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INTRODUCTION: SYMPOSIUM ON *JUSTICE & FOREIGN POLICY*

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Michael Blake has made a number of important contributions to political and legal philosophy, but he is arguably best known for his 2001 article, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy.” In this landmark paper, Blake argues that, because the pervasive coercion of the state is necessary to trigger the egalitarian duties of distributive justice, relative poverty matters morally in the domestic context, but justice requires that we attend only to absolute poverty abroad. In his recent book, *Justice & Foreign Policy*, Blake doubles down on this stark thesis and fleshes out his account of foreign policy with the equally controversial claim that, while liberal states have principled reasons to respect the self-determination of other liberal democracies, they have at most morally relevant practical reasons to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of illiberal and undemocratic regimes. In this symposium, Mathias Risse, Andrea Sangiovanni and Kok-Chor Tan subject these theses to sustained scrutiny before Blake responds to their concerns.

In “On Where We Differ: Sites Versus Grounds of Justice, and Some Other Reflections on Michael Blake’s *Justice and Foreign Policy*,” Mathias Risse compares and contrasts his own views to those of Blake. Risse’s approach to global justice shares more with Blake than most; both authors take for granted the system of states, both believe that compatriots have special duties to one another, and both posit duties of assistance for foreigners. Despite these important points in common, there are sharp differences, differences which lead Risse to contend that Blake’s “preoccupation” with a distinctive feature of the relationship among compatriots leads him to be insufficiently critical of problematic aspects of the international status quo, aspects which Risse’s more pluralistic approach allows us to identify as unjust.

In “Is Coercion a Ground of Distributive Justice?” Andrea Sangiovanni takes aim at Blake’s contention that coercion is necessary to ground distributive justice. Among other things, Sangiovanni objects that Blake’s adoption of a moralized conception of coercion leads to problems, since it entails that neither taxation nor the requirements of criminal law would be coercive unless these laws were substantively unjust. He also argues that Blake’s insistence on each individual’s right to conditions under which autonomy can be exercised may lead to much more cosmopolitan implications than Blake acknowledges.

In “Justice Between Sites of Justice,” Kok-Chor Tan contests Blake’s view that states, and only states, are first-order sites of distributive justice. In particular, Tan questions how Blake can posit a state’s right to rebuff the claims of outsiders without conceding that global institutions define and defend these rights. But if the global institutional order coerces states in this way, it appears as though the coercion which Blake insists generates duties of distributive justice within a state must exist globally, and thus we are not left with the sharp contrast between the relationships among compatriots and the relationships between foreigners for which Blake argues.

In “Agency, Coercion, and Global Justice: A Reply to my Critics,” Blake offers thoughtful responses to several of the foregoing objections. His essay contains three sections. First he replies to charges that he relies upon unwarranted assumptions, in terms of both the values we can take for granted and whether or not we should simply presume the existence of states as they currently exist. Next he responds to Sangiovanni’s contention that coercion is not necessary to ground duties of distributive justice. And finally, Blake explains why he remains reluctant to view global institutions as first-order sites of distributive justice.

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