything from metaphysics to psychotherapy. This is not happenstance. It reflects the nature of the beast we are
tracking, and we have not shied from it. This accounts for both the broad
scope of the volume and the diversity of its contributions.
In important respects, this book complements David Griffin’s Unsnarling
the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem (1998),
which grew out of an interdisciplinary conference sponsored by the Center
for Process Studies at the Claremont Colleges in 1994, “Consciousness in
Humans, Animals and Computers. A Scientific-Philosophical Conference.”
Bringing a Whiteheadian perspective to contemporary consciousness studies,
Griffin effects a broad synthesis of the issues currently under debate and at
the same time provides an excellent introduction to Whitehead’s psychology.
We reverse directions. Bringing different contemporary perspectives (including
Griffin’s) to bear on Whitehead’s psychology, we replace synthesis with analysis
and highlight the richness and polyvalence of Whitehead’s ideas. Of particular concern to this volume is the role that Whitehead’s process philosophy
can play in providing an interpretive framework for neuropsychology, and,
conversely, the role that neuropsychology can play in providing an empirical
model for Whitehead’s concept of process and an empirical confirmation
of his theory of consciousness. According to Whitehead, consciousness is a
process—a very specific kind of process that, despite its uniqueness, holds the
key to understanding process as such. Consequently, a number of important
findings of neuropsychology, some of them familiar, but some of them quite
new and even startling, will figure decisively in these pages.
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 2
8/12/09 2:02:31 PM
Introduction
3
The contributions to this volume can be grouped according to a number
of shared themes. Several contributors (David Griffin, Katzko, Shields, Pachalska, and MacQueen, and the editors in Part I) show that some recognizably
Whiteheadian issues are at stake in the current debates about consciousness
and that Whiteheadian ideas can be exploited—sometimes in ways that
Whitehead could not have anticipated—to advance the debate beyond some
well-known sticking points. Two of the contributors (Rosenberg and Weekes)
explore the curious connection Whitehead alleges between consciousness and
causation. One author proceeds by a conceptual analysis of the structure of
explanatory theories, the other proceeds phenomenologically, but they both
lend support to Whitehead’s signature idea, refereed in chapter 4, that scientists and philosophers find consciousness very difficult to explain for the same
reason that they have a problem understanding the nature of causation and
the basis for induction: due to inherent constraints, the theoretical activity
known as explanation tends to suppress the specifically processual aspect of
becoming, which Rosenberg calls the receptive face of causation and Whitehead
calls concresence. The argument in brief: By suppressing the dynamic aspect
of becoming, explanatory theories render essentially processual phenomena
inscrutable. The paradigm of an “essentially processual phenomenon” would
be, according to Whitehead, experience, of which consciousness is only the most
sophisticated (and deceiving) sort. Others (Verley, Weekes, and the editors
in chapters 3 and 4) expand systematically on Whitehead’s scholarly critique
of modern philosophy, which Whitehead casts almost entirely as a critique
of its favorite concept, consciousness. But there are really three main themes
that connect the contributions to this volume.
First, running through all the contributions to this volume is the critical insight that consciousness is not the sui generis phenomenon it is usually
taken to be—in philosophical and scientific discussion as much as in the
everyday understanding informed by lay sensibilities. Closely related to this
principal theme is a secondary theme that connects more than half of the
contributions to the volume (David Griffin, Donald Redfield Griffin, Shields,
Velmans, Rosenberg, Weekes, and the editors in chapter 4). It is the question
of the distribution of consciousness in the natural universe. Approaching
the question from very different angles, each of the contributors just named
argues that consciousness (or something much more primitive, but in the
same category) is more widely distributed than customarily supposed. At the
opposite extreme from the assumed exclusiveness of human consciousness
is the position usually referred to as “panpsychism.” In the contributions by
David Griffin, Weekes, and the editors in chapter 4, Whiteheadian arguments
for the universal distribution of some kind of extremely rudimentary (pre- or
proto-conscious) experience are explored. In the contributions by Shields,
Velmans, and Rosenberg, the possibility of such a distribution is supported
with robust and original arguments that will give many readers pause.
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:32 PM
4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
The principal theme first: in different ways, each contribution to this
volume seeks to relativize the concept of consciousness that is normally
taken for granted. The reflective and attentionally focused consciousness that
tends to be identified with consciousness absolutely belongs to a wide and
multidimensional spectrum of conscious states—or, if someone insists on
reserving the word consciousness for the particular apex of human experience
that is reflective and attentionally focused (as, indeed, Whitehead allows),
then we must say that consciousness belongs to a wide and multidimensional
spectrum of experience, most of which is “unconscious” or only partially or
obliquely conscious. (To know whether the word consciousness is being used
in its broader or narrower sense, the reader of this volume will have to be
attentive to contexts: we have not thought it appropriate to legislate uniformity in this matter on our contributors.) The point is that “paradigmatic”
consciousness is only one of many kinds of consciousness/experience. Its
isolation as a paradigm is the result of a variety of organic, psychological,
social, and historical processes of development, refinement, and selection
(some necessitated by survival and social existence, others contingent, but
ossified as dogma). Its view of the world is therefore not absolute or final,
but conditioned by these processes.
Weber argues that everyday consciousness of the natural attitude is
not an absolute given, but an artifact of socialized ontogeny. It results from
the constraints of utilitarian and social rationalization that operate on the
individual in mostly unconscious ways. Verley, Weekes, and the editors
in chapters 3 and 4 expose important ways that the preferred concept of
consciousness is an artifact of biases peculiar to the modern philosophical
tradition. Pachalska and MacQueen and Schweiger et al. discuss varieties
of consciousness revealed by brain pathology in humans. These varieties of
consciousness differ markedly from the usual paradigm of reflective and attentionally focused awareness of objects qua objects. The authors argue, moreover,
that these varieties of consciousness are not abnormal. On the contrary, they
are the normal subphases in the moment-to-moment microgenesis of consciousness, with the qualification that they are abnormally exposed because
pathology has arrested the microgenetic process at a preterminal phase of
realization. Velmans also stresses ways that human consciousness results from
and is conditioned by processes of refinement or selection operating on a
spectrum of broader and more basic kinds of consciousness/experience. He
goes so far as to suggest that what we normally think of as consciousness
in humans may be the sophisticated result of a highly selective release from
inhibition of what is in reality a pervasive and primitive kind of awareness
intrinsic to all organic matter or even to all matter, period. In fact, the startling
generality of this conclusion is something to which Rosenberg’s analysis of
causality led him for reasons wholly unrelated to Velmans’ argument: there
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 4
8/12/09 2:02:32 PM
Introduction
5
is, Rosenberg concludes, a primitive experiential aspect in every causal nexus,
and that means in every event, period. Velmans wonders if the purpose of
centralization in complex nervous systems isn’t to prevent overload by inhibiting this primitive consciousness throughout most of the system, allowing
for a selective focus on information of critical relevance. The late Donald
Redfield Griffin’s examination of consciousness in animals relativizes human
consciousness in a more straightforward, if no less controversial way. Although
he is mainly concerned with documenting ways that animals can be seen
to have consciousness similar to ours, its wider distribution in the animal
kingdom means that consciousness is a genus of which human consciousness
is only a specific kind. Reflective human consciousness may indeed possess
an epistemological privilege, but this is no longer something it can take for
granted on the grounds that it defines and exhausts what consciousness is.
Nor can we assume any longer that the minimum identity conditions of
consciousness/experience are in any way obvious—and least of all obvious
from self-conscious reflection or introspection in human beings.
The secondary theme: Since the distribution of consciousness/experience
in the universe bears in an obvious way on the relative or absolute status
of “paradigmatic” human consciousness, the distribution question becomes
another connecting theme in this volume. The distribution of consciousness/
experience cannot be divorced from the question of the minimal conditions
for the existence of consciousness/experience. The more complex the conditions, the less distributed it will be. Conversely, the more distributed it is,
the more the complexity of human consciousness must appear as the result
of specialized constraints that exclude other, more basic kinds of consciousness/experience (or at least their foregrounded manifestation). The distribution
of consciousness, alluded to by Weekes and the editors in chapter 4), is a
thematic focus of contributions by David Griffin, Donald Redfield Griffin,
Velmans, Shields, and Rosenberg, and it naturally leads to the hot-button
issue of panpsychism, notoriously associated with Whitehead’s metaphysics.
This special case of the distribution question brings us to the third unifying
theme of our volume.
The signature thesis of Whitehead’s metaphysics is that the core of
actuality is always some kind of experience. Avoiding the misnomer “panpsychism,” David Griffin has aptly dubbed this thesis panexperientialism.1 It
has long been common to dismiss Whitehead’s panexperientialism hastily
on the grounds that it is patently absurd to suggest that things like rocks
and toasters have experience or that subatomic particles are conscious. But
this conflates panexperientialism with panpsychism. As Griffin shows in his
contribution, these objections are misdirected. First, panexperientialism distinguishes between conscious and nonconscious experience (in the same way
that Velmans, for example, distinguishes between very high-grade and very
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:33 PM
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
low-grade “consciousness”). While all entities that are genuine individuals
(including subatomic events) are postulated to have some kind of experience,
only the most complexly organized of compound individuals have conscious
experience. The simplest individuals, presumably Planck-scale units of nature,
have an extremely rudimentary kind of “experience” that would consist in
little more than a sensitivity or responsiveness to their environment that was
not 100% predictable. Second, drawing on an important clarification made
by Charles Hartshorne, panexperientialism distinguishes between compound
individuals, such as organisms, which are genuine integral individuals and thus
have a coherently unified experience, and merely cohesive aggregates (like
rocks and toasters), which have individuals as their micro-constituents, but
are not themselves integral individuals and as such have no experience.2
It is also important to keep in mind that, according to panexperientialism,
individuals per se are momentary events and do not endure for more than the
briefest possible duration. Enduring entities, such as electrons or psyches, are
made up of many such durational individuals forming a temporal series that
is cumulative and characterized by overwhelming similarity between any two
consecutive members. Consequently, panexperientialism does not attribute a
mind or soul to anything but enduring compound individuals.3 It is only the
small differential of a momentary experience that panexperientialism attributes
to every individual regardless of status—compound or simple, bound within
a cumulative series or not.
A number of contributors to this volume explore arguments, both logical
and empirical, for taking panexperientialism seriously. Logical arguments of
various types (metaphysical, transcendental, conceptual) are advanced by David
Griffin, Shields, Rosenberg, and the editors in chapter 4. Empirical arguments
must appeal to scientific evidence about the distribution of consciousness/
experience. Given the roughly inverse relationship between complexity and
distribution of consciousness/experience, a number of contributors take up the
critical question that unavoidably arises in this context and that any serious
assessment of Whitehead must address: how far downscale in complexity of
organization can types of individuals be found that still appear to have some
kind of experience? As Thomas Nagel has put it, “if one travels too far down
the phylogenetic tree, people gradually shed their faith that there is experience
there at all” (Nagel 1979, 168). David Griffin alludes in summary form to
the growing range of evidence available on this important topic. Three of
our contributors, Donald Redfield Griffin, Velmans, and Shields, observing
a division of labor naturally suggested by their respective areas of expertise
(biology/animal ethology; psychology/neuropsychology; philosophy/physics),
examine empirical evidence that is in many cases startling.
Of course, as an empirical question, how far downscale in organizational
complexity experience goes is something that could be answered only indirectly,
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 6
8/12/09 2:02:34 PM
Introduction
7
by inference from decisive clues. As Donald Redfield Griffin notes, prejudices
on this question are likely to disguise themselves as disagreements about the
criteria for validly inferring the existence of consciousness/experience in other
life forms. Donald Redfield Griffin and Velmans both dispatch a number
of specious objections to less-than-human consciousness simply by insisting
that the same standards of interpretation we apply to other human beings be
applied to other organisms: similar behavior and similar brain anatomy and
physiology cannot be relevant in the one case and not in the other.
Regarding how far down the scale of complexity experience goes,
David Griffin notes that Descartes set the cutoff point right below human
beings, but that natural science has been pushing it down ever since—animal
ethologists pushing it as far down the phylogenetic tree as bees, biologists
as far down as single cell organisms or even as far as bacteria or DNA, and
some physicists right down to the Planck-scale units of nature. In this light,
panexperientialism looks like a position toward which empirical science is
tending all by itself under the weight of the evidence. But it is also a position increasingly under reassessment for strictly philosophical reasons. Part of
the reason for this volume is the fact that this slighted position is beginning
to garner mainstream consideration. As the deadlock between dualism and
materialism in consciousness studies becomes more tiresome, appreciation
for the important differences between the less plausible panpsychism and
the more plausible panexperientialism grows. To many, panexperientialism
is looking more and more like a viable via tertia (or “third way”).
And we note last that an answer to an important objection to panexperientialism also emerges from this volume. The demand is rightly made:
what other meaning can “experience” possibly have than the experience human
users of language are readily familiar with in themselves? Consequently, if
the concept of experience is attenuated and generalized so that it no longer
designates what human speakers normally mean in one language or another,
how can it mean anything at all? If the experience of a bacterium or an
electron is totally unlike ours, what point is there in calling it experience at
all? It seems that we are either saying something obviously wrong or not
really saying anything at all.
A great deal of empirical research into the distribution of experience
in the universe is addressed in this volume, and it suggests a much wider
distribution than is traditionally conceded. But our contributors also show
that within its own compass human experience is rich and multiform enough
to supply the semantic Rosetta Stone needed to talk meaningfully about
these nonhuman manifestations of experience. By noticing that even human
experience encompasses kinds of awareness that fall far short of the lucid,
objectifying consciousness of the well-socialized adult, we can free ourselves
from the conceit that consciousness as such must be narrowly construed as
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:35 PM
8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
something uniquely human (Weber, Weekes, and the editors in Part I ).
If there is, even within human consciousness as we experience it now, the
vestiges of qualitatively distinct kinds of consciousness corresponding to
each evolutionary stratum of our brain (Pachalska and MacQueen and the
work of Jason Brown they draw on), then there is no reason to think that
we do not share these more basic forms of consciousness with those species
that have only the more primitive brain formations. If human consciousness passed through more primitive stages in its own evolution, if it passes
through cumulative phases in the recovery from unconsciousness, if it passes
through distinct phases in the early motor development of the individual and
its subsequent socialization, if it passes through a nested hierarchy of phases
as it emerges moment by moment from the neural activity of the brain
(Schweiger et al., Weber, and the literature they reference), then it makes
no sense to deny that we have any criteria for generalizing an attenuated
concept of consciousness beyond human experience. The important question
that remains open is not whether, but how far the concept of experience can
be meaningfully generalized.
In order to set the individual contributions to this book in the context
of its overarching themes, the editors supply the following précis. As for the
arrangement of the contributions, the editors hoped to order them in a way
that would allow each to benefit the most from being read in the sequence
settled on, but to some extent the order is unavoidably arbitrary, and each
contribution does, in fact, stand on its own.
Précis of the Contributions
David Griffin not only provides a lucid, jargon-free overview of Whitehead’s
theory of consciousness, but he also manages to bring it directly into the
arena of current debate. The fact that there are conceptual common denominators allowing for a meaningful, if virtual debate between Whitehead and
contemporary theorists may surprise many who have, perhaps understandably,
stumbled at the outset over Whitehead’s dense and idiosyncratic language.4
Griffin enlarges on an idea very important to Whitehead: that the
philosopher may not deny in theory what she presupposes in practice. Griffin
notes that this fallacy involves what Apel and Habermas call a performative
contradiction: asserting something that violates the conditions of possibility
of making the assertion in question.5 Accordingly, Griffin elaborates four
criteria having to do with the conditions of the possibility of theorizing.
