Journal of the History of Philosophy

The Hedonic Protagoras Calculus in the and the Phaedo ROSLYN WEISS PLATOTWICEJUXTAPOSES THE PURSUITof aret~ and the calculation of pleasures and pains: at Prot. 35 lb-358d and Phaedo 68c-69c. In the former passage he has Socrates argue that aret~ is achieved through proper use of the hedonic calculus; in the latter, that use of the hedonic calculus fails to yield genuine aret& The main purposes of this paper are (a) to highlight the differences between the two treatments of the hedonic calculus and (b) to account for these differences. These objectives will be addressed, respectively, in sections 1 and ~. Section 3 will then challenge the idea, vigorously defended by Gosling and Taylor in their important book The Greeks on Pleasure, l that the apparently conflicting views espoused in the Protagora~ and the Phaedo on pleasure and aret~ are in fact perfectly compatible. 1. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROT. 351B--358D AND PHAEDO 68c-69c In both Prot. 351b-358d and Phaedo 68c-69c the activity of measuring pleasures and pains (and in the Phaedo also fears) is evaluated in its relation to the acquisition of aret~. The activity itself is described similarly in both dialogues: in the Protagoras as well as in the Phaedo the agent's goal in applying the hedonic calculus is to emerge with the largest pleasure or largest quantity of pleasure and the smallest pain/fear or smallest quantity of pain/fear (Prot. 355d-357b; 358c-d; Phaedo 69a). Yet whereas the calculus is extolled in the Protagoras and even regarded as one's salvation (o0mlq~a, 356e5, 357a6-7), in the Phaedo it is maligned. The Protagoras's discussion of the hedonic calculus proceeds on the radical hedonistic assumption of the identification of pleasure and the good (354c, 355b). Given this assumption, as Socrates argues, the hedonic calculus will be ' J. C. B. Goslingand C. C. W. Taylor, The Greekson Pleasure(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 198~). [511] 512 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 27:4 OCTOBER x98 9 indispensable to aret~--indeed it will be the sufficient condition for aret~. For if the calculus guarantees maximum excess of pleasure over pain it simultaneously guarantees maximum goodness) In the Phaedo, by contrast, Socrates rejects the hedonistic assumption responsible for the critical importance assigned to the measuring technique in the Protagoras. Not only is calculating pleasures, pains, and fears shunned by the philosopher; it is the very hallmark of the philos6matos, the lover of body. The sheer use of calculation signals the agent's overriding concern with pleasure , a concern which in turn impedes his attainment of true aret~. Interestingly , whereas in the Protagoras failure to achieve aret~is attributed to miscalculation , in the Phaedo it is attributed to calculation per se (69a6-9). Thus far two important differences between the Protagoras's and the Phaedo's accounts of the hedonic calculus have come to light: (1) the Protagoras's account proceeds on a hedonistic assumption rejected by the Phaedo, and (2) whereas the hedonic calculus in the Protagoras is sufficient for aret~ (failure to achieve aret~ is traceable to its misemployment), the hedonic calculus in the Phaedo is a hindrance to aret~ (failure to achieve aret~ is traceable to its very employment). Yet, there are two other differences worthy of note, the first regarding the ordinary man's understanding and practice in relation to pleasure and aret~, the second regarding the role of phron~sis in the acquisition of aret~. In both the Protagoras and the Phaedo the ordinary man recognizes the phenomenon of being mastered or overcome by pleasure. In the Protagoras, since the common man distinguishes between pleasure and good, his explanation for why some who know the best nevertheless act contrary to their knowledge is that they are conquered by pleasure (352d-e, 352e-353a). In the Phaedo, the common man understands o0~q~Qoo~vTI(temperance) as not succumbing to passion and pleasure (68c9, 69al), and as maintaining indifference towards them (6XtytAQc0g~Xetv, 68clo). Yet whereas the Protagoras derides the common man's notion of being overcome by pleasure, calling it ye~.o~ov (absurd) at 355a6, b4, and d l, the Phaedo finds no fault with the ordinary notion of oe)q~oool3v...