The Power and Value of Philosophical SkepticismHow should we react to philosophical skepticism? Jeffrey P. Whitman answers this question in The Power and Value of Philosophical Skepticism by examining analytic and post-analytic responses to the problem of skepticism concerning our knowledge of the external world. Whitman analyzes skeptical arguments that call into question our ability to obtain empirical knowledge. He tests analytical theories of knowledge (foundationalism, coherentalism, and reliabilism) and the post-analytical responses of Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty against skeptical arguments. Whitman explores the failure of analytic and post-analytic theories and concludes that embracing a theoretical version of philosophical skepticism has advantages over post-analytic responses - both in the realm of philosophical inquiry and in everyday life. |
Contents
Chapter Three Skepticism | 15 |
Chapter Five Nondoxastic Theories of Knowledge | 41 |
Chapter Seven PostAnalytic Solutions to Skepticism | 61 |
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answer antiskeptic appear argue Aristotle assumption basic beliefs BonJour chapter claim to know closure principle cognitive coherence theories common sense conceptual scheme context criteria Davidson Descartes discover doubt dreaming edifying philosophy Empirical Knowledge epistemic justification Ernest Sosa examples external world externalist theory false first-person foundation foundationalism foundationalist foundationalist theory further justification Gadamer hermeneutical Hilary Putnam Hume intellectual virtues J-rules Kant kind language Laurence BonJour merely metajustificatory argument metaphysical realism Mirror of Nature Moore Moore's moral knowledge naturalized epistemology nondoxastic nondoxastic theories Nozick objective truth objective world one's beliefs perceptual beliefs perspective philosophical inquiry philosophical skepticism phronesis Plantinga Pollock possibility practical premise priori problem properly basic propositions putative knower Putnam question Quine Quine's reality realm reason reject Rorty Rorty's seems sensory experience skeptic's argument solutions to skepticism sort Sosa Stroud Structure of Empirical theoretical skepticism theories of knowledge things true belief truisms truth-conducive University Press Wittgenstein