These performatively undeniable facts Griffin calls ideas of “hard-core common sense,” and any adequate theory of consciousness must account for them:
the idea “that conscious experience exists, that it exerts influence upon the
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 8
8/12/09 2:02:35 PM
Introduction
9
body, that it has a degree of self-determining freedom, and that it can act
in accord with various norms.”
It’s obvious how a statement such as “Consciousness does not exist”
involves a performative contradiction,6 but a statement such as “Consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon” runs afoul of performative consistency,
too. If the uttered statement means what the speaker intended, then it must
be conceded that her mind has had an effect on her body. If the statement
was affirmed because the speaker thought it was true, then she must have
had the freedom to let herself be motivated by an ideal such as truth.7
Griffin takes a broad survey of the important players in current debates
and finds that the discussion remains boxed in by the traditionally dominant paradigms of reductionist materialism and Cartesian dualism. Assessed
against his four performative criteria, neither of these positions is acceptable.
Materialism runs afoul of all four, and dualism runs afoul of all but the first.
The contemporary debate is therefore framed by what amounts to a false
dilemma. The overlooked third option or tertium quid would be a naturalism
that was not reductionistic or, by the same token, an interactionism that was
not dualistic. According to Griffin, Whitehead’s position meets this requirement: “With dualists, Whitehead agrees that consciousness belongs to an
entity—a mind or psyche—that is distinct from the brain, and that genuine
freedom can, partly for this reason, be attributed to conscious experience.
With materialists, Whitehead shares a naturalistic sensibility, thereby eschewing any even implicitly supernaturalistic solution to philosophical problems,
and, partly for this reason, rejects any dualism between two kinds of actualities. Like materialists, in other words, he affirms a pluralistic monism. He
thereby regards consciousness as a function of something more fundamental.
And yet he, like dualists, rejects the reductionism involved in functionalism
as understood by materialists.”
What makes this tertium possible is Whitehead’s theory of experience
as the core of actuality. In other words, panexperientialism is uniquely qualified to avoid the pitfalls of the materialism-dualism dichotomy. This yields
an essentially transcendental argument for panexperientialism: an argument
based on performative consistency as a condition of the possibility of conscious activity. Griffin alludes to two subsidiary arguments, as well. For one,
he notes the trend in empirical science to cast the net of experience more
and more widely. In the absence of a sufficient reason to draw a hard line at
a particular point (as Velmans discusses in his contribution, as well) a prima
facie presumption of validity should be granted to the logical extrapolation
of this trend. For another, Griffin (like Velmans) notes the difficulties that
arise once we draw such a hard line. It creates a discontinuity and a dualism
difficult to square with the theory of evolution. Griffin even makes the case
that panexperientialism alone can explain how consciousness could arise in the
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:36 PM
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
course of evolution. This is no bluff since he charts the intervening phases
that would lead to the gradual or staggered evolution of consciousness from
the unconscious or merely incipient intentionality of experience in its most
rudimentary shape. But Griffin stresses that his most important argument
is the transcendental one: that only panexperientialism can satisfy the four
performative criteria he sets out.
Michael Katzko offers us a complementary survey of current debates
on consciousness, looking especially at three influential philosophers who
strongly disagree with one another: David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, and
John Searle. On the surface it would seem that the positions of these three
philosophers have relatively little in common, but Katzko argues that they
share fundamental presuppositions. This becomes evident when we examine
how each philosopher construes the problem he thinks a theory of consciousness is obligated to solve. In each case the problem defining his objective
is essentially the same: the difficulty of understanding how the physical
could possibly give rise to the mental. (Notice that the question is essentially about causation.) The answers they and many others in the literature
give to this question are to be sure quite different. Some answer that it’s
not possible: either because there’s really no such thing as the mental or
because the mental isn’t caused or created by the physical at all, even if it
always somehow corresponds to it. Others answer that it’s possible, but as
yet incomprehensible, or that it’s possible, but inherently incomprehensible,
and so on. But all these solutions start from the same conception of the
problem. Katzko sees them as so many attempts to make a virtue of necessity—having uncritically embraced false dilemmas bequeathed to them by
the seventeenth century, contemporary philosophers have no choice but to
countenance one side or another. As a whole, the contemporary discussion
takes it for granted that what we need to do is rethink our understanding
of the mental in order to render its relation to the physical unproblematic.
The homogeneity and one-sidedness of the contemporary discussion becomes
evident when we compare Whitehead’s philosophical conviction that what
we need is a new concept of the physical. Why after all should our concept
of the mental do all the accommodating, especially when the concept of the
physical to which accommodation is demanded was discredited by physics a
century ago? (In this connection Shields rightly speaks in his contribution
of a “cultural lag.”)
Looking at the contemporary debate with the eyes of a clinician,
Katzko sees a disordered discourse, hamstrung by arbitrary and unacknowledged limitations. Using Whitehead’s framework of concepts to make this
diagnosis, he shows how the operative concepts of the current debate (mind,
the physical, intentionality, qualia) illustrate many of the fallacies described
by Whitehead (misplaced concreteness, simple location, vacuous actuality).
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 10
8/12/09 2:02:37 PM
Introduction
11
The common denominator of these fallacies is the methodological mistake
of commencing investigation with abstractions to which one subsequently
attempts to reattach what was left out by appealing to other abstractions.
The alternative is to begin inquiry with the complete context of the concrete
experience in which theoretical investigation operates (including such things
as what the investigation presupposes “in practice”), seeking from the outset
a generalization that is inclusive rather than exclusive. Whitehead agrees with
thinkers such as Bergson, James, and Bradley that prereflective experience is
characterized by an unbroken wholeness to which reflection must always do
justice. Whenever analytic abstractions precind8 from this wholeness and treat
the world as a set of typological isolates that can be recombined to “explain”
concrete phenomena—which the reader will recognize as the resolutive-compositive method that inaugurates modern thought—it will subsequently be
difficult, not to say impossible, to understand how things are nevertheless
interconnected in nontrivial ways. Katzko shows how well the now popular
concept of intentionality illustrates this problem. It reflects an attempt to
reattach the contextuality and relatedness that was left out of “mind” when
it was conceived as a kind of substance to begin with. And whenever it is
supposed, for example, that the “content” of experience does not entail the
existence of the “external” world, the mind (or consciousness) is being treated,
at least implicitly, as an autonomous entity—that is, as a substance.
Whitehead does not deny the great practical and technological triumphs
of the resolutive-compositive method, but he thinks it contributes little to
philosophical understanding. It is not possible to explain concreteness—what
Aristotle called tode ti—as a collocation of abstractions. The task of philosophy is therefore not to explain the concrete by means of the abstract, but
to explain how abstractions arise from the analytic partitioning of concrete
experience. Katzo shows how the partitioning of experience preferred by
the current debate, lacking a self-conscious methodological grounding in
the holism of prereflective experience, is often an arbitrary throw-back to
platitudes of the seventeenth century.
The late Donald Redfield Griffin’s contribution goes a long way toward
assuaging the uneasiness noted by philosopher Thomas Nagel that “if one
travels too far down the phylogenetic tree, people gradually shed their faith
that there is experience there at all” (Nagel 1979, 168). Griffin does not make
the specifically Whiteheadian distinction between conscious and unconscious
experience, although he does not rule it out either.9 Defining consciousness as
“subjectively experiencing feelings or thoughts,” he shows that accumulating
evidence strongly suggests that many species of animals have consciousness.
His discussion touches on apes, parrots, dolphins, and bees.
Griffin suggests that evidence of animal consciousness is routinely
ignored because of an overriding philosophical prejudice “that there is no
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:38 PM
12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
conceivable way in which valid, objective evidence about conscious experiences of other species can ever be obtained.” With regard to species very
unlike our own, the prejudice takes the stronger form that conscious thinking simply could not be possible. The result is a double standard, where
something naturally accepted as evidence of conscious thinking in the case
of humans is dismissed in the case of animals. Griffin reviews evidence from
neuropsychology, fieldwork in animal ethology, and experimental work where
animals have been trained to communicate.
The evidence from neuropsychology is arresting. Human consciousness
does not appear to be associated with any neural structure or function unique
to the human brain, but rather with widely distributed, but coordinated
activity engaging large areas of the brain. There is no obvious reason why
activity of this sort must be limited to brains of the highest complexity. In
any case, the close similarity between animal and human nervous systems
“means that there is no inherent reason why animal brains cannot produce
conscious experiences.”
But there is also positive neuroscientific evidence of animal consciousness, at least in monkeys. Just as the phenomenon of blindsight in humans
has been used to clarify the important difference between registering and
responding to information from the environment, on the one hand, and
being conscious of it, on the other, so, too, the evidence of blindsight in
monkeys warrants a similar interpretation. Furthermore, the discovery of
“mirror neurons” in monkeys suggests that they sometimes entertain possibilities, thinking about behaviors they could or would like to perform. If
this interpretation is correct, it has important consequences. It is very hard
(maybe impossible) to understand counterfactual ideation as information processing or as stimulus-response conditioning, and Griffin draws very near to
Whitehead’s technical understanding of consciousness when he suggests that
mirror neurons, in providing evidence that monkeys sometimes think about
what is not the case, but possible, provide evidence of consciousness. There
is, moreover, direct evidence that monkeys are conscious when attentionally
focused on what is the case. It is commonly claimed that monkeys, while
they may “know” many facts that are important in their lives, do not know
that they know them. Reflexivity is thus taken to be a necessary condition of
consciousness that monkeys supposedly lack. However, an ingeniously designed
experiment demonstrates that monkeys are able to know whether they have
remembered a particular piece of useful information and to optimize their
strategies for getting food in light of this higher-order knowledge.
It cannot be stressed enough how close Griffin’s discussion of consciousness in monkeys comes to Whitehead’s very abstract analysis of
consciousness. For Whitehead, experience is conscious in one of two basic
cases: (1) when we “feel” the absence of a difference between a thing and
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 12
8/12/09 2:02:38 PM
Introduction
13
the description it satisfies or (2) when we “feel” the difference between a
thing and a description it doesn’t satisfy. To take an arbitrary example (the
old cat and the mat), the verbal transcription in the former case would be
the cat is on the mat; in the latter case, the cat is not on the mat. But the cat
is on the mat is actually abbreviated. Something logically irrelevant, but psychologically crucial has been left out. The verbal analogue of the consciousness
that the cat is on the mat would have to reflect the actual state of affairs as
the absence of a (potential) difference between the thing indicated and its
description: the cat is not not on the mat. In other words, ideation cannot
be conscious unless it involves a counterfactual element. The counterfactual
element is denied, but the unrealized possibility of its truth is what makes
consciousness of facts possible. To be conscious of a fact is to “experience”
that the possibility of its falsehood exists, but is not realized (note that what
is experienced is therefore a proposition). Such an experience is possible,
according to Whitehead, because there is, in addition to the physical element
that supplies the basis of experience, a purely mental element that supplies
the necessary modal and logical functions.10
In the case of Griffin’s monkeys, they apparently understand that their
recollection could be wrong (possibility), but are confident in specific cases that
it is not wrong (unrealized possibility), and in other cases they understand
that they no longer recall or that the recollection is no longer reliable. In
the former case, where error is the unrealized possibility, they are conscious
of knowing. In the latter case, where knowledge is the unrealized possibility,
they are conscious of not knowing.11
Griffin makes his strongest case on the basis of animal communication.
He asks only that we accept as evidence of consciousness in animals what we
take as evidence of consciousness in humans. Even conceding a single standard, however, many will deny that animal communication has the requisite
parity: it is not symbolic, lacks semantic content, and lacks displacement.
(“Displacement” means “convey[ing] information about something displaced
in space or time from the situation where the communication takes place.”)
Let the reader note that we are here talking about the “decisive clues” alluded
to earlier that would warrant an inference from patent behavior (in this case:
communication) to the existence of consciousness, which is necessarily something latent. The decisive features communication must have to warrant such
an inference appear to be (1) a symbolic character, (2) semantic content, and
(3) displacement. For it is precisely the prominence of these three features
in human communication that compels us to view it as expressing subjective
experiences, and these three features, so it is alleged, are conspicuously absent
from animal communication. But, in fact, these features are attested. The
alarm calls of vervet monkeys convey specific semantic information about
the types of predators, not just emotional arousal, and the famous “waggle
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 13
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:39 PM
14
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
dance” of honeybees displays all three critical features. The waggle dance
is an elaborate symbolic code, specific enough to convey precise semantic
content that is displaced, flexible enough to serve multiple purposes (e.g.,
finding the best nectar or finding the best location for a new hive), and it
involves an extensive exchange of information among dancers leading through
reciprocal adjustments to a final group decision.
Griffin concedes that most examples of animal communication, such as
the alarm calls of the vervet monkeys, are indeed examples of direct reactions
to the current situation in which the animal finds itself, whereas humans “often
think and communicate about past occurrences or what may happen in the
future.” Consciousness is strongly associated with displacement for the same
reason it is strongly associated with counterfactual ideation. It is hard to see
how sensitivity and responsiveness to what is not present could be a matter
of unconscious information processing or stimulus-response conditioning.
Finding displacement in the communication of social insects therefore poses
significant challenges to conventional assumptions about consciousness.
George W. Shields makes skillful use of the methods and resources of
Analytic philosophy to argue for panexperientialism, thereby disarming some
of its most self-confident critics—Anglo-American philosophers who think
panexperientialism violates basic sureties of logically rigorous and scientifically informed analysis. Sophistication in formal logic and command of hard
science often make Analytic criticism formidable. Shields meets this criticism
on its own terms, presenting formally rigorous arguments and hard empirical
evidence in favor of panexperientialism.
The first part of his paper focuses on logical and philosophical arguments for panexperientialism. Shields examines what panexperientialism
means and proposes the following as minimal criteria: that every genuine
individual has a physical presence in space-time and is related internally to its
environment.12 Whitehead’s analytic unit of experience—the prehension—is
therefore an internal relation. Following Hartshorne, Shields argues that
internal relations translate logically into strict implications. From this analysis
he infers what the denial of panexperientialism amounts to: an ontology of
exclusively external relations and a logic of entirely open possibilities. There
would be no restrictions on the conjunction or separation of individuals in
this world (this is what is meant by “open possibilities” in this context).
The only necessity would be the completely symmetrical logical necessities
of identity and noncontradiction.
Shields is happy to continue the strain or argument begun by David
Griffin when he analyzed the idea of performative consistency in terms of
“hard-core common sense.” Shields calls “assumptions which we presume
in our practice universally or nearly universally” “deep protocols of common
sense” and under this rubric extends Griffin’s list to include four more items:
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 14
8/12/09 2:02:40 PM
Introduction
15
“that (1) our experience as temporally conceptualized into ‘past,’ ‘present,’
and ‘future’ is coherent; (2) the act of remembering is in principle not the
same as the act of imagining; (3) causal influence is objectively real; and (4)
a ‘skeptical solipsism of the present’ is false.” Shields presents what he calls
a “reduction to pragmatic absurdity” by showing that the external relations
ontology violates these four common sense commitments. Since the relation between any two events is wholly external and contingent it becomes
impossible to understand how the present could have anything to do with
the past. A present event, such as the act of remembering the past, would
necessarily be independent of anything that actually happened in the past,
undercutting the concepts of “past,” “memory,” and “causal influence” at one
stroke and sealing present consciousness hermetically in the present moment.
Panexperientialism, by accepting internal relations, avoids these difficulties.
Shields notes that panexperientialism also avoids the cardinal problems typically afflicting materialism and dualism, namely, the emergence of qualia out
of matter and the possibility of the mind acting causally on matter.
