Abstract
Casuistry, which involves analogical reasoning, is a popular methodological approach in bioethics. The method has its advantages and challenges, which are widely acknowledged. Meta-philosophical reflection on exactly how bioethical casuistry works and how the challenges can be addressed is limited. In this paper we propose a framework for structuring casuistry and analogical reasoning in bioethics. The framework is developed by incorporating theories and insights from the philosophy of science: Mary Hesse’s ideas on horizontal and vertical relations in analogical reasoning in the sciences, Paul Bartha’s articulation model of analogical reasoning and Daniel Steel’s insights on mechanism-based extrapolation in biomedical research. Adopting our framework results in two practical benefits: it sets methodological standards for analogical reasoning and enables us to compare and evaluate diverging lines of analogical reasoning in a systematic way. Adopting the framework also has theoretical benefits: it helps to understand how analogical reasoning can have moral normativity; it pinpoints exactly where moral principles or theories enter analogical reasoning; and it helps to understand why casuistry is an attractive method in bioethics and in applied ethics more generally.
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Notes
We use the term ‘casuistry’ to refer to the whole process, and ‘analogical reasoning’ to refer to certain reasoning steps in the process.
These are, for the purposes of this paper, the most useful theories of analogical reasoning developed within the philosophy of science. In cognitive science and AI, computational theories of analogical reasoning have been developed. The most influential ones are the structure-mapping theory (Gentner 1983) and the constraint-satisfaction model (Holyoak and Thagard 1989). We do not invoke these computational theories because they are less suited for our purposes.
Hesse does not give a detailed explanation of how physical properties of Earth are relevant for the presence of humans. Their causal relevance is mediated by the fact that they (jointly) help to provide supporting factors for life such as a favorable temperature, liquid water, the ozone layer, etc.
If you consider organ donation morally acceptable in the ANI case, additional ethical questions with respect to stillborn infants arise, e.g. whether we have an obligation to try to resuscitate them.
Remember that we use the term ‘casuistry’ to refer to the whole process, and ‘analogical reasoning’ to refer to certain reasoning steps in the process. Our framework structures the process as a whole by means of the first tenet but also the three stages (by means of the three other tenets).
We use the weak term ‘suggest’ (and not e.g. ‘justify or ‘imply’) because the extrapolation is not straightforward, as will become clear soon.
This refers to cognitive functions such as thinking, remembering and speaking but also to purposive movement.
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The authors thank Heidi Mertes and the members of the Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science at Ghent University for their comments on a previous version of this paper
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Weber, E., Wang, Q. The structure of analogical reasoning in bioethics. Med Health Care and Philos 26, 69–84 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-022-10123-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-022-10123-x