Abstract
Two kinds of considerations are thought to be relevant to the correct response to the discovery of a peer who disagrees with you about some question. The first is general principles pertaining to disagreement. According to the second kind of consideration, a theory about the correct response to peer disagreement must conform to our intuitions about test cases. In this paper, I argue against the assumption that imperfect conformity to our intuitions about test cases must count against a theory about peer disagreement, offer a principled way of (sometimes) shrugging off a theory’s failure to deliver the intuitive verdict, and consider the main extant theories from the new methodological perspective.
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Notes
I am using one of the several ways in which the term ‘peer’ is used in the literature. Nothing hangs on this use.
The term ‘steadfast’ is Christensen’s (2009), and the term ‘conciliatory’ is Elga’s (2010). Following Elga (2007), Christensen (2009), Feldman (2009) and Matheson (2009), I use the term ‘conciliatory’ liberally, to apply to any view that requires us to give non-negligible weight to, and move significantly towards, a disagreeing peer. Kelly (2010) uses the term much more narrowly, to apply only to the Equal Weight view (Feldman 2006, 2007; Christensen 2007; Elga 2007; Cohen 2013), which enjoins us to meet our peer half way. On my (liberal) use, the term ‘steadfast’ applies to views that allow for no change (or hardly any).
Worsnip’s proposal is reminiscent of, but different from Lackey’s. He suggests we break the symmetry by invoking the difference between (2nd-order) assessments of reliability. She invokes, instead, the difference between degrees of objective justification. From a 1st-person perspective, there may be no difference between reliability assessment and justification. It is incoherent for a person to think ‘I am justified in believing p but my belief is unreliable’. But there is certainly a difference between a fact obtaining objectively and a subjective belief, even justified, that it does.
Christensen’s previous self (Christensen 1991, p. 236) was quite willing to violate Independence. According to the “principle of reflection” (van Fraassen 1984), if one knows one is going to believe p at some time in the future, one should believe p now. But Christensen (plausibly) objects, if I think I am going to believe I am the Messiah, it is reasonable for me to put the probability of my actually being the Messiah as very low. Here, there is a disagreement between my present and future selves (who are reasonably assumed to be peers), and I am allowed to assign greater weight to the former without an independent reason.
Independentism can be further developed in different ways. According to one obvious version, equal weight should be given to all the rival positions when there is no undefeated reason for preferring one position to the others that is independent of the very disagreement between the disputants (Machuca 2017).
I am modifying his analysis to fit my example. Christensen is concerned with an example that he calls CAREFUL CHECKING, which is like the ordinary restaurant case except that in it, I compute very carefully and double check. The intuitive verdict in this sort of case, Christensen thinks, is steadfastness. And his analysis is designed to show that Independence can deliver it.
Elsewhere (2014), Christensen suggests that such reasoning cannot be invoked when the disagreement is among groups. I can rule out my being insincere or drunk, and am less confident with respect to my peer. But it is very implausible to suppose that those who disagree with me are more likely than those who agree with me to be insincere or suffering from some form of cognitive malfunctioning. So the knowledge I have about myself is far less weighty here.
Thus, Weinberg, Stich and Nichols (and many other so-called experimental philosophers) are very pessimistic about the current state of analytic philosophy, because of its heavy reliance on intuitions and their pessimistic assessment of their reliability. Alexander et al. (2018) only caution against reliance on particular intuitions and only so long as we are ignorant, as we are now, about the mechanism which generates them.
Here are objections adduced by Bengson (2013). He cites several papers that criticise the inference based on the empirical studies by claiming that they show that those who have Gettier intuitions speak a different idiolect from those who do not; they understand the word ‘know’ in different ways. He also claims, and proponents of the sweeping unreliability claim concede, that intuitions pertaining to paradigmatic cases of the relevant predicates (‘know’, ‘wrong’, e.g.) are stable, and untouched by the empirical studies which purport to show intuitions to be unreliable. I wish to make a different point about the empirical studies on the basis of which Alexander et al (2018) draw a cautionary conclusion about the use of the “case method” with respect to peer disagreement. They report that “people who were presented with scalar questions asking them to make non-comparative evaluations were more likely to give steadfast responses” (2018, p. 2545, my italics). The wording suggests that framing may strengthen tendencies (conciliationism, steadfastness), and this shows that intuitions are not perfectly reliable. With this claim—I agree. Indeed, my aim is to argue that intuitions about test-cases of disagreement may sometimes be dismissed.