Shields considers and rebuts in some detail six objections raised against
panexperientialism: (1) that it implies that things like rocks have thoughts
(only it doesn’t), (2) that it implies that the behavior of the elementary
constituents of matter would not be predictable through their physical properties alone (only they aren’t), (3) that elementary particles are completely
identical whatever their past histories and thus could not have any interior
states (only they aren’t and so could), (4) that attributing any kind of feeling, however qualified or attenuated, to micro-constituents of matter violates
the linguistic protocols for meaningful use of terms such as feeling (but not
just the concept of feeling is generalized—the criteria for its attribution are
generalized as well, yielding predicates such as “openness to the environment”
or “internal relatedness,” which are still “psychological” predicates without
being strained usage), (5) that any adequate physicalism must be tantamount
to epiphenomenalism (but epiphenomenalism cuts against physical science
because it is anti-evolutionary, implying that “animals and humans evolved
with persistent natural selection of entirely superfluous mental entities”); and
(6) that the existence of unproblematic forms of emergence, such a liquidity
from molecules, shows that proto-experiential “elements” are not needed to
explain the emergence of the experience we are familiar with (but experience is unlike liquidity in the relevant respect because the latter is a kind
of emergence that can be understood and predicted from its antecedent
elements, while experience notoriously cannot).
The second part of Shields’ paper looks at arresting empirical data
in support of panexperientialism. In pushing down the lower threshold of
“conscious” experience, Donald Griffin got us to social insects. Velmans,
arguing that even single cell organisms might have some kind of phenomenal
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 15
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:41 PM
16
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
awareness, got us to the very bottom of the phylogenetic tree. Shields, drawing
on startling but well-confirmed empirical findings, provides the final turn of
the screw that anchors experience in the Planck-scale units of nature. He cites
first the phenomenon of neuroplasticity. Although it had long been dogma
that the brain is hardwired once and for all in early childhood, recent research
has documented ongoing alterations in the adult brain, including the growth
of new neurons, as a result of sensory and cognitional input. Important to
Shields’ argument is the remarkable discovery that the brain’s plasticity is
susceptible to clinical manipulation. Attentional therapies, involving such
exercises as “observing” undesirable thoughts and emotions in an impartial
manner and then refocusing attention repeatedly on alternative thoughts,
have not only been shown to work, but PET scans have now revealed alterations of the brain’s neural system corresponding to the behavioral changes.
Shields argues that this is just a special case of the weird but documented
quantum phenomenon known as the “Quantum Zeno Effect,” where observation increases the probability that a given quantum state will not change:
“the more frequently and rapidly you observe a physical system in a certain
selected way, the more you ‘lock in’ a certain physical state of the system.”
The power of attentional therapies to decrease the probability of unwanted
thoughts and emotions would thus result from “locking in” the alternatives
by repeated ideational exercises. Shields’ appeal to quantum mechanics is not
entirely speculative since, as he points out, the release of neurotransmitters
is regulated by processes so microscopic that quantum mechanical principles
do indeed apply. The provocative conclusion is that attention to one’s own
thinking, like the observation of experimental setups, has the power to alter
the probability that one rather than another superimposed wave function
will be actualized. This kind of “top-down” causal influence is precisely what
Whitehead’s panexperientialism is designed to explain. Shields doubts that
classical materialism can make any sense of these phenomena at all.13
Max Velmans also takes up the critical question of how far downscale
in complexity types of individuals can be found that still have some kind of
experience. Velmans approaches the question in the context of a larger question about the evolution of consciousness. Which sorts of entities are thought
to have consciousness determines to a large extent when consciousness must
have evolved and what biological refinements to the evolving organism are
specifically responsible for it. Velmans notes that theories about the distribution of consciousness range from the ultraconservative (only humans have
it) to the extravagantly libertarian (everything has it—panpsychism). While
ultraconservative theories traditionally drew their support from theology,
more contemporary versions “are based on the supposition that higher mental
processes of the kinds unique to humans are necessary for consciousness of
any kind.” Velmans is skeptical not only of these ultraconservative views, but
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 16
8/12/09 2:02:42 PM
Introduction
17
ultimately of any degree of conservatism on this point. He examines a variety
of rationales for the claim that consciousness depends on brain complexity
or higher order cognitive processes and argues that “[s]uch views confuse
the necessary conditions for the existence of consciousness with the added
conditions required to support its many forms.”
While Velmans ultimately endorses the “extravagantly libertarian” view,
it must be noted that his vocabulary does not strictly conform to the usage
of Whitehead or contemporary Whiteheadians. Although he does distinguish
between conscious and unconscious information processing (and elsewhere
[2000] between conscious and unconscious mind), he does not make the
terminological distinction between conscious and nonconscious experience or
between panpsychism and panexperentialism. Nevertheless, he makes nearly
equivalent distinctions by stressing the widely differing degrees of complexity
manifested by the forms that consciousness takes: from mere feeling to conceptually articulated consciousness of self and world. At the lowest extreme,
consciousness in Velmans’ acceptation is tantamount to Whitehead’s nonconscious experience. Accordingly, the form of panpsychism he advocates is very
close to panexperientialism. This becomes evident when we revisit his distinction
between conscious and unconscious information processing in light of his final
reflections on the nature of focal-attentive consciousness. As we discuss below,
Velmans marshals an arresting reason why unconscious information processing
may simply be information processing in which a diffuse, primitive consciousness
has been suppressed. So in the end, feeling may well be a naturally occurring
feature of all biological processes, which regulate themselves through information extracted from their internal and external environments.
Velmans advances two principle arguments against conservative distribution theories. First, following a tradition that includes Thomas Huxley
and Charles Sherrington, he points out that conservative distribution implies
a discontinuity theory of evolution. At some point consciousness must
“appear [ . . . ] (out of nothing) through some random mutation in complex
life forms that happen[s] to confer a reproductive advantage.” Typically, it
is thought that consciousness is linked to the evolution of the neocortex.
However, there is nothing unique to cortical cells that might be responsible
for consciousness. Indeed, as Sherrington observes, cells in the frog embryo
destined to be brain can often be replaced with others, such as skin cells from
the back, and still develop into brain. This leaves us with the assumption
that consciousness must have something to do with neural organization. But
the strong evidence for the gradual evolution of the human brain makes it
unlikely that consciousness sprang fully formed at any point in the brain’s
slow accretion of structural/functional complexity.
Velmans’ second argument against conservative distribution theories
is, by contrast, so untraditional that it upends conventional objections to
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 17
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:43 PM
18
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
panexperientialism. Velmans brings neurophysiology and phenomenology
together in a startling way. He reminds us that a great number of the synapses
in the brain must be inhibitory. Otherwise the nervous system would be in
a constant state of universal excitement after the first signal. At the same
time we know that consciousness would be impossible if the vast amount of
simultaneous information streaming in to the mind/brain were not limited
and filtered down to something that it could manageably attend to.14 From
this Velmans infers the possibility that consciousness may be a naturally
occurring feature of all neural representations. However, the more complex
the nervous system, the more necessary it would be to inhibit consciousness
of all but the most important information to prevent overload and confusion.
In this case, rather than adding something to unconscious representations
to make them conscious, attention15 would correspond to a highly selective
release of consciousness from inhibition.
The implications of this argument are dramatic. As Velmans notes,
cognitive psychology has demonstrated that most human information processing takes place unconsciously. Naturally, this leads cognitive psychology
to seek the specific conditions that distinguish conscious from unconscious
processing. It asks, in other words: why does consciousness emerge at some
particular threshold in the mind/brain’s cognitive functioning? This question is perhaps no less vexed than the question of the threshold at which
consciousness emerges in the course of evolution. Both questions presuppose a discontinuity: on the one hand, a discontinuity in the evolution of
consciousness (a diachronic discontinuity), on the other, a discontinuity in
the distribution of consciousness (a synchronic discontinuity). The synchronic discontinuity takes two forms. There is the discontinuity between
organisms that do and those that do not have consciousness, and, within
the nervous system of organisms that do have consciousness, there is the
discontinuity between conscious and unconscious processes. These two kinds
of synchronic discontinuity are closely related. Without having to make any
particular assumptions about the relation between organic processes available
to consciousness and organic processes that result in consciousness, we can
nonetheless say it is only because consciousness does not extend (in either
sense) to the vast majority of organic processes in our own brains and bodies
that we resist the idea that very similar processes in other life forms might
be conscious (in either sense).
But if what human beings normally experience as consciousness is
only the selective release of an aboriginally pervasive consciousness from its
systemic inhibition in complex nervous systems, then unconscious information processing would not be different in kind from—that is, discontinuous
with—conscious processing. Unless specifically inhibited, a kind of rudimentary
“consciousness” would attach to all organic information processing. Neither
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 18
8/12/09 2:02:43 PM
Introduction
19
at some point in evolutionary history nor at some level of neural activity
would consciousness come into being de novo.
Of course this rudimentary consciousness would not involve attention
or any kind of reflective, objectifying, or thematically motivated awareness.
It would be a diffuse, nonconceptual, nonobjectifying, and nonreflective
feeling of qualia—just the sort of experience Whitehead calls “unconscious”
and generalizes to all events in nature. On this telling, discontinuity—the
abrupt emergence of consciousness from something unconscious—would be
an illusion arising from attentional consciousness, the necessary flip side of
which is the suppression or exclusion of diffuse consciousness. The highly
restricted access of our own consciousness to what it’s like to be a living
organism then leaves us in a poor position to appreciate what we have in
common with less complex forms of life.
We see how this argument leads to a new opening in the vexed problem
of the evolutionary value of consciousness. It would not be consciousness, but
complexity of information processing that confers a reproductive advantage
on certain organisms in certain environments. Such complexity would go
hand in hand with increasing complexity of the attendant consciousness. But
increasing complexity in the nervous system would actually become counterproductive for the organism unless the attendant consciousness of all but a
narrow selection of the increasingly diffuse aggregate experience embraced in
this complexity was suppressed, thus yielding our familiar attentionally focused
consciousness as well as the illusion that it is the addition of something
altogether new on top of an otherwise unconscious cognitive processing.
For Velmans, an evolutionary account of human consciousness is
therefore possible, but only by upending the way the question is usually
posed. It would not be consciousness so much as its suppression that under
certain circumstances confers a selective advantage. Attentional consciousness
evolves when diffuse consciousness begins to pose a selective disadvantage.
We should note in passing how close this comes to Whitehead’s thesis that
complexity of experience, which he calls width and depth through harmony
and intensity, requires a great deal of the data actually given to an entity
to enter into its experience only negatively, that is, as something excluded,
suppressed, diminished, or transmuted.
This unanticipated turn of the argument stands Thomas Nagel’s
reservations on their head. What needs to be explained is not how there
possibly could be simple phenomenal consciousness at the low end of the
phylogenetic tree, but why it is lacking throughout most of the nervous
system of organisms at the high end. “[P]henomenal consciousness (of any
kind) might only require representation. If so, even simple invertebrates might
have some rudimentary awareness, in so far as they are able to represent and,
indeed, respond to certain features of the world.” Empirically, it is as yet
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 19
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:44 PM
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
impossible to rule out even more remote seeming possibilities: “If the ability to represent and respond to the world, or the ability to modify behavior
consequent on interactions with the world are the criteria for consciousness
then it may be that consciousness extends not just to simple invertebrates
(such as Planaria) but also to unicellular organisms, fungi and plants.” The
upshot of the continuity theory of the evolution of consciousness is essentially
panexperientialist: “In the cosmic explosion that gave birth to the universe,
consciousness co-emerged with matter and co-evolves with it. [ . . . ] On
this view, evolution accounts for the different forms that consciousness takes.
But, consciousness, in some primal form, did not emerge at any particular
stage of evolution. Rather, it was there from the beginning. Its emergence,
with the birth of the universe, is neither more nor less mysterious than the
emergence of matter, energy, space and time.”
Gregg Rosenberg also focuses on the case for panexperientialism, but
he takes a very different approach from our other contributors. In a precisely
executed analysis of the semantic structure of explanatory theories and of
causality in particular, Rosenberg surprises us with an altogether original
argument for panexperientialism. Rosenberg observes that Whitehead’s panexperientialism is “a reaction to the void created by his rejection of Vacuous
Actuality,” which he explains with admirable lucidity: “A Vacuous Actuality
would be a fundamental reality that is purely structural and quantifiable,
with no intrinsic nature of its own that escapes the formal description of a
pattern. The rejection of Vacuous Actuality amounts to the assertion that the
entities of fundamental physics, for instance, are more than mere dynamic
quantities, mere information structures in the vacuum. It is the rejection of
the now popular information-theoretic ‘It from bit’ view for understanding
the essential nature of the physical world.”
Rosenberg notes that the rejection of Vacuous Actuality and the
endorsement of panexperientialism by process philosophy look on the surface “like positions of insight, or even faith, not sufficiently motivated by
argumentation.” The purpose of his paper “is to put more argumentation in
place to support the rejection of Vacuous Actuality and the panexperientialist
reaction to that rejection.”
Rosenberg begins with a logical analysis of different kinds of relations. He is especially interested in the kind of relationships that define the
explanatory structure of scientific theories. He illustrates how they are typically
conceptual relations in which the relata mutually presuppose one another.
For example, in economics, goods and services are things that consumers
and producers barter. But consumers and producers are, in turn, simply
people occupying distinct positions in the system of bartering goods and
services. In biology, a heritable characteristic (gene) is one that parents pass
from their generation to the next, but a parent is an organism that passes
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 20
8/12/09 2:02:45 PM
Introduction
21
along its genes. Rosenberg argues that such circularity is logically harmless
and metaphysically possible only because the relationships are in these cases
carried by items individuated by properties external to the circular relation.
The roles of the two players in a game of checkers, for example, are defined
in a circular way because they presuppose one another, but their distinction
is possible only because they are carried by a difference that is not circular,
namely the difference between the colors of the pieces. This leads Rosenberg to identify one kind of circularity as merely contrastive, like “on” and
“off ”—just as the players in a game of checkers are sufficiently defined simply
by stipulating that they are different from one another. Here each term is
defined by nothing more than the negation of the other. Another kind of
circularity he calls compositional because the items presuppose one another
in a positive way as components of each other’s natures. He proposes that
causality exhibits this kind of circularity, involving a nexus between effective
properties, which can determine an event to happen, and receptive properties, which allow such determination to happen. To prevent them from being
logical impossibilia, both kinds of relations, contrastive and compositional,
need carrier properties external to the circles they define.
It may be that these external properties are internal to some other, more
fundamental circularity, but ultimately there must be carriers external to any
circularity. Rosenberg thus throws light on the hierarchical order of the sciences
familiar since Comte, which corresponds to twentieth-century expectations of
reduction. Rosenberg mentions the following sequence: economics, sociology,
psychology, ecology, and biology, chemistry, physics. The circularity of the
higher science is carried by properties external to the circularity of that science,
but internal to the circularity of the more fundamental science. This leads
Rosenberg to the critical question what the ultimate carriers are. We needn’t
agree with the reducibility thesis of the unified science program to agree that
physics will be the lowest order science in this scheme of grounding. Physical
reality in space and time is what finally individuates the operative terms of
the higher sciences. So Rosenberg poses the pointed question: what carries
the circular relations that define physics? These carriers must have several
interesting properties. “What the world needs from a carrier of physics are
properties whose being would be extrinsic within every such system and yet
which still have the requisite internal relations to one another. For physics,
we need ultimate carriers. The properties best answering to this description are
best thought of as properties that are intrinsic tout court. A property whose
categorical nature is extrinsic within every system of properties is simply one
whose being is intrinsic at least partly to itself, rather than to its contextual
relationships. That is, it is a property that we cannot understand in purely
systematic terms without leaving something out.” At the same time, in order
to be “carriers of the effective properties described by physics, these intrinsic
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 21
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:46 PM
22
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
properties must have internal contrasts with one another that mirror the features and relations of physical properties: patterns of distinctness, variations in
magnitude, and relations of compatibility, incompatibility, and requirement.”
