The Magic Prism: An Essay in the Philosophy of LanguageThe late 20th century saw great movement in the philosophy of language, often critical of the fathers of the subject--Gottlieb Frege and Bertrand Russell--but sometimes supportive of (or even defensive about) the work of the fathers. Howard Wettstein's sympathies lie with the critics. But he says that they have often misconceived their critical project, treating it in ways that are technically focused and that miss the deeper implications of their revolutionary challenge. Wettstein argues that Wittgenstein--a figure with whom the critics of Frege and Russell are typically unsympathetic--laid the foundation for much of what is really revolutionary in this late 20th century movement. The subject itself should be of great interest, since philosophy of language has functioned as a kind of foundation for much of 20th century philosophy. But in fact it remains a subject for specialists, since the ideas are difficult and the mode of presentation is often fairly technical. In this book, Wettstein brings the non-specialist into the conversation (especially in early chapters); he also reconceives the debate in a way that avoids technical formulation. The Magic Prism is intended for professional philosophers, graduate students, and upper division undergraduates. |
Contents
18 | |
Russell and More Frege | 33 |
Revolution in the Philosophy of Language | 60 |
Supplanting Linguistic Cartesianism | 75 |
A Father of the Revolution | 91 |
The Puzzles Informative Identity | 114 |
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abstract acquaintance actor anti-Fregean argue Aristotle asserted bearers Begriffsschrift belief reports Bismarck Cartesian chapter Cicero coherences collateral information conception counterexamples David Kaplan definite descriptions denotation discussion embedded sentence empty names entities epistemic example explain formulate Frege and Russell Frege's puzzle Frege's view Fregean senses Fregean thought function fundamental Hesperus identity sentences indexicals indirect discourse informative identity intuition John Wayne Kaplan and Perry Kripke Kripke's linguistic practice Marion Morrison matter meaning Millian mind modes of presentation name-using practice natural notion object ordinary names perhaps philosophical philosophy of language Phosphorus picture pragmatic predicate problem proper names propositional content purely qualitative puzzle question Quine referential relation remarks representationalism representations rigid designation role Russell's Russellian seems semantic Sense and Reference sense-reference singular propositions singular terms someone sort speak speaker substitution suggest suppose talk theory things tion traditional truth and falsity truth values utterance Walker Percy Wittgenstein words
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Page 27 - But are there not thoughts which are true today but false in six months time? The thought, for example, that the tree there is covered with green leaves, will surely be false in six months time. No, for it is not the same thought at all. The words 'this tree is covered with green leaves' are not sufficient by themselves for the utterance, the time of utterance is involved as well.