Sameness and Substance RenewedIn this book, which thoroughly revises and greatly expands his classic work Sameness and Substance (1980), David Wiggins retrieves and refurbishes in the light of twentieth-century logic and logical theory certain conceptions of identity, of substance and of persistence through change that philosophy inherits from its past. In this new version, he vindicates the absoluteness, necessity, determinateness and all or nothing character of identity against rival conceptions. He defends a form of essentialism that he calls individuative essentialism, and then a form of realism that he calls conceptualist realism. In a final chapter he advocates a human being-based conception of the identity and individuation of persons, arguing that any satisfactory account of personal memory must make reference to the life of the rememberer himself. This important book will appeal to a wide range of readers in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and analytic philosophy. |
Contents
I | 1 |
III | 4 |
IV | 5 |
V | 7 |
VI | 8 |
VII | 11 |
VIII | 12 |
IX | 14 |
XLIV | 130 |
XLV | 133 |
XLVI | 136 |
XLVII | 139 |
XLVIII | 142 |
XLIX | 144 |
L | 147 |
LI | 148 |
X | 15 |
XI | 18 |
XII | 21 |
XIII | 24 |
XIV | 28 |
XV | 34 |
XVI | 35 |
XVII | 36 |
XVIII | 43 |
XIX | 50 |
XX | 51 |
XXI | 53 |
XXII | 55 |
XXIII | 58 |
XXIV | 61 |
XXV | 63 |
XXVI | 68 |
XXVII | 69 |
XXVIII | 74 |
XXIX | 77 |
XXX | 86 |
XXXI | 91 |
XXXII | 95 |
XXXIII | 102 |
XXXIV | 105 |
XXXV | 107 |
XXXVI | 108 |
XXXVII | 114 |
XXXIX | 118 |
XL | 121 |
XLI | 123 |
XLII | 125 |
XLIII | 126 |
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Common terms and phrases
actual amoeba animal answer appear argument Aristotelian Aristotle artefact Brown Brown-Brownson Brownson Brownson Sole Caesar Chapter Four Chapter Six Chapter Three claim Cleopatra's Needle coincidence conceive conceptualist condition constitutive continuants count D(ii David Wiggins definition depend determinate distinction donkey entity envisage essence exist experience experiential memory footnote Frege Geach given grasp horse human idea iden Identity of Indiscernibles indeterminate Indiscernibles John Doe Leibniz's Law Leibnizian logical Lovibond and Williams matter mean mereological Metaphysics modal namely natural kind necessity normal notion object ontology ordinary P. F. Strawson P. T. Geach Parfit's particular persistence personal identity philosophical possible Preamble principle of activity quasi-memory quasi-remember question Quine Quine's reference remember require semantics sense sentence ship ship of Theseus singling someone sort sortal concept sortal predicate specific substance Suppose Theseus thought tion true truth W. V. Quine