Rosenberg suggests that the most plausible candidates for the role of such
ultimate individuals are the much talked about qualia. On the one hand,
they have identities that are noncontextual (the subjective feel of lavender
is knowable only through itself and is not implied by any facts of physics).
On the other hand, they have definite logical and quantitative relations with
one another (such as mutual incompatibility or intensity differences). This
leads Rosenberg to his provocative thesis about the identity of the “ultimate
carriers” of causation: “Things in the world are natural individuals if, and
only if, they are experiencing phenomenal individuals.”
If, as seems plausible, the only thing that could be external to every
context was something that was at least partly “internal to itself,” then we
have a strong reason to believe that “self ” is a meaningful and indispensable
predicate of the ultimate bearers of relations in the world. Rosenberg does not
pursue his line of thought in this way, but his logical analysis of a property
which is “external tout court” in terms of “internal to itself ” seems already
to lend credence to Whitehead’s concept of the ultimate constituents of the
world as “actual occasions” understood as possessing an incipient reflexivity
or selfhood. There is something self-referential about them by dint of an
experience, however attenuated, of self-enjoyment, which implies a modicum
of being-for-self happening privately in an interior world. If this argument
holds, then we could say that just as Shields gave the panexperientialist argument a last turn of the screw, Rosenberg gives the response to the classic
objection to panexperientialism a last turn of the screw. For we have specified the criteria that will allow us to generalize the concept of experience
not only to other forms of life without losing the semantic justification for
calling it experience, but also, beyond what are normally considered to be
organisms, to inorganic nature: experience is the entry of something at least
partly internal to itself into an internal relation with something other than
itself. We have, furthermore, identified compelling logical and metaphysical
reasons for making such a generalization.
Maria Pachalska and Bruce Duncan MacQueen point out that the
science most qualified to elucidate the mind-body problem and consciousness in particular is neuropsychology, but that the requisite interdisciplinary
collaboration between neurology and psychology has largely stymied because
the dominant view of brain function in the neurosciences makes a theory of
consciousness impossible: “A modular mind/brain made up of discrete processors shuttling bits of data back and forth does not need to be conscious
in order to do its job. If computers were to become conscious they would
by the same token cease to be useful as computers, and if we conceive of
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 22
8/12/09 2:02:46 PM
Introduction
23
our brains as organic computers, as is fashionable nowadays, then the same
applies to them.”
Proposing microgenesis as a more promising paradigm in neuropsychology, they provide a straightforward and largely nontechnical overview of
the microgenetic theory of consciousness developed by Jason Brown (New
York University Medical Center). Brown draws equally on Whiteheadian
process thinking and acute clinical observations of brain pathology. According to microgenetic theory, mind-brain states such as consciousness arise
as a rapid volley of overlapping waves of activity that can be measured in
milliseconds. Drawing inter alia on Paul MacLean’s theory of the “triune
brain” (MacLean 1967 and 1991), microgenetic theory proposes that each
wave originates from a core in the anatomically deepest and phylogenetically
oldest parts of the brain, the brainstem formations we share with reptiles,
and radiates outward through the limbic system (paleomammalian brain)
to the cortex (neomammalian brain), and finally to the neocortex of the
specifically human brain. Because neurologists tend to think of consciousness as a phenomenon of the cortex, it becomes difficult to understand how
consciously initiated activity, supposedly originating in the neocortex, can be
integrated with activity originating in the “reptilian” brain stem, where the
stimulus-response arc is closed with extreme rapidity. Although the authors
don’t quite say so explicitly, this integration problem is none other than the
“mind-body problem.”
It is crucial to understand that on Brown’s model nothing is initiated
in the cortex—what arises there is always a modification of activity already
begun. Corresponding to each of the three evolutionary levels reflected in
brain anatomy is a wholly functional brain: the outer/later functions are
parasitic on the inner/older ones they enclose, but not vice versa. Thus, all
processing of stimuli or other response activity originates in the brain stem.
The limbic system and the cortex, each in turn, have only the power to sculpt
what has already commenced. Depending on the functional/anatomical level
at which the cycle of activity is closed, it manifests as reflex (brainstem),
emotion (limbic system), or discriminating and objectifying consciousness
(cortex, neocortex). But since the cycles are slower the farther out they are
from the core, the higher brain functions require the interruption of the faster
inner cycles in order to allow the activity initiated in the reptilian brain to
be prolonged and shaped by the emotional loading of the limbic system, or
for the limbic brain response to be further prolonged and channeled through
the more refined constraints of the neocortex. One is reminded of Bergson’s
thesis that perception is a kind of interruption of action or the prolongation
of its incipience, making its enhancement by memory possible. For Brown,
each higher function is an enhancement made possible by the disruption or
retardation of the more primitive function.
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 23
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:47 PM
24
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
A number of thorny problems in cognitive psychology, such as the
binding problem or the murky relationship between cognition and emotion,
can be elegantly solved by this analysis, which is supported by extensive
pathological data. But it must be stressed that Brown’s fascinating analysis
implies a concept of consciousness very different from the acceptation common
in the current literature: “Consciousness is not purely a cortical phenomenon
[. . .] but emerges precisely from the process of evolution, passing from an
undifferentiated core, through an animist dream world, to a world of self
and objects. It is the whole process, not its just endpoint, that constitutes
and creates consciousness.”
Avraham Schweiger, Michael Frost, and Ofer Keren also advance
Brown’s idea that consciousness is the moment-to-moment product of nested
phases of realization, corresponding roughly to the nested evolutionary strata
of the brain just described. But they adopt a broader perspective to argue
for the process view of consciousness. The authors focus on comparing the
development of consciousness at different time scales: phylogeny, ontogeny,
and microgeny (the process that sustains consciousness from moment to
moment). They note that regardless of scale the same pattern characterizes
the process through which consciousness develops. In each case the process
unfolds from the global unity of a diffuse whole to the differential individuation of an objectified diversity. Schweiger et al. then show how pathological
data on the stages of recovery from coma are consistent with Brown’s theory
of microgenesis and reflect the same pattern of development on a time scale
slow enough to be easily detected. Furthermore, their analysis supports
Whitehead’s idea that consciousness as we usually think of it is a late-phase
development preceded by phases of more primitive experience, which we
could, using language not found in their paper, call pre-, proto-, or perhaps
demi-conscious, depending on the level of development. Their analysis also
supports the Whiteheadian idea that consciousness is a refined, high-level
manifestation of a very basic and pervasive type of process that structures
nature at all levels, forming nested hierarchies in which higher levels of process incorporate and recapitulate the lower ones. They note that the process
view of consciousness is opposed to “the current zeitgeist in cognitive science,
according to which phenomenological appearances of objects/events represent
properties of ‘reality.’” If consciousness unfolds through developmental stages,
at each stage “reality” will have a different cast to it, none of which have the
right to displace the others and lay claim to exclusive reality.
Michel Weber undertakes a process-oriented phenomenology in order to
analyze the normal, everyday consciousness of the “natural attitude.” Weber’s
approach to consciousness is mainly influenced by James and Whitehead.
James insisted that the focal consciousness of everyday existence is not the
only kind of consciousness. For one thing, it is always enveloped by a fringe
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 24
8/12/09 2:02:48 PM
Introduction
25
of unthematic awareness whose own irremediable vagueness is essential to
the clarity and effectiveness of focal consciousness. For another, it is only one
of a number of alternate possible states, each with its own cognitive value.
Weber brings one of Whitehead’s deepest intuitions to bear on these insights
of James’. According to Whitehead, permanence and flux (including both
arising and perishing) are the two most important features of the world that
metaphysics must account for, and, accordingly, worldviews can be classified
in terms of the distribution and relative importance they accord to each. We
can imagine a sort of spectrum, with Parmenides (Everything is permanent) at
one end and Heracleitus (Everything flows) at the other. Substantialism is the
view that accords metaphysical primacy to permanence. Weber suggests that
substantialism is defined by a rigid metaphysical reading—inspired by everyday
consciousness—of the principles of Aristotelian logic (Law of Identity, Law
of Non-Contradiction, Law of Excluded Middle). Accordingly, substantialism
manifests itself in psychology as the assumption that consciousness is also a
thing defined by these three laws. Weber argues that this has the unfortunate
effect of absolutizing consciousness in its normal and everyday manifestation to the exclusion of the fringe and alternative modalities that exercised
James. For it forces us to assume, first, that consciousness is a thing with a
fixed identity—an identity that is, moreover, clear and distinct. Second, it
forces us to assume that consciousness must—on pain of contradiction—be
this thing and nothing else (here we may glimpse part of the rationale for
the modern prejudice that consciousness must be all and wholly conscious,
through and through). Third, it forces us to assume that there is nothing
remaindered or intermediate between consciousness, so understood, and what
is unconscious in the sense of dead or inanimate. The implication of this is
that normal consciousness is the only kind of consciousness there is. In the
context of Weber’s Whiteheadian reflections on permanence and flux, clinical evidence from psychotherapy and hypnosis (to say nothing of religious
experience or “mind-altering” drugs) that normal consciousness does not
exhaust what consciousness is militates against substantialism in psychology
and points the way toward process paradigms that allow consciousness to
enjoy a more fluid reality.
Weber is mainly engaged by the third assumption (that something is
either normal consciousness or simply unconscious). He argues that what
normally counts as empirically or phenomenologically “given” consciousness
is an artifact of instrumental, linguistic, and social rationality. An alternative—more provocative—title for his paper might have been “The Social
Construction of Consciousness.” He seeks to relativize the normally absolutized
concept of everyday consciousness by exposing the machinery that leads to
its construction as a stable thematic nucleus within a rich and ever-flowing
multidimensional experience. Through an iterated process of abstraction in
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:49 PM
26
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
which the more thematic features of consciousness are peeled away to reveal
the less thematic, but more fundamental ones, Weber arrives at a kind of
map of the tacit dimensions. His analysis is organized by the hypothesis
that the two faces of consciousness, public and private, are isomorphic in
structure so that each element in the cartography of the one corresponds like
a mirror image to a similarly embedded element in the cartography of the
other. But he also argues that the corresponding elements are interdependent.
Consequently, what stabilizes privately as “consciousness” (but is really just
normal consciousness) cannot be independent of what is established socially
as sane or rational consciousness. Once normal consciousness is exposed in
its relativity it is possible to appreciate its important contributions to our
cognitive life without building a metaphysics around it.
Xavier Verley examines the concept of consciousness native to early
modern philosophy and the dialectical consequences it brings on itself as a
result of its logico-metaphysical prejudices. He supports Whitehead’s view
that a peculiar emphasis on consciousness led modern philosophy into the
quagmire of solipsism and that an appropriate valorization of memory is the
only solution. According to Whitehead the characteristic problems of modern philosophy result from a set of false assumptions and persistent fallacies
ultimately running deeper than its fascination with consciousness. While a
cause of the problem of solipsism, the modern concept of consciousness is
also a symptom of more fundamental errors. Verley referees the deep fallacies of modern thought that Whitehead saw as the most damaging: the
logical primacy ascribed to the subject-predicate form of the proposition,
the metaphysical primacy ascribed to the universal-particular and substancequality dyads, and the Aristotelian principle that a primary substance is
always a subject, never a predicate. Whitehead opposes to these characteristic
assumptions of modern thought a novel set of principles intended on the
one hand to avoid the pitfalls of the philosophy of consciousness and on
the other to ground a new philosophy of organism. Verley’s contribution
provides a concise overview of Whitehead’s critique of Descartes, Locke,
Hume, and Kant, and along the way he names and elucidates the numerous
fallacies and counter-principles Whitehead invokes in this critique, showing
how consciousness gains its prominence from these fallacies and loses its
prominence by their correction.
Verley answers the question: how is it that consciousness emerges as
the substance or form of the subject in modern philosophy? He notes that
Descartes’ peculiar meditation on himself has the effect of substituting for
the “me” (that inhabits the world through its body and inhabits time by
inheriting the past reality of things) the “I” (that is the subject of doubt and
the agent of mental acts). Thinking becomes the fundamental type of mental
act, and a judgment, executed by the will in the present moment, becomes
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 26
8/12/09 2:02:50 PM
Introduction
27
the way the subject is supposed to (re)establish a relation to its body, its
habits (including its personality and character), the world, and the past. The
self is thus defined by a relation to itself, rather than by a specific kind of
relation to the world. Once the self is reduced to the consciousness it has
of itself in the instant, consciousness itself is confined within this solipsism.
What is gained is modest: the self ’s certainty of being itself in the instant
of reflection. What is lost is nothing less than sanity and common sense.
Descartes’ seeming return to good sense at the end of his meditations to the
contrary, all that has been lost cannot be recovered. If time is not physical
inheritance, then the “me” will have no ontological inertia. The “I” must
remain locked in the solipsism of the present moment and—just as Descartes
in fact teaches—only God will have the power to weld together the successive
instants of time. The self will remain dispossessed of good sense because it
will never be anything more than the “I” grasping after its unobtainable “me.”
The integrity of the “I” and the “me” is only possible through memory, where
perception of the past is understood not as presentation of the past, but as
a prolongation of it. In this case, perception is a physical inheritance that
is felt (from the past), not “represented” (in the present). This establishes a
real continuity of the “I” with the evolving world and the “me” it includes.
One important consequence of this valorization of physical inheritance is
that consciousness and the “I” it likes to foreground become inessential
aspects of experience. Thus, just as starting with the “I” led to the idea of
consciousness as the form or essence of the subject, starting with the “me”
leads to consciousness being denied such a privileged status.
Anderson Weekes takes advantage of a provocative discussion occurring in the Journal of Consciousness Studies to bring an ancient philosophical
problem into contemporary focus and to show how Whitehead thought he
solved it. The skeptical critique of causality advanced at one point or another
in every major philosophical tradition received strong endorsement and indirect
empirical support in a paper by Eleanor Rosch on the psychology of explanation. M.C. Price subsequently applied her results to the specific problem
of explaining consciousness. Price argues that the prospects for solving the
mind-body problem cannot be any greater than the prospects for solving the
old riddle of causation. After all, what we are looking for is the mechanism
by which the body gives rise to, causes, the mind or consciousness. We are,
in effect, looking for the necessary connection Hume claimed could never be
found between any two distinct things. If the idea of necessary connection
between distinct things is unintelligible, as Rosch and the skeptics contend,
then the mind-body problem must be unsolvable.
Weekes contends that Whitehead’s thinking, from Process and Reality
to Modes of Thought, is immersed in this problem and that Whitehead offers
a breathtakingly original solution that may not deserve our allegiance, but
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 27
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:51 PM
28
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
deserves closer scrutiny than it has received. After refereeing the arguments
of Rosch and Price and placing them in a large historical context, he examines Whitehead’s doctrine of “perception in the mode of causal efficacy” and
its own historical pedigree. Whitehead wants to claim that the experience
of causation is so fundamental as to be pervasive and undeniable. Supposing this is true, the question becomes aggravated: if causation is pervasive
and undeniable, how can it be so elusive that its reality has escaped those
observers who were most avid about finding it? According to Whitehead,
the answer has to do with the nature of consciousness.