Weatherson says (2003, p. 8) that “[m]any people accept that the more obscure or fantastic a counterexample is, the less damaging it is to a theory”. But it is not clear to me whether he endorses their claim.
Elga’s claim also fails as a reconciliation of EW with our intuition. Finding the answer of one’s peer utterly insane is not part of the “circumstances of the disagreement” (Elga 2007, p. 491), akin to one’s peer being drunk. EW does not allow one to rely on any thought once it is assumed that the two parties are equally likely to be right.
I use the terms ‘justified’, ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ interchangeably.
I owe this point to Lior Tsur.
I owe this point to Hagit Benbaji.
For ease of exposition, I am assuming an epistemicist view of vagueness (Williamson 1994), according to which every (relevant) case of a term satisfies a predicate (‘tall’, e.g.) or its negation. But my argument doesn’t depend on this view.
This point also applies to Lackey’s justificationism, which is based on a coarse distinction between cases in which one’s opinion is “very justified”, and cases in which it is not. Here, too, cases that differ to a very small extent may fall on two sides of the line. And it seems more plausible to suppose that the rational degree of steadfastness is proportionate to the degree of one’s justification. But although the graded version of justificationism is more plausible qua normative theory, it, too, will fail in LOTTERY. So we haven’t yet got a plausible theory that perfectly fits our intuitions.
Although my strategy invokes evolutionary considerations, I do not use it to debunk any normative theory. Quite the contrary. I rely on the fact that HEURISTIC approximates the correct normative theory, so that being governed by it is quite truth-conducive.
RR is very simple in its formulation: remain steadfast if your original response to the evidence was correct. But it is the application of RR which is relevant here. And it is not at all simple. RR is a rule whose function is to assess response to peer disagreement, not to guide it.
I owe this objection to Dalia Drai.
Here is a one way (out of several possibilities) of making the idea more precise. Let j(s, e) denote the degree of justification of a stance, s, given a body of evidence, e. The values of j are in the interval (0, 1], a stance having degree of justification 1 just in case it accords with the evidence. (There is no minimal degree of justification.) A stance’s degree of craziness, c(s, e), is defined as 1-j(s, e). The values of c will be in the interval [0, 1). The weight accorded to one’s peer will be 1-c(s, e), i.e., j(s, e).
In fact, the graded modifications of HEURISTIC and justificationism are identical, although HEURISTIC and justificationism are not.
I owe this objection to Dalia Drai.
Made by Yair Levi and an anonymous reviewer.
Dancy (1993) uses the term ‘particularism’ to denote the claim that there are no true general principles in ethics. This is an extreme version of particularism as Chisholm uses the term. One way of starting from particular claims is not to go beyond them (because there is nowhere to go). Dancy’s form of epistemic particularism is irrelevant for my purpose, because I am interested in upholding general principles (about peer disagreement) in the face of contrary particular claims. Of course, if we fail to do this for every general claim, we might end up adopting radical particularism. But this will be a last resort, and not one I will consider here.
Singer seems to be a methodist who allows for particular intuitions being independently (non-inferentially) justified, although they cannot undermine general ones. He says “we search for undeniable fundamental axioms; build up a moral theory from them; and use particular moral judgments as supporting evidence” (1974, p. 517, my italics). The idea seems to be that particular intuitions that clash with general axioms thereby lose their (independent) support. I know of no particularist who allows for general intuitions being independently (non-inferentially) justified (although they cannot undermine particular ones).
Kelly’s position about peer disagreement is inconsistent with his meta-philosophical position. He defends a view (RR) which conflicts with a multiplicity of common sense intuitions.
There is, in addition to positions located in the spectrum engendered by these two extremes, the sceptical possibility, according to which justification is impossible, since an answer to one question requires a prior reply to the other.
For helpful comments, I am grateful to Hagit Benbaji, Dalia Drai, David Kovacs, Yair Levi and an anonymous reviewer for this journal.
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Weintraub, R. Peer disagreement and counter-examples. Philos Stud 177, 1773–1790 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01284-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01284-2