The Origin of the Justification of the Two-Wrongs Argument: A Conjecture

Authors

  • S.K. Wertz

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v20i3.2281

Keywords:

two-wrongs argument, two-wrongs fallacy, justification of a wrong, principle of utility, doctrine of double effect

Abstract

Different analyses of two-wrongs reasoning are presented and provide relief for the Groarke, Tindale, and Fisher analysis which is suggestive of the origin of this type of reasoning in Bentham and Mill. Aquinas's doctrine of double effect is entertained as a possible counterexample (which it is not). Two-wrongs reasoning can be either acceptable (reasonable) or unacceptable, and there are conditions that can be laid down for both situations in discourse. A negative version of the utilitarian principle assists us in understanding two-wrongs reasoning in moral contexts.

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Published

2000-01-01

Issue

Vol. 20 No. 3 (2000)

Section

Notes

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