On the one hand, consciousness—if not by nature, then at least when
it is seeking knowledge—is objectifying; on the other hand, consciousness
always involves a performative dimension that cannot be objectified as such,
but is nevertheless always experienced. The two most important aspects of
this performative dimension are time and the animal body, and what they
reveal, according to Whitehead, is the causal emergence of “immediacy of
self-enjoyment” (i.e., “mind”) out of what is past and already “second hand”
(i.e., “body”). However, when anything tacitly lived or performed (performed “in the first person”) is objectified, an unwitting substitution occurs.
Because we assume parity between objectifying an object and objectifying
the self, we think we have captured the intended actuality in the focus of
our objectification, just as we would a live specimen, which doesn’t cease to
live simply because it is subject to observation. But in the case of objectifying one’s own performance, what is found at the focus of objectification is
never the intended actuality, but a representation that is precisely lacking
the character of performance. Thus, since objectification renders the actuality of causation (as opposed to the “representation” of it), like anything else
performed or tacitly lived, invisible, objectifying consciousness obscures the
process of its own emergence and cannot help but wonder where in the
world it came from. Far from being that thing whose true nature is fully
revealed in self-objectifying reflection, objectifying consciousness is always
a stranger to itself. By the same token, objectifying consciousness deprives
itself of the only possible means to understand causal connection. Valorizing
the performative dimension of consciousness thus allows Whitehead to offer
an original solution to the mind-body problem as well as to the causation
problem in its most general form: the question, namely, “How are synthetic
judgments a priori possible?”
Weekes stresses that Whitehead’s account of causation and of consciousness in its bearing on the issue of causation is essentially phenomenological. In
light of this it is remarkable that there has not been more intercourse between
process philosophy and Phenomenology. Having at least some goals in common, they could benefit from mutual adjustment and critique. Weekes has set
this process going by tightening up Whitehead’s loosely conceived analyses
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 28
8/12/09 2:02:51 PM
Introduction
29
with sharply defined concepts borrowed from the Phenomenological tradition
(performance, objectification) and by using Whitehead’s decisive critique of
modern philosophy as a template to isolate the critical failure in Husserl’s
Phenomenology that led him absurdly to a form of absolute idealism.
Related Literature
This volume fills a noticeable gap in the literature. Given the importance
accorded to the concept of consciousness in modern (and contemporary)
philosophy and the originality of Whitehead’s critique of consciousness-centered philosophy, it is surprising that there is so little literature devoted to
the exposition and development of Whitehead’s theory of consciousness. A
brief overview of the most closely related literature will highlight the unique
ambitions of the present book.
Craig Eisendrath’s The Unifying Moment (1971, reissued 1999) is a
comparative exposition of the psychologies of William James and Whitehead.
Besides being a James-Whitehead comparison, Eisendrath’s book is quite
different from ours in that it aims to be a faithful and clarifying exposition. Ours is partly an exposition, but more importantly a development and
application of Whitehead’s ideas that dovetails with contemporary research
and discussions, taking advantage of work that has appeared only in the last
ten to twenty years. Furthermore, Eisendrath’s book looks synoptically at
Whitehead’s psychology and devotes only a few pages to the specific topic
of his theory of consciousness.
We have already mentioned David Griffin’s Unsnarling the World-Knot
(1998), a broadly conceived exposition of Whitehead’s psychology that directly
engages the contemporary literature in consciousness studies. Griffin offers
a Whiteheadian critique of current leading theories, arguing specifically that
they fail to solve the mind-body problem. Griffin’s book is not, however,
focused specifically on Whitehead’s theory of consciousness, and while his
treatment of Whitehead is not limited to exposition, it is largely a defense
rather than a development of Whitehead’s ideas. Griffin’s contribution to the
present volume picks up here his own book left off. He recapitulates the
main arguments of his Unsnarling the World-Knot and brings them to bear
specifically on Whitehead’s theory of consciousness.
Jason Brown’s Mind and Nature (2000) is a work in metapsychology that applies Whitehead’s process philosophy to neuropsychology. The
result is a Whiteheadian process theory of consciousness that is empirically
supported by extensive clinical data. Brown’s erudition can be daunting.
Drawing on an extensive philosophical literature, he valorizes the phenomenological insights of British Idealism and Buddhist psychology to delineate
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 29
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:52 PM
30
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
the distinctive challenges that a theory of consciousness must meet, and in
proffering process philosophy as the foundation of a theory adequate to the
challenges, he draws on a lifetime of experience in neurology. We are very
pleased to be able to feature in our collection the contribution by Pachalska
and MacQueen, which presents an overview of Brown’s ideas that presupposes no specialized knowledge of medicine or neglected areas of intellectual
history and will be readily accessible to scholars in process philosophy and
consciousness studies.
Ralph Pred’s Onflow (2005) is an ambitious book. He argues, first,
that certain ideas of William James, John Searle, and Whitehead can be
exploited to generate a phenomenology of consciousness that is unprecedented
in its nuance and accuracy. Second, he argues that Whitehead’s metaphysical categories provide an adequate theoretical model of consciousness and,
conversely, that consciousness adequately described illustrates a concrete
application of Whitehead’s metaphysical categories. Finally, he argues that
Gerald Edelman’s neurobiological theory of consciousness can be read consistently as a physical interpretation of this model and hence as a physical
explanation of the phenomenology.
There are a number of themes common to our book and Pred’s (the
phenomenology of consciousness, causation, and the neurobiological realization
of a Whiteheadian process theory of consciousness), but the treatment in each
case is different. Pred exploits Edelman’s neurobiological theory of consciousness to show that a neurobiological interpretation of his Whiteheadian theory
of consciousness is possible. Our book looks to the neurobiological theory of
Jason Brown, rather than Edelman, to show that a Whiteheadian interpretation of neurobiology is possible and why it is philosophically promising. Pred
looks at the phenomenology of the stream of consciousness, in particular at
its actional context. Phenomenologically, our book looks at the performative
presuppositions of conscious experience, especially in relation to the nature of
time and temporal experience. Pred looks at what the stream of consciousness tells us about causation. Ours looks at what the structure of explanatory
theory tells us about causation. These differences in treatment lead directly
to the topics featured in our volume that fall outside the purview of Pred’s
work: panpsychism, nonhuman consciousness, consciousness as organized on
a continuum of complexity, causation per se as a form of experience.
This brings us to two last books deserving mention, dealing not with
consciousness but the single issue of panpsychism: D.S. Clarke’s Panpsychism
and the Religious Attitude (2003) and David Skrbina’s Panpsychism in the West
(2005). The appearance of these two monographs could not be more timely
for our own project. Both books complement ours insofar as they help bring
the topic of panpsychism into the mainstream. Each has sections discussing
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 30
8/12/09 2:02:53 PM
Introduction
31
Whiteheadian and process philosophy panpsychism, situating it in a wide
historical or critical context.
Clarke’s monograph is a sophisticated and hard-hitting defense of
panpsychism. Clarke has a strong command of the Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy and builds his case entirely with the methods
and insights of this tradition, which prides itself on its rigor and no-nonsense sobriety. The fact that panpsychism can be cogently argued with the
tools of the tradition most inclined to scoff at it guarantees it a seat at the
discussion table.
Skrbina’s book is a survey of panpsychism from the pre-Socratic philosophers up to the present day. His thesis is that panpsychism has, until
the twentieth century, always been one among well-respected mainstream
philosophical positions. Its frequent present day characterization as the fringe
position of an idiosyncratic few he shows to be false. The most compelling
part of Skrbina’s exposition is his treatment of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, where he documents panpsychist thinking, especially among
respected natural scientists, with a degree of prevalence so widespread that
even its present supporters will be taken by surprise. The cumulative weight of
his documentations makes it difficult to deny the seriousness of panpsychism
as a philosophical position. In a final chapter, Skrbina attempts a comprehensive catalog of arguments for and against panpsychism, which takes full
cognizance of the arguments of process philosophers. Notably, however, our
book contains at least one argument for panpsychism (arguably more) that
is entirely new and therefore absent from Skrbina’s survey.
Notes
1. Griffin suggested this terminology as early as 1977. See Griffin’s “Whitehead’s Philosophy and Some General Notions of Physics and Biology,” in Cobb and
Griffin 1977, 122–134.
2. See Hartshorne’s “The Compound Individual,” in Northrop et al. 1936,
193–220.
3. The concept of an “enduring compound individual” is of course found in
Whitehead, but his terminology is more cumbersome than Hartshorne’s. Whitehead
speaks of a “socially ordered nexus” with a single “regnant” occasion, and to indicate the
perdurance of its order over time he speaks of a “personally” ordered social nexus.
4. The list of the first-rate philosophers who have been put off by the immersion in abstract categoreal thinking required by Process and Reality would be quite
long, the best-documented case being perhaps Hans Jonas (1986).
5. This fallacy, identified already by Socrates, has been beautifully highlighted
by Arendt in her Life of the Mind.
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 31
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:54 PM
32
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
6. Let us remember that the point of James’s famous 1904 paper “Does
Consciousness Exist?” was not to deny the existence of consciousness, but to insist
that it was a function rather than some special kind of thing ( James 1912, 1–38).
7. As Whitehead remarks, “Scientists animated by the purpose of proving
that they are purposeless constitute an interesting subject for study” (FR 16).
8. In Scholasticism “precision” (praecisio) designates abstraction that excludes
whatever it does not expressly include. “To precind” is always to form an abstraction
by exclusion.
9. In his book Animal Minds (1992) he does makes a similar distinction
between purely “perceptual consciousness” and the “reflective consciousness” of human
beings (7–8).
10. As summarized here, Whitehead’s theory of consciousness may seem
to have the peculiar implication that one cannot be conscious of necessary truths.
Whether this is implied is a moot point since Whitehead does not believe there are
any strictly necessary propositions (MT 90–95).
11. Since this appears to be a case where Whitehead’s abstruse speculations
have a clear relevance to experimental science, we should perhaps draw this out as
explicitly as possible. Let us, for the sake of didactic simplicity, define belief minimally, as behaviorism would, as a disposition to behave in a certain way and say that
a belief is true when the behavior does or would lead to satisfaction of the relevant
desires. Then we can say that the monkeys’ beliefs appear to be conscious because
their behavior appears to be influenced by the following: the possibility that their
belief may be wrong; the confidence in some cases that it nevertheless is not wrong;
the lack of confidence in some cases that it is not wrong. But there is nothing in
sense experience corresponding to such things as possibility, negation, or contingency.
Unless we can succeed at the unlikely prospect of describing the monkeys’ behavior as the result of operant conditioning alone, it seems that we must admit that
in addition to having conditioned dispositions to behave in certain ways (“beliefs”
as here defined), they also have consciousness of these dispositions. Otherwise we
leave unaccounted for how they go on to develop more sophisticated dispositions
to behave that seem to result at least in part from the modalities of counterfactual
ideation and logical negation.
12. If we concede that the reductio arguments advanced by Shields (and
Weekes) prove that experience must be internally related to its environment, we still
have an interesting question to settle: whether this is a sufficient or only a necessary
condition of experience. Certainly not sufficient, since not every strict implication
is a case of experience. By adding the condition of having physical space-time presence, has Shields produced sufficient criteria for experience? This seems prima facie
implausible. However, a case can be made that the only way something with physical
space-time presence can be internally related to its environment is by experience.
Weekes in his contribution attributes this very position to Whitehead, pointing
out that for Whitehead when experience/concresence is terminated; what is left are
items that are only externally related. Only as long as something is still in the act
of experiencing an object can the former be internally related to the latter. On the
other hand, if Shields’ two criteria are found to be too lax to constitute a sufficient
condition of experience, then Rosenberg’s contribution can be seen to take the next
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 32
8/12/09 2:02:54 PM
Introduction
33
step, isolating a very plausible candidate for the missing constraint: that which experiences must have a nature that is at least partly “internal to itself ” (see pp. 20–22
above). It is very possible, however, that Whitehead would have regarded Shields’
and Rosenberg’s respective formulations as logically equivalent on the grounds that
nothing with space-time presence could be partly internal to itself without being
internally related to its environment and vice versa.
13. The editors note that Stuart Hameroff ’s concurrence on this point can be
found in the first volume of the WPN Studies, Searching for New Contrasts (Riffert
and Weber 2003, 61–86).
14. Peirce, Bergson, and James seem to have expressed this idea first. It also
plays an important role in Whitehead.
15. James’ understanding of the role of attention in shaping consciousness has
obvious relevance here.
References
Arendt, Hannah. 1978/1971. The Life of the Mind. 1-vol. ed. San Diego: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich.
Brown, Jason W. 2000. Mind and Nature: Essays on Time and Subjectivity. London
and Philadelphia: Whurr Publishers.
Clarke, D.S. 2003. Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude. Albany: State University
of New York Press.
Cobb Jr., John B., and David Ray Griffin, eds. 1977. Mind in Nature: Essays on
the Interface of Science and Philosophy. Washington, DC: University Press of
America.
Eisendrath, Craig R. 1971. The Unifying Moment: The Psychological Philosophy of
William James and Alfred North Whitehead. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Griffin, David Ray. 1977. “Whitehead’s Philosophy and Some General Notions of
Physics and Biology.” In Cobb and Griffin 1977, 122–134.
Griffin, David Ray. 1998. Unsnarling the World-knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the
Mind-body Problem. Berkeley: University of California Press. Reissued 2008
by Wipf and Stock Publishers, Eugene, Oregon.
Griffin, Donald Redfield. 1992. Animal Minds. Beyond Consciousness to Cognition.
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
Hanlon, Robert E., ed. 1991. Cognitive Microgenesis: A Neuropsychological Perspective.
Springer Series in Neuropsychology. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Hartshorne, Charles. “The Compound Individual.” In Northrop 1936, 193–220.
James, William. 1912. Essays in Radical Empiricism. New York: Longmans, Green,
and Co.
Jonas, Hans. 1987. “Wissenschaft als personliches Erlebnis.” Conference given on
the 15th of October 1986 in Heidelberg. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and
Ruprecht.
MacLean, Paul D. 1967. “The Brain in Relation to Empathy and Medical Education.” Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 144:374–382.
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 33
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:02:55 PM
34
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
MacLean, Paul D. 1991. “Neofrontocerebellar Evolution in Regard to Computation and
Prediction: Some Fractal Aspects of Microgenesis.” In Hanlon 1991, 3–31.
Nagel, Thomas. 1979. Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Northrop, F.S.C. et al. 1936. Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead. February fifteenth, nineteen hundred and thirty-six. London: Longmans, Green,
and Co.
Pred, Ralph. 2005. Onflow: Dynamics of Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Riffert, Franz G., and Michel Weber, eds. 2003. Searching for New Contrasts. Whiteheadian Contributions to Contemporary Challenges in Neurophysiology, Psychology,
Psychotherapy and the Philosophy of Mind. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
Skrbina, David. 2005. Panpsychism in the West. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Velmans, Max. 2000. Understanding Consciousness. London/Philadelphia: Routledge.
