Abstract
In a recent set of publications Ballantyne (Can J Philos 41(4):485–503, 2011, Synthese 185(3):319–334, 2012, Synthese 91(7):1391–1407, 2013) argues that luck does not have a significant role in understanding the concept of knowledge. The problem, Ballantyne argues, lies in what is commonly thought to be a necessary condition for luck—a significance or value condition (Pritchard, in Epistemic luck, 2005; Coffman, in Synthese 15(3):385–398, 2007; Lackey, in Austral J Philos 86(2):255–267, 2008, Ballantyne, in Can J Philos 41(4):485–503, 2011). For an event, like forming a true belief, to be lucky then it must be of some significance or value to an agent. Yet, if significance, as it has also been commonly thought, plays a role in determining the degree of luck (Pritchard and Smith, in New Ideas Psychol 22:1–28, 2004; Ballantyne, in Can J Philos 41(4):485–503, 2011), then this leads to a result similar to (but not the same as) an absurd form of pragmatic encroachment. If this problem cannot be avoided, then anti-luck epistemology should be abandoned. However, this paper will argue that with proper considerations about the nature of luck according to at least one theory, no such problem arises.
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Notes
Thanks to Nathan Ballantyne for giving me this example.
Rex’s psychological well being will probably be adversely affected, so in this sense, something bad has happened to him but, in this case at least, it looks as if Rex should prioritize his physical health over his psychological health.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to include this point.
Lack of control accounts of luck hold that an event is lucky for an agent iff that event is significantly beyond that agent’s control and the event is significant for the agent. Modal accounts of luck hold that an event is lucky for an agent iff the event occurs in the actual world but, holding relevant initial conditions fixed, not in nearby possible worlds, and that event is significant for the agent. I discuss further differences between the two accounts of luck in section IV.
Thanks to Duncan Pritchard for this suggestion.
Epistemic factors are truth conducive factors such as evidence and justification.
By learner here, I only mean someone who wants (or is required) to gain more propositional knowledge. The concept of “learner” is undoubtedly more complex and nuanced than this, but so long as we think that knowledge of propositional facts is at least an important component of learning, then the usage here should not be problematic.
This doesn’t mean that the different “significances” cancel each other out or add to one another. Adding and subtracting different kinds of significance is like adding and subtracting apples from oranges. Instead, we should think that depending on how we view the event we have either been lucky or unlucky.
Many will not share this intuition at all. Believing in resultant moral luck depends on some consequentialist leanings. So long as the results of an action bear some role in determining the moral value of an action, then Red will be less morally reprehensible than Blue on the basis that he has actually committed less morally bad action.
“Treated” here should be understood as treated by the value attributor.
This account may be mistakenly understood as a form of value T-monism whereby truth is the sole and fundamental epistemic good (Pritchard 2011). However, this account only requires that truth is an epistemic good, not that it is the sole and fundamental epistemic good.
This may be perfectly compatible with Hazlett’s original definition, in which case this adjustment is just for the sake of clarity.
I take it that if the epistemic aims at or is motivated by truth or cognitive contact with reality, then any mechanism that helps achieve these aims or motivations will be epistemically valuable.
A truth orientated understanding of the epistemic may also be problematic. For example, creativity might be thought of as an epistemic virtue, but it may not be obvious as to how creativity is truth orientated. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
Those in the “knowledge first” camp in epistemology will disagree with this, but as anti-luck epistemology sits in a JTB-plus framework, this assumption should at least be shared with anti-luck epistemologists and its non-knowledge first detractors.
It’s possible that true beliefs have intrinsic or final epistemic value, but I am treading cautiously here.
This argument depends on a commitment to atomism about the content of beliefs such that both the physicist and I have the same belief. Conversely, holists about the content of belief will state that the physicist and I have different beliefs due to the different relationship with our background beliefs. If holism turns out to be correct, then the argument against Ballantyne could effectively be concluded here. If having different levels epistemic significance necessarily requires that the beliefs in question are different, then it would be impossible vary the levels of epistemic significance for the same belief. Ballantyne’s argument would be unable to make the adjustment of significance moves that it requires to reach its conclusion. In other words, shifting our commitments about belief content will not help Ballantyne’s argument. Thanks to Joey Pollock for suggesting that I talk about this.
Epistemic significance is not included in Pritchard’s original account, but I have included it here for the sake of congruity with what has been previously said in this paper.
The relationship between control and responsibility is often discussed in the literature on freewill. For example, see Fisher and Ravizza (1998).
Specifically, veritic or environmental luck, as there are types of epistemic luck that are not knowledge precluding such as evidential epistemic luck.
An issue with understanding modal proximities in this way has been raised by Jonathan Kvanvig (2008a), but I won’t deal with that particular problem here.
Ballantyne makes a similar argument to version (C) in Anti-Luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment and True Belief (2011).
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Whittington, L.J. Luck, knowledge and value. Synthese 193, 1615–1633 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0794-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0794-1