Abstract
In this paper, I examine the claim that Rawls’s overlapping consensus is too narrow to allow most mainstream religions’ participation in political discourse. I do so by asking whether religious exclusion is a consequence of belief or action, using conversion as a paradigm case. After concluding that this objection to Rawls is, in fact, defensible, and that the overlapping consensus excludes both religious belief and action, I examine an alternative approach to managing religious pluralism as presented by Adam Smith. I show that Smith’s so-called “marketplace of religions” assumes and encourages religious conversion. I then offer objections to Smith’s approach from Rawls’s point of view, concluding that, while Rawls cannot adequately respond to the Smithian challenge, in the end the two positions are complimentary.
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Notes
I use the following abbreviations throughout this essay: JFR – Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Rawls 2001b), LP - The Laws of Peoples (Rawls 2001c), PL – Political Liberalism (Rawls 1993), PRR – Public Reason Revisited (Rawls 2001a), TMS - The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 1982), TJ – A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971), WN - An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Smith 1976). I retain Adam Smith’s original eighteenth century spelling.
Rawls represents this attitude well by beginning his autobiographical statement about his own religious attitudes with the claim that “my religion is of interest only to me.” Rawls (2009). This sentiment is not generalizable, as is evident by friends, family members, and neighbors deep interest in whether children will become bat mitzvah, for example, or be confirmed. If Rawls’s religion were only of interest to him, there would be no need to publish his autobiographical essay.
Dworkin (1984: p. 64), originally published in Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
Abolitionist arguments are not convincing examples for inclusive views. The American civil war was not an exercise in reason at all. The resolution to the public debate came about only when those holding one opinion killed enough people and destroyed enough property that they were able to force their view upon their opponents.
Peter Steinberger offers Calvinism as a counter example to Rawls’s claim. See: (Steinberger, 2000).
How different Smith and Rawls are is a matter of debate. James W. Buchanan argues that they are more similar than is often allowed (1976). Samuel Fleischacker contrasts great differences (1999: pp. 184-240), and Carolina von Villez offers a more moderated approach, emphasizing methodological similarities and a common reliance on a “reflective equilibrium” (2006).
See: Weinstein (1997), chapter three.
This should not suggest that the impartial spectator is the analogue of the state of nature; Smith rejects the social contract. See: Khalil (1998).
von Villez writes, “Smith proposes a thick notion of partiality that does not even exclude the natural partiality of individuals toward their own person from the judgment situation. Rather, the latter is entered into the impartiality procedure to balance the scales…” (von Villez, p. 123).
I have in mind Nussbaum and Sen’s work on the capabilities approach. Both have written extensively on Smith.
Buchana, p. 3. Rawls remarks that for simplicity sake, the maximin should be considered a monetary rule (TJ 155). He has this in common with Smith. Like all classical economists, Smith’s minimal standard is subsistence level. Rawls economics is not detailed enough for us to know what he is considering when he considers inequality.
Hume does not use the term “natural belief.” It was introduced by Norman Kemp Smith in 1941 (Gaskin, 1993: p. 316).
I am reluctant to endorse a market-based metaphor for all of Adam Smith’s work. In this instance, however, it is useful for emphasizing the competition for adherents that Smith relies upon, and for the non-centralized community-based regulation of fanatical religions. For my opposition to a market-centered interpretation see Adam Smith’s Pluralism (Weinstein, forthcoming) and my review of Jim Otteson’s Adam Smith’s Market Place of Life (Otteson 2002, Weinstein 2004).
Smith was writing before the advent of weapons of mass destruction.
Justice, for Smith, is a negative virtue and can be followed simply by sitting around and do nothing (TMS II.ii.i.9). See also: WN IV.ix.51 and TMS III.6.11.
Rawls implies that witnessing only takes the form of voting, although this would be too narrow a restriction, precluding public discourse and debate. Thus, Rawls can’t possibly mean to suggest such a limitation.
An unacknowledged criticism of conversion is simply that it is rude. Neither Smith nor Rawls acknowledge this, although Smith deals with it by creating public festivals where conversion is expected and therefore polite.
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Weinstein, J.R. Overlapping Consensus or Marketplace of Religions? Rawls and Smith. Philosophia 40, 223–236 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9352-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9352-3