SP_WEB_Int_001-034.indd 34
8/12/09 2:02:56 PM
Process Thought
35
Part I
Setting the Stage
Part I consists of four chapters. In the first chapter, we introduce the Whitehead
Psychology Nexus (WPN) and its scholarly mission. We briefly illuminate
the background, motivation, and orientation of the present volume of the
WPN Studies before addressing ourselves to some fundamental questions of
terminology and method that bear on the heuristic approach to be found in
these pages. Consciousness, we claim, is a phenomenon that resists anything
but an interdisciplinary approach, while Whitehead-inspired process thinking
offers an integrative heuristic that can bring coherence to multidisciplinary
studies. We situate our approach in relation to some recognizable coordinates: empiricism, radical empiricism (in James’ sense), Phenomenology (in
Husserl’s sense), empirical science (with special reference to neuropathology
and abnormal psychology), and critical doxography (which remains relevant to
the extent that early modern European philosophy defined the phenomenon
that we still refer to as consciousness). These preliminary remarks we follow
with three introductory chapters dealing with the background and context
of Whitehead’s philosophizing. These chapters form a whole, but can also
be read and appreciated separately. In turn, these examine (a) Whitehead’s
place in twentieth-century philosophy, (b) the origin of our Western concept
of consciousness and the history of “consciousness” as a topic of European
philosophical reflection, and (c) Whitehead’s renegade approach to this
venerable topic.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
35
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 35
8/12/09 2:03:04 PM
36
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 36
8/12/09 2:03:04 PM
Process Thought
37
1
Process Thought as a
Heuristic for Investigating Consciousness
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
Background, Motivation, and Orientation
of the Present Volume of WPN Studies
The Whitehead Psychology Nexus (WPN) is an international scholarly society
that takes its immediate mandate from issues important to contemporary
philosophy and psychology, but seeks creative (possibly daring) solutions,
drawing its inspiration from the process-oriented thinking that emerged in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which includes the thought
of Henri Bergson, Charles Sanders Peirce, and William James, but is most
closely associated with the organic philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead
(1861–1947).1 WPN promotes dialogue and is not shy of controversy. The
present volume of the WPN Studies places consciousness at the focus of
disciplinary cross-elucidation. It taps leading researchers and theorists in
the study of consciousness and Whitehead scholars to explore an interface
between process thinking and the burgeoning field of consciousness studies.
The rationale for such a project has at least two facets worth mentioning by
way of introduction. They have to do with the state of an educated debate
that seems, first, unproductive and peculiarly burdened by its deep modernist
origins and, second, marked more by disciplinary rivalry than interdisciplinary synthesis.
A good part of what fuels the current boom in consciousness studies is the robust progress of cognitive psychology and neuroscience toward
reaching consensus explanations of just about anything except consciousness.
Psychology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence have produced many
astonishing results and upset many old beliefs. Nevertheless, it remains
controversial what implications these discoveries have for a general theory
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
37
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 37
8/12/09 2:03:05 PM
38
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
of consciousness. Despite hopes that empirical research and computational
modeling would constrain theory, consciousness (to judge from a literature
in which the most cited figure continues to be Descartes!) is a topic that
still lies wide open to speculation. Indeed, the literature is fond of noticing
that the contemporary discussion is defined by the same set of theoretical
options that became established in early modern philosophy, ranging from
materialism to epiphenomenalism to various forms of attribute or substance
dualism. Even idealism remains on the table if we include the extreme forms
of social and linguistic constructionism, where the world-creating subject of
traditional modern philosophy is replaced by the world-creating language or
social praxis. In short, it seems that scholarly debate has not so much reached
an impasse as remained at one reached in the seventeenth century. Given the
massive effort currently invested in research and debate, the lack of progress
toward a general (and generally accepted) theory of consciousness begins to
make consciousness look like a kind of twenty-first-century Philosopher’s
Stone, whose hidden nature seems to hold the key to the greatest mysteries,
but continues to elude us.
This situation explains one part of the rationale for the present volume.
A philosophical intervention in the consciousness debate that does not take
for granted the same assumptions that define and limit traditional approaches
should not be unwelcome, especially if the goal is a more positive accommodation with empirical research than is achieved by many current models
of consciousness. For example, an objection to functionalist models that will
emerge from discussions in this volume is that they imply that consciousness
per se has no evolutionary or even any cognitive value. If this assessment is
correct, it is easy to see why empirical research in biology or psychology
has had relatively little impact on the construction of theoretical models of
consciousness and why the philosophical debate continues to be exercised by
ideas that predate the very existence of psychology and biology as sciences.
Because it provides ways to understand how consciousness has cognitive and
evolutionary value, process thought has attracted the attention of a number
of researchers whose work is featured or discussed in this volume.
Due to its continuing dominance within the discipline of cognitive
psychology, functionalism looms largest over those who seek to reject it. In
fairness, then, we should, here at the outset, give the reader some idea of
the sorts of arguments and provocative suggestions she can expect from the
later chapters of this book. How do our authors propose to deal with the
vexed problem of the evolutionary value of consciousness, and why do we
claim that this topic poses an insuperable problem for functionalism?
Consciousness could confer a selective advantage only if it enhanced
an organism’s ability to survive, allowing it to adapt better or more flexibly
to its environment. But the computational paradigms of cognitive science
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 38
8/12/09 2:03:05 PM
Process Thought
39
have led us to the following impasse: any function, even biological ones,
can in principle be executed mechanically; consequently, consciousness
cannot be necessary to the performance of any function. In fact, any function consciousness appears to perform (unless perhaps it can do something
“supernatural”) is superfluous since the underlying neural architecture is ipso
facto already sufficient to enable this operation, leaving consciousness with no
possible role to play. This conclusion follows directly from the computational
understanding of a “function.” It is therefore impossible for conscious as such
to have any function. What this finally means is that consciousness is not
the sort of thing that could be selected for in the course of evolution: an
evolutionary account of consciousness is impossible.
At the point where cognitive scientists arrive at the insight (as David
Chalmers does; see 1996) that consciousness, whatever it is, cannot have any
function or survival value—at this point we might want to step back and ask
if we haven’t taken a wrong turn. Since the conclusion follows inexorably from
the computational paradigm according to which any function is by definition
Turing machine computable, other ways of understanding neurocognitive
function may prove to be well worth looking in to.
Neuropathology makes it clear that consciousness depends on the
functional architecture of the brain, as damage to specific areas of the brain
correlates with specific impairments of consciousness. But some of the phenomena of neuroplasticity adduced by Shields in his contribution (specifically, those that appear to result over time from the deliberate control of
one’s attention) suggest that the functional architecture of the brain is also,
in part, dependent on consciousness! It is easy to see that neuroplasticity is
something that could confer an evolutionary advantage, as it would allow for
more adaptive behavior. But if, at least in some cases, neuroplasticity depends
in part on consciousness, then these are cases where consciousness itself
confers a selective advantage. It is certainly possible that the intervention of
consciousness in the evolution of an individual brain’s plastic infrastructure
could turn out to be illusory—just a case of the brain affecting itself according
to a predetermined neurofunctional program in which consciousness plays
no causal role. But this is hardly a foregone conclusion.
Although it is often asserted as fact, it is by no means clear—and
certainly not clear a priori—that any function the brain performs could
indeed be achieved computationally (Putnam 1992). And even if a given
function could be achieved computationally, it is not necessarily the case
that it is achieved computationally. The role of quantum indeterminacy in
synaptic activity (also discussed by Shields) and the peculiar causal role the
“observer” plays in the collapse of the probability wave function (and hence
in the calculation of further probabilities of synaptic activity) suggest a
functional role for consciousness that does not fit neatly into the framework
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 39
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:03:05 PM
40
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
of computationalism, and this suggests one way that consciousness might
confer a selective advantage.
Drawing on ideas of Karl Popper, David Griffin’s contribution will suggest another way that consciousness might confer an evolutionary advantage:
consciousness allows an organism to conduct thought experiments, that is,
to try out possible strategies for survival without exposing itself to real risks,
by imagining what their differential outcomes might be. The critical element
here is counterfactual ideation. In effect, the organism poses the question: if
I were to do such and such, then what? Behaviorism almost certainly cannot
explain counterfactual ideation (it needs rather to deny its existence). What
about cognitive science, behaviorism’s heir to the mechanistic agenda in psychology? It seems unlikely that strictly computational functionalism, which
is only interested in a program that generates real outputs from real inputs
through real operations, could provide what Hilary Putnam (1992) calls a
“perspicuous representation” of this peculiar process—the cognitive process
of counterfactual ideation—and if it cannot, then we would have another
good candidate for a neurocognitive function that confers an evolutionary
advantage, but is not (and possibly cannot be) a computational function.
Now the question may be raised: what does that have to do with
consciousness? Is there any reason why such a neurocognitive process must
be conscious, seeing that most neurocognitive processes are not? Regardless
of the conclusion one ultimately draws, here is a point where Whitehead’s
ideas could stimulate productive debate in contemporary cognitive science,
for Whitehead claims—to a rough approximation—that counterfactual ideation is precisely what consciousness is. There is no need to add something
to such a process to make it conscious, and nothing could be removed that
would render it unconscious. If Whitehead is right about this, then Donald
Redfield Griffin is entirely justified in his contribution to see evidence of
counterfactual ideation in monkeys as evidence of consciousness.
For their part, Pachalska and MacQueen offer a comprehensive theory
of brain function that is noncomputational. Consequently, in their account of
consciousness as an activity or function of the brain, no conflict with evolutionary biology need arise. In fact, their account is altogether evolutionary.
According to the model developed by Jason Brown, brain function in humans
organizes progressively over three levels, corresponding to the evolutionary
strata of the brain (brain stem, limbic system, and cortex, which correspond
to the reptilian, paleomammalian, and neomammalian brains). Activity occurs
in a dense volley of overlapping waves that radiate from the phylogenetically
oldest and anatomically deepest part of the brain, the brain stem, toward the
youngest and outermost part, the neocortex. Consciousness is not so much
the property of a system in a steady state, as something the brain brings
about, moment by moment, through a microgenetic process (measured in
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 40
8/12/09 2:03:05 PM
Process Thought
41
milliseconds) that must unfold over all three levels. Continuity of phenomenal
consciousness results from the overlapping waves of microgenesis.
Because this theory of brain activity is holistic, not modular, consciousness cannot occur at higher levels of activity without being implicated in
some way at lower levels. Consciousness is only refined at higher levels; it
does not arise de novo. This puts the question of the evolutionary value of
consciousness in an entirely different light. Consciousness is not something
purely cortical that attends to or even commandeers functions that are already
executable unconsciously. Consciousness is integral to function because it
is the overall unity of function that can be realized at one of three levels:
wakefulness (facilitating globalized, essentially reflexive responses), emotion
(facilitating more differentiated and purposeful responses), and articulated
perception (facilitating separation of self from a world of enduring, independent objects).
A distinct kind of consciousness thus correlates with each level of
activity, and its evolutionary value lies in the discriminating response to the
organism’s environment that it facilitates, with a higher, more adaptive degree
of discrimination arising in the outer, more evolved strata. Most important,
the higher functions do not supplant the lower ones: we do not cease to be
awake because we feel emotion, or cease to feel emotion because we enjoy
articulated perception. Rather, the higher functions build on the lower ones,
incorporating them as more basic phases in their own genesis. Since microgeny
recapitulates phylogeny, the value of consciousness is nothing less than the
cumulative value of the organism’s adaptive evolution.
As with the radical theory of consciousness advanced by Velmans in
his contribution to this volume, so too with microgenetic theory: what needs
explaining is not so much how or why consciousness arises at the highest
levels of brain function, as why it appears largely absent from lower levels of
functioning. According to Brown’s model, primitive functions appear unconscious because they no longer occupy the terminal point in the moment-tomoment microgenesis of consciousness. They have been reduced (through
a kind of neoteny of microgenesis) to early and incomplete phases in the
genesis of a more complex and differentiated consciousness. They recede from
foreground to background, becoming the global backdrop presupposed by the
more sophisticated function. It follows that they remain present in higher
consciousness vestigially, even if this is not obvious from the phenomenology
of normal consciousness.
The crucial contribution of primitive brain functions to higher consciousness is precisely what breaks to the surface in the neuropathological
symptom. Depending roughly on the depth of the brain lesion along the
radius from brainstem to any point on the cortical surface, the genesis of
normal conscious behavior is interrupted at a more or less primitive phase.
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 41
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:03:06 PM
42
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
Deeper lesions cause more global pathologies; more superficial lesions, closer
to the brain’s outer shell of gray matter, cause more specific and localized
pathologies. What appears to be a deficit, however, is really the abnormally
exposed competence of a more primitive level of information processing.
Disturbed behavior does not replace normal behavior. Rather, the normal
process through which conscious behavior comes about is derailed before
completion, exposing a less differentiated competence than expected, but a
competence nonetheless—one that informs normal consciousness and without
which normal consciousness would be impossible.
For example, the patient sees the word cat, but reads it as dog. It is not
by accident that the categorization is correct (four-legged domestic animal).
The disrupted ability to fully differentiate meaning exposes the ability to
categorize as a more primitive and independently functioning competence.
What neuropathology shows, then, is that the importance of a competence’s
contribution to consciousness is inversely related to how noticeable it is.
The more fundamental the competence, the more removed it is from the
foregrounded differentiation of conscious attention. It is not categorically
unconscious, but its presence in normal consciousness is so global and diffuse
that its noticeability is pathological.
Reminiscent in some respects of Kurt Goldstein’s (1995) application of
the categories of Gestalt psychology to biology, this model leaves no berth
for functionalist theories that would deprive consciousness per se of cognitive
function or survival value. It has the advantage of being an empirical theory,
based not on an a priori conception of what a physically instantiated function
“must be,” but on neuroanatomy, evolutionary biology, and neuropathology.
Even if further research should leads us back to a more modular understanding
of brain function, Velmans in his contribution offers a coherent account of
how consciousness could evolve—and how, in particular, diffuse consciousness
could evolve into attentional consciousness—without having to be directly
subject to natural selection.
In sum, while computational paradigms are hard pressed to assign
any evolutionary value to consciousness, the present volume offers no less
than four arresting possibilities. If nothing else, this fecundity demonstrates
that models based on a Whiteheadian process approach can be a valuable
heuristic in developing an evolutionary account not just of the brain, but
even of consciousness.
Another reason for approaching the study of consciousness from a
Whiteheadian organic or process thought perspective has to do with the
unique complexity of consciousness as an object of study. For a single object
of study, consciousness lies at the intersection of an unusual number of
disciplines—many of them are represented by contributions to this volume,
which draws on philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, zoology,
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 42
8/12/09 2:03:06 PM
Process Thought
43
neurobiology, neuropathology, and even physics. This disciplinary polyvalence
tells us something about the complexity of consciousness. Any attempt to
approach consciousness from one discipline alone is bound to result in a
reduction both obvious and unacceptable to the other disciplines. Indeed, for
this reason many of the individual contributions to this volume are themselves
interdisciplinary in perspective. But once we acknowledge the disciplinary
polyvalence of our topic, we face an important philosophical question, one
that was uppermost in Whitehead’s mind in defining a continuing role for
philosophy in the age of empirical science and its multiple specializations.
If consciousness can be understood only through the convergence of many
different kinds of knowing, then the old problem of the one and the many
comes back as a methodological challenge: How are the different approaches
to be coordinated? How do we ensure that the convergence of so many perspectives results in a coherent model? How do we resolve conflicts between
their different presuppositions—and in a nonreductive way? Whitehead’s
process philosophy was animated by this problem.
The contributors to this volume are not all “process philosophers” or
even Whitehead specialists, and by no means do they share a single point
of view. However, they do share the conviction that dominant, mainstream
approaches to the study of consciousness, whether philosophical or empirical,
have failed to integrate the relevant perspectives in a way that does justice
to important evidence—indeed, that these approaches lack an appropriate
framework that would allow them to do this. Lacking such a framework,
each of these dominant approaches may come up short in different ways, but
their shortcomings reflect a common failure to integrate diverse perspectives.
This was Whitehead’s diagnosis of the intellectual scene of his own day, and
the situation does not seem to have changed. Our contributors’ sympathies
with Whitehead come from the shared sense that his philosophical theories,
right or wrong, were a painstaking and often insightful response to the same
limitations that still hamper contemporary philosophy and psychology.
