Abstract
Political liberalism is supposed to be neutral among reasonable comprehensive doctrines, including comprehensive liberalism. Some critics think that it implicitly assumes comprehensive liberalism. I argue that political liberalism has the resources to avoid this charge and chart a path between sectarianism and unprincipled accommodation that allows a range of policy justifications onto the political agenda of a scope that honors the ideal of neutrality.
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Westmoreland, R. Realizing ‘Political’ Neutrality. Law and Philos 30, 541–573 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-011-9102-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-011-9102-5