Summary
Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself.
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Wendel, H.J. Radikaler Konstruktivismus und Konstruktionismus. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 23, 323–352 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801456
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801456