The disciplinary rivalry alluded to above illustrates this point. In its
most acute form this rivalry takes shape as a conflict between scientific and
humanistic outlooks, each contesting the primacy of the other. In this case,
the failure to integrate relevant perspectives seems obvious. There can be no
denying that here we still see the disconnection between different disciplinary approaches that Whitehead deplored. It results from a long-standing
stalemate, the origins of which can be traced to the seventeenth century
(Descartes’ substance dualism, Spinoza’s attribute dualism, Leibniz’s preestablished harmony, or the contrasting roles played by perception and reflection
in the British empiricists) and to Kant, who cast the problem in the form
it has since retained. Kant tried to resolve the tensions between the two
domains by separating them from one another (Weekes 2003, 347–366). As
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 43
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:03:06 PM
44
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
though they were squabbling children who resented sharing, Kant established
rigid boundaries, giving each of them nonoverlapping domains of safe space,
forbidding them, in effect, to talk to one another. As any parent knows,
this solution is only temporary: ultimately the world is something we all
must learn to share. The insularity of different domains of discourse that
nevertheless bear on the same topic is a problem more than ever now that
the children are grown up.
Whitehead is famous for having constructed a solution to the philosophical problems he diagnosed that seems highly artificial. How much of
this intricate construction is useful is a matter for debate. However, all of
our contributors agree that Whitehead’s motives are sound and that his
critique of modernity is especially relevant to the issues currently under
debate in the consciousness literature. But they also agree that at least some
of Whitehead’s constructive proposals can and should be rehabilitated and
brought to bear on this topic. This may turn out to be the needed expedient
to enable theories of consciousness to profit from a positive accommodation
with the historical and phenomenological evidence valued by humanists and
the empirical research valued by scientists, both of which must be integrated
if we are to move beyond speculations of the seventeenth century that still
control so much of the discussion.
In short, although our contributors do not agree on how much of
Whitehead’s approach can be endorsed without significant reconstruction, to
a greater or lesser extent they all exploit aspects of Whitehead’s “categoreal
scheme” because they share the conviction that the conceptual and analytic
framework of Whitehead’s process philosophy offers the outlines of something
that mainstream approaches often lack: a promising schematic for assessing and
integrating the full range of evidence relevant to the nature of consciousness.
As noted, the diversity of evidence includes not just the results of empirical
research. To be exact, it includes two other important sources: the uncontrolled, but ubiquitous evidence of everyday experience and the evidence to
be found in the history of philosophical opinions about consciousness. Of
course, philosophical opinions cannot be taken at face value any more than
the conceits of everyday experience, but in both cases an adequate theory
of consciousness must be able to make sense of prevailing opinions and
reconcile them with an accurate phenomenology. The hermeneutic principle
here is the Aristotelian one that includes “opinion” among the phenomena
that an adequate explanation must “save”: if things are not as they seem, to
philosophers or ordinary folks, there nevertheless must be a good explanation
why things seem to them other than they are. In sum, the contributions to
this volume use a broadly conceived process framework to draw on three
sources of evidence about consciousness, often confronting one with another:
empirical research, phenomenology, and philosophical doxography.
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 44
8/12/09 2:03:07 PM
Process Thought
45
Methods and Definitions
Since we have yet to define our terms or set specific methodological constraints, we should say a few words in advance about how we understand
phenomenology, how empirical research and doxography will bear on our
investigation, and above all what we mean by consciousness.
By “phenomenology” we mean a methodologically self-conscious procedure of description, which takes as its object not the way things are thought
to be “in themselves” or independent of any particular manner of access, but
the way they appear in experiential real time in some actual mode of givenness: for example, how something is given (appears) to vision, or hearing, or
memory, or the imagination. It is a difficult phenomenological question how
some things we obviously experience are actually given—the animal body, for
example, or mathematical certainty. It is a very difficult phenomenological
question whether some things are given at all—for example, the reality of
the past or the external world. And, it is a matter for phenomenological
description if some things are habitually imbued with phenomenological
misinterpretation—a possibility Whitehead was not alone in seeing. We
also use “phenomenology” to designate the object of phenomenological
description—the same way “psychology” can mean not only the clinical
science of the way people think but also the typical or characteristic way
a particular person or group of people thinks. Thus, for example, we refer
below to the “phenomenology of certainty,” meaning: how certainty appears
to the consciousness experiencing it (second meaning of phenomenology).
Describing this appearance yields (at least some of ) the specific experiential
conditions under which something can be given as certain (first meaning of
phenomenology).
It will become clear as we proceed, but let us note at once that our
understanding of phenomenology differs from that of its best-known practitioner, Edmund Husserl. Nothing in the preceding description presupposes
the specifically Husserlian method of the epoché. Unlike Husserl, we are
not convinced a priori that the transcendent reality of the empirical world
is not something that could appear to us as a primitive phenomenological
datum, that it must be something consciousness “constitutes.” Consequently,
we do not see the epoché as a precondition of successful phenomenological
description. We must look to how things are actually given, yes; but we
need not assume in advance that their existence depends on their givenness.
To avoid confusion, therefore, we will always capitalize “phenomenology”
and its cognates when we have in mind the more specific interpretation of
phenomenology made famous by Husserl and lease as lowercase our own
more general use of the term, which seeks not to prejudice the answer to
this important philosophical question.2
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 45
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:03:07 PM
46
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
One of the most important targets of phenomenological description is
the everyday world of ordinary experience and social existence—what Husserl
calls the life-world. Because it is pragmatically and performatively presupposed
by everything we say and do, it constitutes in some sense a transcendental
condition. The significance of this kind of pragmatic presupposition is of
course far from obvious (not to say controversial) and requires elucidation.
Description of how the life-world is given and how its givenness is habitually
understood (i.e., how it seems to be given in discursive reflection if this is
different from how it is actually given in immediate experience) must form
one part of such an elucidation. An idea that Whitehead shares with Husserl
is the implicit or nonthematic way in which the life-world is actually given,
as well as the elusiveness of this fact. This has important methodological
implications that might be brought out best if we briefly compare Husserl
and Whitehead, for both philosophers came to this discovery unwillingly.
Husserl originally thought of Phenomenology as a way to transform
philosophy into an exact science: “reduced” to pure phenomena, the world
of experience could be handled in a precise and rigorous way on the model
of the mathematical theory of manifolds. Husserl eventually abandoned the
idea of philosophy as rigorous science, saying famously that the “dream was
dreamed out” (Husserl 1969, 508). He did not abandon the idea of a foundational stratum of experience that Phenomenology could access and assess,
but only the idea that it could be fixed like a specimen in formaldehyde,
delineated with morphological exactitude, and rendered conceptually without
ambiguity. It is clear from Husserl’s fantastic comments on Manifold Theory
in the “Prolegomena” to his Logical Investigations (1900) that this had been
his ideal of scientific rigor, and the fact that just a few years later he describes
the methodology of his new science, “Transcendental Phenomenology,” in
similar terms lets one know that Manifold Theory was his original paradigm
for Phenomenology.
Similarly, Whitehead was intoxicated at first with the idea that a
mathematically formal analysis of the world, what he later calls “morphology,” could be the epistemologically recovered foundation of our knowledge
and experience of the world.3 But in the years following the publication
of his three great works on the philosophy of natural science (PNK, CN,
PRel) he comes instead to the opposite conclusion—that the decisive and
indispensable foundation of experience is everything that morphology leaves
out! Like Husserl, he became convinced that what is fundamental always has
the character of background, horizon, or tacit presupposition: “The necessities are invariable, and for that reason remain in the background of thought,
dimly and vaguely” (MT vii). But this means that what is “foundational”
in experience is incapable of focal objectification and must be accessed
indirectly. This same realization led Husserl to his method of indirection or
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 46
8/12/09 2:03:07 PM
Process Thought
47
“questioning back from the pre-givenness of the life-world” (Husserl 1969,
Part III A, 105–193). Whitehead advocated a similar kind of questioning
back to find fundamentals. His philosophy looks to the “presuppositions of
language rather than its express statements” (MT vii) and to the “generalities which are inherent in literature, in social organization, in the effort
towards understanding physical occurrences” (MT 1). Philosophy’s “ultimate
appeal,” he says, “is to the general consciousness of what in practice we
experience. Whatever thread of presupposition characterizes social expression throughout the various epochs of rational society must find its place
in philosophic theory” (PR 17). This explains the stress Whitehead lays on
the fundamental importance of “unscientific” sources of information such as
poetry, religion, or collective anthropological experience. The evidence they
provide is indirect, but indispensable. Because this indirection is the manner in which the life-world is actually given, we do not hesitate to call its
description phenomenological.
What do we mean by consciousness? Because some of the proposals
that follow, both in these introductory chapters contributed by the editors
and throughout the book, are highly unorthodox, it bears stressing at the
outset that the consciousness we—the editors and the contributors—seek
to circumscribe, understand, or explain is the same one that is at stake in
the current debates in philosophy and psychology. We share in the large
consensus of opinion that sees consciousness as the qualitative feel of an
experience impressed with such hallmarks as unity, intentionality, reflexivity,
perspectivity, and personality. But we seek more vigorously than some of
our colleagues to find explanations of consciousness that preserve the phenomenology of these features of our experience. Also like other parties to
the consciousness debates, we understand the phenomenon targeted in this
standard description to be the consciousness experienced (post-infancy) by
any “normal” human being.
However, “abnormal” consciousness is by no means irrelevant to our
inquiry. On the contrary, a great deal can be learned about normal consciousness from the altered or diminished consciousness consequent to trauma
or impairments (e.g., neuropathology, psychopathology, coma, catatonia,
anesthesia, intoxication), to say nothing of states of consciousness that are
clinically normal yet marginalized in the usual understanding of normal
consciousness (e.g., sleep, fatigue and duress, yogic meditation, religious
and aesthetic experience, consciousness at its lowest thresholds, implicit
or nonobjectifying consciousness, animal consciousness). This explains the
prominence given in this volume to findings of empirical research, on the
one hand, and to phenomenology, on the other. Empirical research teaches
us about states of consciousness that fall outside the compass of clinically
normal consciousness (or outside the compass of human consciousness in the
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 47
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:03:08 PM
48
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
case of animal studies), while phenomenology teaches us about modalities
of normal consciousness that are often omitted (suppressed or overlooked)
in the lay, scientific, or philosophical descriptions.
Among the contributors addressing the former topic, Schweiger et al.
focus explicitly on what can be learned about normal consciousness from the
stages through which consciousness passes during recovery from coma; Weber
looks at clinical experience with mental illness, Pachalska and MacQueen
at brain pathology, Shields at meditation and attentional therapy, Donald
Griffin at experiments assessing consciousness in animals, Velmans at the
assumed biological and evolutionary thresholds of consciousness, and so on.
Addressing the latter topic, several of our contributors draw attention to
implicit or performative aspects of ordinary consciousness that are easy to
ignore or even to deny precisely because they are normally operative without being thematic. David Griffin, Shields, and Katzko look at the implicit
performative presuppositions of objectifying, theoretical consciousness; Verley,
Shields, and Weekes examine the implicit performative conditions of time
consciousness and memory, Weber looks as the implicit social aspects of
rational consciousness.
In this circumspection we are radicalizing a fundamental precept of
Whitehead’s; it is well known but worth quoting again:
In order to discover some of the major categories under which
we can classify the infinitely various components of experience,
we must appeal to evidence relating to every variety of occasion.
Nothing can be omitted, experience drunk and experience sober,
experience sleeping and experience waking, experience drowsy and
experience wide-awake, experience self-conscious and experience
self-forgetful, experience intellectual and experience physical,
experience religious and experience sceptical, experience anxious
and experience care-free, experience anticipatory and experience
retrospective, experience happy and experience grieving, experience dominated by emotion and experience under self-restraint,
experience in the light and experience in the dark, experience
normal and experience abnormal. (AI 226)
The motive for this broad approach has its roots in an insight of William
James:
Some years ago I myself made some observations on this aspect
of nitrous oxide intoxication, and reported them in print. One
conclusion was forced upon my mind at that time, and my impression of its truth has ever since remained unshaken. It is that our
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 48
8/12/09 2:03:08 PM
Process Thought
49
normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it,
is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted
from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of
consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without
suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at
a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types of
mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can
be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite
disregarded. How to regard them is the question—for they are so
discontinuous with ordinary consciousness. Yet they may determine
attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas, and open a region
though they fail to give a map. ( James 1902, 387–388)
The lesson Whitehead took from James was perhaps more sober, but
daring nonetheless. It becomes possible to dismiss a vast amount of evidence
about ourselves and the world as “unscientific” or “not really empirical” simply
by restricting what counts as cognitively relevant consciousness to states that
are in fact exceedingly rare:
We [. . .] objectify the occasions of our own past with peculiar
completeness in our immediate present. We find in those occasions, as known from our present standpoint, a surprising variation in the range and intensity of our realized knowledge. We
sleep; we are half-awake; we are aware of our perceptions, but
are devoid of generalities in thought; we are vividly absorbed
within a small region of abstract thought while oblivious to the
world around; we are attending to our emotions—some torrent
of passion—to them and to nothing else; we are morbidly discursive in the width of our attention; and finally we sink back
into temporary obliviousness, sleeping or stunned. Also we can
remember factors experienced in our immediate past, which at
the time we failed to notice. When we survey the chequered
history of our own capacity for knowledge, does common sense
allow us to believe that the operations of judgment, operations
which require definition in terms of conscious apprehension, are
those operations which are foundational in existence either as an
essential attribute for an actual entity, or as the final culmination
whereby unity of experience is attained? (PR 161)
The present volume carries forward Whitehead’s program of developing a more adequate understanding of normal consciousness by attending to
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 49
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:03:08 PM
50
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
occurrent states that are excluded by normal consciousness or marginalized
by our usual understanding of normal consciousness. To the extent that it
only radicalizes the bias inherent in normal consciousness, philosophical
and psychological reflection attempts to “epiphenomenalize” these normally
excluded or marginalized states. This is closely related to the modern tendency,
noted by (among others) Dewey and Heidegger, to think of consciousness
as a spectator. Probably because it is reinforced by the phenomenology of
(epistemic) certainty, this tendency is still palpable in much of the literature
on consciousness. Certainty about the characterization of an object attaches
to consciousness at the moment of optimal focus and peak acuity. Consciousness at this moment is indeed very much like a dispassionate spectator. Its
attitude is fact-oriented, which means that it is objectifying and theoretical,
possessed of acute self-consciousness and analytic attention. The question is
whether this particular delineation of consciousness—which consciousness
arrives at because it is indeed in this state when it goes looking for itself and
what it is—captures its base form, its “essence” so to speak, representing a
sort of “pure consciousness” presupposed by its other forms.4 If so, then all
other forms would constitute so many modifications of this fundamental sort
of consciousness: attenuations, perturbations, accretions, distortions, etc. This
has been the implicit (or even explicit) position of the mainline tradition
of modern philosophy. It should perhaps not surprise us that consciousness,
seeking certainty about what consciousness is, ends up by identifying itself
with the limited certainty it can have.
Like Bergson, Whitehead thinks that consciousness as it has come
to be known and come to understand itself in the sharp delineation that it
owes to modern European thought yields a filtered, straitened, and truncated
experience. In its notion of scientific objectivity, European philosophy unwittingly canonized as normative and definitive an extreme idealization of that
way of experiencing the world that allows us to maximize our power over
nature: above all, to exercise power with algorithmic certainty. As a result,
information from other modalities of experience (which certainly occupies a
great part of our consciousness, even if it cannot or normally does not take
pride of place at the objectified focus of attention) was—and still is—devalued. It is customarily assumed that the information provided by marginal
and alternative modalities of consciousness, to the extent that it differs from
what normal consciousness does or would disclose directly in otherwise
similar circumstances, is simply normal content degraded by “subjectivity”
(inattention, suboptimal function, dysfunction, emotions, prejudice, etc.).
