Abstract
It is argued that the common definition of diagnosis as ‘the determination of the nature of a disease’ is misleading. Many diagnoses are not the names of disease entities. This finding reflects the integral relation of the diagnostic task to the rest of clinical reasoning. Diagnosis has no separate goal of its own, in particular it does not have the goal of determining the nature of a disease. Instead, diagnosis contributes to the general goals of clinical medicine. Any attempt to model diagnostic reasoning abstracted from the rest of clinical reasoning will yield an inadequate representation of diagnosis. Such a distortion of medical reasoning will blind us to whatever implications an adequate epistemology of medicine may have for an understanding of the relation between theoretical and practical knowledge in other contexts.
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I wish to thank Edmund Erde for thoughtful and detailed criticism of earlier drafts of this paper.
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Whitbeck, C. What is diagnosis? Some critical reflections. Metamedicine 2, 319–329 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00882078
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00882078