Such modalities are seen as offering nothing of objective value that could
not become the focus of deliberate and thematizing attention, resulting,
moreover, in an experience of greater cognitive value. In other words, the
nonpreferred modalities of consciousness are treated as “deficient modes” of
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 50
8/12/09 2:03:08 PM
Process Thought
51
an assumed normative state, which, uncorrupted, possesses (would possess)
the world as a crystalline cognitum.
We are tempted to say this modernist prejudice is refuted by Impressionist and post-Impressionist painting, to say nothing of the magical phenomenology of writers such as Proust or Virginia Woolf, which discovers in
every banality a suppressed ontological nimbus, an unsuspected abundance
of detail overflowing the thing of “normal” consciousness and indispensably
qualifying how the thing exists. What these works of art do is make directly
available to normal consciousness the information that would otherwise
remain unthematic, marginal, and fleeting. The fact that they reveal so
much important information that conditions normal consciousness without
being directly available to it is the reason they astonish us. If they exposed
nothing more than a degraded form of something perfectly accessible to
normal consciousness, they would not, as they so often do, seem like revelations. It goes without saying that when marginal information is revealed
in this artificially direct way to objectifying consciousness, it is no longer
performing its proper function, which explains why it is art rather than
life. But it also explains how an artwork can be more or less “true” even
though it is entirely fictional. As a mapping of the marginal onto the focal,
it can be more or less faithful, even if such a focal objectification of the
marginal is impossible in the real performance of an activity and its execution necessarily an exercise in make-belief. In short, marginal information
possesses a preeminence that is unique to its marginal status, and far from
being the degraded content of (a possible) direct normal consciousness, it
is only through the degradation of its preeminent function that it can ever
be turned into the content of direct normal consciousness. Degradation of
precisely this kind is characteristic of artistic representation, and we might
go so far as to say that here lies the cognitive value of art. (A question that
does not belong to the compass of this investigation, but certainly to its
horizon, is whether religion does not perform a function similar to art. It
makes directly available to normal consciousness something that is otherwise necessarily marginal in one of two ways: it can be directly available to
consciousness, but only in extreme and exceptional states of consciousness;
or available to normal consciousness, but only indirectly, remaining fugitive
and implicit, despite being somehow fundamental.5)
Whitehead rejects these modernist prejudices. To name one of his
reasons: a significant consequence of these assumptions is none other than
the famous mind-body problem. As we will detail in the last chapter of Part
I, the world as disclosed to “normal” consciousness is a medium in which
consciousness of any sort could not arise and cannot exist. How then consciousness is related to this medium that excludes it becomes the greatest
of philosophical puzzles.
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 51
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:03:09 PM
52
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
Needless to say, no philosophical discussion can avoid presupposing
normal consciousness. The question is whether we shall do this uncritically,
accepting the narrow interpretation of normal consciousness bequeathed to
us by modern philosophers along with their assumption that it is uniquely
cognitive. One very Whiteheadian aim of this volume is to find out and critically assess just what we are thereby presupposing. We need to know, above
all, what such a presupposition excludes. The fact that we must begin with
normal consciousness does not mean we have to remain there. Whitehead
thinks that marginal experience offers an opportunity to circumscribe a very
different concept of subjectivity than the one we are accustomed to—a weak
subjectivity, which is only faintly like the strong subjectivity of consciousness.
If he is right, it may turn out after all that consciousness is the Philosopher’s
Stone. For if we can find within consciousness (or at its fringes), in its liminal, implicit, or fugitive states, or in states deviant, weakened, or disturbed
on normal accounting, the vestige of a world differently disclosed and no
longer incompatible with the existence of consciousness, then we can use
consciousness against itself to transmute the false show of objectivity into
something possibly less transparent, but probably more real. If what we lose
is the transparency of the world dear to normal consciousness, what we gain
is the meaningfulness of that world. Whitehead thinks this process of transmutation, which after all is just a biological critique of normal consciousness,
is indeed possible and that it reveals to us a world urged on from countless
centers of weak subjectivity, whose evolving interactions are the course of
nature alive with possibilities. This is a nature in and from which the coming-to-be of the strong subjectivity of consciousness is no longer impossible.
If the epiphany of such a world flickers in the meditations of philosophers
or in the margins of everyday experience, it might be better described not
as a transmutation, but as a reversal—however brief, partial, or unstable—of
the transmutation already wrought upon the world by normal consciousness.6
The dramatic implication for psychology, however, is that clear and distinct
consciousness requires elucidation from more primitive (and usually marginal
or transmarginal) forms of awareness, not the other way around.
With these comments we hope to have clarified not only what we mean
by consciousness, but also the role played in our investigations by the various
sources of evidence on the nature of consciousness. Because contemporary
theories of consciousness, like the contemporary self-understanding of ordinary
consciousness, owes so much—so much that Whitehead rejects—to the intellectual accomplishments of modern European philosophy, it is necessary for
us to take account of this influence doxographically and critically. Verley’s and
Weekes’ contributions, which look at early modern figures and Whitehead’s
critique of them, fall in this category, while David Griffin, Katzko, and Shields
bring this doxography up-to-date with the current literature.
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 52
8/12/09 2:03:09 PM
Process Thought
53
To some extent the critique of modern philosophy and its contemporary
legacy can be an immanent one, assessing their success in terms of their own
goals by their own criteria. But ultimately we must question the validity of
the phenomenology they presupposes. To do this, we must have recourse to
a description of conscious experience that is not hamstrung by modern ideology. The Phenomenology of Husserl fails on this account, while the radical
empiricism of William James presents a promising alternative. Several of
our contributions make use of a description of everyday experience in tune
with Jamesian radical empiricism. The result is the critique of modern and
contemporary accounts of consciousness implicit in David Griffin’s appeal
to “hard-core common sense notions,” in Shields’ “deep protocols of common sense,” and in the descriptive account of memory deployed by Shields,
Verley, and Weekes. The agreement between Shields and Weekes on this
point is noteworthy given the wide differences in their backgrounds and
in the figures they examine. Shields approaches Whitehead from a generally Analytic perspective and focuses his critique on Russell and current
Anglo-American literature; Weekes approaches Whitehead from a generally
continental perspective, focusing his critique on early modern philosophy
and Phenomenology.
If phenomenology brings us to the margins of consciousness, empirical
research on abnormal consciousness brings us to what is normally beyond
the margins, but nevertheless always there, shaping the contours and coloring
the content of normal consciousness. In their contributions, Schweiger et al.
and Pachalska and MacQueen argue that these normally transmarginal modes
of experience are not so much an alternative to normal consciousness as its
concealed foundation. They are simply the lower tiers in the substructure
of normal consciousness, which have become directly exposed because the
genesis of normal consciousness finds itself arrested at a preterminal phase.
In other words, the clinical presentation of abnormal consciousness gives
descriptive phenomenology unique access to the genetic process by which
normal consciousness comes to be.
Notes
1. For an overview of process philosophy, see Rescher 1996 and 2000, Weber
2004 and Weber and Desmond 2008. The term “process philosophy” appears to have
been coined by Bernard Loomer (1949).
2. What Husserl calls phenomenology is more specific than our definition
because Husserl has already taken a decisive position on the question of the givenness
of transcendent things. As transcendent, Husserl believes, they are not given—he seems
to regard this not as a phenomenological finding, but as a sort of analytic truth: if
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 53
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:03:09 PM
54
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
transcendent, not given, if given, not transcendent. In Husserlese: Erlebnisse (lived
experiences) are ipso facto immanent, and the act of meaning, which interprets (apperceives) some of them as the appearances of transcendent things, is equally immanent,
ergo etc. Husserl thinks it is a non sequitur to suppose that one of the things capable
of being given to a description that makes no assumptions about the independent
being of objects might be . . . the independent being of objects! It follows from this
initial commitment that any description that does not, for the sake of methodological
purity, deny the independent existence of objects is ipso facto unphenomenological. (For
reasons that cannot be addressed here, Anglophone readers of Husserl are unlikely
to recognize in this précis the philosopher they think they know.) There is, however,
no need to exclude a priori the possibility of transcendence being given, and it will
be licit to admit transcendence as long as we can describe its particular manner of
givenness. Perhaps it is not given; perhaps its givenness is phenomenologically impossible, but this is surely not a logical impossibility. The important upshot of these
differences between Husserl and us is that properly phenomenological statements for
Husserl will always be “transcendental” statements—statements about the unworldly
Absolute Consciousness—while properly phenomenological statements for us could
very well turn out to be ordinary empirical statements—statements about things
given to consciousness, but not dependent on consciousness, or about consciousness
itself insofar as it is given to itself, but not dependent on its own self-givenness.
It is only so as not to prejudice these questions in advance that we must reach for
the word “phenomenology” at all. Otherwise, “precise empirical description” would
do just fine. This and other differences between a Whiteheadian and a Husserlian
phenomenology are broached in chapters 4 and 15. It should be noted that Husserl
has no monopoly on phenomenology. It was practiced by Brentano, Stumpf, Hodgson, Bergson, Bradley, James, Mach, and many others. Perhaps none of these figures
qualify as Phenomenologists, but all of them are phenomenologists.
3. This parallelism is not coincidental. Both Whitehead and Husserl had
been stimulated by the seminal paper of Riemann’s, “Über die Hypothesen, welche der
Geometrie zu Grunde liegen,” which first introduces into mathematics the abstractly
defined multidimensional manifold, to develop the idea of a deductively generated
formal ontology/meta-theory of theoretical models. See Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 30 (1981, 81–82) and Whitehead’s early Treatise on Universal
Algebra (UA 13).
4. For example, Hans Thomae: “That this ‘actual individual totality’ [of
consciousness] indicates an actual reality [Wirklichkeit] can only be demonstrated by
pointing to the particular experience of self-observation [Selbstbeobachtung]. Thus,
we can only point to self-observation and the inner reality it grasps if we want to
make the factual existence [Tatbestand] of this totality in someone else’s thinking
the logical subject of judgments regarding its characteristics. But precisely in this
way this concept reveals itself as the description of a thoroughly concrete reality
[Tatbestand] to which all other ‘modes,’ ‘forms,’ or varieties of consciousness are to
be reduced” (1940, 540).
5. This is a recurring theme in William James’ Varieties of Religious Experiences: “Rationalism insists that all our beliefs ought ultimately to find for themselves
articulate grounds. Such grounds, for rationalism, must consist of four things: (1)
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 54
8/12/09 2:03:10 PM
Process Thought
55
definitely statable abstract principles; (2) definite facts of sensation; (3) definite
hypotheses based on such facts; and (4) definite inferences logically drawn. Vague
impressions of something indefinable have no place in the rationalistic system, which
on its positive side is surely a splendid intellectual tendency, for not only are all our
philosophies fruits of it, but physical science (amongst other good things) is its result.
[. . .] If you have intuitions at all, they come from a deeper level of your nature than
the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits. Your whole subconscious life, your
impulses, your faiths, your needs, your divinations, have prepared the premises, of
which your consciousness now feels the weight of the result; and something in you
absolutely knows that that result must be truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic
talk, however clever, that may contradict it. This inferiority of the rationalistic level
in founding belief is just as manifest when rationalism argues for religion as when
it argues against it” ( James 1902, 73).
6. Note that besides being the fabled process sought by alchemists, transmutation is also a category in Whitehead’s metaphysical scheme of basic concepts having
to do with the emergence of aggregate effects—such as the qualitative continuity
of passively displayed appearances—from the activities of a manifold of discrete
micro-constituents.
References
Brown, Delwin, Ralph E. James Jr., and Gene Reeves. 1971. Process Philosophy and
Christian Thought. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Chalmers, David. 1996. The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Goldstein, Kurt. 1995/1934. The Organism. New York: Zone Books.
Griffin, David Ray. 1998. Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the
Mind-Body Problem. Berkeley: University of California Press. Reissued 2008
by Wipf and Stock Publishers, Eugene, Oregon.
Husserl, Edmund. 1969. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. 2.
Auflage. Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, Edmund. 1981/1929. Formale und transzendtale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der
logischen Vernunft. 2. Auflage. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
James, William. 1902. The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature.
Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edinburgh in 19011902. New York: Longman, Green, and Co.
Loomer, Bernard MacDougall. 1949. “Christian Faith and Process Philosophy.” The
Journal of Religion 29:181–203. Reprinted in Delwin et al. 1971, 70–98.
Putnam, Hilary. 1992. Renewing Philosophy. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard
University Press.
Rescher, Nicholas. 1996. Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy.
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Rescher, Nicholas. 2000. Process Philosophy: A Survey of Basic Issue. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 55
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
8/12/09 2:03:10 PM
56
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
Thomae, Hans. 1940. “Bewusstsein und Leben: Versuch einer Systematisierung des
Bewusstseinsproblems.” Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie 105:532–636.
Weber, Michel, ed. 2004. After Whitehead: Rescher on Process Metaphysics. Frankfurt/
Lancaster: Ontos Verlag.
Weber, Michel, and Will Desmond, eds. 2008. Handbook of Whiteheadian Process
Thought. Frankfurt/Lancaster: Ontos Verlag.
Weekes, Anderson. 2003. “Psychology and Physics Reconciled: Whitehead’s Vision
of Metaphysics.” In Searching for New Contrasts: Whiteheadian Contributions
to Contemporary Challenges in Neurophysiology, Psychology, Psychotherapy and
the Philosophy of Mind, Franz G. Riffert and Michel Weber, eds., 347–374.
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
SP_WEB_Ch01_035-056.indd 56
8/12/09 2:03:11 PM
Whitehead as a Neglected Figure
57
2
Whitehead as a Neglected Figure of
Twentieth-Century Philosophy
Michel Weber and Anderson Weekes
The world of academic philosophy knows Whitehead as a brilliant but eccentric
figure, outside the intellectual mainstream, whose ideas are not often taken
seriously. Any worthwhile assessment of Whitehead’s intellectual contributions
must have something to say about this state of affairs. But first we should
note that the characterization is not altogether true anymore.
The unexpected developments in physical theory that launched the
twentieth century, because they challenged so much of our “default” metaphysics, invited philosophical exploration from the start, even if the results were
often greeted with skepticism. Like the philosophical ideas of de Broglie,
Bohr, or Heisenberg (and like the more daring ideas of Pauli and Wigner),
Whitehead’s ideas emerged in this early period of skeptically received speculative ferment. Unlike most of his contemporaries, however, what Whitehead
championed was a full reconciliation of physics with common sense (Weekes
2003, 347–365).1 Despite his profound knowledge of mathematical physics,
this deference to naïveté cast him at once as an outsider in an intellectual
world defined by the preeminence of modern physics. But the scene has
changed. Prominent figures in the hard sciences are now actively promoting the rapprochement with humanistic outlooks that an earlier generation
mocked as unscientific.2 This is due in part to a growing sense of urgency,
but in part as well to growing confidence that theoretical models in physics are close to the level of sophistication required to breach the fortress of
the mind and reconcile with naive common sense (Weekes 2003, 366–370).
Attempts to harvest the remarkable developments of twentieth-century physics for insight into traditional philosophical problems such as free will or
the mind-body problem remain highly controversial, but have clearly taken
a quantum leap in respectability since the early 1980s.3 By the same token,
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
57
SP_WEB_Ch02_057-072.indd 57
8/12/09 2:03:27 PM